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Abstract 
 
Throughout the centuries interstate wars have been fought over territory to satisfy 
the requirement of states‘ to secure sufficient land and resources to meet the 
lifestyle needs and economic aspirations of their citizens. While in the past, the 
conditions precipitating war were predominantly anthropogenic in their origin, in 
the twenty-first century, wars are increasingly likely to be the consequence of 
worldwide environmental degradation. Two environmental conditions that have 
paralleled humanity‘s unceasing drive for wealth and prosperity are becoming 
significant threats to the security of every state: these threats are global climate 
change and natural resource scarcity. Although these two threats are global in 
stature, their impact will initially influence security interdependencies at the state 
and regional levels.  
 
Regional security complex theory is a methodological attempt to explain why 
traditional – military and political – security interdependencies trigger the 
aggregation of geographically contiguous states into regional groupings defined 
by the social condition of amity or enmity. However, strictures embedded within 
this typology prevent the same methodology from being used to explain 
regionalisation when threats arise from non-traditional sources or the affected 
states lack geographic contiguity. To overcome this methodological impediment, 
this thesis proposes a theoretical enlargement – a ―hybrid‖ theory – which 
combines methodologies drawn from sector security analysis with essential 
elements of ―externalities‖ and ―Shatterbelts‖ drawn from Regional Orders and 
Geopolitics ontologies respectively.    
 
To test the authority of the ―hybrid‖ theory, two futuristic scenarios are composed, 
each representing a possible, even probable, future for the two Polar Regions. 
Each scenario depicts the world in the year 2035, when the human population and 
individual wealth will likely be of a magnitude greater than they are today and 
when the world is also detrimentally affected by an increasingly inclement climate 
and the declining availability of natural resources. Common to both scenarios are 
iii 
 
potential changes to the political world order and the growing worldwide 
influence of emerging great powers in Asia and Latin America. 
In the contemporary Arctic, the future is already being determined by the inimical 
politics of oil. In a scenario where the Arctic region has become progressively less 
sanguine, the ―hybrid‖ theory suggests that antagonisms between Arctic-rim 
countries will forge the establishment of at least one security complex. There will, 
therefore, be a security response to the region-wide competition for resources. As 
the twenty-first century unfolds, the presence in the Arctic of non-Arctic states as 
resource competitors heightens the probability that established security complexes 
will transmute into conflict prone shatterbelts. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty currently prohibits both the commercialisation and 
militarisation of the continent. It is an institutional regime that is not due to be 
reviewed until mid-century. Antarctica is a continent like no other for its legal 
status remains ill-defined and the existing seven territorial claims attract no 
universal endorsement. Given this political environment, the ―hybrid‖ theory 
suggests, that in a world experiencing a severe shortage of resources no security 
complex will form in Antarctica but, instead the region will become a shatterbelt 
or the loci for resource wars. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
lthough the Cold War threat of nuclear conflagration has largely 
receded into history, states have not reaped the much vaunted ‗peace 
dividend‘ so earnestly sought by world leaders two decades ago. 
Indeed, the traditional military and political security threat posed by the Soviet 
Union and its Warsaw Pact cohorts has been replaced by so called ‗non-
traditional‘ security threats such as ethnic rivalry, terrorism, environmental 
degradation, climate change, forced migration and pandemic diseases. Therefore, 
it is of little wonder that globally contemporary human society has become 
increasingly driven with uncertainty and insecurity. Under conditions of 
uncertainty, Gimpl and Dakin have noted the existence of a fundamental paradox 
in human behavior ―the more unpredictable the world becomes the more we seek 
out and rely upon forecasts and predictions to determine what we should do.‖1  
Forecasting, prediction or speculation, for these are interchangeable terms, 
has a seductive quality that human society finds difficult to resist. This is true of 
predictions about future geopolitical events, especially future wars. Such 
predictions range from the cautionary like those of General Sir John Hackett
2
 and 
Alfred Price,
3
 both of whom during the Cold War wrote ‗predictive‘ essays about 
the coming of World War III, to the supernatural such as  Michael Rathford‘s 
interpretation of Nostradamus‘ prophetic quatrains that foretold of a world of 
2008 racked by a global nuclear war.
4
 Yet another seer, the eminent historian 
Niall Ferguson, suggested that a devastating nuclear exchange would signal the 
beginning of the 2007-2011 ―Great Gulf War;‖ a war waged between America 
                                                 
1
 See Gimpl, M. L. and S. R. Dakin, ‗Management and Magic‘, Californian Management Review, 
Fall 1984, p. 125. 
2
 See Hackett, General Sir John, The Third World War: August 1985, New York, Berkeley, 1980. 
3
 See Price, Alfred, Air Battle Central Europe, London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986. This 
predictive essay described a possible air war scenario fought over the flatlands of Northern 
Germany during the non-nuclear phase of a major conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact 
forces between the years 1986 and 1990.  
4
 See Rathford, Michael, ‗The Nostradamus Code: World War III 2008-2012‘, 
http://www.nostradamus.org  (9 January 2008). 
A 
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and Iran.
5
  Even the prestigious British weekly, The Economist, is not beyond 
dabbling in predictions about forthcoming security predicaments; one prediction 
going under the title ―Defence in the 21st Century.‖6 In the post-Cold War world 
predictions are commonly about interstate wars over diminishing natural 
resources that might even force allies to turn against each other.
7
 One prediction 
even went so far as to suggest that the United States will soon need to use its 
military power to curtail other states hegemonic aspirations, an action seen as the 
precursor of coming global warfare.
8
   
Dire predictions are not the sole province of international politics; they are 
equally prevalent in the natural sciences, especially where the overuse of natural 
resources is the topic of discussion. Thomas Malthus (1776-1834), through his 
much derided Malthusian Principle, predicted that since ―[t]he power of 
population is infinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce substance 
for man‖9 humanity‘s misery is assured.‖ According to Malthus, human 
population in the future will founder and collapse if these two unequal powers – 
unchecked human population growth and food production – are not kept equal.10 
Today, as never before, these two powers are diverging to a point where a number 
of states can only support their human population by reaping the ―ghost 
acreage,‖11 that is, by importing food from other countries and/or harvesting food 
from the sea. Natural science predictions are often couched as ‗likelihood‘ 
scenarios; a series of discrete predictions positioned along a probability 
continuum. One end of this continuum is fixed by the most pessimistic, often the 
                                                 
5
 See Ferguson, Niall, ‗Tomorrow, when the war began,‘ Auckland, New Zealand Herald, January 
21, 2006, p. B14. A war between these two protagonists is also foreseen as a probable 
consequence of current United States policy towards Iran by Robert Baer, a former Central 
Intelligence Agency operative who first visited Iran in 1978. See Baer, Robert, The Devil We 
Know: Dealing with the new Iranian superpower, Scribe, Melbourne, 2009. pp. 249-262.     
6
 See Beedham, Brian, ‗Defence in the 21st Century: Meet your unbrave new world‘, The 
Economist, September 5
th
 1992, pp. 3-20. 
7
 For example, see Friedman, George and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan, New 
York, St. Martin‘s Press, 1991. 
8
 See Joffe, Josef, ‗Why the World Still Needs Mr. Big‘, Newsweek Special Issues, December 
2007/February 2008, pp.26-27. 
9
 Malthus, Thomas Robert, An Essay on the Principle of Population, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, 1798, Reprint 1976, p. 71. In 1803, Malthus published his Essay on the Principle 
of Population in which he maintained that unrestrained human population increases in a geometric 
ratio, while food production increases in an arithmetic ratio. Malthus states the obvious when he 
wrote ―[a] slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in 
comparison with the second.‖ Ibid.  
10
 Ibid. 
11
 See Catton, William R JR., ‗Overshoot‘, in Philip Appleman (ed.), Thomas Robert Malthus: An 
Essay on the Principle of Population, Norton, New York, 2004, p. 177. 
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business-as-usual-scenario, while the other end is anchored by the most 
optimistic, and often the author‘s recommended policy option.12 Increasingly, the 
more pessimistic of these scenarios, especially those cataloguing environmental 
degradation, are couched as looming cataclysmic events using terms similar to 
those highlighting the inevitability of a Third World War. Not unrealistically, 
many of these authors foresee environmental degradation as the harbinger of 
human conflict.  
In 2005, Colin Gray, a widely acclaimed author and strategist, went as far as 
to predict that under conditions of abrupt climate change and diminishing natural 
resources, warfare would once again define human life.
13
 More recently (2008), 
five of the West‘s most senior military officers and strategists argued that the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) must be prepared to carry out pre-
emptive nuclear strikes to halt the progress of numerous threats to Western values 
and way of life. Included in this list of threats was climate change and mass 
human migration.
14
  
Despite their obvious failings, predictions appear an attractive exercise, in 
part, because predictions are so rarely checked against subsequent experience. 
Those who make predictions remember only their successes and prefer to forget 
their failures. According to Marguerite Kramer, in international affairs systematic 
efforts to evaluate predictions and to relate success or failure to a particular 
method or intellectual perspective are rare. Sometimes this is no more than an 
unwillingness to compare a forecast with records of events, but more often it is 
the way predictions are made in the first place.
15
 The noted researcher and author 
Michael Crichton, maintains that the complexities inherent within natural and 
social systems makes suspect the very notion that events can be predicted with 
any accuracy.
16
 However, predictions are usually not expressed with sufficient 
                                                 
12
 For a contemporary example, although by no means the only example, see World Wildlife Fund, 
Living Planet Report 2006, Banson, Cambridge, 2006, pp.20-24. 
13
 See Gray, Colin S., Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, Weidenfield & Nicolson, 
London, 2005, p. 396. 
14
 See AAP, ‗Nuclear dawn for the West,‘ New Zealand Herald, January 23, 2008, p. B1. 
15
 See Kramer, Marguerite and Bruce Russett, ‗Images of World Futures‘, Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1984, p. 317. 
16
 See Crichton, Michael, ‗Complexity Theory and Environmental Management,‘ Speech to the 
Washington Centre for Complexity and Public Policy, Washington D.C., November 6, 2005, 
http://www.crichton-official.com/speech-complexity.html  (14 April 2008). 
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precision to enable an independent observer to determine whether or not they 
were actually fulfilled.
17
  
Because of this shortcoming it could be argued that speculation about the 
future, especially in the absence of hard data, only serves to exacerbate an existing 
sense of uncertainty and insecurity. While this is a compelling argument there are 
two worthy counter-arguments. First, as Thérèse Delpech claims, it is simply not 
true to say that nothing is known about the future and in particular the future state 
of international affairs. While it might be difficult to predict in detail world affairs 
for one year let alone for a decade or two hence, it would be an exaggeration to 
say that absolutely nothing is known about the future.
18
 Delpech also argues that it 
would be a mistake to assume that nothing enables us to imagine the future since 
history tells us that the world usually goes in the direction of our thinking.
19
 Thus, 
according to Delpech, by the year 2025 our thinking is unlikely to have advanced 
much beyond today‘s international security issues: global terrorism, continued 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and China‘s role in world affairs.20  
       Secondly, as futurist Alvin Toffler maintains, musing about the future is a 
credible academic discipline for highlighting civilization‘s uncertain destiny. 
Toffler, in his seminal book Future Shock,
21
 acknowledged that no person can 
speak with any precision and certainty about future events.
 
However, Toffler 
makes a pertinent point in maintaining that lack of precision and certainty is no 
excuse for silence. Also of considerable import is his contention that ―[W]here 
‗hard data‘ are available, of course, they ought to be taken into account. But where 
they are lacking, the responsible writer – even the scientist – has both a right and 
an obligation to rely on other kinds of evidence, including impressionistic or 
anecdotal data and the opinions of well-informed people.‖22 When considering the 
future, Toffler is of the opinion that it is more important to be imaginative and 
insightful than to be 100 per cent ‗right‘, and that speculation does not have to be 
‗right‘ to be enormously useful.23 In the fields of climate change and resource 
                                                 
17
 Kramer, op. cit., p. 317. 
18
 See Delpech, Thérése, Savage Century: Back to Barbarism, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington, 2007, p. 82. 
19
 Ibid., p. 83. 
20
 Ibid., p. 84. 
21
  See Toffler, Alvin, Future Shock, Pan books, London, 1970, p. 15. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
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scarcity speculation is rife. Much of this may ultimately be proved wrong but, 
right or wrong such speculation could turn out to be enormously useful in charting 
humanity‘s future. 
Speculation about the likelihood of an adverse event occurring is often 
dismissed as nothing more than an unlikely worst-case scenario espoused by the 
ill-informed. However, given the undeniable seriousness of climate change, Gwyn 
Prins argues for the import into this arena of the Cold War military threat 
assessment tool – worse case analysis.24 Like Prins, Michael Edwards also suggests 
that a direct analogy can be drawn between the case of climate change and nuclear 
war and therefore worst-case analysis is an appropriate analytical tool.
25
 
Furthermore, Prins maintains that ―… military worst-case analysis can be 
extremely powerful in moving from analysis to action. It forces choices and that, in 
addressing the environmental security threat, this is just the sort of forcing we 
require.‖26  Nonetheless, worst-case analysis when applied to climate change is not 
without its failings. Edwards‘ worries that developed countries might use such an 
analysis to coerce the developing world into submitting to a new strand of 
colonialism – ecocolonialism27 – or worse still, it will create a new subset of 
environmental refugees
28
  – ‗climate refugees‘.29 It is not impossible that under a 
worst-case scenario, created to cover the situation of depleted energy resources, to 
                                                 
24
 See Prins, Gwyn and Robbie Stamp, Top Gun and Toxic Whales: The Environment and Global 
Security, Earthscan Publications, London, 1991. p.71.  
25
 See Edwards, Michael J., ‗Climate Change, worst-Case Analysis and Ecocolonialism in the 
Southwest Pacific‘, Pacifica Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1996, p. 78. 
26
 Prins & Stamp, op. cit., p. 71. 
27
 Edwards, op. cit., p. 78. 
28
 Gwyn Prins mentions that a leading authority on the adverse impacts of environmental 
degradation has suggested that degraded environments throughout the world (i.e. those 
environments unable to grow sufficient food due in part to climatic changes) would result in no 
fewer than 65 million environmental refugees by the year 2000. See Prins, Gwyn, ‗A New Focus 
for Security Studies,‘ in Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds.), Strategic Studies in a Changing 
World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Australian National University, Canberra, 
1992, p. 198. This figure will in the future pale into insignificance due to the unrelenting 
advancement of deserts. In the years ahead it has been estimated that desertification will place at 
least 135 million people worldwide at risk of being driven from their lands. See Renner, Michael, 
‗Security Redefined,‘ in Michael Renner, Hilary French and Erik Assadourian (eds.), State of the 
World: Global Security 2005, Earthscan, London, 2005, p. 8. Whilst Andrew Simms of the United 
Kingdom based New Economic Foundation predicts that 50 million people worldwide will be 
displaced by 2010 because of rising sea-levels, desertification, depleted aquifers, weather-induced 
flooding and other serious environmental changes. See West, Larry, ‗Scholars Predict 50 Million 
Environmental Refugees by 2010,‘ About.Com:Environmental Issues, 2007, 
http://environment.about.com/od/globalwarming/a/envirorefugees.htm (20 June 2007). 
29
 See Edwards, Michael J., ‗Security implications of a Worst-Case Scenario of Climate Change in 
the South-west Pacific,‘ Australian Geographer, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 317. 
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foresee whole communities or even nations being forced to move to where a 
semblance of a petroleum economy still functions. Some industry experts call this 
scenario the ―psychological avalanche,‖30 which conceivably would result in a 
flood of ‗oil refugees.‘ 
Barry Buzan also cautions against worst-case scenario thinking since it can 
deny consideration of other alternatives to direct military action as a means of 
resolving security issues.
31
 Michael Renner, using the nomenclature ―livelihood 
insecurity,‖ maintains that pressures on society and people often translate into a 
political dynamic that increases both polarization and radicalization. Worst-case 
outcomes usually arise where grievances are left to fester. Thus, Renner suggests 
that while worst-case outcomes do not necessarily lead to violent conflict they can 
result in lengthy periods of instability and mass suffering that create conditions that 
may jeopardize the basic fabric of communities and states.
32
  
 Despite these concerns, Prins remains emphatic that climate change is one 
environmental problem where worst-case analysis has a direct application since 
there is no intermediate position between the worst-case and best case scenarios.
33
  
Furthermore, Prins,
34
 Edwards,
35
 and to a limited extent Renner,
36
 maintain that 
when predicting worst-case outcomes the only assumptions that can safely be 
made are pessimistic ones. Unfortunately, today‘s society tends to treat 
pessimistic predictions in exactly the same manner as the ancient Trojans treated 
their Goddess Cassandra‘s prophetic visions – they might be true but they are not 
to be believed.  
While this thesis is hopefully visionary and not overly pessimistic, there 
appears little point in discussing any vision other than the worst-case scenario 
                                                 
30
 A ―psychological avalanche‖ would be the likely outcome from a situation where a country 
finds that it can no longer import enough oil because of a spike in price or local supply problems. 
Media hysteria then creates within the public an impression of a looming oil shock and panic 
buying ensues that ultimately degenerating into a global grab for oil. See Sample, Ian, ‗Final 
warning,‘ New Scientist, Vol. 198, No. 2662, 28 June 2008, p. 34.  
31
 See Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, Pearson, Harlow, 1991, p. 140. 
32
 See Renner, Michael, ‗Security Redefined‘, in Michael Renner, Hilary French and Erik 
Assadourian (eds.), State of the World: Global Security 2005, Earthscan, London, 2005, p.5. 
33
 Prins, ‗A New Focus for Security Studies,‘ p. 213. 
34
 Prins, ibid., p. 198.  
35
 Edwards, 1996, op. cit., p. 66, 
36
 Renner, op. cit., p. 6. 
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since given the chosen subject matter, a best-case climate change scenario is 
rapidly moving beyond humanity‘s reach.37  
Since the end of the Cold War many analysts have attempted to broaden and 
deepen the concept of security by redefining the central principle of contemporary 
international relations. Prior to 2001 and the centrality international terrorism 
imposed upon this debate, several authors gained prominence by identifying what, 
in their opinion was security‘s new defining principle. Among these authors were 
Samuel Huntington,
38
 who claimed that global security dynamics could in the 
future be shaped by a ―clash of civilizations‖; Robert Kaplan,39 who depicted a 
world overtaken by human population excesses leading to environmental 
degradation and international anarchy; Thomas Homer-Dixon
40
 and Michael 
Klare,
41
 both of whom foresaw the growing shortage of natural resources as a 
threat to global security.  
The traditional concept of security which evolved over the course of the 
Cold War was viewed as a function of interstate power competition. It took the 
sovereign state as the principal referent (the thing to be made secure) and was 
concerned only with military threats or threats emanating from an ‗enemy‘ state. 
Moreover, security has customarily been considered synonymous with ‗military 
security‘ since in the past most challenges to state sovereignty have come from 
externally initiated state aggression.
42
 
However, the problem in any study of post-Cold War security is that there is 
now no agreement on what constitutes ‗security.‘  Since the end of the Cold War 
the view of security has been increasingly focused on non-traditional security 
                                                 
37
 See United Nations, Confronting Climate Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable, Managing the 
Unavoidable, United Nations Foundation, New York, February 2007, p. XVIII. Also view United 
Nations Environmental programme, Global Environmental Outlook GEO4, United Nations, New 
York, 2007, pp. 395-454. While the World Wildlife Fund maintains that humanity has only five 
years to save the planet from the ravages of climate change – see Amanda Brown, ‗We have five 
years to save the planet: WWF,‘ Auckland, New Zealand Herald, May 16, 2007, p. A13. For a 
report on the consequences of ecosystem degradation see Millennium Assessment Board, 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Synthesis Report, New York, United Nations, March 23, 2005, 
p. 27. 
38
 See Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations, Touchstone, New York, 1997. 
39
 See Kaplan, Robert D., ‗The Coming Anarchy,‘ Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44-75. 
40
 See Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., Environment, Scarcity and Violence, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1999.  
41
 See Klare, Michael T., Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, Metropolitan 
Books, New York, 2001,   
42
 See Rowlands, Ian, ‗The security challenges of global environmental change,‘ Washington 
Quarterly, Winter 1991. 
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threats.
43
 Non-traditional security threats differ from the more traditional ones in 
numerous ways. First, they are not necessarily state centered but stem from factors 
or actors that are sub-state or trans-state in character. Secondly, they have no 
single geographical locus because they are so diffuse, multidimensional and 
multidirectional in make-up. Thirdly, they often cannot be countered by military 
means alone, as their resolution often requires a raft of non-military approaches. 
Finally, they represent a threat to every level of society from the individual to the 
global community. 
Barry Buzan explores this traditional/non-traditional security dichotomy 
from a perspective created by dividing the security genre into five recognisable 
sectors - military, political, societal, economic and ecological.
44
 As all five of 
these security sectors can interact it is often difficult to examine one while at the 
same time excluding an examination of the remaining four. For some the 
environment is not accepted as a threat to national security and, therefore, does 
not warrant the ‗security‘ categorization. In arriving at this stance, however, many 
commentators overlook the fact that the boundary between these five sectors is 
blurred. Thus, environmental threats in many instances can also be classified as 
societal, economic, or even military ones,
45
 and therefore fit into the rubric of 
traditional security.  
Marc Levy and Joseph Nye argue that the environment refers to physical 
and biological systems, as distinct from political, economic and other social 
constructs.
46
 The propensity amongst security commentators to list natural 
resource scarcity, especially of mineral deposits, as an environmental security 
issue is highly problematic since mineral resources do not involve ―biological or 
physical systems characterized either by significant ecological feedbacks or by 
their importance to the sustenance of human life‖.47 Furthermore, Levy and Nye 
are not alone for there is a cohort of scholars who continue to reject any 
suggestion that the environment is a security issue. In their view such an inclusion 
                                                 
43
 See Dokken, Karin, ‗Environment, security and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: is 
environmental security a useful concept?‘ The Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2001, p. 518. 
44
 Buzan, op. cit., pp. 116-133. 
45
 See Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A new Framework for Analysis, 
LynneRienner, Boulder,1998, p. 175.  
46
 See Levy, Marc A., ‗Is the Environment a National Security Issue,‘ International Security, Vol. 
20. No. 2, 1995, pp. 35-62 and Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynne-Jones, ‗International Security 
Studies,‘ International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1988, pp. 5-27. 
47
 Levy, op. cit., p. 39 
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will only serve to weaken, possibly wreck, the foundation upon which the concept 
of national security has been painstakingly built since the inception of the Cold 
War. This viewpoint is completely opposite to that taken by Jessica Tuchman 
Mathews and Richard Ullman
48
 in their respective seminal essays and it is also 
contrary to the views of Homer-Dixon and Klare. These four scholars claim that 
depletion of any form of natural resource is a security issue and one that 
constitutes a major threat to the national security of all states.  Despite this lack of 
unanimity amongst security commentators over the existence of an environment-
security nexus, there is little disunity amongst commentators that biospheric 
issues do represent a national security threat.  
Climate change appears to have reached an ill-defined threshold of 
acceptance as a threat to national security. Indeed, it appears to be accepted as a 
threat of some significance at all levels of analysis, be that at the global, regional, 
state, societal or individual level. Such acceptance raises the question as to 
whether this contemporary biospheric phenomenon
49
 should remain a sub-set of 
the environmental security genre or warrant a distinct category of its own. 
Interestingly, Levy accepts that the biosphere warrants inclusion in the traditional 
security genre, although he remains adamant that the environment per se was not 
a security concern.
50
 While this distinction is an interesting digression, it is one 
that will not be pursued further in this thesis. 
John Mearsheimer doubts that any threat emanating from the degradation of 
the global commons - for that is what the biosphere is - was likely to threaten the 
survival of states, especially powerful states. Therefore, according to 
Mearsheimer, climate change constitutes, at the most, only a second-order 
                                                 
48
 See Ullman, Richard H., ‗Redefining Security,‘ International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1983,     
pp. 129-153 and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, ‗Redefining Security,‘ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62,      
No. 2, 1989, pp. 162-177. 
49
 The term biosphere has been defined by James Lovelock as ―a self-regulating entity with the 
capacity to keep our planet healthy by controlling the chemical and physical environment.‖ While 
this definition is similar to that offered by Levy, neither definition is all-encompassing. This 
definitional restriction resulted in Lovelock coining the term ‗Gaia‘, for Gaia includes the earth‘s 
biosphere, atmosphere, oceans and soils which combine to form a cybernetic system to provide the 
optimal conditions for life on earth. See Bryer, Gary C., Gaia‘s Wager, Rowman & Littlefield, 
Oxford, 2001, pp. xix-xxi.   
50
 Levy, op cit., p. 39. Klare suggests that wars in the twenty-first century will be fought not over 
ideology but over commodities, as states battle to control the dwindling supply of natural 
resources. Under this scenario, Klare posits that interstate wars will not be caused by 
environmental degradation but, environmental degradation will be the inevitable outcome of any 
international scramble for resources and consequently environmental degradation could result in 
further intra-state conflicts.  
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security threat.
51
 This position is vigorously contested by Mark Lacy who 
maintains that Mearsheimer‘s continued advocacy of ―offensive realism‖ has 
blinded him to the rising importance of non-traditional security threats in general 
and climate change specifically.
52
 As a global event, climate change is, according 
to Buzan and his co-authors, comparable to past global events such as the two 
World Wars and the Great Depression - an event that will affect every corner of 
the world to differing degrees.
53
 Given the societal and economic calamity 
wrought by these three twentieth-century events, climate change arguably 
warrants greater status in the security lexicon than that afforded to it by 
Mearsheimer. 
The causal link between climate change and security is often assumed as 
indirect or even tenuous, but evidence does exist that climate change induced 
environmental stresses can metamorphose into national and international security 
threats. This progression has been identified by a number of authors and 
analysts.
54
 Moreover, the idea that climate change induced environmental 
problems could trigger war has not been lost on the United Nations. In 2004, the 
UN convened a ‗global summit‘ to consider the range of possible environmental 
threats to the national security of nation-states and how these might be 
mitigated.
55
  In 2006, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
announced that climate change was likely to be globally catastrophic and a major 
                                                 
51
 See Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, New York, 2001,       
p. 372. 
52
 See Lacy, Mark J., Security and Climate Change: International Relations and the Limits of 
Realism, Routledge, Abingdon, 2005.  
53
 Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, p. 85. 
54
 See Gleick, Peter H., ‗The Implication of Global Climatic Changes for International Security,‘ 
Climatic Change, Vol. 15, 1989, pp.309-325; Homer-Dixon, Thomas, ‗Environmental and 
Demographic Threats to Canadian Security,‘ Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1994, p. 17; 
Edwards, ‗Security Implications of a Worst-case Scenario of Climate Change in the South-west 
Pacific,‘ op. cit., pp. 311-330; Barnett, Jon, ‗Security and Climate Change,‘ Tyndall Centre 
Working Paper No. 7, October 2001; Stripple, Johannes, ‗Climate change as a security issue,‘ in 
Edward A. Page and Michael Redclift (eds.), Human Security and the Environment International 
Comparisons, Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002, pp. 105-127; Shibuya, Eric, ‗Climate Change and Small 
Island States: Environmental security as National Security,‘ in Eric Shibuya and Jim Rolfe (eds.), 
Security in Oceania in the 21
st
 Century, Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Honolulu, 2003, 
pp. 137-150; Lacy, op. cit.; Brown, Oli, Anne Hammill and Robert McLean, ‗Climate change as 
the ‗new‘ security threat: implications for Africa,‘ International Affairs, Vol. 83, No.6, 2007,      
pp. 1141-1154.  
55
 See Associated Press, ‗UN studies environmental catalysts for warfare,‘ The New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland, April 1, 2004, p. B4. 
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precipitator of war and conflict.
56
 More recently, in April 2007, the United 
Nations Security Council held its first ever debate on the likely impact climate 
change would have on global peace and security.
57
 
Prior to these contemporary warnings, Neville Brown suggested that altering 
climatic conditions could wreak a ‗paradigmatic change‘ to the way security is 
viewed, similar to the change in academic thought brought about by the creation 
of nuclear deterrence theory.
58
 Other authors, such as Peter Gleick, consider 
climate change will no more than exacerbate existing security issues rather than 
being a principal cause of conflict. Unlike Brown though, Gleick foresees climate 
change, and the manner in which it may alter access to natural resources in the 
future, as a significant cause of interstate tension that could result in pre-emptive 
military action, especially by a strong state against a weaker, but resource-rich 
neighbour.
59
 If Gleick is correct, then a multilateral solution to the climate 
change/resource scarcity/security nexus appears unlikely.  
Although the link between climate change and security has received 
considerable acceptance there is still no universal acceptance amongst 
climatologists as to whether the Earth‘s climate is actually changing, whether the 
planet is warming rather than cooling,
60
 and if changes are indeed occurring the 
extent to which they are of anthropogenic origin.
61
 Yet, irrespective of the 
climotologist‘s view, public perception is that the climate is indeed changing and 
warming rather than cooling. This view, according to the sceptics, is being driven 
by both the climate change prophets - such as the former United States Vice 
President Al Gore
62
 and distorted presentations of scientific findings by the 
                                                 
56
 See United Nations, ‗Climate change as dangerous as war: U.N. chief Ban,‘ Reuters,                   
3 November 2006, ,http://nz.news.yahoo.com//070301/5/3oe.html (March 2, 2007). 
57
 See United Nations, ‗Security Council holds first-ever debate on impact of climate change on 
peace and security,‘ 27 April 2007, http://www.un.Org/Docs/Scinfo.htm  (4 May 2007). 
58
 See Brown, Neville, ‗Climate, ecology and international security,‘ Survival, Vol. XXXI, No. 6, 
1989, p. 531. 
59
 Gleick, op. cit. 
60
 A prediction that Earth will enter a cooling phase due to a new Solar Minimum around 2040-
2050 has been proposed by Nils-Axel Mörner. See Mörner, Nils-Axel, The Greatest Lie Ever Told, 
JOFO Grafiska A, 2007, p. 15. 
61
 For the view of a climate change disbeliever or sceptic see Akasofu, Syun-Ichi, ‗Storm in a 
Teacup Over Climate Change,‘ Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 170, No. 7, September 2007, 
pp. 27-31. A similar view is expressed by Chris de Freitas in a newspaper article titled ‗Emotion 
clouding underlying science of global warming,‘ New Zealand Herald, Auckland, January 5, 2011, 
p. A11.  
62
 See Al Gore, an inconvenient truth, London, Bloomsbury, 2006, for a counter to the sceptic‘s 
view. 
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media.
63
  Possibly, but not necessarily,
64
 the most independent and authoritative 
source of current knowledge on climate change and its future global impacts is the 
United Nations‘ sponsored Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).  
In the latest of its four assessments (2007) the IPCC has concluded that ―most of 
the observed increase in the globally average temperature since the mid-20
th
 
century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas concentrations.‖65 Although there is often unease over the accuracy of 
forecasts developed through computer generated climate modeling, the IPCC 
concluded that there was sufficient correlation between observed and modeled 
changes to climate to have a high degree of confidence that ―[a]nthropogenic 
warming over the last three decades has had a discernible influence on many 
physical and biological systems. Other effects of … climate change on natural and 
human environments are emerging, although many are difficult to discern due to 
adaptation and non-climatic drivers.‖66 The report catalogues the key impacts of a 
predicted increasing global average temperature change ranging up to five degrees 
Celsius (relative to global mean average temperature for the period 1980-1999).
67
 
It also identifies the effect such changes are likely to inflict on various 
geographical regions from as early as 2020.
68
  
Although the argument over the extent to which anthropogenic forcing is 
responsible for climate change is likely to rage for some time yet, it is an 
argument of no consequence to this thesis. What matters is whether or not climate 
change is occurring. On that point the IPCC, as the recognized global authority, 
has stated categorically that the world is currently in the throes of climate change. 
By accepting the IPCC‘s report this thesis is relieved of having to justify the 
occurrence of climate change. 
The link between resource scarcity and violence has also come in for close 
scrutiny; particularly by the Peace and Conflict Studies Program University of 
                                                 
63
 Akasofu, op. cit., p. 28. 
64
 British researchers who have seen drafts of the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007) 
claim that it was significantly watered down when governments became involved in writing it. For 
additional information see Pearce, Fred, ‗Climate report ‗was watered down,‘, New Scientist,     
Vol. 193, No. 2594, 10 March 2007, p. 10 or online web site www.meridian.org.uk/whats.htm .   
65
 See  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Contributions of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Summary for 
Policymakers, p.9, IPCC Summary Report (2007).pdf  (20 August 2007). 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Ibid., p. 16. 
68
 Ibid., p. 13. 
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Toronto and the American Academy of Arts and Science. Based on the detailed 
analysis of sixteen case studies the program director, Professor Thomas Homer-
Dixon, concluded that during the early part of the twenty-first century the world 
will experience a steady increase in the incidence of violent conflict caused, in 
part, by environmental scarcities.
69
 Homer-Dixon believes that such violence 
would be the probable outcome of deteriorating social effects, such as 
impoverishment and migration, resulting from an unending series of scarcities 
caused by the continuing depletion and degradation of renewable resources such 
as forests, croplands, river water and wild fish stocks.  
While depletion of renewable resources can provide illustrative examples of 
looming environmental catastrophes that humanity might have to grapple with, it 
is the diminishing availability of non-renewable resources that is the central pivot 
of this thesis. As with renewable resources, the global demand for many key 
minerals is growing at an unsustainable rate. According to the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) humankind consumed nearly one-third of the earth‘s available 
natural wealth in the twenty-five years between 1970 and 1995.
70
 This study, 
released in 1998, revealed a significant decline in the availability or quality of 
many critical resources, including freshwater and fossil fuels. This led researchers 
to conclude that humanity will, in the near future, face a significant shortage of 
many vital resources.
71
 As global consumption rises and environmental conditions 
deteriorate –amplified by climate change – the total supply of many resources will 
diminish rapidly and the price of whatever remains will inevitably rise. 
 In some instances scarcities will be ameliorated by exploiting new sources 
of supply, which may well include either or both Polar Regions, or the 
introduction of substitute materials. Some societies with the means to do so will 
simply pay a higher price for whatever they need or desire – as China and India 
are doing currently. However, neither substitute materials nor market forces can 
solve every resource problem and thereby avert all future resource conflicts. As 
Klare points out, some commodities such as water cannot be replaced by another 
substance and nor can many poor societies afford to pay for their resource needs. 
In these circumstances, conflict may arise between states over access to resources, 
                                                 
69
 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, op. cit., p. 4. 
70
 Klare, op.cit.,  p. 18. 
71
 Ibid. 
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and within states over resource entitlements. Furthermore, as prices rise, 
contending groups and political elites in resource wealthy countries will have a 
greater incentive to forcibly seize and retain control of non-renewable resources.
72
  
This conclusion is supported by Arthur Westing, of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
73
 who contends that human society depends for 
its very survival on resources derived from the environment and that warfare, 
being a prominent human activity, was one means by which access to these 
resources was achieved. According to Westing, once natural resources are in short 
supply, either globally or regionally, there is a high probability of the occurrence 
of interstate rivalries, disputes, and wars.  
Whereas contemporary literature generally differentiates natural resources 
into either renewable or non-renewable, Westing categorizes them either as living 
or non-living. This removes, for example, the difficulty of how to categorize fresh 
water; a resource often categorized as either renewable, non-renewable or both. 
Since Westing‘s categorisation appears to be both the simplest and least confusing 
it will be used in this thesis. 
Having established the strength of the climate change–resource scarcity–
security nexus it is necessary to consider further one aspect of security‘s ontology.  
In the absence of an over-arching global authority, societies and states exist in a 
world conditioned by anarchy - a world where violence is likely to be both 
spontaneous and uncontrollable.
74
 Neither realism nor idealism can adequately 
explain every international relations event. For example, neither belief anticipated 
the end of the Cold War nor could either adequately explain the rapid 
disintegration of the Soviet empire.
75
 Whereas both realism and idealism tend to 
focus on material factors such as power or trade, a new theory, constructivism,
76
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74
 See Wendt, Alexander, ‗Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power 
politics,‘ International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, p. 392. 
75
 See Walt, Stephen M., ‗International relations: One World, Many Theories‘, Foreign Policy, 
No. 110, Spring 1998, p. 41. 
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places considerably more emphasis on the impact of ideas. Instead of taking the 
state for granted and assuming that its principal goal is to survive, constructivist 
theory regards the interests and identities of states as highly malleable, the result 
of specific historical processes. Of particular relevance to constructivism is the 
prevailing discourse in society, because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and 
interests and establishes accepted norms of behaviour. Thus, constructivism 
explains the end of the Cold War as being the outcome of former president 
Mikhail Gorbachev‘s transformation of Soviet foreign policy and the 
embracement of new ideas such as ―common security.‖77 Political constructivism 
referenced in this thesis is aligned to the ‗applied‘ theoretical concepts espoused 
by Alexander Wendt
78
 rather than the ‗pure‘ or radical interpretations of the 
reality discourse that underpin Paul Watzlawick‘s book ―The Invented Reality.‖79  
Irrespective of its ontological profile, constructivism, like idealism and 
realism, has now developed numerous strands
80
 with a theme common to all 
strands being the capacity of discourse to shape how political actors define 
themselves and their interests, and thereby modify behaviour. At the level of a 
state the political actors are the governing elite and it is they who seek to modify 
the behaviour of the citizenry. In order to achieve behavioural and attitudinal 
                                                                                                                                     
a set of selfish goals, such as survival and material gain. See Barkin, J. Samuel, ‗Realist 
Constructivism,‘ in Hans J. Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, McCraw Hill, New York, 2005, 
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78
 See Wendt, Alexander, ‗Constructing International Politics,‘ International Security, Vol. 20,   
No. 1, 1995, pp. 71-81. 
79
 See Watzlawick, Paul (ed.), The Invented Reality: How Do We Know What We Believe We 
Know?, W. W. Norton, New York, 1984. 
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changes, the elite not infrequently turn events into security problems
81
 by 
manufacturing threats so that the ―state‖ can claim unto itself special rights. In the 
final analysis these rights are always defined by the state or its representatives. In 
describing the mechanism by which discourse is used to define security, Ole 
Wæver turned to language theory which thus enables ―security‖ to be defined as a 
speech act. Simply put, if the state or the elite can through discourse convince 
their citizenry that a particular issue is a security problem then the issue can be 
securitized and the resources of the state mobilized accordingly. Therefore, 
providing the citizens are convinced that both climate change and resource 
scarcity will deleteriously affect their lives, both have the potential to be 
securitized.  
A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that actors (people 
or states) act towards ‗others‘ on the basis of what the ‗other‘ means to them. 
States act differently towards friends than they do towards enemies, because 
friends do not pose the threat that enemies do. Thus, states construct social 
relationships amongst themselves based on a mutual feeling of amity or enmity. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia provides a contemporary example of such a 
social construction. Kosovo‘s declaration of independence in February 2008, with 
the tacit approval of numerous North Atlantic Treaty Organisation powers, 
created enmity between itself and Serbia over the loss to Serbia of territory, whilst 
simultaneous creating amity with Albania centred on historical kinship ties. While 
amity and enmity among states can be either inter-subjectively or exogenously 
initiated, both amity and enmity exert a strong pressure on states to coalesce into 
security collectives. It is this tendency that underpins Barry Buzan‘s classical 
security complex theory (CSCT) and is the force behind regional security 
complex theory (RSCT).
82
 
Regional security complexes (RSC) are, according to Buzan, clearly defined 
by a durable pattern of amity and enmity in the form of regional or geographically 
                                                 
81
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coherent patterns of security interdependencies.
83
 The particular characteristics of 
a regional security complex are shaped by historical factors such as long-standing 
enmities or cultural linkage to a specific geographical region. Close geographic 
contiguity tends to generate more security interaction than between states located 
at some distance from each other. While the impact of geographical proximity on 
security interaction is most keenly felt in the military, political, societal and 
environmental sectors, this does not preclude a regional security complex from 
including states separated by a significant geophysical barrier or geographic 
distance. The question of geographical contiguity is discussed by Lake and 
Morgan who, unlike Buzan, maintain that close geographical proximity is not 
necessary for a state to be a member of a security complex.
84
  
Security complexes are also discernable by the relative intensity of security 
interdependence amongst states in a complex and the security indifference 
between these states and surrounding states. Furthermore, the intensity of the 
security interdependence is generally decided by the domestic vulnerabilities, the 
nature of state-to-state relations, the level of interaction between a region and 
neighbouring regions, and the role played by great powers in the region.
85
 The 
spread of a great power‘s influence from one security complex into another is the 
prime determinant in the creation of a security supercomplex. In the post-Cold 
War World, East and South Asia together form the Asian supercomplex.
86
  
Not all the world falls within either a regional security complex or a super-
complex. Currently, according to Buzan et al, Greenland is classified under 
security complex theory as an ‗Insulator‘: a region that faces two regional security 
complexes, but is not strong enough to unify both into one.
87
  Under a less 
common classification, Antarctica is described as an ‗unstructured security 
region‘: a region formed when a country fails to display sufficient security 
interdependence with neighbouring states to create the essential structure of a 
regional security complex.
 88
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Classical security complex theory focuses primarily on the state, in which 
political and military sectors are the key elements of analysis. However, as 
previously noted, since the end of the Cold War other security sectors (economic, 
environment and societal) have assumed greater importance in the wider security 
debate. In recognition of this, Buzan and others posit that each of these sectors 
could create their own security complex whose boundaries may coincide with 
classical regional security complexes, may overlay a number of existing security 
complexes or even create one or more entirely new security complexes. It is this 
theoretical development that forms the basis of what has become known as sector 
security complex theory (SSCT).
89
  By using the environmental derivative of 
sector security complex theory as an analytical lens, regions like the Arctic and 
Antarctica could assume a new significance. Climate change and natural resource 
scarcity offer a unique way of examining security interdependence between states 
that leaves possible the creation of entirely new security complexes. Thus, by 
applying an analytical dyad comprising classical security complex theory and 
sector security complex theory a more holistic view of regional security could be 
formed than if the same analysis was undertaken by using either dyadic 
constituent alone. It is possible for a sector security complex (SSC) to not only 
cover countries within a classical security complex, but also countries external to 
that security complex and not currently a member of it. Likewise, it is also 
possible for a sector security complex to include countries from within different 
regional security complexes and for those countries to be geographically distant 
from each other. To describe the latter situation Buzan coined the term ‗security 
constellation.‘90 An example of a climate change induced security constellation is 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).
91
 These micro-states are welded 
together by fear that rising sea levels will inevitably threaten their very existence. 
Thus, in the final analysis, the border of a sector security complex is just another 
artificial construct.  
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Neither the Arctic nor Antarctica warranted more than a scant mention by 
Buzan et al when explaining regional security dynamics in the post-Cold War 
World. This could imply that both regions were considered strategically irrelevant 
and likely to stay that way. However, there exists the possibility that under an 
alternate scenario both regions will be strategically and economically transformed 
to the detriment of their natural environment by the impact of climate change and 
the need to access the non-living resources they might harbour. In this thesis this 
alternate scenario is explored, which consequently might result in the formation of 
two polar sector security complexes — one representing the Arctic and the other 
Antarctica. Each scenario would reshape the contemporary security architecture 
for the ‗Northern Continental Rim States‘ and ‗Southern Oceanic Rim States‘92 
respectively, although a discussion on the manifestation of such reshaping lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis.   
The Arctic is one region increasingly riven with both climatic and resource 
induced security concerns. In the Arctic, climate change is already seen by polar 
states as the harbinger of a new set of security problems centred on territory, 
sovereignty and access to unrecovered mineral resources. Indeed, the question of 
which country has sovereignty over the North Pole has become the central issue in 
a number of increasingly acrid interstate disputes.
93
 Such disputes may well have 
remained submerged amongst a plethora of unresolved political/military issues 
had it not been for an amendment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS).  This amendment enables coastal states under certain 
circumstances to claim sovereignty to the very edge of their maritime continental 
shelf. It was this development that enabled Russia in August 2007 to unilaterally 
declare sovereignty over an extensive area of Arctic seabed; a claim strenuously 
condemned by all other Arctic rim states.
94
 Thus, the Arctic, being a potential 
storehouse of energy and non-energy minerals,
95
 could come to represent an 
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93
 See Huebert, Rob, ‗Canadian Arctic security issues,‘ National Journal, Spring 1999, pp. 203-
229. For a more recent article on security issues bedevilling the Arctic see William Underhill, 
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29, 2005, p. A12. 
94
 See Harrington, Caitlin, ‗Eyeing up the new Arctic,‘ Janes Defence Weekly, Vol. 45, No. 3,     
16 January 2008, p. 24. 
95
 See de Wit, Maarten J., Minerals and Mining in Antarctica: Science and Technology, 
Economics and Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985. 
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extension of existing security complexes, an entirely new sector security complex, 
or even a supercomplex.   
The geographical remoteness and an absence of an indigenous people, along 
with the stability engendered by the Antarctic Treaty regime, is a mark of 
difference between Antarctica and the Arctic. However, the first and third of these 
differences may be nothing more than a transitory illusion. A changing climate 
coupled with exponential population growth and unfettered economic prosperity 
has resulted in both China
96
 and India
97
 being blighted with an acute shortage of 
fresh water. Given that ice harvesting is now technically feasible and an activity 
not covered by the Antarctic Treaty, it is possibly only a matter of time before 
either or both countries turns their attention, along with their economic and 
technical resources, towards exploiting the continent‘s vast store of frozen water. 
By this action an Austral ice-security complex could become established. Should 
other minerals, especially hydrocarbons, be found under the ice in commercial 
quantities then additional sector security complexes could form. 
Although such complexes may be the result of interstate cooperation 
encouraged by a benign global political environment, a more worrying prospect 
for states in close proximity to either pole would be the establishment of a security 
complex driven by enmity. Notwithstanding this alarming prospect one could 
picture an alternate geopolitical development occurring, a worst-case scenario, 
driven not by security interdependence between contiguous polar states, but by 
exogenous belligerent great powers seeking ownership of polar resources. Such a 
development could readily create a ―shatterbelt‖ and hence the very real prospect 
of polar resource wars.  
Deftly put, shatterbelts are described as ―…regions where military rivalries 
between outside great powers tie into local contentions and bring the possibility of 
conflict escalation.‖98 In the Western Hemisphere, for example, the Soviet alliance 
with Cuba that challenged the United States and its Caribbean and Central 
American allies caused a shatterbelt to form in Middle America from 1960 until 
                                                 
96
 See Keyuan, Zou, ‗China‘s Antarctic policy and the Antarctic Treaty System,‘ Ocean 
Development & International Law, Vol. 24, 1993, p. 249, and Ma Jun, China‘s Water Crisis, 
Eastbridge, Norwalk, 2004. 
97
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Interests, and Geopolitics,‘ Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 21, 1990, p. 47. 
98
 See Kelly, Philip, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America, 
University of Texas Press, Austin, 1997, p. vii. 
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the late 1980s.
99
 Although that shatterbelt collapsed with the disintegration of the 
Soviet Empire, the Cuban missile crisis is illustrative of how close great power 
tensions within a shatterbelt came to sparking a nuclear conflagration.        
In this thesis, the Polar Regions will be examined through a new theoretical 
lens derived from a number of essential elements lifted out from several 
acknowledged, but disparate theories. Each of these disparate theories is itself an 
attempt to explain why states coalesce into security regions. The theory 
underpinning the thesis recognizes that while realism still abounds in an anarchic 
world, the political elite employ constructivist techniques to create national 
security issues within this anarchic political environment. Thus, both ideologies 
will become increasingly important in explaining a future which may await the 
Polar Regions.  
The thesis applies the concepts underpinning security complex theory to 
explain how two security dynamics could shape both the Northern and Southern 
Hemispheres over the next twenty-five years. Unlike many predictions, the 
futurist scenarios embedded in this thesis could easily become self-fulfilling 
prophesier for the Arctic by 2035;
100
 the date to which all predictions in this thesis 
are directed.  Moreover, nascent rumblings concerning the need to exploit 
Antarctic resources suggest that the existing governance arrangements for that 
continent are unlikely to continue unchanged beyond the Antarctic Treaty‘s 
review date of 2048.
101
  
Although classical security complex theory has for thirty years provided a 
useful explanation for traditional security relations within and between 
aggregations of states, sector security complex theory has no such heritage to call 
on and nor does there appear to have been any concerted attempt to create one. 
Even the authors of the theory have not applied it in an attempt to explain 
contemporary challenges to international security. Remedying this shortcoming, 
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100
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even in a limited way gives this thesis a unique character. This is a uniqueness 
also derived from the application of a composite (hybrid) theory to explain a not 
improbable future that awaits both the Arctic and Antarctica: two geopolitical 
regions often overlooked in the post-Cold War period by scholars of security 
studies. 
The thesis examines how a combination of climate change and resource 
scarcity could transmogrify both Polar Regions and suggest that any unanticipated 
transformation could provide sufficient impetus for states to disregard their 
current pacific attitude towards these regions. If just one great power should seek 
to absent itself from the existing political provisions that govern either region, 
then in all probability other states will ‗bandwagon‘ around this revisionist power 
so as to avail themselves of the spoils a new policy might afford them. This 
prospect becomes increasingly more likely as the existing rules-based 
international system that has provided the framework for interstate relations is 
itself  being transformed to reflect the wishes and wants of the state and non-state 
actors imposing a new political order upon the world.
102
  
This Introduction serves as an entry point into a thesis structured into three 
individual parts, each with its own theme. Each Part comprises an introductory 
chapter followed by subject chapters and closes with a concluding chapter. A brief 
conclusion – Chapter Sixteen – brings the thesis to a close. Part I, titled – Towards 
a Single Theory – and introduces the aforementioned disparate theories from 
which seven essential variables are drawn into a single ―Hybrid‖ theory. Part II – 
People, Climate and Resources – examines the role a burgeoning global human 
population will have in influencing both the geophysical and geopolitical forces 
that will shape the world during most, if not all, of the twenty-first century with 
special emphasis on the Polar Regions. The final part, Part III – The Thawing of 
Frozen Wealth – describes both the historical and contemporary geophysical and 
geopolitical environments for the Arctic and Antarctica. By interweaving 
information garnered about the past and present, supplemented by conceivable 
future events, the ultimate chapter within this Part discusses a plausible scenario 
capable of explaining the strategic future of the Arctic and Antarctic regions.
                                                 
102
 See National Intelligence Council, ‗Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,‘ United States 
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PART I 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Introduction: Towards a Single Theory 
 
 
ew people would dispute that the end of the Cold War had a profound 
impact on the whole pattern of international security, but even a decade 
into the twenty-first century the actual character of the post-Cold War 
security order still remains hotly contested. Since decolonisation, regional level 
security has become both self-directed and prominent in international politics, 
whilst the ending of the Cold War appears to have accelerated this process.
1
 
Regionalism is a natural corollary to the end of bipolarity and, without 
superpower rivalry intruding obsessively into regions local powers have more 
room to manoeuvre. The result is a new international security structure that is 
more regional than global in character.         
 
Multifarious regionalism  
There has never been any shortage of either authors or ideas on how to divide the 
world into regions. However, no purpose would be served by traversing these 
multifarious permutations of regionalism. Lamentably, political regions are often 
born out of either empirical thought with limited theoretical underpinning or 
scholarly theory that remains shy of empirical validity. A recent example of the 
former is a world divided into two hemispheres – Western and Asian – as 
proposed by Kishore Mahbubani.
2
 This is a world not dissimilar to that proposed 
by ‗core-periphery‘ exponents except with a twist, the juxtaposition of the West 
and Asia — Asia being the ‗core‘ and the West or Western hemisphere the 
periphery. Of the second type one of the more notable theoretical divisions of the 
                                                 
1
 See Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The structure of International Security, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 3. 
2
 See Mahbubani, Kishore, The New Asian Hemisphere: The irresistible Shift of Global Power to 
the East, Pacific Affairs, New York, 2008. In this book the ‗West‘ is defined as the United States, 
Europe and the Anglo-Saxon states of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. By implication the 
remaining states are portrayed as ‗Asia.‘   
F 
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world into regions is the Heartland theory, first proposed by Sir Halford 
MacKinder in 1904, which he later revised in 1943. In his latter publication, 
which is a significant embellishment of the original theory, MacKinder divided 
the world into two diagonal sectors separated by an imaginary girdle-line that 
commences in the scorching Saharan desert of Africa‘s Atlantic coast before 
sweeping eastward across the steppes of Asia to terminate in forest wilderness of 
Canada and upper United States. Inside the girdle‘s northern realm lie the two 
competing geopolitical realms of the continental ―Heartland‖ and ―Midland 
Ocean‖ – Eurasia and Euro-American maritime countries respectively. Outside 
this girdle lie the other great world oceans and all the lands that drain to them.
3
 
Unfortunately, the ideological schism that developed between the two regions 
above the girdle-line after the Second World War gave lie to Mackinder‘s theory 
and his cherished hope that a balance of power in a latitudinal divided world 
would ultimately provide humanity with peace, happiness and freedom.
4
 But as 
political-geographer Saul Cohen has noted, any chance that  MacKinder‘s world 
had of becoming a reality ebbed away on a tide of sweeping changes to global 
economic and social conditions; the spread of advanced military technology and 
an ideology that did not totally embrace either Western capitalism or a Soviet-
style command economy.
5
  
Despite this draw-back, Mackinder‘s original theory continues to attract its 
adherents although its zenith of popularity occurred during the politically 
turbulent years of the 1930s. German geopolitical writers of the Nazi era proposed 
a tripartite division of the world into super regions that acknowledged American, 
European (German) and Japanese hegemony.
6
 Although this division failed to 
materialize as a consequence of the Second World War, contemporary 
geopolitical thinkers have not entirely abandoned such a division but merely 
reconstituted the theory to take account of the contemporary international system. 
These thinkers have distorted MacKinder‘s theory to such an extent that ‗world 
regions‘ are now only worthy of the title ―Trading Blocs.‖ In another 
                                                 
3
 See MacKinder, Sir Halford J., ‗The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,‘ Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 1943, p. 602.  
4
 Ibid., p. 605. 
5
 See Cohen, Saul B., ‗A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium: a developmental approach,‘ 
Political Geography Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1982, p. 224. 
6
 See O‘Loughlin, John and Herman Van Der Wusten, ‗Political Geography of Panregions,‘ 
Geographical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1, January 1990, p. 1. 
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contemporary permutation, Alpo Rusi proposed sub-dividing the world into 
numerous pan-regions centred on present and future great economic powers, for 
example a world pivoted around China, an enlarged European Union, the United 
States, Japan and India.
7
 Yet other theorists believe that globalization portends a 
more restrictive world division of large interdependent hemispheres focused on 
just three economic powers; the United States, European Union and China. Parag 
Khanna recently suggested that given the fortunate geography of these great 
powers their true priority lay in establishing longitudinal self-sufficient pan-
regions extending from the Arctic to Antarctica, thus creating their own 
hemispheres where every state within each hemisphere pays homage to their 
respective hegemon. However, this structure could see the current drive towards 
global economic interdependence falter or even worse, reverse direction, 
hardening competition amongst the pan-regions in manner ―eerily similar to what 
Orwell envisioned in 1984.‖8  
Notwithstanding the Doha trade negotiations championed by the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), many states now prefer to place their economic 
survival on bi-lateral trade agreements that run counter to the notion of centred 
economic pan-regions. Nevertheless, pan-regions can have their origins in politics 
rather than economics. O‘Loughlin‘s defines a pan-region as ―a large functional 
area linking core states to resource peripheries and cutting across latitudinally 
distributed environmental zones.‖9 This definition is obviously comprehensive 
enough to apply to both geo-economics and geopolitics. And in the immediate 
post-Cold War world both political-geographers and political scientists continue 
to speculate about ultimate division of the world given the sudden collapse of bi-
polarism in favour of a uni-polar superpower, the United States. But since the 
future is anything but static, the concerns of yesterday are not necessarily those of 
tomorrow.  Thus, in all likelihood post-Cold War era unilateralism will crumble 
before the forces of multilateralism with no single power being dominant.
10
 This 
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scenario holds the possibility that the contemporary forces driving security 
interdependence might fracture into ―[a] new world disorder.‖11  A disorder that 
would force states to coalesce into a series of security region for optimal 
protection against aggressive tendencies exhibited by other states and other 
security regions.    
 
Creating security regions   
In the lexicon of international relations there are two dominant approaches to 
constituting a region. First is the ‗inside-out‘ approach,12 which attempts to 
delineate regions by the intensity of their cultural [civilization] interaction; a 
methodological approach favoured by Samuel Huntington.
13
 Secondly, the more 
traditional ‗outside-in‘ approach, which focuses on geopolitical or strategic 
landmarks such as mountain ranges, rivers and stretches of water.
14
 Despite the 
primacy of this dyadic approach William Thompson found from a literature 
review there is a lack of consensus amongst theorists as to a theoretical or 
descriptive framework for defining a region.
15
 That being so, expediency would 
suggest that a simple endorsement of Buzan‘s restrictive description of a security 
region would suffice for this thesis, namely ―…that a distinct and significant 
subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they 
have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.‖16  
Although geographical closeness is often taken as a pre-requisite for the 
establishment of a region, proximity has become less important with every new 
development in global transportation and communications.
17
 This finding is of 
particular importance when security considerations are viewed from a descending 
systemic setting – global, regional, national [state] and local – for then regions are 
                                                                                                                                     
United States will have by 2025 forfeit its position as the world‘s sole superpower in favour of 
being one, but only one, of a number of dominant powers.  
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 Carpenter, Ted Galen, ‗The New World Disorder,‘ Foreign Policy, No. 84, Fall 1991, p. 24. 
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 See Neumann, Iver B., ‗A region-building approach to Northern Europe,‘ Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 20, 1994, p. 53. 
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 See Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order, Touchstone, 
New York, 1996, pp.26-27. 
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 Neumann, op. cit., p. 56. 
15
 See Thompson, William R., ‗The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a 
Propositional Inventory,‘ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1973, p. 91. 
16
 See Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear: An agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1991, p.188. 
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no more than a subsystem of the whole (global) system and need not represent a 
geographical region per se. Rather, regional subsystems are more likely to be 
formed through the interactions of national elites than through the physical 
closeness of states themselves. In this sense, it should only be necessary to 
employ the most minimal criteria in determining the boundaries of a security 
region – namely general proximity.18 Lake and Morgan in their theoretical exposé 
titled ―Regional Orders‖ question whether even general proximity is too 
restrictive a criterion, for they consider the United States a legitimate member of 
the European security region.
19
  
This is a view not shared by Buzan and Wæver who claim that in the post-
Cold War world global security can be best understood through the evaluation of 
relative power and mutual relationships within and between clearly defined 
regions. Unlike geo-strategists who argue their case from a geographical and 
power typology, Buzan and Wæver contend that an appropriate theoretical 
structure for analysis is one provided by regional security complex theory 
(RSCT).
20
 This theory distinguishes between system level inter-actions of the 
highest or superpower level, where capabilities enable them to transcend distance, 
and the subsystem level interplay of great powers whose main security 
environment is their immediate region. Accordingly, the process of securitisation 
and hence the depth of security interdependence are more intense between 
countries within a regional security complex than outside of it. This does not deny 
the reality that security complexes may be extensively penetrated by a 
superpower, but acknowledges that regional dynamics retain a considerable 
degree of autonomy from patterns set by a superpower. However, in the closed 
architecture of the international system it is necessary to understand both the 
degree of independence and interaction within and between these two hierarchical 
levels.
21
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Buzan and Wæver readily acknowledge that regional security complex 
theory is a blend of neo-realism and constructivism. From the former rise the 
ideas of bounded territoriality and the distribution of power, but with a regional 
rather than global emphasis. From constructivism, regional security complex 
theory draws heavily upon the securitisation theory first proposed by Ole Wæver 
which concentrates on the social processes through which security issues are 
created. In so doing there is an acceptance that securitisation is influenced by not 
one but a host of factors, many of which are political in origin.  Unlike neo-
realism, constructivism treats the distribution of power among states and the 
patterns of amity and enmity as independent variables. For its advocates, regional 
security complex theory offers a conceptual framework by which to catalogue 
regions according to certain characteristics thus providing a basis for comparative 
studies in regional security. Of equal importance, constructivism offers some 
powers of prediction by narrowing the range of possible futures for each given 
region.
22
   
Although Buzan and Wæver have divided the world into numerous security 
regions a comprehensive explanation of that division is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. While this thesis is reliant upon regional security complex theory to 
provide a typological platform on which to build a ―hybrid‖ theory to explain one 
of many security futures awaiting the Polar Regions, exempt of those states that 
constitute their respective temperate girdle. This thesis is not about restating 
Buzan‘s regional security complex theory per se, but rather an enlargement of its 
theoretical precepts by incorporating appropriate tenets from regional orders 
theory, sector security complex theory, and the theories of geopolitics.  This is 
undertaken in an attempt to gain an insight into the consequences a changing 
world might foist upon the Polar Regions once states begin to squabble over who 
has ‗dibs‘ on these last frontiers of resource wealth. This is in keeping with 
Buzan‘s suggestion that the ―organisation [furthering] of empirical studies‖ is a 
useful purpose for regional security complex theory,
23
 albeit in this thesis a 
modified version of the original theory.  
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The structure of Part II 
The chapters in Part II chart the development of a ―hybrid‖ theory used to explore 
the security future awaiting the Polar Regions. Chapter Three is a shortened 
description of regional security complex theory ending with the identification of 
four essential elements that underpin the concept. The chapter also high-lights 
how the specificity of geographic contiguity provides an inherent impediment to 
using the typology to explain the security situation that does not neatly fit within 
the strict methodological boundaries envisioned by the theory‘s originator. It falls 
to Chapter Four to move the thesis beyond this methodological restriction. This is 
achieved in two ways. First, it takes from regional orders theory the precept that 
great powers can rightfully be a member of a region other than their own and 
secondly, the use of security externalities to describe those political-military 
pressures exerted on states, including great powers, which ‗force‘ them to band 
together as a region security complex. This chapter, like subsequent chapters in 
Part II, endows the thesis with one additional essential element and it is the 
aggregation of these elements into a unique analytical structure that is different 
from those theories from which it evolved. 
Chapter Five moves discussion beyond the classical approach to security 
complex theory by opening the analysis to a wider range of security sectors. The 
chapter explores to what extent regional security patterns are discernable in the 
environmental sector, given that natural resource scarcity is discussed under this 
rubric. What will become evident is that the security dynamics emanating from 
this non-traditional sector can generate significant regional formations or security 
complexes, the borders of which often lack synchronicity with those of traditional 
regional security complexes.  
Political geography lacks resonance within classical security complex 
theory; mentioned but no emphasized except for the post-Soviet and South 
American regional security complexes. Nevertheless, it is the combination of 
politics and geography that commonly determines the attitude and behaviour of 
countries one to another, often forcing the coalescing of states into distinguishable 
security regions. Chapter Six discusses how internecine hostility can readily turn 
regions into ―shatterbelts‖ triggering influences that drive states within these 
regions inextricably towards conflict. 
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Chapter Seven, as the ultimate chapter in this Part, draws seven essential 
elements into a theoretical amalgam to supplements and contextualize those 
theories from which they were drawn so as to build a credible scenario that 
represents the future security environment of the Arctic and Antarctica.  
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Chapter Three  
 
Regional Security Complex Theory 
 
The formation of regions 
To recap, within regional security complex theory, a ‗region‘ means ―that a 
distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states 
whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each 
other.‖1 In part, this subsystem arises from the fact that threats, particularly 
military ones, are felt most strongly when they emanate from a neighbouring state. 
The need to balance a threat usually, but not universally so, results in a clamour 
for increased military capabilities that can exacerbate an already existing security 
dilemma. Should insecurity amongst neighbouring states within a region persist 
then the region as a whole can sink ever deeper into a security dilemma with 
adverse consequences for national, regional and possibly systemic stability.    
Power relations are but one element that defines regional security, for 
relations among states are also determined by patterns of amity and enmity. Amity 
and enmity are emotionally charged terms that have their origins in the universe 
of interpersonal interaction and thus should be used with caution when discussing 
interstate relations.
2
 Relations among states can vary considerably from the 
extreme of total enmity where two belligerents are locked in a fight to the end to 
extreme amity where two or more states drop their guard completely as is the case 
amongst states within today‘s European Union. Outside of these two extremes are 
interstate relationships that are based on neither amity nor enmity because states 
decide to take a neutral position of ―going it alone‖ to avoid entanglement in the 
disputes of others or because they are too weak to affect an outcome at a regional 
or systemic level
3
 - a characteristic displayed by some non-aligned countries. 
Unfortunately for humanity, enmity has shown itself to be particularly durable 
when it acquires an historical character between peoples, as between the Poles and 
Russians or the Japanese and Koreans.  
                                                 
1
 Buzan, Barry, People, States & Fear: An agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-
Cold War Era, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1991, p. 188. 
2
 See Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962, p. 25. 
3
 Ibid., p. 26. 
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Patterns of amity and enmity arise from a variety of issues that are not 
simple derivatives of power distribution. These range from specific and often 
historical incidents such as a disputed border, through ethnically related 
populations, and ideological groupings to age-old links between different 
societies. However, amity and enmity, be it at the interstate or interpersonal level, 
are most often created through social intercourse between the respective parties. 
Whilst both can be enduring neither condition is irreversible depending on the 
goodwill or otherwise of the parties.  
Regional security subsystems reflect the patterns of amity and enmity that 
are substantially confined within a particular geographical area. To differentiate 
respective loci of amity or enmity Buzan coined the term security complex.
4
 This 
term denotes both the character of the attribute that defines the interdependence of 
states – security – and the intensity of this interdependence since it is this 
characteristic that distinguishes a particular region from its neighbours. Therefore, 
security complexes stress the interdependence of rivalry as well as that of shared 
interests.
5
 It is possible for a security complex to exist and function regardless of 
whether or not states involved recognize its existence.
6
 
Identifying the borders that enclose a security complex is no different from 
identifying the borders of any artificially created geographical entity, for they are 
nothing more than a matter of personal judgement. In this instance, judgement 
pivots on a determination of the relative strengths of security interdependence 
among different countries. In some locations these strengths will be very strong as 
between Taiwan and the People‘s Republic of China while in other regions 
relatively weak as between states within the European Union. In regions where 
liberal democracies predominate, interdependence will generally be positive. 
Conversely, if authoritarian states prevail then interdependence will frequently be 
seen as negative.  Interdependence is usually a function of local relationships, but 
should great powers become involved a collective of states can be bound together 
by a common threat. China‘s encroachment into the South China Sea has fused 
together a number of Asian littoral states to face what they perceive a common 
threat.  
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Given that security interdependence is shaped by the strength of amity and 
enmity between states, then security interaction between the same set of states 
will mimic that relationship. A security complex exists whenever a group of states 
are strongly focused on their relationship to the exclusion of security interactions 
with other non-involved neighbours. The boundaries between groups of states are 
usually defined by relative indifference, characterized by benign security 
perceptions and weak interaction.
7
 Strong insecurities link India and Pakistan and 
place them within the same complex, while relatively weak links between 
Pakistan and China suggests the existence of a boundary between two complexes 
– South Asian and East Asian regional security complexes respectively.8  
 
The characteristics of a security complex 
Insecurity among small states is not the deciding factor defining a security 
complex, of greater significance is the palpable fear that is mutually felt between 
two or more ―major‖ states. Unless they are powers with a global reach, such 
states will inevitably be a close neighbour. Closeness does not universally signify 
the presence of a state of enmity for, as with any grouping of states, individual 
counties can find the bonds of amity too strong to break. It is shared common 
values that bind countries of the EU together, and although such bonds are more 
tenuous than the political elite would desire
9
 they are strong enough to overcome 
disintegrative pressures exerted by the internal anarchic dynamics of this 
particular regional subsystem. This is quite unlike previous historical eras when 
European great powers were seduced by anarchic forces created by age-old 
enmities born of hegemonic aspirations. 
Both rhetorically and in practice the global community of states is organized 
into numerous security complexes that mirror the global hierarchy of power. 
Buzan‘s original theory envisaged that the lowest hierarchical level would be 
composed of states whose power does not extend beyond their immediate 
neighbourhood. This lack of power restricts the security dynamic to within a 
group of immediate neighbouring countries. A higher level complex will contain 
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one or more great powers – those states whose force extends beyond their 
immediate environs or those states whose power is great enough to impinge on 
several regions turning them into a vast ―local environment.‖10 Great powers can 
also penetrate adjacent regional security complexes by making security 
alignments with states inside a regional security complex. Such linkage between 
regional and global security patterns is a natural occurrence in an anarchic system 
but one not to be overstated. Normally, patterns of conflict stem from factors 
indigenous to a region and external powers cannot usually define, securitize, 
desecuritize or reorganize a region at will.
11
     
Nevertheless, an analysis of international security cannot be rendered to a 
simple dyad of levels and hence neither can regional security complex theory. In 
their contemporary theoretical opus Buzan and Wæver have synthesized the 
essential elements of a regional security complex (RSC) into four variables:   
    
1. boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours; 
2. anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be 
composed of two or more autonomous units; 
3. polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the 
units; and 
4. social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and 
enmity among the units.
12 
 
 
As with levels of analysis, the type of complexes likely to be formed are not a 
mere dyad of lesser and greater powers, but are multifarious structures differing 
one from another in recognition of the influence exerted on a region by the 
predominant power or powers. In redefining the established regional security 
complex categorisation, Buzan and Wæver have drawn a distinction between 
standard and centred regional security complexes. 
A standard regional security complex is broadly Westphalian in character 
with two or more powers and with a primarily military-political schema. All 
standard regional security complexes are anarchic in structure. Polarity in 
standard regional security complexes is determined by regional powers (e.g., Iran 
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or Saudi Arabia or both in the Persian Gulf given the demise of Iraq as a regional 
power post-2003) and may be uni-, bipolar or even multipolar in character. A 
unipolar standard regional security complex is centred on a single regional power, 
for example, South Africa fulfils that role in the Southern Africa regional security 
complex. A standard regional security complex differs from centred complexes 
because in the former the security dynamic of the region is not dominated by a 
unipolar power at its geographical centre. Amity and enmity will shape the 
structure of a standard regional security complex; it may be a centre of conflict, a 
security regime, or even a security community: a response determined by patterns 
of rivalry, balances, alliances, concerts or friendships. Within standard regional 
security complexes the most important security relationships are those that exist 
between the regional powers since they determine the behaviour patterns of minor 
powers and the prospects for penetration by global powers.
13
  
Centred regional security complexes come in one of three forms. The first 
two of these are special derivations of a unipolar regional security complex in 
which power is centred on either a great power (e.g., Russia in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States) or on a superpower (e.g., the United States 
in North America), instead of a regional power. The expectation in these instances 
is that these powers will dominate their immediate region turning it unipolar in 
character by preventing the rise of another competing regional centre of power, 
such as the Ukraine, or Canada or Mexico respectively.
14
 The third form of 
centred regional security complex is structurally very different involving a region 
put together by an institution rather than by a single power. The European Union 
is one such institution, for it hangs halfway between being a region in the form of 
a highly developed security community and being a great power in its own right 
with pretensions of becoming a superpower. This form creates a problem within 
regional security complex theory methodology since the theory assumed that a 
process of securitisation would occur between actors – which invariably meant 
states – within a region. Notwithstanding this assumption the methodology is 
sufficiently robust to incorporate the development of a security community for 
such institutions are marked by the processes of desecuritisation, where actors 
cease treating each other as a security problem and start acting as friends. States 
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within the EU still compete and feel challenged by each other from time to time, 
but issues are resolved by political means so they don‘t become a question of 
security.
15
 The EU has shown that as an institution it can act as if it was a single 
Westphalian-type state by securitizing threats against its wellbeing, a point 
demonstrated by a common commitment to the ―War on Terror‖ and its military 
involvement in the pacification of the Balkans post the Cold War.   
Regional security complex theory acknowledges that not all regional 
security complexes are entirely homogeneous in character which accounts for the 
presence of subcomplexes or ‗half-levels‘ within a regional level.16 Subcomplexes 
are essentially no different from a regional security complex except that they are 
firmly embedded within a larger complex. However, while they do represent a 
distinctive arrangement of security interdependence they are unable to escape the 
wider patterns that define the regional security complex as a whole. This is true of 
the post-Soviet complex with the Caucasus region forming a subcomplex of two 
parts. North Caucasus is located within the Russian Federation and includes 
among other states Chechnya and Dagestan, while the South Caucasus consists of 
the independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Besides the Russian 
Federation, the Caucasus as a group, are the object of external interest emanating 
from Turkey, Iran and the United States. These two subcomplexes fuse into one 
region most clearly via the border-straddling provinces such as South Ossetia 
(formally in Georgia) and North Ossetia (in Russia).
17
 Subcomplexes are not a 
necessary trait of regional security complexes, but they are not uncommon either, 
especially when the number of states within a complex is large.
18
 
It is also possible for regions not to fit within the category of either a 
standard or centred regional security complex, but to lie somewhere in between. 
These cases arise from having a number of systemic level powers scattered 
throughout the system. The greater the number of systemic powers there are in the 
system the less room there is for standard regional security complexes. This 
scattering of systemic powers creates two possibilities other than centred 
complexes: great power security complexes, and supercomplexes. In the 
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contemporary unipolar world represented by a single superpower and four great 
powers both possibilities are evident in Asia.
19
  
In a great power security complex the polarity of a region is defined by the 
presence of two or more great powers. Historically, this has been the case in 
Europe, but it is now evident in East Asia where China and Japan form the core of 
a great power security complex. These complexes differ from ordinary regional 
security complexes in two ways. First, their dynamic directly affects the global 
balance of power in ways not expected of standard complexes. Certain aspects of 
great power security complexes resemble those of standard complexes, for 
example, with regard to polarity, amity-enmity and boundaries. But because their 
dynamics involve systemic level powers, great power security complexes have 
become a part of today‘s global security dynamic. In the contemporary polarity 
system, or any approximation of it, the existence of a great power security 
complex as a subset of the global polarity equation not only shapes the options 
available to those powers directly involved, but for all other powers throughout 
the system. Where two or more great powers share a complex then the dynamics 
between them, whether amity or enmity, will prove to be a significant influence 
on the global security dynamic. If the great powers are all in centred regional 
security complexes then the regional level does not directly affect how they react 
to each other, however, trouble within a centred complex might weaken the power 
of a major state relative to its peers.
20
 Secondly, actions involving great powers in 
one regional security complex might spillover regional boundaries and affect 
adjacent regions. It is natural for great powers to develop a capability that enables 
them to project their power into an adjacent region and under certain 
circumstances they can be expected to do so. A recent notable example of power 
projection occurred in August 2008 when Russia, acting as guarantor against 
renewed Georgian hegemony over South Ossetia and Abkhazia sent military 
forces across the border to ‗punish‘ Georgia for its clumsy attempt to 
reincorporate these two ‗breakaway‘ regions within the Georgian state proper. 
While Russia‘s action was a revivification of classic great power politics abhorred 
by liberal democracies, in the idiom of regional security complex theory it 
confirmed the maintenance of the status quo by blocking an external 
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transformation of the post-Soviet regional security complex by a combination of 
Euro-American powers.
21
  
Inter-regional interaction can be expected from great powers in the form of 
sustained and substantial security dynamics. Rather than expecting such security 
dynamics to be as weak as are those between members within a standard regional 
security complex they are likely to be strong, reflecting a vigorous relationship 
between like powers. This interaction could spillover into other regions one or 
more of which might be centred on another great power, thus binding these 
separate complexes into a supercomplex with one or more great powers at its core. 
As a consequence, instead of there being three levels (state, regional and global) 
to consider, a fourth level, super-regional, may be added in place of the weak 
inter-regional one. In a supercomplex the inter-regional relationships are strong 
and on-going, but not usually strong enough as to override the regional dynamics 
created within a penetrated complex – as is the case in South Asia where, as of 
2008, the United States has contemporaneous security relationships with both 
Pakistan and India,  but has failed to turn historical enmity into contemporary 
amity. Nonetheless, should inter-regional interactions become sufficiently strong 
enough to override regional dynamics then spillover will subordinate previous 
patterns of regional security dynamics and constituent regional security 
complexes within the supercomplex will undergo external transformation, 
merging to form a new and larger complex.
22
 States within a supercomplex, like 
those in a subcomplex, have no need to be awarded dual membership. 
 
An absence of security complexes  
Regional security complex theory presupposes that the security map of the world 
will be covered by a patchwork of security complexes. However, this is not the 
case. There exists the possibility that some states at the local level do not generate 
a pattern of security interdependence although they are ‗normal‘ in the sense that 
they possess autonomy to make their own policies and have sufficient power 
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capabilities to engage other members of the international system. In consideration 
of this phenomena, there are two conditions under which regional security 
complexes do not, or cannot, form - overlay and unstructured. Buzan and Wæver 
maintain that overlay occurs when: 
 
… great power interests transcend mere penetration, and come to 
dominate a region so heavily that the local patterns of security relations 
virtually cease to operate. It usually results in the long-term stationing of 
great power armed forces in the region, and in the alignment of the local 
states according to the patterns of great power rivalry. The strongest 
examples of overlay are European colonisation of Africa, Asia, and the 
Americas, and the situation of Europe itself during the Cold War when 
the classical European security dynamic was overlaid by superpower 
rivalry. [Nonetheless], [t]he term overlay will not be applied to dynamics 
[within] regions although the pattern in a centred RSC in some ways can 
be seen as analogous because a great (or super) power dominates a 
region. But since it is a power [of] the region, the region has not 
succumbed to extra-regional dynamics and therefore the situation is not 
designated overlay.
23
 
 
Buzan and Wæver consider that David Lake and Patrick Morgan‘s book titled 
―Regional Orders‖ is methodologically close to their own for it takes regional 
security complex theory as its starting point and tries to study specifically 
security-defined regions.
24
 Methodology similarities are also acknowledged by 
Lake and Morgan both of whom are mildly critical of classical security complex 
theory because, in their view, it is a theory still firmly rooted in the Cold War 
period and consequently fails to recognize the security architecture of the post-
Cold War era. For particular criticism, Morgan singles out the concept of 
‗overlay‘ which he suggests was driven by the prospect of global-level conflict 
and the foreign policy concerns of the then superpowers. In the absence of Cold 
War bipolarity and superpower rivalry overlay or the penetration of regions by 
either the Soviet Union [Russia] or the United States is no longer the concern it 
once was and hence should be withdrawn from the argot of regional security 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., p. 62. 
24
 Ibid., p. 78. 
 40 
 
complex theory.
25
 Morgan‘s comments hold credence only with regard to Buzan‘s 
original theory since his later work contains no evidence of overlaid states.   
An unstructured security region is created if either or both of the following 
determinants are present: 
 
…[F]irst, where local states have such low capability that their power 
does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries; and, 
second, where geographical isolation makes interaction difficult (for 
example, islands separated by large expanses of ocean). Either 
condition can result in insufficient generation of security 
interdependence to form the structure of an RSC. Low capability of 
course amplifies the effect of geographical insulators, and high 
capability reduces it. But even for capable actors it makes a difference 
whether one‘s borders are defined by seas (Britain, New Zealand) or 
high mountains (Spain), or by open plains (Poland). Parts of sub-
Saharan Africa and the Pacific after decolonisation illustrate this 
condition.
26
  
 
Whereas overlay in a security region is defined by external powers, an 
unstructured region is defined by a collective of states either too weak in power to 
generate security interdependence at the regional level, by a continent without 
states (Antarctica), or by the vacant space left over when the global map of all 
legitimate security regions has been identified. Unstructured regions are able to 
change into pre-complexes when a set of bilateral security relationships has the 
potential to bind states together into a regional security complex, although such 
bonds are not currently sufficiently numerous enough to achieve that end.
27
 In the 
same way proto-complexes come about when there is sufficient security 
interdependence to delineate and differentiate it from its neighbours, but the 
dynamics within the region are still too weak for the region to be accorded the 
status of a full-fledged regional security complex.
28
   
Map 1, although a simplification of that proposed by Buzan and Wæver, 
reflects the contemporary division of the world into numerous regional security 
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complexes. This thesis will not attempt to explain either the common and unique 
security characteristics of each security complex for this could never be anything 
more than an iteration of Buzan and Wæver. Of greater importance is whether this 
map can be modified to represent an indicative portrait of how the world might be 
regionalized by mid-century. 
 
 
 
Map 1. A simplified map of patterns of regional security post-Cold War. Adapted from 
Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, p. xxvi.  
 
Conjectural methodology  
Regional security complex theory provides not only a framework explaining 
regional security in both its historical and contemporary context it also offers the 
possibility for creation of a series of predictive scenarios. Such analysis must take 
as a given the current structure of the international system and then assess what 
form possible changes might take. As is usual in such analysis, identifying which 
one of a number of probabilities will represent a future situation depends not only 
on the global politics of the time, but more significantly upon the foreign policy 
orientations of the great powers. Scenario analysis inevitably traverses a broad 
range of possibilities and in so doing consideration must be awarded to what 
options for change are likely to present themselves in the future. Accordingly, 
Buzan and Wæver considered the most likely options to be: 
 
 42 
 
An unstructured region has the possibility of becoming an RSC or 
getting overlaid. It is hard to imagine an unstructured region leaping 
straight to integration [EU] without passing through one condition or 
the other. 
A standard RSC can undergo internal or external transformation 
or get overlaid. It is more difficult to imagine it unravelling back to an 
unstructured region, though not impossible (as, for example, if plague 
or environmental disaster greatly weakens all of the units), or moving 
directly to integration. An RSC in security community form has the 
possibility of building itself into a centred RSC, and possibly a new 
actor, by creating institutions. A centred great or superpower RSC, or a 
unipolar standard one, might do the same, probably more coercively, 
by becoming an empire. Conversely, either form could unravel back to 
standard multipolar mode, as happened to the Soviet empire. If an RSC 
contains subcomplexes, then these serve as markers for a possible split 
if the overarching issues tying the subcomplexes together fade away.
 29
 
 
This would not prevent an overlaid security region from being transformed into 
any of the other regional security types depending on the depth and character of 
the changes induced in it by the experience of overlay. 
Countries that are an aggregation of what were once separate states can 
disintegrate, as happened to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and 
Pakistan. If states are large then the most likely outcome is the creation of new 
regional security complexes, but if the actor is small insufficient security 
interdependence will exist for the creation of a complex. While it is unlikely that 
disintegration will result in the creation of an unstructured region, elements of an 
overlay or annexation cannot be discounted.
30
 Such changes can manifest 
themselves in either an internal or external transformation thereby altering the 
dynamics within an regional security complex. 
As with all scenario analyses, predictive regional security complex theory is 
not offered as a means to provide only a single scenario, but to narrow the range 
of relevant scenarios in any specific instant. As a generalisation, a unique set of 
conditions will usually produce one scenario that best represents that situation and 
is worthy of further development, in other words a process of self-reinforcement 
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occurs. At crucial points of historical change, for example the end of the Cold 
War, preconceived restrictions fall away and numerous scenarios become 
possibilities, although ultimately the future will show that most were not 
realistically viable.
31
 Bearing this disclaimer in mind the, Map 3, which contains 
elements of both Maps 1 and 2, is as likely a scenario as any other at reflecting the 
global security environment twenty-five years hence. However, given this lengthy 
timeframe all the scenarios have an equal probability of correctly representing the 
mid-century international order, and thus the final choice is a subjective one.  
 
 
Map 2. A simplified map of patterns of regional security during the Cold War. Adapted 
from Buzan et al., Regions and Powers, op. cit., p. xxv.  
 
Given that this thesis revolves around an attempt to explain the likely security 
implications the future might impose on Polar Regions, it is not proposed to 
discuss plausible mid-century regional security dynamics for regions other than 
the Polar Regions.  
In a divided world, global regionalisation could more closely resemble 
MacKinder‘s geopolitical precepts than Buzan and Wæver‘s post-Cold War 
patterns of regional security complexes, although a combination of the two 
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concepts might best represent future regionalism. Indeed, the resultant theoretical 
product would dovetail neatly with the tenets underpinning Regional Orders.
32
  
 
Map 3. Possible patterning of regional security for the Middle Twenty-First Century. 
 
It is difficult to separate the political/military regional configuration depicted in 
Map 3 from environmental factors such as climate change and natural resources 
depletion as both of these factors are already having a significant impact on 
regional security dynamics. Since the determinative nature of these two 
environmental factors will become apparent in Part III only a very brief 
explanatory comment is warranted at this juncture.  
The security implications of climate and resource wars have recently been 
likened in magnitude to either World War of the twentieth century.
33
 Just one of 
many illustrative but speculative outcomes of these twin threats concerns, yet 
again, the demise of the sovereign state and the consequential rise of warlordism 
within a state fated to become a future great power - Mexico.
34
 Under this 
particular scenario the United States would, as the result of climate chaos and 
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water and food shortages beyond its southern borders, re-establish geographical 
separation by metaphorically creating impenetrable barriers reminiscent of the 
European walled cities of the Middle Ages. The major difference between the two 
‗cities‘ is that the United States would separate itself from Latin America‘s 
climate and resource fed chaos by a moat filled with anti-personnel mines and 
razor wire ‗ramparts‘ patrolled by remote-sensor automatic machine guns.35  
 
Polar regional thumbnails 
By 2050 there exists the possibility that an environmental calamity will have 
overtaken either or both Polar Regions.
36
 A changed security dynamic is a likely 
outcome, but as the character of a security dynamic cannot be quantified in 
advance, it is impossible to accommodate it within the framework of classical 
regional security complex theory. Therefore, before embarking upon a thumbnail 
portrait of the polar regional security complexes there is merit in making some 
general observations about the Polar Regions. 
First, post-World War II decolonisation reduced the prevalence of overlay, a 
characteristic that has totally disappeared with the demise of Cold War 
antagonisms. Thus, the Cold War overlay of Greenland is not a feature in either 
contemporary or predictive scenarios. Suzerainty rather than overlay might be a 
characteristic of the twenty-first century international system. Secondly, 
insulators, those regions that separate regional security complexes one from 
another, e.g. contemporary Greenland, are an unlikely feature of predictive 
scenarios. The numerical decline in the number of insulators in predictive 
scenarios is one of the likely consequences of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO)‘s continued geographical expansion. NATO‘s appetite for eastward 
expansion into the Caucasus region
37
 and Moscow‘s growing influence within the 
Levant
38
 are but two examples of where geopolitics is challenging the existence of 
insulator states and contemporary regions. Finally, unstructured regions will 
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similarly be reduced in both number and extent as a consequence of the increasing 
number of great power security complexes. Besides the Polar Regions, the 
world‘s maritime domains are also becoming fading remnants of what were once 
unstructured regions.  
 
Arctic region 
Like most maps of the world, Buzan and Wæver portray the surface of the world 
as a Mercator‘s projection,39 showing the earth as a rectangle on which the 
northern hemisphere has North America to the left, Europe in the centre and Asia 
on the right. Under this format both the northernmost and southernmost ten to 
twenty degrees of latitude are not shown because it is generally assumed that these 
are places of little interest and the shape and area of what land there is would be 
badly distorted by the projection.
40
 Compounding the geographical distortion 
evident in Buzan and Wæver‘s maps is the failure to identifying the precise 
northern boundaries for any Arctic-rimmed security complex. From a review of 
their maps one might assume that the northernmost border of the three northern 
regional security complexes would be circumscribed by a line that touches the 
northern extremities of Greenland, Franz Josef Land and Ellesmere Island.
41
 
Given that only water and ice extend beyond this demarcation line then the Arctic 
Ocean might, under regional security complex theory, be categorized as an 
unstructured region. Conversely, in the absence of any confirmation to the 
contrary, the northern extent of these regional security complexes might be 
delineated by the outer limit of their respective Exclusive Economic Zones. The 
area beyond this outer territorial boundary might then be categorized as an 
unstructured region.  
Sovereignty over Arctic territory is an increasingly vexed question facing all 
Arctic-rim states as testified by the many contemporary maritime border disputes. 
Such disputes might have been circumvented had states adopted a 1907 proposal 
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by the Canadian Senator, Pascal Poirier to divide the region along the following 
lines:       
A country whose possession today goes up to the Arctic regions, 
will have a right, or should have a right, or has a right to all the 
lands that are to be found in the waters between a line extending 
from its eastern extremity north, and another line extending 
from the western extremity north. All lands between the two 
lines up to the North Pole should belong and do belong to the 
country whose territory abuts up there.
42
 
 
Poirier‘s proposal, while being reminiscent of a pan-region concept favoured by 
geo-politicians, would also have dispelled any doubts over the appropriate 
categorisation of the Arctic within regional security complex theory methodology, 
for an Arctic so divided would become part of the sovereign territory of each 
Arctic-rim state. 
By 2035 the regional security complex theoretical arrangement covering the 
maritime Arctic may or may not have evolved beyond today‘s status quo. If the 
current situation persists, then in the absence of any interstate agreement over the 
division of the maritime Arctic, the region will remain unstructured and open to 
the vagaries of global power politics and national interests. Already the non-
existence of an agreement continues to facilitate serious security challenges for all 
Arctic-rim countries, the direct result of many non-polar states such as China and 
Japan increasing both their interest in and their activities within the area.
43
   
Conversely, if there is a region-wide change in attitude towards the sanctity 
of territorial sovereignty that encourages the endorsement of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in particular Article 76, then the 
peaceful division of the Arctic is achievable. Regrettably, international law may 
not possess sufficient authority to force such a division given that the antagonistic 
politics of hydrocarbons has already stamped its presence on the region. Even 
before there is adequate evidence to conclude that any country of either ‗Western‘ 
or ‗Eastern‘ persuasion is seeking hegemony over the region‘s maritime oil and 
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gas reserves the rhetoric is about a ―new Cold War‖ in the Arctic.44 A division of 
the Arctic Ocean amongst littoral states, no matter how achieved would result in 
the creation of a supercomplex, comprising the United States, European Union 
and Russia. Given existing interstate hostilities enmity rather than amity is the 
likely force that would bind these states into such a complex. 
There is also a third security scenario based on the continuing decline of the 
European Union in terms of absolute power
45
 and a weakened position of the 
United States and Russia relative to Third World rising powers. If these changes 
coincide with any extension to the maritime Exclusive Economic Zone of Arctic-
rim countries becoming an intractable international problem, then the Arctic could 
be penetrated by non-Arctic countries attempting to exploit the region‘s energy 
resources. Evidence exists that this is already occurring as witnessed by China‘s 
unannounced Arctic incursions
46
 and South Korea developing polar capability and 
year-round presence on the Arctic island of Spitsbergen.
47
 Compounding these 
unwelcome foreign incursions is a rise in belligerency between certain Arctic-rim 
states as witnessed by the recent Norwegian-Russian dispute over the Svalbard 
Archipelago.
48
 In a world increasingly bereft of resources, inter- and intra-
regional interest in the Arctic will intensify invariably leading to an increase in 
international tension
49
 which may result in the creation of an entirely new and yet 
unforeseen regional security dynamic. Regional security complex theory would 
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have difficulty accommodating such a new dynamic, especially when the 
principal protagonist states aren‘t contiguous with either each other or the Arctic 
maritime region. Hypothetical validation of such a scenario could be derived from 
the theories of Regional Orders or geopolitics, since neither theory holds 
geographical contiguity as a mandatory premise.  
 
The Antarctic region 
Antarctica‘s strategic options are at the same time similar and different to those of 
the Arctic Ocean region. Similarity occurs because neither region is comprised of 
an individual country or a collective of states, consequently territorial sovereignty 
in both regions remains obscure. Dissimilarity is the result of a significant 
strategic difference between these regions; the contemporary lack of military 
activity in Antarctica due to countries honouring both the ‗spirit‘ and ‗intent‘ of 
the Antarctic Treaty. In contrast to the benign southern polar region, the strategic 
stability of the Arctic has been under constant challenge since the close of World 
War II and although this challenge abated during the initial decade and a half of 
the post-Cold War era, it has resurfaced with a resurgent Russia. 
Buzan and Wæver give scant recognition to the strategic importance of 
Antarctica and fail to acknowledge that interstate violence has visited the region 
on several occasions. However, they do acknowledge that Antarctica could 
potentially become a locus for future conflict especially between Argentina and 
Chile.
50
 This prospect does not require all scenarios to have interstate violence at 
their core, for peace in all probability will continue its rein for as long as the 
Antarctic Treaty remains uncontested.   
The Antarctic Treaty permits the status quo scenario to remain in force until 
mid-century. Under regional security complex theory Antarctica is an 
unstructured region due to its geographical isolation that makes interaction 
between the continent and other global regions difficult. Such isolation has taken 
Antarctica beyond the domain of commercial exploitation into its own unique 
category, that of a frigid open-air scientific laboratory. Hence it is conceivable, 
although unlikely, that prior to the review of the Treaty this situation will be 
consummated by making Antarctica into a world park under the aegis of the 
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United Nations or a special purpose international institution.
 51
 A modification of 
this nature would prevent the creation of a continental state, the rise of a number 
of sovereign states within its continental perimeter or even the division of the 
continent into a provinces governed by existing claimant states. Without one of 
these alternatives becoming established Antarctica will fail to create a security 
dynamic or security environment predisposed to give rise to a regional security 
complex.  
In the contemporary world the establishment of either a single or multiple 
states is unimaginable, while absorption into the territorial framework of existing 
claimant countries is equally as unlikely since neither Argentina nor Chile will 
forego their claim nor accept a condominium as a resolution to their territorial 
dilemma.
52
 This would also leave unresolved the status of the unclaimed sector 
known as Marie Byrd Land. Given the probable existence of hydrocarbon and 
other mineral deposits within this sector a flurry of sovereignty claims would 
ensue if the Treaty should fail, thus making resolution impossible. 
Notwithstanding this assertion, if a new claimant state had global primacy then it 
might prevail over the wishes of the international community as might some 
unique form of international institutional arrangement. If the former alternative 
became reality then a standard regional security complex or a series of pre-
complexes might evolve. However, should the latter alternative triumph then a 
centred institutional regional security complex not dissimilar to the European 
Union could be a likely outcome.  
 A second tenable scenario is one that denies the continuance of the Treaty 
beyond 2048. In the absence of a treaty both Argentina and Chile would 
immediately sue for exclusive recognition of their respective claim to Antarctica 
as a natural extension of their sovereign territory. Neither is likely to give way to 
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the other‘s claim nor to that of the third claimant – Great Britain – whose claim 
predates and overlaps the other two. International recognition of the existing 
seven claims over Antarctic territory is equally as doubtful given that many non-
claimant countries have already established a permanent presence on the 
continent, seemingly in anticipation of sharing in the continent‘s mineral wealth. 
Antarctica would become a landmass without any sovereign states, but a continent 
penetrated by many states. Under this scenario Antarctica would fall outside the 
theoretical strictures of regional security complex theory. 
Currently, a lack of geographical contiguity rather than amity and enmity is 
the crucial determinant that inhibits any prospect of a classical regional security 
complex forming beyond the existing Exclusive Economic Zones in the Arctic 
Ocean and in Antarctica.  Hence both regions are correctly described as 
unstructured. Predictive regional security complex theory provides no theoretical 
typology capable of describing these two regions in 2035, for Buzan and Wæver 
presumably never foresaw their theory being the basis of a regional security 
forecast more than two decades hence. Notwithstanding this restriction, the theory 
does provide a foundation on which other complementary theories can be overlaid 
to provide a companion of useable and useful security theories suitable for 
describing the security future of both Polar Regions.  
Of the three principal tenets of regional security complex theory, amity and 
enmity being human vagaries remain the most permanent and least contentious 
parameter. The remaining two tenets of geographical proximity and primacy of 
the state in international relations
53
are more problematic. At a cursory level the 
first of these two tenets appear to impose a limitation the usefulness of predictive 
regional security complex theory, although its amelioration is the topic of the next 
chapter. As for the remaining tenet, its very nebulousness renders it but a minor 
topic and thus not mentioned in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Regional orders 
 
 Security orders
1
 
Admiral Sir Reginald Custance (RN) reminds readers of his book, A Study of War, 
that ―[t]he underlying assertion is that when armed force is used instead of moral 
suasion security is reached through battle or the threat of battle.‖2 Although 
Custance was known to take his enthusiasm for offensive action to imprudent 
lengths, in truth, he was correct to maintain that any evocation of looming 
violence made by one country against another inevitably heightened the sense of 
insecurity within the recipient country. In spite of a general wisdom so often 
espoused that threats travel more rapidly over shorter rather than longer distances, 
history is replete with examples that show threats to national security do not 
necessarily diminish with distance. The implied threat made by a former United 
States president G. W. Bush against Iran, Iraq and North Korea – the ―Axis of 
Evil‖ – post-September 11, 2001 was as palpable in each of those states as was the 
threat posed by a resurgent China to Vietnam prior to their border war of 1979.  
Indeed, the threat or use of force has always been a part of a great power‘s foreign 
policy.
3
 The principal difference between these two examples is that the ―Axis of 
Evil‖ states are separated from the mainland United States by many time zones, 
while China and Vietnam (sharing a common border) are locked within the same 
time zone. In neither case did geographical contiguity or the lack thereof spare 
either Vietnam or Iraq from invasion by a more powerful and determined 
adversary. 
                                                 
1
 Suggestions have proliferated as to how states can best pursue the management of international 
politics to achieve order and security. Patrick Morgan situates such pursuits along a continuum of 
management structures - ranging in succession from integration, to pluralistic security 
communities, collective security, great-power concerts and, finally, to power restraining power. 
This is a hypothetical ladder up which regional security complexes may climb in pursuit of an 
appropriate security management structure. Europe, for example, has now established the most 
pacific of all regional security orders - integration. See Morgan, Patrick M., ‗Regional Security 
Complexes and Regional Orders,‘ in David A. Lake, and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional 
Orders: Building Security in a New World, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA., 
1997, p. 32. 
2
 The quotation from A Study of War was cited in Gray, Colin S., Modern Strategy, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 90. 
3
 See Engler, Mark, How to rule the world: the coming battle over the global economy, Nation 
Books, New York, 2008, p. 298. 
 53 
Geographical contiguity has also become less important in an era of instant 
communications and rapid mass air transportation and given that these changes 
are of considerable import then they should find expression in any revision of the 
orthodoxy of regional security complex theory. Buzan and Wæver‘s insistence on 
geographical contiguity has become an impediment in the use of regional security 
complex theory to explain future security dynamics of either Polar Region, hence 
a hybrid methodology is required. 
The basis for such a methodological development is provided by David Lake 
and Patrick Morgan through the typology of ―Regional Orders.‖ These authors 
have neatly side-stepped the need to precisely describe a security region by 
adopting, with modifications, Buzan‘s regional security complex as their basic 
unit of analysis. Lake and Morgan also subscribe to the constructivists‘ definition 
that regions are socially created entities that take on meaning and importance 
because states perceive themselves as cohabitating a common area and sharing a 
common future.
4
 With this description to the forefront these authors have 
redefined what constitutes a regional security complex within contemporary 
international politics. To wit, it is: 
 
…a set of states continually affected by one or more security 
externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area. In such 
a complex, the members are so interrelated in terms of their 
security that actions by any member, and significant security-
related developments inside any member, have a major impact on 
the others.
5
   
 
Although, under this definition, geography remains an important binding agent 
that welds states within a nominated region together, geographical proximity is 
not a necessary precondition for membership of a regional security complex.  
Contemporary regional security complexes often have one or more 
dominant members, customarily great powers able to project force over distance, 
but which are not geographically located within the region that is the loci of the 
complex. There is little doubt that the United States belongs to the European 
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security complex, as well as that of the Middle East, although geographically it is 
separated from both. Involvement by the United States in both complexes goes 
beyond mere politico-military penetration. Lake and Morgan have not wavered in 
their belief that contiguity is not a prerequisite for membership of a security 
complex for they maintain: 
 
…geography defines the physical area from which security 
externalities radiate, not the set of states that may be members of 
a regional security complex.
6
  
 
However, geographical contiguity remains a contentious issue for Buzan and 
Wæver, who remain unequivocal in their assertion that geographical proximity is 
central to all applications of regional security complex theory.  
Lake and Morgan do not question the claim that threats to security and acts 
of violence emanate more frequently from neighbouring rather than distant states. 
Nor do they dispute that for most states military strength falls off sharply with 
distance. However, they remain convinced that provision must be made for the 
possibility that ―members of a regional security complex [are] not located in that 
neighbourhood.‖ 7 Such a situation would arise when a distant state (usually a 
great power) has obviously become enmeshed in a web of security relations in 
response to externalities impacting on or emanating from of a geographical region 
of interest, other than its own. The concept of externalities lies behind the ability 
to dispense with geographical membership criteria whenever a discursive factor 
distorts the relationships embedded within a complex. This is a more permanent 
characteristic of a complex than that which arises from temporary penetration by 
a powerful external actor. The question then turns on what characteristics an 
external state needs to exhibit to be considered a member of a distant complex. 
Lake and Morgan posit that an ―outside‖ state becomes an ―inside‖ member 
when: 
 It has the greatest military strength or nearly so; 
 Regularly deploys its military force to an area for many years; 
 Is a party to important alliances within the area; 
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 Participates in most if not all important negotiations about conflict and 
security in an area; 
 Fights in major wars there; 
 And by some member states is seen as the greatest threat they face.8  
 
If these are the deciding criteria for an ―outside‖ state to be accepted as an 
―inside‖ member, then Lake and Morgan are correct in asserting that: 
 
…for detecting the members of any RSC we must use the active 
durable presence of important military forces, major security 
commitments, and profound security involvement over a lengthy 
period (something like two or more decades) to supplement a 
geographical criterion.
9
  
 
Acceptance of the above would suggest that ―[a] regional security complex has a 
geographical location, but this is not necessarily an exact guide to its members.‖10 
Put another way, the geographical area is where security relationships of 
consequence are located, while the members of the complex are those states who 
are deeply enmeshed in those relationships. Thus, each state inside a region will 
see its security interactions influenced by the actions taken by other members 
within a specific geographical location, rather than with states that are not 
participants in those interactions. Hence, membership and geography define a 
regional security complex and accounts for why some ―outside‖ states become 
―insiders‖ while other states remain on the outside. It explains not only why the 
United States is a member of the European security complex, but also why no 
European state is a member of the North American security complex. It also 
explains why the United States is a member of the East Asian security complex, 
but not a member of the South Asian security complex. In the latter case this may 
change if the United States fails to extricate itself in the future from Afghanistan.   
Nevertheless, there is an inherent weakness with this framework. It permits 
any number of security complexes to overlap, vary with issues, events or the 
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perceptions of what are deemed relevant externalities.
11
 Perceptions, as history 
often shows, change very rapidly. Hence identification of a security complex can 
be problematic given that not every actor or analyst‘s situational perception 
necessarily coincides. This weakness has been seized upon by Buzan and Wæver 
to question the theoretical validity underpinning regional orders. 
Assuredly, Buzan and Wæver‘s methodology differs from the economistic 
formulation
12
 favoured by Lake and Morgan. At the centre of this difference lies 
the issue of levels of analysis and whether regional security complex theory is 
weakened by the intermingling of global and regional levels. If this is viewed as 
typologically untenable then the theory underpinning regional orders must fail. In 
contrast, Buzan and Wæver ―insist that regions are defined exclusively [of the 
global level] and that external powers are treated in terms of penetration or 
overlay, not members of the RSC as such.‖13 Under this concept the United States 
during the course of the Cold War overlaid Western Europe and ever since the 
close of World War II has successfully penetrated East Asia, however, in neither 
case has it become a member of the respective regional security complex. In 
making this case, Buzan and Wæver appear to have discarded any semblance of 
logic for surely, after six decades of maintaining a considerable military presence 
in both Europe and East Asia, being the principal guarantor of peace in ―Western‖ 
Europe and having spilled blood in a war on the Korean Peninsula, the United 
States has earned the right to be an ―inside‖ member of both regional security 
complexes. In both of these examples the actions of the United States are a close 
match of the ―insider/outsider‖ criteria identified by Lake and Morgan.     
 
The Malvinas/Falkland Islands conundrum  
Both sets of authors hold strong convictions as to their respective approach to the 
question of contiguity but, having considered both sides to this argument the 
thesis author prefers the pragmatic approach (Lake and Morgan) over the purist 
approach (Buzan and Wæver) as to which states should or should not be included 
in which regional security complex. Notwithstanding this election, the decision by 
Buzan and Wæver to gloss over the unique geopolitical situation of the 
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Malvinas/Falkland Islands weakens their argument. The Malvinas/Falkland 
Islands is an archipelago in the South Atlantic whose sovereignty Islanders have 
sworn to Great Britain but whose ownership is fiercely contested by Argentina. In 
terms of regional security complex theory these islands during the Cold War were 
subsumed within the South American regional security complex but not within the 
Southern Cone subcomplex;
14
 an interesting oversight or intentional exclusion. 
This omission held little consequence until 1982 when the Argentine military, at 
the behest of an unpopular military jŭnta, invaded these islands to correct what the 
Argentineans perceived as an historical injustice. The outcome was war and a 
victory to Great Britain. As a corollary of this war Great Britain turned the 
Falkland Islands into a fortified ―strategic gatekeeper‖ from which it can extend 
its military power, in particular airpower, over the South Atlantic, and the western 
approaches to the Drake Passage and the Antarctic Peninsula.
15
  
Cessation of the Cold War did not significantly alter the patterns of regional 
security
16
 in South America and even today the Malvinas/Falkland Islands remain 
excluded from the Southern Cone subcomplex. What has not remained the same 
after 1982 is the arrival within the region of another great power besides the 
United States, a resurgent Great Britain. Since the 1982 war Great Britain has 
exerted a significant military and political presence in littoral South America, 
primarily below latitude 45˚ south.  
It can be argued that the Malvinas/Falkland Islands represent nothing more 
than a remnant of Britain‘s colonial past; a colony of British immigrants in the 
South Atlantic. If that were the case then this archipelago would, under regional 
security complex theory, be considered nothing more than territorial possession 
overlaid by a European metropolitan power and thus excludable from both the 
Southern Cone subcomplex and the South American regional security complex. It 
is only when a group of states are released from an overlay that alternate security 
dynamics can exert a regional influence that can result in the formation of a 
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security complex.
17
 Such dynamics may not be evident immediately, for as Walter 
Little argues from the Latin American case, a ‗working out‘ period is necessary 
after decolonisation in order for states to sort out relationships. For Latin America 
that period was more than half a century.
18
 Such a lengthy gestation period was 
not afforded to either India or Pakistan, for the South Asian security complex 
sprang into existence nearly fully formed in 1947. For individual states that were 
once colonies, the date of independence marks their transition to membership of a 
security complex.
19
 For example, in the case of Belize, a British colony in Latin 
America since 1776, its inclusion in the Central American  subcomplex and North 
American regional security complex was realized on independence from Great 
Britain in 1981.       
However, Britain‘s presence in the South Atlantic is no mere penetration or 
overlay, for the Falkland Islands are a distant possession of metropolitan power. 
If, as Buzan and Wæver maintain, this island group is an integral member of the 
South American regional security complex, then ipso facto Great Britain must 
also be a member of the same complex. Why the Malvinas/Falkland Islands is not 
a member of the Southern Cone subcomplex given its membership of the South 
American regional security complex is not explained by Buzan and Wæver, 
though that may have more to do with the island group not being a sovereign 
entity in its own right or a province of Argentina than with geographical 
contiguity. There is of course an alternate explanation; that inclusion of the 
islands, given they extend British sovereignty deep into the South Atlantic, would 
turn the Southern Cone subcomplex into a great power regional security complex 
with distant Great Britain at its geopolitical centre.
20
  
There is also an interesting comparison to be drawn between the 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands and the Galapagos Islands. The latter are considered 
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integral to the Andean subcomplex
21
 although they are nearly one thousand 
kilometres west of the South American mainland, while the former are denied 
inclusion within the Southern Cone security subcomplex though they are only half 
that distance from the eastern shore of South America. The only feasible 
explanation for the inclusion of the Galapagos Islands within a subcomplex and 
for the Malvinas/Falkland Islands exclusion is that the former are a possession of 
a South American state (Ecuador) while the latter are not. These unwelcome 
aberrations highlight the frailty of the purist approach central to any classical 
interpretation of regional security complex theory.  
The Malvinas/Falkland Islands example is a testament to the ability great 
powers possess to infiltrate and become an ―inside‖ member of a security complex 
though they share no contiguous border with any member state. Even though 
distance imposes a significant cost on membership - £143 million per year (2007) 
in the case of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands
22
 – it is a cost that has not deterred 
Great Britain from maintaining membership of the South American regional 
security complex. Notwithstanding that costs will increase year-by-year Great 
Britain shows no inclination to turn the Falkland Islands over to the Argentineans. 
Therefore, some exogenous factor must weigh more heavily than membership 
costs with the British Parliament. Although a number of factors may account for 
the attitude adopted within the British Parliament, one factor that should not be 
overlooked is the one expressed in 1740 by Lord Anson: 
 
The Falkland Islands, even in time of peace, might be of great 
consequence to this nation, and in time of war would make us master of 
the seas.
23
    
 
In the future, the need to source resources from Antarctica could easily turn the 
continent from a zone of peace to one of interstate conflict. If that became the 
reality then the state that has sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands 
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along with those islands that comprise the Scotia Arc holds a significant strategic 
advantage over other states, for its military forces could prevent or inhibit the 
transit of belligerent forces through the South Atlantic to the southern continent. 
 
Creating an Antarctic regional security complex  
The twist that the Malvinas/Falkland Islands impose on regional security complex 
theory deepens with acceptance that great powers are capable of becoming an 
―inside‖ member of a distant regional security complex. This manoeuvring 
becomes central in mounting a challenge to the accepted wisdom that only 
sovereign states can coalesce into a regional security complex. Buzan and Wæver 
use particularly interesting nomenclature to describe the political entity
24
 upon 
which regional security complexes are centred:  
 
Within terms of RSCT, RSCs define themselves as structures of the 
international system by the relative intensity of security interdependence 
among a group of units, and security indifference between that set and 
surrounding units.
25
 (Emphasis added)  
 
Hence the pivotal question becomes what are the characteristics of the political 
entity known as a ―unit?‖ Obviously, in accordance with constructivist ontology a 
―unit‖ can assume any characteristics defined by its creator. It is also possible to 
take advantage of Buzan and Wæver‘s lack of preciseness to create a new 
typology that allows for the creation of security complexes by other than 
sovereign states. That typology could then be tested against the tenets of classical 
security complex theory.  
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Buzan and Wæver accept that the Malvinas/Falkland Islands are a member 
of the South American regional security complex even though this archipelago is 
not a state in its own right but a dependency of Great Britain. Therefore, by 
logical extension, any terrain, even territory without an autonomous government 
or centre of power, provided it possesses defined geographical boundaries and can 
provoke an intensity of security interdependence could become a ―unit‖ and 
consequently an ―inside‖ member of an security complex. That a ―unit‖ can 
metamorphose beyond the sovereign state is evidenced by the European Union; a 
multilateral institution at the centre of its own complex.  
Extending regional security complex membership criteria to include political 
entities other than states raises the conceptual possibility that Antarctica could be 
a regional security complex in its own right. This concept is worthy of deeper 
examination by comparing the empirical characteristics of a notional Antarctic 
security complex  with the four variables that represent the essential structure of a 
regional security complex: 
 
 Boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours 
The Southern Ocean clearly differentiates Antarctica from all 
other neighbourhood security complexes. 
 anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be 
composed of two or more autonomous units  
Prior to the advent of the Antarctic Treaty, Antarctica was 
divided into eight segments, seven of which are under claim by 
Western-orientated metropolitan states. (To date no claim over 
Antarctic territory has been withdrawn)   
 Polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the 
units 
The list of claimant countries comprises two great powers – 
France and Great Britain; one middle power – Australia and 
four minor powers – Argentina, Chile, New Zealand and 
Norway.  
 Social construction, which covers the pattern of amity and 
enmity among the units 
In terms of regional security complex theory, Antarctica could 
be seen as a standard RSC divided into two subcomplexes; one 
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covering the Antarctic Peninsula — incorporating the segments 
claimed by Argentina, Chile and Great Britain – bound 
together by a pattern of enmity, while over the remainder of the 
continent the predominant pattern is amity.  
 
Through the use of a Malvinas/Falkland Islands analogy it is possible to create a 
scenario under which Antarctica assumes the character of a continental-sized 
standard regional security complex, not unlike that of either Africa or South 
America. One reason why this has not occurred in the post-Second World War era 
is that local security interdependence ceased once the seven claimant states 
yielded to a political overlay proposed by a much more powerful state – the 
United States – under the guise of the Antarctic Treaty.    
 
Externalities  
The two sets of authors also differ markedly as to whether regional security 
complexes are mutually exclusive or overlapping. As mentioned above, Buzan 
and Wæver take the position that regional security complexes are mutually 
exclusive and distinguished from each other by degrees of relative security 
connectedness or indifference.
26
 Lake and Morgan, through their reliance on 
externalities, have created a methodology under which any number of security 
complexes can overlap when triggered by different causal factors. If externalities 
lie behind the involvement of great powers in distant complexes then an 
understanding of the nature and use of externalities is crucial. 
 ‗Externalities,‘ which is an uncommon term within the security lexicon, is 
as familiar an idiom to economists as is the notion of the ‗market place.‘ The 
market place is a mechanism that facilitates the exchange of goods and services 
for money. Market place transactions identify a monetary amount that a seller is 
offering and a buyer is willing to accept. Both the buyer and the seller are seeking 
‗value for money‘ in their own terms. By definition, the market price ignores the 
externalities in any transaction, namely those costs to other parties that the seller 
need not take into account and the benefits parties other than the buyer can enjoy. 
These are the costs and benefits that exist outside of the transaction and are 
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commonly called the ‗social costs and benefits.‘27  According to Cornes and 
Sandler there is a strong temptation to avoid giving an explicit definition of 
‗externalities‘ for it provides a fertile source of controversy. However, in their 
book they are persuaded to define externalities and does so by deferring to a 
definition developed several decades prior by J. E. Meades:  
 
An external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers an 
appreciable benefit (inflicts appreciable damage) on some person or 
persons who were not fully consenting parties in reaching a decision or 
decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in question.
28
  
 
Lake and Morgan appear to have seized upon Meade‘s non-specificity as to what 
constitutes externalities
29
 as the conduit through which to introduce the concept of 
externalities into the security environment. 
Lake categorizes a regional system as a set of states joined by at least one 
transborder, and affected by an externality that emanates from within a specific 
geographical area. If a local externality poses a real or potential threat to the 
physical safety of persons or governments in other states it produces a regional 
security system. Not all externalities pose a threat to physical security but, where 
they do, they bind a set of states into a regional security complex. Simply put, 
externalities can be either costs (negative externalities) or benefits (positive 
externalities) that do not accrue only to the actor that created them.
30
 This spread 
of externalities from the originating actor or state to adjacent actors or states is 
known as spillover or the neighbourhood effect.
31
 The broadness of interpretation 
as to what constitutes externalities is the feature of Meade‘s essay that enables 
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Lake to maintain that the concept explains the origin of interstate security 
dilemmas.
32
 
The essential point being made by Lake is that states do not receive the full 
cost or benefit when producing either negative or positive security externalities. 
With externalities, the regional or ―social‖ costs or benefits are greater than the 
national costs or benefits. Therefore, each state exhibits a tendency towards 
reducing these greater social costs or capturing greater social benefits through 
interstate co-operation. Nevertheless, it is national returns that guide state policy. 
Individual states will seek to manage their interstate relations up to the point 
where the private marginal cost of one less unit of negative externality or one 
more unit of positive externality is equal to the private marginal benefit of 
obtaining that unit. In the absence of an effective agreement between relevant 
states negative security externalities will be overproduced, since the originating 
state does not bear the full social cost of its actions but does bear the private cost 
of modifying its behaviour. The corollary is also true, for positive security 
externalities will be under produced since states must pay the private cost of 
production for which it does not receive the full social benefit.
33
  
Externality is also a concept found in geopolitics. For political geographers 
where ―everything is related to everything else, but near things are more 
related,‖34 externalities tend to travel more quickly over shorter than longer 
distances. Externalities (variously referred to as neighbourhood effects, third party 
effects or free-rider costs and benefits) pose a problem because of their effect on 
political power structures, the level of equity within a political system, and have a 
propensity to generate conflict within society.
 
For example, implicit within the 
question of equity is the allocation of resources; how should scarce public 
resources be allocated across diverse public ends? In human societies allocation 
problems often engender conflict between actors with diverse preferences, 
especially when such difference cannot be resolved by the current political 
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regime; a situation made more complicated when there is involvement of an 
external actor.
 35
       
David Mares, in an exposition on regional conflict management, has 
catalogued the role security externalities have played in turning Latin America 
into a security complex on three different levels: international, regional and 
domestic. At the international level, the United States is a great power that, 
irrespective of Latin American wishes, identifies Latin America as being within 
its sphere of influence. From its hegemonic position the United States has insisted 
on a unilateral right to ―defend itself‖ in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, 
United States‘ defence interests produce fundamental security externalities for 
each and every Latin American state.
36
 A second externality dates from the 
colonial days: the incidence of disputed territorial borders means that the 
resolution of one border conflict has an impact on the others. While many border 
disputes have been diplomatically or militarily settled, the majority of Latin 
American states still have a territorial dispute with at least one neighbour.
37
 The 
third security externality arises from the highly stratified social structure in Latin 
America and the interconnectedness of their economies. Because states in the 
region are an interlocking community, when there is revolutionary upheaval in 
one state then the elite in the rest of Latin America begin to worry. These worries 
can be exacerbated by a United States willingness to act militarily raising the 
spectre of a domestic conflict becoming internationalized.
38
  
Security externalities display three dimensions that can affect regional 
security. First, they differ in magnitude, in terms of the cost they impose on other 
states. The greater the cost the more likely states will alter their behaviour, 
organizing either to capture positive or mitigate negative effects. Secondly, 
externalities will inevitably affect some states more than others. Intensity may be 
governed by factors like geography, proximity, preference, desire for a certain 
level of security, even technology. Intensity will ultimately determine whether 
states lean towards individual or collective action when solving problems. Finally, 
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states face numerous security externalities. Each externality holds the potential to 
create a new security complex that may or may not cover an aggregation of the 
same states. Thus, there exists a high probability that a state will be a member of a 
number of security complexes brought into existence by an equal number of 
discrete externalities.
39
 As each complex forms it will overlay others to a lesser or 
greater extent, which is an illustration of an overlapping cleavage as defined by 
Cleavage Theory. A basic proposition of the theory of cleavages asserts that if the 
cleavages in society overlap, then conflictual behaviour – violence – at the 
societal [interstate] level is relatively likely. The theory also maintains that if the 
same people [states] hold opposing positions in one dispute after another, then the 
severity of conflicts is likely to increase.
40
   
It is the last of these dimensions that most concerns Buzan and Wæver. They 
see that this approach invariably leads to the unmanageable multiplication of 
issues and hence security complexes, which can only be contained by taking a 
narrow (military) definition of security. Buzan and Wæver also raise the analytical 
difficulty of sifting through each issue to determine the respective composition of 
each security complex.
41
 However, their argument is undermined through an 
acknowledgement that regional security complexes might not always be identical 
in each security sector
42
 i.e. in the military, environmental, economic, societal and 
political sectors. Non-security issues within the environmental, economic and 
societal sectors may or may not metamorphose into  security externalities. If they 
should do so, then any resulting security complex may not be conterminous with 
any existing politico-military security complex.
43
 In the next chapter this caution 
will be shown to hold true, but it is also a reality in contemporary security 
architecture. Finally, in terms of prediction, Buzan and Wæver believe that the 
‗exclusive‘ approach inherent in classical regional security complex theory holds 
advantages over regional orders because it creates a comprehensive picture of the 
world‘s regional security complexes, including their borders and insulator states.44 
However, in an increasingly interrelated world where security complexes might 
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form in a number of sectors maintaining the intrinsic clarity of the purist approach 
appears impossible.  
 
Intervention by great powers 
The methodology required to expand the essential composition of regional 
security complex theory to enable the development of a ―hybrid‖ theory capable 
of explaining the formation of polar security complexes turns on the notion that 
states can and will intervene in regions that are not their own. As the American 
invasion of Iraq demonstrated, great power interventions are hazardous and often 
motivated by extra-regional and domestic political factors rather than by tightly-
bounded regional security concerns. Similarly, disengagement from a region is 
equally driven by these factors, as illustrated by America‘s protracted withdrawal 
from Iraq. 
Unlike minor powers, great powers possess the military capability to cast 
their influence well beyond their immediate region and into distant security 
complexes whenever it suits their interests. According to Lake, the willingness of 
great powers to manage regional conflicts and contribute to the creation of 
regional order is contingent upon how deeply great powers are affected by the 
security externalities emanating from a particular area. Great powers that are full 
members of a distant regional security complex will be affected by the character 
of both security and non-security externalities emanating from that region in ways 
nearly identical to those experienced by the region‘s non-great powers.  
Difficulties arise, however, if a great power is embedded in more than one 
regional security complex for then precedent and reputation often dictates actions. 
Great powers may be more interventionist in one region in order to deter conflict 
within other areas of interest, or less interventionist for fear that acting in a 
particular manner might set an unwelcome precedent for action in an area of lesser 
concern.
45
  
Again, according to Lake, great powers that are ―outside‖ the regional 
security complex are unlikely to intervene in the region except when prompted by 
compelling internal or external reasons. Even when non-security externalities 
affect great powers in important ways and international co-operation is possible, 
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great powers that are unaffected by regional security externalities have no 
incentive to pay the cost of mitigating such externalities. Nevertheless, under 
global unipolarity or multi-polarity unaffected great powers might choose to 
intervene, but their actions will be driven by internal factors which may not 
necessarily be conducive to the establishment of order and stability within a 
region.
46
  
 
Synthesizing a theory 
There are two foundational tenets to classical security complex theory: 
geographical contiguity and a pattern of relations characterised by amity and 
enmity. Patterns of amity and enmity are likely to be a common thread woven 
through any synthesis of any alternate theory to traditional security complex 
theories: It hold true for this synthesis. The remaining tenet, geographical 
contiguity, shall be replaced by accepting the arguments mounted by Lake and 
Morgan that a great power can become an ―inside‖ member of a regional security 
complex if the externalities emanating from a region are sufficiently strong and 
enduring so that the external power‘s presence becomes synonymous with that 
region. Local externalities, even non-security externalities can, metamorphose 
into an international security incident drawing great powers ever deeper into a 
region with the possibility of turning a standard or centred regional security 
complex into either a uni- or multi-great power security complex or even a 
supercomplex. 
Based on a synthesis of the ―useful‖ theoretical elements of both classical 
regional security complex and regional orders theories the ‗interim‘ theory below 
provides a pathway towards the development of a ―hybrid‖ theory that could 
explain the future security dynamics for Polar Regions. Further extensions of this 
theoretical construct will occur in subsequent chapters. Accompanying this 
theoretical extension is an enlargement of the essential structure defining a 
regional security complex by amending Buzan‘s second variable and by adding a 
fifth.  
 
1. boundary, which differentiates the RSC from its neighbours; 
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2. anarchic structure, which means that the RSC must be composed of 
two or more autonomous units, but geographical contiguity is not a 
mandatory requirement;
47
 
3. polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units;  
4. social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity 
among the units; and 
5. the intensity of security externalities on both regional and non-
regional units. 
 
While classical regional security complex theory remains substantially 
unchanged, the amendment to the second and the addition of the fifth element 
does facilitate the evolution of polar security complexes. Such evolution can move 
polar security complexes into or out of one of three structural configurations:   
 
 maintenance of the status quo, which means that there are no 
significant changes to its essential structure; 
 internal transformation, means that changes to the essential 
structure occur within the confines of its existing outer 
boundary. This could mean changes to the anarchic structure 
(through regional integration); to polarity (because of 
disintegration, merger or conquest); to the dominant patterns of 
amity/enmity (because of ideological reorientation, changes in 
leadership) or local externalities (because of changing rainfall 
patterns, discovery of natural resource deposits). 
 external transformation, which means that the outer boundary 
expands, or contracts, changing membership of the security 
complex, and most likely transforming the essential structure in 
other ways. This could result from the merging of two security 
complexes. Transformation would also occur if a distant great 
power become embedded or disengaged in a regional security 
complex as the result of the presence or absence of security 
externalities.
48
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Polar regional thumbnail sketch 
There is no shortage of externalities emanating from either Polar Region. 
Common to both, for example, is the externality represented by access to natural 
resources which in the Arctic has assumed a security dimension not currently 
found in Antarctica. If there is no resolution to the territorial claims lodged under 
UNCLOS III then the lure of hydrocarbon deposits presumed to lie along the 
Lomonsov Ridge
49
 in a region beyond established Exclusive Economic Zones, 
might draw not only the Arctic rim powers into a resource imbroglio, but also 
more distant states with a craving to secure access to petroleum reserves. 
Although no single sovereign state can form in the high Arctic Ocean, the 
presence of many militarily capable states within that locality could give impetus 
to the creation of an institutional arrangement to moderate antagonistic overtures 
exhibited by one power towards another. Interestingly, such action could of itself 
create a ―phantom‖ region that would take on the characteristics of a multi-great 
power regional security complex, not dissimilar to the European regional security 
complex but, more probably it would result in a geopolitical ―shatterbelt.‖ 
Antarctica is not immune from the externalities that exist elsewhere in the 
world for example, biospheric degradation resulting from climate change and 
ozone depletion. Countries could seek to mitigate one effect of global climate 
change, i.e. water scarcity, by harvesting ice in Antarctic. In that case much of the 
environmental cost (pollution) of such harvesting would be borne by the Southern 
Oceanic Rim States rather than the state harvesting the ice, particularly if it was a 
northern hemisphere state. Until such an event occurs one can only speculate as to 
the characteristics and intensity of externalities and the resulting behaviour of 
affected and unaffected states. A possible outcome could be the military 
enforcement of sovereignty claims by claimant countries or the ―invasion‖ of 
Antarctica by distant powers that wilfully disregard all sovereignty claims as they 
seek to secure unencumbered access to natural resources. 
     
The onset of changes to both the environmental and geophysical character of both 
Polar Regions is indicative of a need to explore further methodology amendments 
to regional security complex theory.  Having resolved the matter of geographical 
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contiguity there is yet another immediate impediment to developing a 
comprehensive security complex theory – specifically, the question of whether the 
environmental issues in the broadest sense of that term, could come to represent 
causal factors leading to the creation of individual security complexes. If such a 
cause can be proven then the resulting complex would, in all likelihood, be more 
latitudinal and less longitudinal in orientation. This latter orientation is often 
geographically governed and ethno-culturally determined, yet it remains 
counterintuitive to the latitudinal character of regions and zones found in the 
natural world. Such a distinction might have remained irrelevant but for the 
impact of climate change and its suggestive revision of contemporary latitudinal 
climatic belts. Since classical regional security complex theory cannot resolve this 
dilemma, it is necessary to consider an alternative methodology such as that 
provided by sector security complex theory. 
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Chapter Five 
 
A Non-traditional Approach to Security Complex Theory 
 
The latitudinal natural world 
A latitudinal world has at its foundation the geography of life on Earth. This 
concept is rooted in ecology — a scientific model first developed in the nineteenth 
century by Ernst Haekel, who was also responsible for its name eco, taken from 
the Greek word meaning ―household‖ and logy, the Greek word for ―study.‖ 
Ecology, then, means the study of one‘s house.1 This chapter is, therefore, a vision 
of how and why ―one‘s house‖ – the state – could come to be imperilled in the 
foreseeable future by any one of a number of non-traditional security threats.
2
 
This chapter is predicated on the notion that ecological or environmental 
degradation will not become a securitized referent object as perceived by 
numerous commentators but, rather, a causal factor that will heighten security 
interdependence between states locked within a geographic region and between 
that region and adjacent regions. The very presence of security interdependencies 
assures the establishment of a security complex, but that complex is unlikely to be 
an exact geographical replica of a region created under classical security complex 
theory.  
 
The natural order 
Living organisms are generally restricted to areas where available habitats – local 
environments - and potential lifestyles fit their adaptations. The greater the 
difference among habitats, the greater is the differences among the organisms that 
inhabit them. In the terrestrial environment the major life zones, or biomes, are 
largely defined by climate. Each biome is a relatively distinct ecosystem, both 
climatically and geographically defined, with similar plants and animals 
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regardless of where it occurs on Earth. The boundaries separating each biome are 
determined by climate more than any other factor.
3
 For example, the tundra biome 
located immediately below the Arctic polar desert is colder, and has a shorter 
growing season with fewer types of vegetation, than the more temperate biomes. 
Like temperature, rainfall is an important climatic factor in defining the location 
of biomes, producing the communities of desert, grassland and forest in increasing 
order of precipitation.
4
 
 
 
 
Terrestrial biomes classified by vegetation  
     polar desert 
     tundra  
     taiga 
     temperate 
broadleaf forest 
     Temperate steppe 
     Subtropical rain forest 
     Mediterranean 
vegetation 
     monsoon forest 
     arid desert  
     xeric scrubland  
     dry steppe  
     semiarid desert 
     grass savannah  
     tree savannah  
     subtropical dry forest  
     tropical rainforest 
     alpine tundra  
     montane forest 
Map 4. The world‘s major terrestrial biomes are distributed primarily in accordance with 
temperature and precipitation. These factors are the principal determinants behind the predominant 
latitudinal orientation displayed by all terrestrial biomes. 
Map source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/biomes  
 
This latitudinal order is evident at both Polar Regions, but more so in the Arctic 
where the tundra forms a discernible geobotanical zone between the boreal forests 
of more temperate zones and the botanically bare polar desert of the highest 
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northern latitudes. Indeed, the tundra biome, being an oversimplified stratification 
of a botanical region, can be further divided along the six degree Celsius July 
isotherm into the Arctic and sub-Arctic tundra sub-regions.
5
 One former Soviet 
Union researcher (A. A. Grigoŕyev) maintained that along this border there occurs 
an essential change in the character of the atmospheric circulation and the 
radiation balance which affects every aspect of this physico-geographical 
complex.
6
 The plants that dominate the Arctic tundra differ in one fundamental 
way from all other plants on earth: they are able to carry on metabolic and 
reproductive processes at a growing season temperature only slightly above or 
even below zero degrees Celsius.
7
 If, as posited by other researchers, the Arctic 
growing seasons are becoming longer and warmer, then the tundra may become 
extinct as a unique biome or become subsumed into an expanding taiga zone. 
Furthermore, this once pristine and relatively isolated region is now subject to 
considerable disturbance, due mostly to increasing human populations and the use 
of industrial equipment and motor vehicles.
8
                
                                                                                                                                                  
                                           
 
Map 5. Latitudinal distribution of the Arctic tundra biome (orange) across Arctic-rim countries.                                
A Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/file:800px-map-Tundra.png    
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The Antarctic tundra biome is primarily located within an oceanic rather than a 
continental environment. As a geobotanical zone, the Antarctic tundra occurs 
along the ‗warmer‘ reaches of the Antarctic Peninsula as well as on many 
Antarctic and sub-Antarctic islands, including South Georgia, the South Sandwich 
Islands, Macquarie, Prince Edward and the Kerguelen Islands. Aleksandrova 
considers that, like the Arctic, the Antarctic tundra biome can be divided into two 
distinct circumpolar, geobotanical sub-regions. The more temperate of these, 
located beyond the northern limits of where ice-flows and icebergs are found all 
year round, is aptly named the region of sub-Antarctic cushion plants. With a few 
exceptions these islands conform to what has been described as ―the subantarctic 
province of peatbogs with cushion plants.‖9 Such a description is not intended to 
deny the existence of fields of knee-high tussock grass (Poa) on the many 
Subantarctic Islands scattered across the Southern Ocean.
10
 The other sub-region 
is comprised of the continent proper and immediate offshore islands all of which 
are surrounded year-round by ice-flows.  Although this sub-region amounts to a 
polar desert it is not completely devoid of either nonvascular plants or algae and 
on the Antarctic Peninsula, where favourable environmental conditions permit, 
two flowering plants species have become established.
11
 
Common to the tundra biome in both Polar Regions is the presence of 
permafrost—the ―fortifier‖ that binds these ecosystems together.12 Permafrost can 
be defined as terrain where the temperature is continuously below zero degrees 
Celsius in both winter and summer. At one extreme, permafrost may be ground 
that froze during a winter and survived frozen through the following summer and 
into the next winter and at the other extreme it includes terrain which has been 
frozen for millions of years.
13
 Embedded within the permafrost are large white ice 
sheets (Poylgons) upon which a succession of tundra vegetation has clustered in a 
cyclic sequence that never reaches a stage of complete stability. The continued 
existence of the tundra is dependent on permafrost and its pattern of ice wedges. 
Should these ice wedges warm to temperatures above freezing by increased soil 
temperature, exposure to warmer air and flowing water due to climate change or 
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human disturbance such as by motor vehicles, the result is accelerated erosion 
(thermokarst) due to melting permafrost.
14
 Significantly, and as a consequence of 
human activity (anthropogenic-forced climate change), an increase in permafrost 
temperature across the Alaskan Arctic tundra was reported as far back as the early 
1980s by Lachenbruch and Marshall.
15
 Thermokarsting is not solely an Alaskan 
issue, for melting permafrost is now an increasingly common environmental 
characteristic found throughout the tundra biome from Canada across Siberia to 
Greenland.
16
          
Anthropogenic changes now occurring within the Arctic tundra are not 
unique, for over the centuries humans have fundamentally altered global patterns 
of biodiversity and ecological processes. As a consequence, vegetation forms 
predicted to only occur in each biome are now rarely unique to those biomes.  
Anthropogenic altered biomes have come to provide an alternate view of the 
natural world, one that is based on global patterns of sustained direct human 
interaction with ecosystems including agriculture, forestry, human settlement and 
urbanisation. The term, ‗anthropogenic biomes,‘ is an acknowledgement that an 
irreversible coupling now exists between human society and ecological systems 
particularly at the global level. The concept also offers a view as to how 
humankind might best live in harmony with a tainted biosphere. 
In common with natural biomes, anthropogenic biomes possess both 
latitudinal and longitudinal dimensions. However, it is only when the third 
dimension, elevation, is added that the biome becomes the biosphere. The 
importance of this additional dimension to non-traditional security studies should 
not be understated especially if the referent object to be secured adjourns from the 
state to the individual. That situation is likely to occur, for example, if climate 
change follows the catastrophic path predicted by some commentators, including 
the well-known British scientist James Lovelock.
17
 The methodology known as 
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―critical security studies‖ (CSS) is built on the notion that the individual is the true 
reference for security; an idea encapsulated under the rubric of ―human 
security.‖18 However, since individualism differs markedly from any sense of 
methodological collectivism and a focus on collectives (states), critical security 
studies as a typology will not be discussed further. Like the individual, each and 
every state can be endangered by a raft of non-traditional threats (threats that do 
not emanate directly from either the political or military sectors), including those 
originating from within the biosphere, for example acid rain and ozone depletion. 
Again, the typology supporting this distinctive approach is not developed further 
in this thesis. A more fitting methodology is one that acknowledges that non-
traditional threats, particularly environmental threats, primarily serve to heighten 
interstate security interdependence along both the latitudinal and longitudinal 
axis: a process that is likely to redefine the perimeter of contemporary security 
regions. Consequently, in the future, security complexes are likely to follow the 
boundary dictates of security regions and these will demonstrate a greater 
latitudinal orientation than is currently evident in classical regional security 
complex literature.          
 
Moving beyond classical security complex theory 
Even at the height of the second Cold War (1979-1989) dissatisfaction was 
mounting over the narrow view imposed on security studies by an academic 
obsession with military and nuclear affairs. This dissatisfaction was fuelled by the 
rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during 
the 1970s and 1980s and was sustained by concerns with ethnic identity and 
transnational crime in the 1990s. Latterly, these issues have been supplanted by 
concerns over the spread of diseases (global pandemics) and a rise in religious 
fundamentalism. The placing of more and more issues under the security rubric 
brought forth a counter-reaction and a plea from numerous academics to restrict 
security studies to issues centred on the threat of, or use of, military force. The 
crux of the argument behind this counter movement was that any definitional 
widening would sufficiently endanger the intellectual integrity of ―security‖ that 
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its essential meaning could become void.
19
 This argument no doubt gave voice to 
hidden political concerns that securitizing non-military issues would have an 
undesirable and counterproductive effect on the entire fabric of social and 
international relations.
20
  
 Protagonists on each side of this debate are unwavering in their views, 
especially the traditionalists who continue to push forward the conventional 
argument centred on the enduring primacy of military security. Stephen Walt, as 
one of the more strident traditionalists, argues that the main focus of security 
studies concerns the phenomenon of war and as an academic discipline security 
may simply be defined as the ―study of the threat, use, and control of military 
force.‖21 He continued his argument by saying that security ―…explores the 
conditions that make the use of force more likely…and the specific policies that 
states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war.‖22 Arguably, these 
phrases are common to whatever cause lies behind a call to arms, be that threat 
from traditional or non-traditional sources.  Despite the strength of the non-
traditional argument, Walt‘s strong disposition towards the traditional is further 
illustrated through his argument that if: 
 
…non-military phenomena can also threaten states and individuals, some 
writers have suggested broadening the concept of ―security‖…but this 
prescription runs the risk of expanding ―security studies‖ excessively; by 
this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic 
recessions could all be viewed as a threat to security. Defining the field in 
this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more 
difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.
23
  
 
     
For Walt, non-traditional problems are matters of societal well-being to be solved 
through the political process rather than by military means. Notwithstanding the 
persuasiveness of Walt‘s arguments, Peter Hough echoes the view of many 
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twenty-first century security commentators by maintaining that today many ―non-
military issues can become ‗securitized‘ and hence privileged with ‗national 
security‘ status.‖24  
Like Hough, all ―wideners‖ appear vociferous in their views that non-
traditional threats deserve recognition within the security genre. Nina Græger, for 
one, is convinced that environmental degradation and security are now so 
intertwined that this inseparable combination has become part of ‗high politics‘ in 
many Western countries.
25
 Other ―wideners‖ might suggest that in the 
contemporary world, the economic crisis of 2008-2009 has eclipsed both 
terrorism and the curtailment of nuclear proliferation as paramount security 
threats. At a United States Senate intelligence committee hearing on February 12, 
2009, retired Admiral Dennis Blair, as Chairperson of the United States National 
Intelligence Council, pronounced that ―[t]he primary near-term security concern 
of the United States [is] the global economic crisis and its geopolitical 
implications.‖26 In linking ―economic crisis‖ and ―geopolitical implications,‖ 
Admiral Blair has followed a well-trodden, but restrictive path, which allows 
‗widening‘ only inasmuch as it links concern over the threat or actual use of force 
between the dominant political actors – states. Interestingly, John Chipman 
recognizes both sides of the traditional/non-traditional schism, but maintains that: 
 
…the structuring element of strategic analysis must be the possible 
use of force…. Non-military aspects of security may occupy more of 
the strategist‘s time, but the need for peoples, nations, states or 
alliances to procure, deploy, engage or withdraw military forces 
must remain a primary purpose of the strategic analyst‘s inquiry.27       
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In so saying, Chipman has moved beyond the traditional/non-traditional argument 
in two respects. First, he acknowledges that non-traditional issues may cause a 
military response. Secondly, he moves away from state centrism by 
acknowledging the role other political actors as strategic users of force have upon 
the international system, while simultaneously acknowledging the increasing 
importance non-military threats. The use of plural nouns is also interesting for it 
can imply that the legitimate use of force remains the prerogative of the collective 
rather than the individual.
28
  
The mention of security issues arising from other than the traditional sectors 
provides an opportunity to move security complex theory beyond its classical 
origin. Buzan et al propose ―sector security theory‖ as a way of identifying 
specific types of social interactions that provide an alternate focus for security 
studies. This is succinctly described as follows:  
 
…the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the 
political sector is about relationships of authority, governing status, 
and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, 
production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of 
collective identity; and the environmental sector is about 
relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.
29
  
 
As this chapter is directed towards environmental issues
30
 and their influence over 
the politico-military polity, there is no need for a detailed examination of the 
causal importance of the remaining sectors. In undertaking such a truncated 
analysis it is helpful to keep to the forefront the idea that national security is about 
the ability of states to maintain their independent identity and their functional 
integrity. It should also be acknowledged that national security is a conservative 
concept inasmuch as it relates to existing states, usually to the exclusion of all 
other political actors.   
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The number of non-military issues that possess a high probability of 
developing into interstate threats worthy of a military response appears to be 
rapidly increasing. Although journal articles and books continue to be written 
about the strong empirical evidence linking, for example, climate change with 
security, these same articles fail to provide evidence that climate change has in 
fact induced the establishment of any inter-state regional security structures. 
According to Buzan et al this can be explained by the observation that regional 
structures are determined by whether the relevant units are fixed or mobile and 
whether threats and vulnerabilities are close or distant. If units are not fixed or if 
threats are moderated by distance then regionalizing logic is generally weak.
31
 
Even if discrete regions are created within each sector it remains an open question 
as to whether such regions will be a geographical replica of each other, i.e. do 
they pivot around the same loci and within the same geographical perimeter. This 
is unlikely in every case.   
As deserts move northwards beyond latitude 30˚ North, a result of a climate 
change initiated shift of the northern Hadley Cell,
32
 their societal impact will be 
increasingly felt within each European Mediterranean state. Indeed, since 1979 
there has been a poleward expansion in each hemisphere of the Hadley Cell of 
between 2.0 to 4.5 degrees. In the northern hemisphere this movement is 
occurring at the rate of approximately 1.4 kilometres per year.
33
 The perimeter of 
the new ‗environmental security‘ region formed in response to the externality that 
is desertification will not coincide precisely with the current European regional 
security complex. However, a similar movement of the desert biome on the North 
American continent would not create an ‗environmental‘ security region. It might, 
however, intensify the security interdependence between states within the North 
American regional security complex.             
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Buzan et al maintain that there are two means by which regional security 
complex theory
34
 can be applied to sectors other than the politico-military or to 
actors other than states. The first and most obvious means is by adopting a social 
constructivist approach to understanding how an issue becomes securitized, i.e. 
by a speech act as discussed in Chapter 1. The second way is by adopting one or 
other of two structural approaches:                 
 
1. Homogeneous complexes. This approach retains the ―classical‖ 
assumptions that security complexes are concentrated within specific 
sectors and are therefore composed of specific forms of interaction 
among similar types of units (e.g., power rivalries among states).This 
logic leads to different types of complexes that occur in different sectors 
(e.g., military complexes made up predominantly of states, a societal 
complex of various identity-based units, and the like). 
 
2. Heterogeneous complexes. This approach abandons the assumption 
that security complexes are locked into specific sectors. It assumes that 
the regional logic can integrate different types of actors interacting 
across two or more sectors (e.g., states + nations + firms + 
confederations interacting across the political, economic, and societal 
sectors).
35
  
 
The choice between these alternatives is determined by the purpose to which any 
analysis is directed and which alternative represents the ‗best fit.‘ Selecting either 
alternative does not by itself deny that under changed circumstances the original 
choice can be forsaken for the other.  
Buzan et al opted for the homogeneous alternative for no other reason than 
that they wished to explore the as yet poorly understood security dynamics of 
each sector and because it represented for them the best methodological fit.
36
  The 
advantage of the heterogeneous approach is that it facilitates keeping an entire 
multi-sector picture in a single frame and enables the tracking of inevitable 
spillovers between sectors. This could become important in understanding how 
the adverse impact of climate change in one state might result in deterioration in 
traditional security relations between itself and adjoining states. A contemporary 
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illustration of the effect of inter-sector spillover is visible along the five thousand 
kilometre border separating India from Bangladesh. Here, the environmental 
effects of climate change combined with the societal effects of poverty have 
‗forced‘ India to construct a border fence policed by the military so as to contain 
the flow of Bangladeshi climate refugees and illegal migrants, which New Delhi 
perceive to represent an existential threat to India‘s security.37  
Conversely it is also possible for changes in climate to eliminate the cause 
behind a deterioration of relations between two countries. A low-lying 
uninhabited island known as New Moore Island in India and South Talpatti in 
Bangladesh, which was situated at the mouth of the Hariabhanga River, has been 
a continuing source of dispute since between these two countries ever since 
Bangladesh secured independence from Pakistan in 1971. This island, which was 
never more than two metres above sea level, is no longer visible on satellite 
imagery and hence its disappearance offered an opportunity to resolve territorial 
dispute that has bedevilled interstate relations for forty years. However, its 
disappearance may also represent a harbinger of worst things to come for the 
many islets that dot the Sundarbans delta. Over the past decade sea has been 
rising by approximately five millimetres a year, whereas prior to the turn of the 
century the sea rose by around three millimetres per year. Indeed, several islands 
in the Bay of Bengal have been abandoned causing thousands of ―climate-
change‖ refugees to seek refuge within and beyond their home country.38       
Ultimately, attention becomes focused on where security dynamics are 
predominantly located – is it at the global, regional or local level? To answer that 
question consideration has to be given to the cause-effect nature of those issues 
responsible for securitisation; these are what have become known as the 
―facilitating conditions‖ for securitisation.39 Answers to these questions 
ultimately rest on understanding the socialisation of the securitisation process: a 
process which also explains how sector issues can be turned into security 
externalities – the essence of the Regional Orders typology. 
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The character of environmental security  
The central actor in contemporary environmental security is not necessarily the 
state. Unlike in either the military or political sectors there is no universal 
acceptance as to what or whom the security actor is, what represents a legitimate 
referent object or what constitutes an existential threat. The environmental 
security agenda is also dogged by the uncertainty as to whether it exists as a 
separate legitimate typology. Some analysts, such as Myers, describe 
environmental security as the ―ultimate security,‖40 while others, such as 
Duedney, see environmentalism as the ―ultimate threat‖ causing decay of the 
national security mindset and institutions.
41
 The ultimate complication besetting 
the environmental sector is the variety of issues now included under its rubric, 
although some issues might be more appropriately included in one of the other 
security sectors. Given the lack of universal acceptance in the allocation of 
particular issues to specific security sectors Buzan et al‘s review of the 
environmental security literature is telling as to the diversity encompassed within 
this single topic. The issues which they include are:   
 
 Disruption of ecosystems which includes climate change, depletion of the 
ozone layer, loss of biodiversity, deforestation, desertification, erosion in 
all forms, and various forms of pollution. 
 Energy problems include depletion of natural resources, pollution 
resulting from the use and transportation of energy resources, and 
scarcities and uneven distribution. 
 Population problems include unrestricted human population growth, 
excessive resource consumption, pandemics, politically and socially 
uncontrollable migration, and unmanageable urbanisation. 
 Food problems include poverty, famines, over consumption and diseases 
related to these conditions, loss of fertile soils and water resources and 
their scarcities and uneven distribution. 
 Economic problems which includes the protection of unsustainable 
production methods, societal instability inherent in the pursuit of 
economic growth, and structural asymmetries and inequalities. 
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 Civil strife includes war-related environmental damage on one hand and 
violence resulting from environmental degradation on the other.
42
  
 
In the absence of unanimous acceptance as to those issues that can be legitimately 
securitized, environmental problems continue to be politicized at the behest of 
affected individual or groups of states. Such politicisation is often a response to 
pressure being applied by community groups, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and issue-specific institutions. While some international environmental 
issues are readily and amicably resolved through negotiation, as epitomised by the 
―Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of Canada on Air Quality‖ (an agreement by the United States to 
reduce air pollution including acid rain),
43
 a similar agreement pursued by the 
Nordic states has been vigorously resisted and its mitigation impact severely 
curbed by pollution emitting states. In the latter case, the resultant agreement 
offers little or no protection to individual or state victims of European 
transboundary acid rain.
44
  
The overriding problem to creating a linkage between environmental issues 
and security revolves around determining the referent object‘s location on the 
level of analysis continuum — is the object to be secured the individual, the state, 
humanity or the global environment. 
Environmentalists maintain that the environment per se or some strategic 
portion of it is the only acceptable referent object. James Lovelock takes a most 
radical view of environmental security in suggesting that the Earth or, to use his 
parlance, ―Gaia,‖ is under threat of being seriously damaged by the activities of 
humankind.
45
 Lovelock‘s view would render Earth per se the referent object. 
Notwithstanding environmentalists‘ views another concern can be detected; that 
the environment remains a threat to civilisation and hence humanity is the referent 
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object. In an attempt to bridge these two views Buzan suggests that the security of 
human collectives in the environmental sector is about ―the maintenance of the 
local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all 
other human enterprises depend.‖46 Such a concept puts the focus on humanity‘s 
symbiotic relationship with the environment: a relationship in which humanity is 
utterly dependent upon the environment for its wellbeing and today‘s 
anthropogenic biosphere has become utterly dependent on humanity for its care. 
This interpretation would be anathema to Lovelock who considers that Gaia‘s 
immediate imperilment could be vanquished if humankind vanished.   
None of these views hold the state as an actor of any importance with regard 
to environmental security although, arguably, this was tenuously implied by 
Buzan. Porter and Brown maintain that the most important roles played by state 
actors in global environmental politics are those relating to the process of regime 
formation. This view dovetails neatly with their belief that no country can 
increase its own security without at the same time increasing the security of other 
countries. Such a paradigm assumes that major threats to global security come not 
from individual states but from global problems shared by the entire international 
community.
47
 Hence, for Porter and Brown security is best provided for at the 
global level. Thus, the prime purpose of international environmental regimes is to 
prevent conflicting political interests turning into security threats. Even so, the 
unwillingness found within the Euro-Atlantic community to politicize, let alone 
securitize, transboundary acid-rain speaks volumes of the difficulties likely to be 
experienced in gaining any semblance of universal securitisation of environmental 
issues. 
 
Towards an environmental security complex  
Despite the difficulties experienced by the Nordic states in resolving the issue of 
transboundary acid rain, there is little doubt that the contemporary environmental 
security agenda was conceived of as global. Its emergence was not the result of 
the globalisation of local problems but the realisation that seemingly harmless 
individual or local practices can have global consequences. This contrasts with the 
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development of other security agendas which evolved out of the globalisation of 
problems that were historically local in character; for example, in the military 
sector, it was only during the twentieth century that warfare became a global 
phenomenon. There exists a strong sense that environmental degradation is a 
universal problem that can only be effectively managed on the basis of co-
operation between all peoples, or at the very least a significant percentage of the 
world‘s states. However, this is not entirely true for many environmental 
problems retain a local or regional focus—the acid rain that is a highly visual 
blight on the environment of many Euro-Atlantic countries is a non-issue for 
people living in the Southwest Pacific.  
Threats and vulnerabilities emanating from within the environmental sector 
are most frequently issue specific and seldom universal. Moreover, as Buzan et al 
maintain, causes and effects may be located at different levels and in different 
regions. Few global events have the total character of a potential nuclear winter 
but some, such as climate change, will affect every corner of the Earth albeit not 
to the same degree.
48
 Geographically disparate states with the potential to be 
affected to the same degree by an identical environmental problem i.e. sea-level 
rise, might well be drawn to form a political constellation out of mutual security 
concerns. Indeed, small island states have good reason to consider sea-level rise as 
an existential threat for the sea has already swallowed the Carterat Islands 
northeast of Papua New Guinea.
49
 It is little wonder then that twelve Pacific 
Island states have called for a United Nations General Assembly resolution that 
declares climate change to be a threat to international peace and security.
50
 If 
successful, their action would represent the first step towards securitisation of 
climate change. But irrespective of their success, their action acknowledges the 
existence of a sub-systemic lens through which regional environmental 
vulnerabilities and resultant security threats can be identified and their political 
impact assessed.  
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 In the contemporary world, it can be argued that the rising scarcity of two 
natural resources seen as crucial to humanity – water and oil – could cause states 
to coalesce into regional security structures. 
Approximately sixty per cent of all freshwater is contained within the 
world‘s 263 international river basins.51 While water scarcity seldom leads to 
formal declarations of war, in the fifty years between 1948 and 1999 there were 
1,831 reported instances where water became the source of interstate friction. The 
majority of these interactions – sixty-seven per cent – were resolved co-
operatively, but twenty-eight per cent resulted in some level of interstate 
confrontation. In the remaining five per cent, water ultimately proved to be an 
insignificant conflictual factor.
52
 In the period between the years 2000 and 2003 
fourteen out of twenty-four disputes over water resulted in some level of violent 
confrontation.
53
 The result of a recent research project concluded that the sharing 
of international rivers does seem to be associated with interstate conflict although 
there is no conclusive evidence that sharing a river basin is a major issue 
whenever conflicts occur.
54
  
Though not exclusively a Middle Eastern problem, the shortage of water in 
this arid region has further heightened already existing tensions between many of 
the region‘s states. This has created a new sub-set within the political genre 
known as hydropolitics – a major issue for states like Turkey, Syria and Iraq.55 
Water security links these states‘ national security inevitably raising the level of 
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intraregional security interdependence. National security has come to possess an 
environmental dimension.  
Even though Schulz cites Buzan when defining the key characteristics of a 
hydropolitical security complex, he displays a superficial understanding of the 
nuisances of sector security complex theory as he relies primarily on a simple 
definition of amity and enmity and security interdependence when determining 
the existence of a security complex.
56
 Accordingly, a hydropolitical security 
complex is formed when the above characteristics exist amongst  states that are 
geographically either ‗owners‘ or ‗users‘ of a river in a region and consequently 
regard that river as a major security issue. Riverine issues of concern generally 
involve dams, reduced water flow, salinization and hydroelectricity. The 
Euphrates-Tigris Rivers link Turkey, Syria and Iraq in a hydropolitical security 
complex,
57
 while the Jordan, Yarmuk, Litani and the West Bank aquifer connects 
Jordan, Syria, Israel and Lebanon plus the West Bank Palestinians in another 
hydro security complex.
58
 Other examples of emerging hydro security complexes 
encompass Angola, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi 
and Mozambique over the Zambezi River; Lesotho, South Africa, Botswana and 
Namibia over the Orange River;
59
 Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the Nile 
River;
60
 India and Pakistan over the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej 
Rivers; Cambodia, [China], Laos, Thailand and Vietnam over the Mekong River 
and Argentina and Brazil over the Paraná River.
61
 It is not difficult to find 
numerous other examples.  
Theoretically, a hydropolitical security complex can form whenever two or 
more states share a common river basin. Buzan et al have endorsed this concept 
without reservation, while Schulz in acknowledging the typology has tempered 
his acceptance of it. Put succinctly, Schulz supports the formation of 
hydropolitical security complexes under the general precepts embodied in sector 
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security complex theory but with a twist: security subcomplexes can form within 
the larger hydropolitical security complex provided the causal factors have no 
direct relationship to security over water supplies—ethnicity or religion being the 
most likely extraneous causes.
62
 It is wrong for Schulz to use the term 
―subcomplex‖ in this context for the causal factors of ethnicity and religion are 
most likely to create separate security complexes that will overlay the original 
hydropolitical security complex. An overlapping cleavage situated within a region 
that is itself an overlapping cleavage. Furthermore, Schulz does not place 
hydropolitical security complexes within any overarching regional security 
complex, an oversight also attributable to Buzan et al.
63
  
Buzan and Wæver acknowledge water scarcity and access to water across 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq contributed to the creation of the Levant security 
subcomplex.  On the other hand, they preclude water as a causal factor that frames 
the security dynamics of the Gulf security subcomplex. Both subcomplexes are 
firmly embedded within the Middle Eastern regional security complex even 
though both possess their own unique set of security interdependencies not found 
elsewhere in the parent security complex. Should Iraq have been a member of 
both subcomplexes then it is impossible for the Turkey, Syria, and Iraq triangle to 
be conceived as a hydropolitical security complex or even a subcomplex. This 
possibly explains why the presence of a hydropolitical subcomplex was not 
specifically commented upon by Buzan and Wæver.
64
 With Iraq embedded in the 
Gulf subcomplex and Turkey and Syria in the Levant subcomplex, access to water 
creates a unique security dynamic that fuses these three states into the Euphrates-
Tigris hydropolitical security complex. This unique security structure would 
super-impose itself over the existing regional security subcomplexes.  
This illustration creates a useful model by which to judge whether the 
presence of non-traditional causal factors will create a unique security complex.  
If security interdependence within a regional constellation of states alters to reflect 
the presence of a new causal factor, then this will result in the establishment of an 
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entirely new security complex.
65
 Any new security complex established will tend 
not to replace an existing complex providing the causal factors that gave rise to 
the original complex remain valid.  Given the wide menu of both traditional and 
non-traditional issues that can lead to the creation of a security complex, any 
region is likely to resemble a collage of overlapping cleavages or security maps. 
Likewise, when states or regions face more than one security externality a 
complex pattern of relationships is similarly created. The greater the number of 
externalities present the more ―dense‖ the regional security environment becomes: 
alternatively, the fewer the number of externalities the ―thinner‖ the security 
environment.
66
 In the future, analysts will be required to skilfully fashion a 
coherent national security collage that represents a multiplicity of seemingly 
disparate security cleavages.  
The strategic significance of hydrocarbons is currently immeasurably higher 
than that of water. Regional conflict, civil war, insurgency and terrorism are 
foreseen as the most persistent and widespread threats to the global flow of 
petroleum in the early decades of the twenty-first century.
67
 Violent upheaval in 
one form or another has afflicted nearly every oil-producing region raising the 
likelihood of either superpower or great power intervention. As hydrocarbons 
reserves become depleted intense competition among the major powers for 
possession and distribution of energy resources will lead to larger conflicts. 
According to Michael Klare, if there is a single prize that could provoke ―great-
power warfare on a grand scale today, it is the vast untapped energy reserves of 
the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea areas.‖68 Three great powers, the United 
States, Russia and China, are in competition for control over the global flow of 
hydrocarbons from both of these increasingly important oil-producing regions.
69
 
All three states have either deployed combat forces to these regions or have 
established military ties with receptive local governments. As the global demand 
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for petroleum increases and more countries, such as India, begin to rely on both 
the Middle East and Central Asia for their energy requirements, all three states 
can be expected to reinforce their strategic position and to attempt to thwart their 
rivals.
70
 
Global energy needs are expected to rise by forty-five per cent between 2006 
and 2030, with almost half of the growth in demand coming from India and 
China.
71
 Within a decade China is expected to take half of Saudi Arabia‘s planned 
oil output with the majority being shipped through the Strait of Malacca. India, 
over the same time period, will draw ninety per cent of its petroleum needs from 
the Persian Gulf region.
72
 Both states now find themselves competing for the 
same energy resources
73
 and their respective continued access to the region‘s oil 
and natural gas reserves has become a matter of national security
74
 to which each 
has dedicated an increasing amount of political and military resources.  
Energy security is but one factor that has caused both India and China to 
increase their military presence throughout the Indian Ocean. An equally 
important factor is the protection of sea lines of communications (SLOC) given 
each country‘s burgeoning economic interdependence with many African states.  
The importance of unfettered access to the Indian Ocean is evidenced by China‘s 
―string of pearls‖ strategy under which a series of naval facilities are being 
constructed in friendly states along the ocean‘s northern seaboard.75 In response, 
India is undertaking the construction of new mainland naval facilities in addition 
to establishing military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar islands. These 
latter naval stations create a ―metal chain‖ capable of blocking the western 
entrance to the Strait of Malacca.
76
 Establishment of these respective military 
facilities has created an interesting strategic juxtaposition. While the Indians 
bemoan their ―Hormuz dilemma‖ whereby their oil imports through that strait are 
                                                 
70
 Klare, op. cit., p. 147. 
71
 See Kaplan, Robert D., ‗Centre Stage for the Twenty-first Century: Power Plays in the Indian 
Ocean,‘ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88. No. 2, March/April 2009, p. 20. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 Lall, Marie, ‗India‘s Energy Juggling Act,‘ Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 170, No. 5,         
June 2007, p. 47. 
74
 Klare, op.cit., p. 162. 
75
 Kaplan, op.cit. p. 22. 
76
 Ibid., p. 23. China‘s anxieties will undoubtedly increase further with the recent launch of India‘s 
first locally designed nuclear-powered missile armed submarine, the lease of a Russian Akula-II 
class nuclear-powered submarine and the long awaited and yet to be delivered refitted Russian 
aircraft carrier the Admiral Gorshkov. See Bedi, Rahul, ‗Nation stays under radar with sub,‘ New 
Zealand Herald, Auckland, July 17, 2009, p. A20.  
 93 
placed at possible risk of interdiction by the Chinese navy stationed in ports along 
Pakistan‘s Makran coast, the Chinese bemoan their ―Malacca dilemma‖ which 
requires their oil imports to pass through a strategic adversary‘s ―metal chain.‖77  
China‘s military modernisation programme not only poses a perceived threat 
for India but also for Japan; Asia‘s third great power. Japan and China have 
competing maritime claims in the East China Sea and over the Diaoyu/Sengkaku 
Islands that are located astride a prospective oil field.
78
 Any development of 
China‘s naval capabilities that included operation of a large deck carrier – such as 
the recommissioning of an ex-Soviet aircraft carrier
79
 – would likely provoke 
considerable apprehension in Japan in relation to the former state‘s intentions. As 
with China, Japan is dependent upon the Middle East for some eighty-seven per 
cent of its oil needs.
80
 On-going naval expansion would prompt Japanese fears 
that China would gain a stranglehold over its own oil lifeline in the Malacca Strait 
and surrounding waters. Mutual concern over sea-lane protection has the potential 
to extend Chinese-Japanese rivalry into Southeast Asia and beyond.
81
 Moreover, 
there is intense rivalry between China and many Southeast Asian states over 
sovereignty of the South China Sea and prospective maritime oil fields.  
The layering of a petropolitical security complex over the contemporary 
patterns of Asian regional security creates a more complex security portrait. Map 
6 represents a conceptual sketch of the resultant regional security complex. 
Convergence of these two complexes will create a series of new political and 
security dynamics, especially through new roles and alignments amongst the 
region‘s great powers and between such powers and the only remaining 
superpower, the United States. As petro-scarcity deepens and states take measures 
to ensure continued access to supplies, further militarization within the 
petropolitical security complex appears inevitable and interstate conflict a distinct 
possibility. 
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Map 6. Conceptual map of Asian petropolitical security complex overlaid on a diagram of post-
Cold War Eurasian military-political regional security complexes. A characteristic of these 
security cleavages are their distinctive latitudinal orientation.    
 
Environmental degradation-security complex 
Maps can be compiled for virtually every cause of environmental degradation.
82
 A 
map, for example, can be constructed from the research undertaken by Arthur 
Westing into the impact environmental degradation has wrought on the arid 
upland region in the Horn of Africa. This is a region covering Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, as well as a portion of northern Kenya – see Map 7 
– which has long been a perennial contender for the position of the most 
belligerent region in the world.
83
 As a result of his study, Westing has labelled this 
sector of Africa an ‗ecogeographical region.‘84 On the Horn of Africa, 
environmental degradation is human-induced as a result of a burgeoning human 
population that far exceeds the ability of the land to produce a sufficiency of food 
and fuel. Croplands, rangelands, forestlands and wildlands are being utilized far 
beyond their sustainable yield. In this region environmental degradation has 
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historically provided a trigger for both intra-
85
 and interstate conflict.
86
  Westing, 
in his use of the term ‗ecogeographical region‘ has applied a security twist to an 
ecological term commonly used to describe the subdivision of a landscape into its 
constituent ecosystems.
87
 However, according to Westing an ecogeographical 
region can also be formed when a region‘s occupants share a common concern 
over environmental degradation and exhibit a willingness to put aside any 
political or other enmities that prevent the forming of a common regional security 
outlook.
88
 Westing, being a forest ecologist turned peace researcher, naturally 
displays a preference for the peaceful resolution of transborder environmental 
degradation through the establishment of a Horn of Africa security community.
89
 
However, this requires a level of amity that is currently absent from the region. 
The presence of enmity rather than amity does not render invalid the concept of a 
Horn ecogeographical region or ecogeographical regions as an analytical 
methodology within the security genre.  
Westing has also noticed that ―[m]any ecogeographical regions overlap one 
or more national boundaries.‖90 This is an interesting observation. Since Westing 
accepts that ecogeographical regions display a heightened level of security 
interdependence and display amity or enmity, two of the essential elements for the 
establishment of a security complex, then it is reasonable to accept the proposition 
that an ecogeographical region can metamorphous into a ecogeographical security 
complex. Thus, methodologically, an ecogeographical security complex should be 
treated no differently from a politico-resource security complex: just as with the 
latter, the former security complex type is capable of overlaying either single or 
multiple classical regional security complexes. As with other overlay process 
ecogeographical security regions can craft a latitudinal extension to existing 
classical regional security complexes. The ‗Horn‘ ecogeographical security region 
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provides an overlaying cleavage across all of the Horn and a portion of the Central 
Africa regional security complexes. 
Along African‘s Atlantic seaboard another ecogeographical region has 
formed comprising just two states; Mauritania and Senegal – see Map 7. Conflicts 
between these two countries, as well as intrastate conflict between different ethnic 
groups within each state, are narrowly related to availability of and entitlement to 
water from the Senegal River.
91
 However, the underlying causal factor behind the 
enmity displayed between these states is the unstoppable expansion of the Sahara 
desert.
92
 In common with many other sectors of North Africa, desertification in 
this region is directly attributed to human-induced ecological changes such as 
deforestation and over-grazing of pastures, combined with an unprecedented 
growth in human population, a changing climate and misguided development 
policies.
93
  
The Senegal River valley which marks the border between these states has 
become the site of forced relocation of each other‘s citizens, as each country, in 
denial of historical precedents, reserves unto its own citizens the fertile land over 
which it can exercise sovereignty. Forced relocations are considered a form of 
‗ethnic cleansing‘ and their continued occurrence has created a deep political rift 
between these neighbouring states, which on occasions has led to their respective 
armies facing each other across the Senegal River.
94
 Whereas the Horn 
ecogeographical region overlies two regional security complexes, in the Senegal 
Basin the ecogeographical security region is superimposed upon the north-western 
sector of the West African regional security complex. 
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                Map 7. A Depiction of the North Africa ecogeographical 
regions as described by Westing and Libiszewski. 
                    
Another way of drawing maps of regional environmental security problems is by 
linking issues. As a result of an ill-conceived policy implemented by the former 
Soviet Union, Central Asia is confronted with ―[t]he greatest single, man-made 
ecological catastrophe in modern history‖ or ―ecocide.‖95 Dehydration of the Aral 
Sea due to the provision of water to irrigate a burgeoning cotton industry could 
trigger an ―eco-domino effect,‖96 an environmental externality that could 
ultimately create a region of ecological degradation extending from Scandinavia 
to the Black Sea.
97
  
Climate change, in exacerbating environmental degradation, heightens 
further the incidences of both political instability and the prospect of armed 
conflict. Climate change induced shortages of water, food and energy, plus a 
general deterioration in human health, will precipitate transborder migration by 
hundreds of millions of people.
98
 For states, climate refugees, like other forms of 
unregulated and unwanted migration, pose a significant security risk that 
amplifies political tension within recipient state and between recipient and donor 
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states.
99
 Unregulated human migration is certainly an existential security threat in 
the societal sector, but it can also represent a threat in the economic and 
environmental sectors if the newcomers overburden a fragile environment or 
compete for scarce resources.  Consequently, climate refugees can come to 
represent a contributory factor in the establishment of security complexes. Since 
whole continents can be severely affected by climate change,
100
 continent-wide 
―climate change‖ security complexes are a clear possibility. 
 In Africa, a contemporary assemblage of climate change vulnerabilities is 
likely to worsen over the course of the twenty-first century. Should current 
climate change trends continue then the Sahel and southern Africa could 
experience increased warming of between three to six degrees Celsius before the 
twenty-second century. As a consequence, precipitation patterns across the 
continent will be dramatically affected possibly declining by more than twenty per 
cent compared to 1990 levels. Another dire prediction for Africa is that by 2020 
continental-wide climate change will cause somewhere between 75 and 250 
million people to be exposed to severe water stress.
101
 Since African societies are 
unlikely to be able to adapt to either of these changes the outlook for Africa‘s 
human population is grim. 
If it is at all possible a more calamitous climate change future appears to 
await Africa. According to the Hadley Centre, a part of the United Kingdom 
Meteorological Office, by the year 2055, the average global temperature will have 
risen by four degrees Celsius unless greenhouse gas emissions are immediately 
curtailed. Unlike northern Europe or North America, where temperatures are 
expected to increase by up to sixteen degrees Celsius, the average temperature 
throughout the African continent will increase by just five to twelve degrees 
Celsius. Even so such an increase will aggravate the problem of food and water 
scarcity which many African societies are already experiencing,
102
 with a lateral 
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band of countries comprising Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Tanzania being the most affected.
103
  
The outcome of these predictions could be reminiscent of the mid-1985 
drought when a famine swept across Africa, from the Atlantic to the Horn and 
south to Mozambique and the South African bantustans.
104
 An entire continent 
was on the brink of collapse. It was said that at least 35 million Africans in more 
than twenty countries had insufficient food to live on, that 10 million had 
abandoned their homes and farms in search of food and water and many 
abandoned their countries.
105
 In the developing world famines usually are the 
result of either prolonged adverse weather conditions – severe drought - or 
specific grain production and marketing policies.
106
 The 1985 African drought 
was the outcome of climate variability and the progressive reduction of 
precipitation over the previous two decades which reached its nadir during the 
mid-1980s.
107
  
Just as it is possible to construct maps representing hydro- and petro-security 
complexes, similar maps can also be constructed to portray a series of countries 
united by wind erosion and/or lack of rainfall that together form a specific 
category of environmental security complex.
108
 If the impetus forcing coalescing 
is sufficiently widespread and intense as it was in Africa during the 1970s and 
1980s, then it is possible for a whole continent to form a continental climatic 
security complex. If environmental facilitating conditions force countries through 
the ‗securitisation‘ end-point of the politicisation-securitisation continuum then 
they are likely to create a climatic shatterbelt before taking the ultimate step of 
engaging in conflict with neighbouring states. Buzan et al., citing Hylke Tromp, 
argue that environmental conflicts will express themselves along the traditional 
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fault lines in society.
109
 That being the case then it is conceivable for the African 
continent  to fracture along some non-environmental exogenous tension lines into 
a number of classical regional security complexes as shown on Map 3. 
Alternatively, Africa could form part of a new and much larger complex as the 
continent‘s indigenous people are forced into other geographical regions such as 
Europe, thereby creating an Afro-European supra-continental security complex. 
 
Towards a composite theory 
In combining two complexes into a single cleavage map there is little danger of 
any mutual linkages becoming lost or obscured. In the above examples, with 
states being the referent object, what was created was a large homogeneous 
complex. However, as the number of security complexes increases so does the 
complexity, and with it the possibility that some important feature or features will 
be misinterpreted or misplaced reducing the overall value attributable to the 
composite picture. Non-state actors, either in the role of referent object or 
securing agent, present a challenge best met by a heterogeneous than a 
homogeneous methodological approach.  
Based on a synthesis of the ―useful‖ theoretical elements of regional security 
complex, regional orders and sector security analysis a further element in a 
composite theory is discernible. This sixth element is included to account for the 
role non-traditional sector issues can play alongside the military and political 
sectors in the creation of security complexes.  The inclusion of this sixth element 
is at best tentative, for the issues that are likely to create a sector security complex 
may be better classified under the rubric of security externalities than as a separate 
genre. Irrespective of which classification rubric is chosen, it should be noted that 
sector specific security complexes differ in origin from classical regional security 
complexes and since it is the former that is the dominant security structure 
identified in this thesis, the term ―security complex‖ has been adopted to cover 
both classical and sector security complexes.     
 
1. boundary, which differentiates the SC from its neighbours; 
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2. anarchic structure, which means that the SC must be composed of 
two or more autonomous units, but geographical contiguity is not 
mandatory; 
3. polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units;  
4. social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity 
among the units;  
5. the intensity of security externalities on both regional and non-
regional units; and  
6. issues formed within non-traditional sectors can legitimately create 
security complexes providing elements 1 to 4 are met.  
N.B. Element #5 is not an absolute pre-requisite since for major 
powers non-traditional issues can elicit a similar response to that of 
‗externalities‘        
         
In the future, defence planning will have to wrestle with the regional impact of a 
multiplicity of security complexes formed from a rising number of both traditional 
and non-traditional security threats and changing security interdependencies. 
While classical security complex theory is capable of explaining how military-
political issues coalesce together to create regional security complexes, a new 
interpretation of Buzan‘s typology is required when analysing and mapping 
complexes created by non-traditional issues. Non-traditional security complexes 
can take a number of forms ranging from subcomplex to supercomplex to 
supracomplex. They can form within existing regional security complexes or 
overlap a number of complexes or transform a complex into an entirely new 
international system.
110
  At least conceptually, security regions in the future will 
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consist of a cluster of complexes, each being a response to different security 
issues resulting in a security constellation of geographically contiguous and/or 
disparate states located within one or more international orders. Finally, security 
complexes spawned out of environmental degradation, especially climate change, 
will display the same strong latitudinal bias as natural biomes: a characteristic 
absent from classical regional security complex theory.  Although the ―hybrid‖ 
theory so far developed could at its present level of development be used to 
explain the future security architecture of the Polar Regions, grafting on one 
further element will usefully strengthen the overall methodology and account for 
the propensity of states to resolve foreign policy issues through warfare. Unlike 
previous theoretical amendments this new element, shatterbelts, comes from a 
geopolitical, rather than security ontology. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Politics of Geography 
 
The six essential elements assembled from the review of security complex 
literature have their origins in the social sciences rather than a geographic 
ontology. Further development of the ―hybrid‖ theory necessitates correction of 
this inadequacy, for in the end, all of the future state and non-state actors likely to 
exert increasing influence over the poles are geographically separated from these 
respective regions. Given that the future security of the Arctic and Antarctica is 
the crucial point to which this thesis is directed, then the role geography plays in 
determining events arising from the political/military sectors warrants a detailed 
examination.  
Geography‘s role in determining outcomes on the battlefield remains beyond 
question. However, no matter how much technology changes or whatever the 
differences in population or resources are, there are certain strict rules of warfare 
that should to be observed. Sun Tzu, a Chinese ruler and strategist who lived in 
the Confusion era, more than 2,400 years ago, had determined certain rules of war 
even before the time of Alexander the Great. Sun Tzu‘s strategic acumen forms 
the basis of a small acclaimed book, The Art of War.
1
 Of the thirteen chapters in 
this book, four chapters deal specifically with the relationship between geography 
and military affairs. This relationship may assume a tactical guise when, for 
example, a general commanding one of the opposing forces makes use of the 
nuisances of terrain to gain a victory on the battlefield.
2
 More importantly for this 
thesis, geography can also assume a strategic dimension highlighted by Sun Tzu‘s 
as the ―focal ground.‖3 Sun Tzu explains the focal ground as ―[t]he area which is 
at the junction of three states is focal. He who gets control of it will gain the 
support of surrounding states…. On focal ground, make allies of those states…. 
And I should consolidate my alliances.‖4  
                                                 
1
 See  Hauzhang Tao, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, Wordsworth, Ware, Hertfordshire, 1993. 
2
 Ibid., p. 71. 
3
 Ibid., p. 72. 
4
 Ibid. 
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Focal ground is considered to be outside of one‘s own territory, but it is 
strategically most important. The state that occupies it first will be the state that 
ultimately finds itself in the most favourable position. By definition, since the 
focal ground is outside one‘s boundary, it need not be contiguous and can be some 
distance away. Under one interpretation of Sun Tzu‘s writings the ―[f]ocal ground 
is a junction which extends in all directions. Take hold of it first and the others 
will obey you. It gives security to get but is dangerous to lose.‖5 This passage 
mentions also the wisdom of alliances and allies, clearly illustrating that Sun Tzu 
intended to adopt the full breath of geopolitical and geo-economic means to gain 
support from the state in which the focal ground is situated.
6
 
According to Sun Tzu‘s explanation of focal ground, a number of 
strategically important locations for the Cold War protagonists were identified by 
Hauzhang: the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bosporus—the 
three passages to the Mediterranean Sea; the Strait of Malacca, between Indonesia 
and Malaysia; the Panama Canal in Central America; and Persian Gulf and Gulf 
of Mexico—one each in the eastern and western hemispheres.7 However, a natural 
link between these two hemispheres, Drake‘s Passage, warranted no mention.  
Both Cold War superpowers committed much political effort and treasure to 
the pursuit of bringing these focal grounds and the states that surround them 
within their sphere of influence. While the Soviet Union was unable to 
permanently garner any of these focal ground within its ideological orbit, it did 
persuade Turkey with a billion dollar ―aid‖ package to grant a right of passage for 
the aircraft carrier Kiev through the Straits of Bosporus into the Mediterranean 
Sea in contravention of an international treaty.
8
 What the Soviet Union achieved 
was in line with Sun Tzu dictum: ―One should attach enough importance to giving 
aid….‖ 9  This interpretation of Sun Tzu‘s principle would locate the historical 
origins of ―geopolitics‖ in China some twenty-four centuries prior to the 
conceptual theory, popularly attributed to the Englishman, Sir Halford Mackinder.   
 
 
                                                 
5
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8
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9
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Defining geopolitics 
Geopolitics is an ontology that theorists along with international relations 
practitioners either embrace or detest. For some commentators it is an ideology 
that can explain every machination behind the actions taken by states in the 
international arena, while for others, there are no ―ideologies…as whimsically all-
encompassing, as romantically obscure, as intellectually sloppy, and as likely to 
start a third world war as the theory of ―geopolitics.‖‘10  This dialectic could be 
responsible for Colin Flint suggesting that the very concept of geopolitics was ―up 
for grabs‖ now that the causes and goals of territorial conflicts have become 
progressively broader.
11
  
There is no universally accepted definition of ―geopolitics.‖ One definition 
put forward is that the term arose out of the study of ―[S]tates in the context of 
global spatial phenomena, in an attempt to understand both the bases of State 
power and the nature of States‘ interactions with one another.‖12 A more crisp 
definition is offered by Philip Kelly who suggests that ―geopolitics signifies the 
impact of certain geographical factors on a country‘s foreign policy.‖13 However, 
this definition seemingly devalues the role of political power, which is an issue 
picked up by Colin Gray in his iteration of Saul Cohen‘s definition that 
geopolitics refers to ―the relation of international political power to the 
geographical setting.‖14 On a continent that still strongly subscribes to the 
geopolitical ontology – South America – the relationship between geography and 
politics is encompassed in the term ‗political geography.‘15 A cynical definition of 
this term is offered by Klaus Dodds, who considers political geography ―a form 
geographical reasoning rather than as a rigid policy mindset [which] can indicate 
how political, scientific and media elites ―manufacture‖ a place and then use that 
construction to justify or legitimate their … policies or claims to territory.‖16 
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 See Gray, Colin S., ‗The continued primacy of geography,‘ Orbis, Vol. 40, No. 2, Spring 1996. 
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Dodds‘ definition gives geopolitics a constructivist‘s twist by way of the speech 
act typology. 
The most workable definition of geopolitics is the one proposed by 
Streusand as ―the study of international relations from a spatial or geographic 
perspective.‖17 Because of its brevity this definition deserves an expansive 
description as provided by Kelly and Child. 
 
Geopolitics [i]s the impact on foreign and security policies of 
certain geographical features, the more important among these 
being locations among countries, distance between areas, and 
terrain, climate, and resources within states. Geopolitics might 
also be described as the relationship between power politics and 
geography. The usefulness of geopolitical analysis derives in part 
from the formation of broad linkages or theories among these 
geographic features and policies, linkages that bring insight to 
international relationships. Geopolitics…represents one method 
for studying foreign and strategic affairs, and it relates as much to 
planning for peace as it does to military involvement.
18
  
 
This is a salient description within the context of this thesis, for it locates within 
the geopolitical ontology two essential geophysical elements – climate or climate 
change and natural resources – both of which are assuming an increasing 
importance in the development of contemporary interstate relations.
19
 These two 
elements have historic import for Halford MacKinder refers both climate and 
resources, either explicitly or implicitly, in his ‗three Rs‘ expression of the pivotal 
factors that gave the Heartland its critical importance – resources, railways and 
remoteness.
20
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 A chronology of geopolitics  
Although it might be possible to argue that geopolitics is a relic bequeathed to the 
here-and-now by Sun Tzu, as an analytical approach its formal origins go back no 
further than the latter half of the nineteenth century. The origin of geopolitics
21
 is 
attributed to the German geographer Fredrich Ratzel (1844-1904) who having 
fallen under the influence of Social Darwinism used similes and metaphors from 
biology in order to compare the state with an organism. Ratzel‘s theory on the 
organic state can be summarized thus: 
 
The State is land, with man on the land, linked by the State 
and conforming to natural laws, with development tied to the 
natural environment. Therefore, States, like plants and 
people, do not do well in deserts or polar regions. States 
need food in the form of Lebensraum (living space) and 
resources, and they constantly compete for them. They live 
through stages of youth, maturity, and old age, with possible 
rejuvenation. The vitality of a State can generally be gauged 
by its size at a given point.
22
 
(Emphasis in the original) 
 
Unlike Ratzel, who was known to be a careful scientist, Rudolf Kjellén (1864-
1922) being inspired by the formers work in political geography, but in 
contravention of good scientific practice, insisted flatly that the state was an 
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organism. Moreover, Kjellén, like Ratzel, saw the state in a condition of constant 
competition with other states, where larger states would extend their power over 
smaller ones until ultimately the world would comprise only a few very large and 
extremely powerful countries. Kjellén is credited with being the originator of the 
terms Geopolitik and Autarky,
23
 while his political philosophies were seized upon 
as state building tools by all three Second World War Axis powers.
24
  
While Ratzel and Kjellén concentrated their attention on the state, other 
scholars were attempting to discern global patterns of development and 
behaviour. The first was Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), a United States naval 
historian. Mahan argued that control of sea lanes to protect commerce and wage 
economic warfare was very important for any state. He also advocated for a large 
navy. Mahan‘s glimpse of the world at the end of the nineteenth century is 
revealing for it differs little from that portrayed a decade later by the Englishman 
Halford Mackinder. Mahan recognized a core area in Asia and Russian the 
domination of which he anticipated would result in a struggle between Russian 
land power and British sea power. Mahan presumed that British sea power would 
be able to contain Russian expansionism. What is more, well before the turn of 
the twentieth century Mahan was predicting that the containment of Russia and 
control over China would become the joint concern of the United States, Great 
Britain, Germany and Japan.
25
         
Contrary to Mahan, who placed primacy on sea power, the Englishman Sir 
Halford John MacKinder (1861-1947) felt that the great age of naval warfare was 
over and that changing technology, especially railways, had altered the existing 
relationship between sea and land power in favour of land power. In 1904, 
Mackinder read a paper to the Royal Geographical Society in London entitled 
―The Geographical Pivot of History.‖ This paper has become the seminal essay on 
global geopolitics and is still discussed and evaluated today more than a century 
later. MacKinder‘s paper can be précised thus: there is a Eurasian core area that, 
protected by inaccessibility from naval forces, could shelter a land power that 
might come to dominate the world from its continental fortress. This Eurasian 
core MacKinder termed the Pivot Area, which he later renamed the ―Heartland.‖ 
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Two geographical characteristics of this region are; its rivers drain into the Arctic 
and distances to warm oceans are great, with only the Baltic and Black Seas 
offering passageways for sea power penetration and these are easily defended. To 
MacKinder the Eurasian territory — an area he later termed the ―World Island,‖ 
conceptually comprised Eurasia and Africa – would become the centre of great a 
power that would dominate East and South Asia, as well as Europe. Within this 
spatial agglomeration MacKinder presumed there would be substantial resources, 
certainly sufficient to sustain a power of world significance.
26
  
The greatest threat to the ―World Island‖ MacKinder argued lay in Eastern 
Europe for it was an ―open door‖ to the ―Heartland.‖ Thus MacKinder formulated 
his now famous hypothesis: 
 
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island 
Who rules the World-Island rules the World 
27
  
 
In 1924, MacKinder acknowledged both the passing of a previous era and the 
lesson learned from World War I with a little known counterhypothesis to his 
Heartland theory. In this counterhypothesis Mackinder conceded that the 
potentialities of the Heartland could be balanced in the future by Western Europe 
and North America, which would ―constitute for many purposes a single 
community of nations.‖28  The ocean – the North Atlantic – that separated the two 
halves of this community he simply termed the ―Midland Ocean.‖29  
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Map 8.    MacKinder‘s pivot area. 
Source: http://www.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Geopolitics   
 
 
Among MacKinder‘s many critics was a United States citizen of Dutch origins 
Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1943), a professor of international relations at 
Yale University. Spykman found two basic weaknesses with Mackinder‘s 
theories. First was MacKinder‘s over-emphasis on the power potential of the 
Heartland when its importance was greatly reduced by significant internal 
transportation difficulties and by access through barriers that surround it. Second, 
the real power potential of Eurasia lay not within the Heartland but, in what 
MacKinder termed the ―Inner or Marginal Crescent.‖ Spykman called this region 
the Rimland:
30
 a region vulnerable to sea and land powers and thus it must operate 
in both modes. Also, historically, alliances have always been concluded among 
Rimland powers or between Heartland and Rimland powers. In recognition of 
these concerns Spykman proposed his own dictum:  
 
Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; 
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.
31
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At the conclusion of the Second World War Spykman advocated that the Allies 
base their post-war policy on preventing any consolidation within the Rimland. 
While there is no evidence that George Kennan — originator of the Cold War 
―containment‖ policy favoured by the United States – ever read Spykman, a 
derivative of the Rimland policy was fundamental to the anticommunist position 
taken by the Western powers during the Cold War.
32
  
During the inter-war years (1918-1939) a new school of geopolitics 
developed in Germany, and chief among its originators was Karl Haushofer 
(1869-1946). Haushofer, who became a professor of geopolitics through 
sponsorship of the Nazi Rudolf Hess, believed in two concepts which he drew 
together to form his version of Kjellén‘s geopolitiks or the ‗physical structure of 
the State.‘33 First, was that certain aspects of politics can be learned as if they 
were a science and secondly, the prefix geo was used to rid politics of ―arid 
theories and senseless phrases which might trap our political leaders into hopeless 
Utopias:‖34 the prefix relates politics to the soil. Haushofer drew upon the theories 
of those geopoliticians that preceded him to which he added German chauvinism, 
some wilful ambiguity and mysticism to create a case for German expansionism. 
The notion of Lebensraum was drawn from Ratzel, but distorted to justify as 
―natural‖ Germany‘s growth at the expense of its weaker neighbours, particularly 
Czechoslovakia and Poland.
35
 Haushofer believed that if Germany was to become 
a great power then it had to emerge out of the narrowness of its present living 
space and into the freedom of the world. And that this task had to be approached 
scientifically using the methodologies of geopolitics to study the problems of 
boundaries, human settlement and migration. He firmly believed in a phrase 
awarded to his academic mentor Erich von Drygaslski that ―We [the German 
people] must see foreign nations as they really are, not as we would like them to 
be.‖36 Realism should trump idealism every time! 
In 1943, MacKinder was asked to consider whether his strategic concept of 
a ―Heartland‖ had lost any import under conditions of modern warfare. Upon 
reflection he felt that the map of the original Heartland lacked a certain 
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preciseness which he rectified with a more detailed description. The territory of 
the Soviet Union is equivalent to the Heartland except that there was now no 
eastward projection beyond the Lena River — the territory stretching eastward 
from the river to the Pacific Ocean MacKinder called ―Lenaland.‖37 While the 
Heartland concept is seen as MacKinder‘s great contribution to geopolitics he is 
responsible for another geographical division of the world base on a dividing 
girdle whose pivot point was the North Pole.  
 
 
Map 9.   Mackinder‘s world divided by a latitudinal girdle. 
Source: Author. 
 
The above map is a stylized illustration of the division of the world into two 
major regions; the regions of Deserts and Wilderness and Great Ocean Drainage. 
In Africa and Asia the dividing girdle tracks the southern limit of the desert 
biome, while in North America it marks out the lower extremities of the montane 
and taiga biomes. In replicating biological schisms MacKinder‘s geopolitical 
division of the world tends to follow a natural latitudinal patterning.     
The importance of MacKinder‘s geographical division in the immediate 
post-World War II era rests on which side of the girdle economic resources must 
be directed in order to garner greatest global prosperity. For MacKinder the 
answer was obvious, the area within the desert/wilderness realm for ―lest a whole 
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civilization should deliquesce into chaos.‖38 The prospect for those on the other 
side of the girdling line was not necessarily bleak, for MacKinder foresaw that 
China would ultimately bring prosperity to that region. 
Also in the immediate Post-World War II era there occurred an interesting 
irony: Americans vilified geopolitics as a Nazi enterprise resulting in its virtual 
disappearance from academic studies,
39
 while at the same time the United States 
government was developing its role as a world power guided by the strategic 
tenets of geopolitics.  This resurgence of geostrategy was led by Alexander P. de 
Seversky (1894-1974) who strongly advocated the use of airpower now that ―the 
twilight of sea power‖40 was imminent. Seversky was an isolationist who urged 
the withdrawal from overseas based as they represented nothing more that costly 
luxuries. His geopolitical theory is notable for its emphasis upon the Polar 
Regions as new zones of conflict and his use of a map drawn on an azimuthally 
equidistant projection centred on the North Pole to show clearly just how close 
the United States and Soviet Union really were. This map illustrated the vast areas 
of air dominance displayed by both superpowers and how these areas overlapped 
over the North Pole in what de Seversky called the ―Area of Decision.‖41 As a 
result of this ―new‖ world view the United States and Canada constructed three 
lines of radar stations and airbases in the vast wilderness of Alaska and Northern 
Canada. 
 
Futurecasting geopolitic 
Given the vilification of geopolitic at the end of World War II it is not surprising 
that some commentators sought to consign the ontology to the dustbin of history. 
This certainly would have occurred if major interstate wars had no future as 
maintained by Christopher J. Fettweis in his double claim that ―at the upper levels 
of international relations geopolitical analysis is already as obsolete as major war 
itself.‖ 42 (Emphasis in the original.) Fettweis does however, subscribe to a more 
contentious theory that during the twenty-first century the world will divide into 
two zones, one of peace and prosperity, the other represented by ―turmoil‖ 
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displayed as political instability and communal violence. These two zones will 
inevitably clash as evidenced by the terrorism of September 11
th
 2001, which 
stands as a contemporary example of the struggle between the ―haves‖ and ―have-
nots.‖ Therefore, instead of being concerned with MacKinderian geopolitics 
politicians should concern themselves with relations of those states within this 
zone of turmoil, rather than those between great powers.
43
 Fettweis‘ contentions 
have failed to find favour as evinced by the Cold War, when foreign policy for 
many Western countries followed a United States lead to ensure, in terms of 
classic geopolitics, ―that no single power would dominate the Eurasian 
landmass.‖44 These geopolitical concepts did not occur by accident; rather, 
―[f]rom Harry S. Truman to George Bush, the overarching vision of U.S. national 
security was explicitly geopolitical and directly traceable to the heartland theory 
of MacKinder.‖45 During the Cold War geopolitics was resurrected as an 
academically acceptable discipline, while, moreover, in the popular media any 
overseas foreign policy controversy was, by virtue of its geographical location, 
―geopolitical.‖ Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of whom have 
served as a National Security Adviser to the White House, are credited with 
geopolitics academic resurrection, which should come as no surprise since both 
were formally educated in Europe where great importance was attached to both 
geopolitics in international affairs and geostrategic analysis in the pursuit of 
foreign policy goals.
46
 That geopolitics continues to captivate America‘s politico-
military polity was demonstrated twice during the presidency George Bush Junior, 
first with the Afghan War of 2001, and secondly the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Futurecasting geopolitics into the twenty-first century is open to a surfeit of 
criticism. However, that prospect has not dissuaded numerous commentators from 
predicting the future. For ardent scholars of geopolitics, such as Colin Gray, the 
future is but a natural extension of the past. He finds compelling the idea that 
major wars will arise when and if powers of the ‗Midland Ocean,‘ pre-eminently 
the United States, endeavour to deny Eurasian powers global domination. Under 
this scenario the most probable menace will come from an axis of China and 
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Russia. However, there is a possibility, be it remote, that an axis could be 
established between China and EU-Europe. Should that occur Gray foresees both 
Japan and India being forced into an alignment with a new United States led 
maritime coalition, perhaps with Russia as a weak continental partner. 
Conversely, from another geopolitical perspective, it could be argued that the 
great continental powers of Eurasia could forge a strategic alliance for the 
expressed purpose of humbling a hegemonic America.
47
 With all of these 
variations MacKinder‘s theory holds true. 
The United States National Intelligence Council would find little 
disagreement with Gray‘s views, for by 2025 the Council expects that a single 
―international community‖ of states will no longer exist and power will be 
dispersed amongst many emerging states thereby weakening traditional Western 
alliances. Rather than emulating Western models of political and economic 
development, many countries are expected to be attracted to China‘s alternative 
model of ―state capitalism.‖ The adoption of that model will exacerbate the 
transfer of relative wealth and economic power from the West to the East, a 
process now firmly underway.
48
 This point was emphasised by attendees at the 
Group of 20 Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, when they laid stress on the rising 
importance of this emerging-states economic forum relative to the older Western-
dominated G-7.
49
 It is conceivable that as a result of states investing in their 
economic wellbeing, global geopolitical stability will increase. However, the 
transfer of wealth could strengthen states such as Russia that are bent on 
challenging Western order.
50
  
Notwithstanding geopolitics traditional roots, a number of geopolitians view 
the twenty-first century through a different lens, foreseeing the rise of non-
traditional problems as the biggest threat to global harmony. For these adherents, 
                                                 
47
 See Gray, Colin S., Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 
2005, p. 150. Little difference is detectable between the views of Gray and those for example of 
Thomas Barnett and Michael Ignatieff, See Barnet, Thomas P.M., ‗The Pentagon‘ New Map‘, and 
Ignatieff, Michael, ‗The American Empire: The Burden,‘ both cited in Ó Tuathail, Gearóid, Simon 
Dalby and Paul Routledge (eds.), The Geopolitics Reader, Routledge, London, 2006, pages 151-
154 and 155-163 respectively.  
48
 See Reuters et al., ‗Power shifts to emerging nations,‘ Weekend Herald, Auckland,               
September 26, 2009, p. A20. 
49
 Ibid. Group of 20 or G-20 comprises the world‘s twenty most industrialized states. G-7or Group 
of Seven is comprised of the seven highly industrialized Western States.   
50
 See National Intelligence Council, ―Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,‖ United States 
Government Printing Office, November 2008, p. iv, 
http://www.dni.govt/nic/NIC_2025_project.html   (23 November 2008). 
 116 
nascent threats are represented by pandemics, bioterrorism, environmental 
degradation, climate change, nuclear fallout, ozone-layer depletion and violent 
competition over natural resources. Thus, geopolitical emphasis is moving away 
from its traditional military/political dimension to an environmental prescription 
in recognition of the explicit geographical danger these threats present.
51
 In 
identifying these new geopolitical threats Simon Dalby shows insight by 
commenting that ―[m]ost of them have imprecise geographies; they are only 
sometimes mapped, but are always understood as threats out there somewhere that 
threaten our well-being in the supposed safe domestic spaces of our lives and 
communities.‖52 This is the new agenda of global security in the age of 
geopolitical terror and bio-anxiety.
53
 Although each of these new geopolitical 
threats is the subject of an increasing library of academic works, a review of 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis except those works concerned with 
climate change and the scarcity of natural resources.  
Of these two topics, natural resources have become the focus of a recently 
established sub-genre of geopolitics known as ―geo-economics.‖ The geo-
economics typology can be defined as the study of the spatial, temporal and 
political aspects of economics and resources. It is under this rubric that 
commentators suggest that a state‘s foreign policy should not be governed by the 
wanton historical precepts of the Cold War, since the world has entered an era of 
economic conflict, especially over resources.
54
 Indeed, there is in geo-economic 
literature a preponderance of references to existing or looming resource 
imbroglios that have or will bring world powers into economic conflict. These 
conflicts are the result of attempts by private or state-owned organisations, with or 
without state support, to secure unto them alone or deny competitors access to 
natural resources in a foreign country. That such competition exacerbates tensions 
between competing countries is evidenced by the friction that exists between 
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China and the United States over Africa‘s oil reserves,55 China and Japan over 
access to Siberian oil
56
 and Russian claims to the Arctic seabed in an attempt to 
deny other Arctic-rim states access to potentially significant reserves of oil and 
other minerals.
57
  
The geo-economics of natural resources has recently assumed an alternate 
guise that has given the typology, at least for the present, a less confrontational 
facade. One of the lingering effects of the 2007-08 food-price crises is the 
proliferation of farmland acquisitions in developing countries by developed states 
seeking to ensure their own future food security. Increased pressures on natural 
resources, water scarcity, export restrictions imposed by producer countries when 
food prices were high, and growing distrust in the functioning of regional and 
global markets has pushed states short of land and water to find alternate means of 
producing food for home consumption. While such acquisitions hold the potential 
to inject much-needed capital into local agriculture and the economy of poor rural 
areas in host countries there exists a danger that these land purchases will have a 
detrimental impact on poor local people, who risk losing access to and control 
over land on which they depend.
58
 As the number of such land purchases 
increases throughout the Third World, the United Nations has expressed concern 
that the ghost of colonialism - ―neo-colonialism‖ 59 - will again plague Africa 
where Malthusian worries are gaining credence.
60
 ―Land grabbing‖ is not without 
a violent face as demonstrated during 2009 when the Malagasy people violently 
overthrew of their government, in part, to prevent one million hectares of land 
being leased for 99 years to the South Korean firm Daewoo Logistics.
61
 Should 
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the violence that marked Madagascan political crisis become endemic in other 
African states that are either contemplating or have signed similar land-transfer 
arrangements i.e. Angola, Egypt, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania,
62
 to name but five 
host countries, then Sub-Sahara Africa may once again become a geopolitical 
―shatterbelt‖ reminiscent of the 1970s-80s.        
  
Shatterbelts 
A lesser known concept within the geopolitical ontology is that of ―Shatterbelts‖ 
also known as ―Crush Zones‖ or ―Shatter Zones.‖ The concept likely originated 
with Mahan who studied a belt of weak Middle Eastern and Asian states lying 
between latitudes 30˚ and 40˚ North which, due to their perceived wealth in 
natural resources, attracted the competition of extra-regional powers—notably 
Great Britain and Russia.
63
 MacKinder ascribed the same term to those states in 
East and Central Europe, which after the cessation of the First World War 
hostilities were unlucky enough to be geographically located between Russia and 
Germany.
64
 A similar ascription was also awarded to this same rim of states by 
George Hoffman nearly forty years later in an attempt to ensure that Western 
powers did not overlook the economic and human resource importance of those 
states to the Soviet Union in any forthcoming East-West conflict.
65
 Eastern 
Europe continues to be judged a ―shatterbelt,‖ or ―crush zone,‖ for the same 
reasons the region earned that title in the ninetieth century – great power rivalry 
and the delimitation of the eastern boundary of ‗Europe.‘66  Indeed, the 2008 
Georgian-Russia War was indicative of the continuing instability that festers 
within this particular shatterbelt. 
A matter worth considering is whether in the twenty-first century the 
typology of ―shatterbelts‖ will have universal application beyond the thin rim of 
countries that edge the eastern border of continental Europe. To provide that 
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answer and how the typology might apply to the polar situation, there is a need to 
both define and situate shatterbelts within a quarrelsome global security 
landscape.  
The starting point in this typological exploration is a determination of an 
acceptable definition. According to Philip Kelly, ―shatterbelts,‖ as a traditional 
geopolitical term does not frequently appear in the literature of either geopolitics 
or political science, but when it does, it refers to a distinct type of geographical 
region from which local turmoil escalates into serious conflict among major 
external powers.
67
 Because of the typology‘s impreciseness it has for a long 
period of time been ignored as a means of explaining international tension and 
strife in regions other than Eastern Europe, for instance in East Asia, in the 
Middle East or Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, for the political geographer 
shatterbelts are of particular interest. A large proportion of interstate wars 
seemingly originate from within these unstable regions: for example, in the 
twentieth century, World Wars I and II, the Korean War and the Vietnam conflict. 
Moreover, since the end of the Second World War, most conflicts have occurred 
in the Third World where great power competition along with political and 
economic depression still persists. Frequently these zones of tension are 
strategically positioned, often located close to great power territories or allies and 
are regions in which local or international power vacuums are a common 
tradition.
68
     
Having undertaken a review of both historical and contemporary literature 
Kelly proposed a new and ‗improved‘ definition of a shatterbelt. It was his view 
that any new definition should stress that the colliding interests of major powers 
in a region pose a risk conflict escalation.
69
 Regions need exhibit only the 
necessary amounts of depression, ethnic fragmentation, colonialism, border 
disputes, strategic resource reserves or transportation chokepoints for eligibility as 
a shatterbelt. If these features represent ―why‖ shatterbelts are created, then the 
―how‖ occurs when major powers decide to oppose one another within a regional 
context. History shows that powerful states seriously compete for control of 
certain regions whenever they perceive it is within their national interest to do so, 
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despite the possibility that such competition might escalate towards global war. 
External involvement generally occurs when they perceive that a particular 
territory contains strategic resources, transportation benefits, certain defensive 
positions, sensitive political ties or vital economic benefits for themselves, their 
allies or more importantly for their competitors.
70
 
Nevertheless, serious competition among great powers for regional control 
does not of itself create a shatterbelt. Such competition is usually linked to spheres 
of influence or to some form of military alliance, for without either a shatterbelt 
will not emerge. For these linkages to occur states within a region must be 
fragmented politically or acutely depressed in order to provide external powers 
with opportunities for establishing alliance footholds. Historically, it is only when 
competition within a specific region occurs that shatterbelts come into existence.
71
  
Kelly, having considered the above factors felt that the traditional shatterbelt 
concept remained too imprecise and inflexible for clear application within the 
context of international conflict. Hence he developed an ‗improved‘ definition:    
 
A shatterbelt is a geographic region for whose control Great 
Powers seriously compete. Great Powers compete because they 
perceive strong interests for doing so and because opportunities 
are presented for establishing alliance footholds with states of the 
region. Consequently, a high potential exists for escalation of 
conflict to major power warfare. A shatterbelt originates when 
rival Great Power footholds are present in an area.
72
  
 
Application of this definition led Kelly to identify six regions as shatterbelts: the 
Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, Southeast Asia, East Asia, South Asia and 
Central (Middle) America.  
Possibly because of the criticism his ‗improved‘ definition attracted,73 
Kelly, barely a decade later, when discussing the geopolitics of South America, 
dispensed with the notion that shatterbelts are conceived through an alliance 
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between local states and competing powerful sponsors. His definition of a 
shatterbelt now became:  
 
[R]egions in which two strategically important countries 
compete for control, with a resulting two-tiered structure of 
interrelated regional and strategic conflicts. Shatterbelts pose a 
danger of escalation, of wars that might spread elsewhere, and 
of smaller countries prompting serious confrontation between 
their larger, strategically important sponsors.
 74
   
   
Even this definition would not appease Hensel and Diehl for it lacks clarity as to 
the mechanisms that lead to the creation of shatterbelts. From a review of current 
literature, Hensel and Diehl discerned three prevailing theme. First, shatterbelt 
regions are composed of ‗weak‘ states; being fragmented in terms of race, 
language, religion and nationality, and also seen as economically underdeveloped. 
Secondly, Shatterbelt regions are seen as being fragmented themselves. States in 
these regions are often mutually antagonistic, leaving them unwilling to co-
operate economically, politically and militarily. Shatterbelts often exhibit 
substantial conflict both within and between states in the region. Finally, 
shatterbelts are the site of substantial foreign military and economic involvement, 
typically attracting the presence of at least two competing major powers.
75
    
Another exponent of the shatterbelt typology is the American geographer 
Saul Cohen who, drawing on the concepts of Mahan, MacKinder, Spykman and 
de Seversky, conceived the entire world as being divided into geostrategic realms 
and geopolitical regions. Unlike Buzan‘s division of the world that changed 
significantly after the Cold War, Cohen‘s concepts have remained relatively 
unaltered for more than four decades. 
Cohen describes the two geostrategic realms as: 
 
One is the trade-Dependent Maritime realm, centring on the North Atlantic Basin with 
outliers in South America and the Western Pacific. The other is the Eurasian Continental realm. It 
focuses on the Eurasian Heartland and also encompasses Central Europe and the East Asian 
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mainland. Neither of geostrategic realms has an intrinsic strategic advantage over the other. 
South Asia is the only geopolitical region that is relatively independent of the two realms….76 
 
 
 
Map 10. Geostrategic realms and geopolitical regions: End of the twentieth century
77
 
Source: Author. 
 
In Cohen‘s hierarchical structure the highest level is occupied by geostrategic 
realms, which are arenas of strategic place and movement. Two characteristics 
mark a difference between them; the Maritime suggests an open trading 
orientation, whereas the Continental is inner-orientated. The Maritime realm also 
has a global reach comprised of five, second tier or geopolitical regions while the 
Eurasian Continental realm comprises just two. Geopolitical regions are fashioned 
by many of the same elements that help shape regional security complexes; 
geographical contiguity, migration, and political, cultural, military and economic 
interaction.
78
 At the close of the twentieth century the seven geopolitical regions 
are North and Middle America; South America, Maritime Europe and the 
Maghhred, Sub-Saharan Africa, Heartlandia, East Asia and Offshore Asia and 
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Oceania.
79
 There is a third level of hierarchy comprised of states, which are 
ordered according to their power positions and functions in the international 
system.
80
  
In common with his division of the world into realms and regions, Cohen‘s 
―operational‖ definition for shatterbelts has also remained largely unchanged for 
forty years. It is: 
 
[S]trategically-orientated regions which are politically fragmented 
areas of competition between the Maritime and Continental 
realms.
81
 
 
According to Cohen the distinguishing features of the shatterbelt are firstly, they 
represent a ―playing-field‖ used by two or more competing major powers82 from 
different geostrategic realms.
83
 Secondly, shatterbelt regions and their boundaries 
are fluid and any change in the geopolitical map can lead to their creation, 
extinction or reappearance.
84
 Finally, in what might be best considered as an 
extension rather than a contradiction of the first distinguishing feature, Cohen 
suggests that shatterbelts can be created in a region, for example the Middle East, 
if it becomes ―highly fragmented internally‖ due to the presence of belligerent 
regional powers, or when ―outside powers cannot guarantee against continued 
turbulence.‖85 Just like Kelly, Cohen has identified possession of oil reserves, 
intraregional migration and economic capital flows, along with access to fresh 
water as major contributing factors that drive regions towards political 
fragmentation and creation of shatterbelts.
86
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Neither Kelly‘s nor Cohen‘s shatterbelt concept has met universal 
acceptance. It can be argued Kelly‘s definitions are too broad, for if applied as 
intended it would encompass the majority of the Third World. Kelly concedes that 
his original definition takes in ―literally all contested regions where escalation to 
global conflict could transpire.‖87  The stumbling-block with Cohen‘s concept is 
its total reliance on the acceptance of the ‗geostrategic realm/geopolitical region‘ 
nomenclature which has not found favour in a world where the notion of spheres 
of influence is considered obsolete, even reprehensible.
88
 Nevertheless, Cohen‘s 
contention that shatterbelt wars were more likely to occur between states that 
occupy the ‗rimland‘ dividing the geostrategic realms is analogist to Samuel 
Huntington‘s ‗fault line wars‘ between clashing civilisations.89 Just as with Kelly 
and Cohen‘s theories, Huntington‘s concept is not without its critics.  
The deriding of his essay The Coming Anarchy has not inhibited Robert 
Kaplan from searching for another geopolitical prescription to explain what he 
perceives as the forthcoming struggle over territory and resources. In a 2009 
essay, Kaplan maintains that geography defines the perimeter of no less than five 
unstable early twenty-first century ―shatter zones.‖ The first of these is 
MacKinder‘s heartland of Eurasia which will become a shatter zone as the states 
within its perimeter proceed to war over territory to accommodate a burgeoning 
and violent urban population that is unable to feed itself.
90
 Notwithstanding this 
looming shortage of agricultural land both Russia and the Ukraine have either sold 
or placed on long-term lease some 600,000 hectares and 400,000 hectares 
respectively to foreign organisations.
91
  
To the south of the Eurasian shatter zone lie three equally unstable regions: 
the Fertile Crescent shatterbelt comprised of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq 
linked together by religious enmities.
92
 Then there is the Arabian Peninsula 
shatterbelt where a densely populated heavily-armed Yemen covets the wealth 
and Lebensraum afforded by Saudi Arabia.
93
 At the region‘s extremity lies the 
Persian Plateau shatter-belt comprised of Iran and the Caspian Sea states, where 
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the inimical politics of oil and pipelines determine interstate relations.
94
 
Christopher Fettweis would concur with Kaplan that the Caspian region is 
destined to become a twenty-first century shatterbelt given that the region will 
transform itself into a ―new Saudi Arabia‖ in the coming decades.95  Kaplan‘s 
fifth shatterbelt is the Indian Subcontinent, where artificial borders delineated by a 
departing colonial power do not reflect regional geography and continue to create 
insecurity and division.
96
 The future of each of these shatter zones remains 
uncertain and conflict is likely especially if the history of great power intervention 
is repeated. 
 
Shatterbelts as the loci for conflict  
In the ontology of geopolitics the term ‗shatterbelt‘ generally refers to a 
geographical region that is historically plagued by conflict. Moreover, shatterbelt 
regions are often blamed for a large proportion of major power wars. Not 
surprisingly, Hensel and Diehl maintain that shatterbelts act as the catalyst that 
drives conflicts higher up the ‗escalatory‘ ladder thereby making disputes more 
dangerous whilst broadening their scope. In their view shatterbelts could offer a 
way of ―understanding how geography can provide the bases for conflict as well 
as condition state behaviour in that conflict.‖97 Such theoretical observations are 
less deterministic than those espoused by Kelly. Based on his empirical analysis 
of twentieth-century major power wars, Kelly is emphatic that ―shatterbelts 
clearly tend to be war-prone.‖98 During the period from 1900 to 1983 seventeen 
out of nineteen major power wars occurred in shatterbelts
99
 and these figures do 
not include either the Gulf War (1991) or the Yugoslavian ‗Wars of 
Disintegration‘ that occurred throughout much of the 1990s. Nor does Kelly‘s 
figure include either of the two major wars of the twenty-first century – the 
Afghanistan conflict and the Iraq War - both of which originated in the Middle 
East shatterbelt.  
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Kelly makes several other observations about the nexus between shatterbelts 
and conflict. First, he echoes Hensel and Diehl in maintaining that shatterbelts 
tend to propel turmoil onto the stage set by great power military rivalry. In this 
escalatory process great powers find it difficult to resist intervening in local affairs 
especially when they perceive their national interests to be in jeopardy. In doing 
so, the likelihood of large-scale warfare increases. Secondly, shatterbelts once 
they emerge usually do not peacefully atrophy. What‘s more, as their existence 
becomes prolonged their spread worsens conditions both locally and 
internationally. Shatterbelts are largely negative contributors to international 
peace reflecting a stalemate amongst great powers unless some states loses 
patience and commit increased resources towards achieving a military solution. 
Finally, because shatterbelts are prominent escalators of conflict, they merit 
greater attention than they are currently afforded.
100
  
In a more comprehensive statistical analysis than that undertaken by Kelly, 
van der Wusten and Nierop explored the role played by ‗second-tier‘ powers – 
regional power centres – in exacerbating conflict along borders of geopolitical 
regions. From their analysis they concluded that shatterbelts exhibit a higher level 
of violence than non-shatterbelt regions for all types of conflict and that 
participation in violence becomes more pronounced over time.
101
 Additionally, 
these authors concluded that shatterbelt regions do matter and that states along the 
borders of geopolitical regions are likely to be conflict-prone.
102
  
Historically, intervention in the affairs of another state was generally 
considered a prerogative that great powers accepted as theirs alone. Citing 
research undertaken by J. H. Leurdijk, van der Wusten and Neirop show that 
during the decades since the Second World War minor powers have intervened in 
the affairs of another country twice as frequently as great powers – 19 out of 27 
cases. Such interventions could have been at the side of a great power, but in no 
less than one third of all interventions no great powers were involved.
103
 
Furthermore, intervention appears to be a shatterbelt phenomenon executed by 
minor powers. Interestingly, it is not those second-order powers identified by 
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Cohen that solely fulfil the role of intervener, for in 11 out of 27 cases the 
intervening state was one not included on Cohen‘s list. 104  
Just like the previous authors, Hensel and Diehl found that most studies of 
shatterbelts largely relied on impressionistic accounts of their effect on the 
international system. These accounts presumed, rather than rigorously tested, the 
hypothesis that states in shatterbelt regions were fragmented internally, and that 
there was substantial conflict both within and between these states. As a result of 
their more ‗rigorous‘ examination Hensel and Diehl concluded in respect to 
interstate conflict that shatterbelt regions were between two and two and a half 
times more likely to experience militarized conflict than non-shatterbelt regions. 
Similarly, shatterbelts were more prone to full-scale wars than other regions.
105
 
Furthermore, interstate wars in shatterbelt regions tend to last longer and be 
bloodier than conflicts occurring in non-shatterbelt regions.
106
 These findings 
generally replicate previous studies of intrastate conflict which show shatterbelts 
are more likely to experience extra-systemic wars and civil wars rather than non-
shatterbelt regions.
107
 Also, shatterbelt conflicts are likely to last up to four times 
longer than in other regions.
108
 The authors‘ final conclusion was that the prospect 
of foreign intervention was twice as likely in extra-systemic wars, four times as 
likely in interstate wars and six times as likely in civil wars occurring in a 
shatterbelt region than in any other region.
109
 However, foreign intervention did 
not necessarily include major powers as an intervening party. 
These studies failed to conclusively ascertain why shatterbelts produce 
longer and more deadly conflicts. Hensel and Diehl suggest that this may be a 
function of a conflicts intractability, the political dynamics existing between states 
within shatterbelts, the provision of arms and other forms of aid by foreign 
sponsors, or the lack of will by the predominant major power in the region to 
arbitrate between minor power states.
110
 Therefore, since the world continues to 
be politically unstable shatterbelt regions are expected to be a feature of the 
international system well into the twenty-first century. 
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Kelly‘s improved definition of a shatterbelt – see page 119 – seemingly 
encompasses the salient elements pertinent to a geopolitical understanding of both 
Polar Regions in the foreseeable future. Adoption of this definition is the result of 
several considerations. First, given that climate change and access to resources 
will impact on both regions the likelihood that two or more strategically important 
countries becoming involved in geopolitical manoeuvrings to gain territorial 
control of either regional ―global common‖ is not easily dismissed. Certainly this 
appears to be what fate holds for the Arctic. Secondly, the presence of numerous 
minor powers with ambition to secure similar access rights as great powers poses 
a danger that existing disputes over sovereignty – and there are many - could 
escalate into serious state-upon-state confrontations that could ultimately draw in 
the great powers. Finally, the potential exists for the centre of such confrontations 
to move away from the Polar Regions and metamorphose into a broader 
continental or systemic conflict.  
 
Shatterbelts: where MacKinder meets Buzan  
Regional security complex theory and geopolitics are not mutually exclusive 
ontologies [typologies] for geography plays a crucial role in determining attitudes 
of countries toward the need to (de)securitize in order to balance against 
aspirations of neighbouring states. Regional security complex theory maintains 
that the closer states are to each other the more heightened their level of security 
interdependence becomes and if this dynamic is exacerbated by lingering enmities 
then states tend to seek security through military preparedness which may find its 
ultimate expression in a region-wide arms dilemma. Upward cascading of arms 
purchases does not of itself mean interstate war, but if a region lies within a 
shatterbelt, then that likelihood of war occurring is significantly increased. The 
Russian-Georgian War is a recent illustrative example of a war in a shatterbelt 
where an arms dilemma occurred. A point also worth noting is that this war was 
restricted to a small geographical area and did not involve other states from within 
the same regional security complex as the two protagonists. 
Geopolitics shows deterministic tendencies in two regional security 
complexes. In Russia, geographical vastness has provided generations of Russian 
with an identity anchor and any geographical reduction to the original, ethnically 
Russian European possessions, would create an intolerable situation where the 
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resultant state would be ―Russian, but not Russia.‖111 Obviously, in order to 
prevent such a situation from occurring geopolitical considerations weigh heavily 
on all Russian foreign policy decisions taken especially in the presence of 
perceived existential threats i.e. the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO). The post-Soviet regional security complex is riven 
with geopolitical manoeuvrings related to alliance choices, shifting patterns of 
loyalties, meddling in the domestic affairs of other countries and the struggle for 
control over natural resources and transportation routes particularly in the ―near 
abroad,‖ which creates instability within this complex and between it and 
adjoining security complexes.
112
  
The South American regional security complex is the other complex cleaved 
by geopolitical overtones concentrated around boundary issues and weak political 
control over a vast, thinly-populated hinterland by states whose authority remains 
concentrated along a coastal margin.
113
 During the 1970s this situation was of 
concern because as states gradually conquered vast tracks of wilderness and 
spread their transportation infrastructure the natural barriers that historically 
separated them disappeared permitting an increase in interstate interactions which 
lead to an increase in interstate violence. In the northern part of the continent this 
was evidenced by a tendency for some of the longstanding border disputes to 
become more manifest, whilst Southern Cone countries moved in the opposite 
direction.
114
 However, on a continent where geopolitics governs international 
relations, nothing is as it seems. If an Argentine suggestion had been adopted that 
―more accurately‖ reflected certain historical and geographical circumstance then 
the Southern Cone area would be replaced by a ―new‖ geopolitical region that 
excluded Brazil.
115
 Such a structure might well lead to the resumption of past 
animosities between Brazil and Argentina and the resurrection of the historic 
Spanish-Portuguese La Plata shatterbelt.  
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As discussed in Chapter Four, Argentina is located within both the South 
American regional security complex and the Southern Cone subcomplex, while 
the Malvinas/Falkland Islands are a constituent of the former they are not 
incorporated into the latter. Whereas regional security complex theory 
unnecessary complicates an analysis of this region, geopolitics provides simple 
description of interstate relations in the South Atlantic Ocean. Within Argentina 
there remains simmering discontentment concerning the loss of sovereignty over 
the Malvinas and their continued ―occupation‖ by Great Britain. An Argentine 
institutional view located the 1982 Falkland Island conflict within the broader 
global context of deteriorating Cold War East/West relations. In this context the 
South Atlantic was perceived by NATO as a weakness that the Soviets might 
exploit to threaten the West‘s hegemony over the North Atlantic.116 Thus the need 
for Great Britain to retain sovereignty over its South Atlantic archipelago stems 
from the security threat posed by the Soviet fleet and was related to a strategic 
view that ―whoever dominates South Atlantic traffic will dominate northern 
maritime Europe and the ‗U.S. Atlantic.‘‖117 The influence of MacKinder on such 
Argentine geostrategic thinking is obvious. 
What is also evident is that the South Atlantic – a geographical rectangle 
extending east from Argentina to Southern Africa and then south to Antarctica – 
had, in Argentinean geostrategic thinking, become indistinguishable from 
Argentina‘s own continental space (Patagonia) and that Great Britain‘s 
―occupancy‖ of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands had transformed the region as a 
whole into a shatterbelt.
118
 Norberto Ceresole is clear about the detrimental effect 
that this shatterbelt has had on the future of Argentine security with his assertion 
that ―[a] shatterbelt in the interior of our national space is the clearest possible 
threat to our real interests in that space and is the clearest and most precise factor 
which threatens our security.‖119 This view no doubt lies at the heart of Argentine 
disgruntlement with the current geopolitical arrangement in the South Atlantic and 
portends of a war yet to come.    
Shatterbelts will continue to evolve within, overlap or supersede regional 
security complexes whenever the geostrategic elements that give rise to their 
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establishment dominate interstate relations. It is also feasible for the shatterbelt 
typology to offer a geopolitical explanation of interstate relations in geographical 
regions where a regional security complex is absent.  
Regional security complex theory is not an all-encompassing analytical 
explanation of every security problem for it can only help to explain security 
problems within the context of the relevant security complex as a whole. For 
example, in practice it could not be used to explain or justify what Buzan 
considers to be a ‗misguided‘ idea, the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace.
120
 According to Buzan, the Indian Ocean per se is in no sense a 
maritime security complex, and given that it is bounded by five non-maritime 
regional security complexes there is no prospect of it containing all the divergent 
interests within and across its notional boundaries.
121
 However, a different picture 
emerges if the Indian Ocean is viewed through a geopolitical lens. 
Notwithstanding Buzan‘s concerns, Ceresole, citing Bernard Cohen, 
contends that globally there are three great geopolitical ―world‖ of which one has 
formed around the Indian Ocean basin and that between these three ―worlds‖ 
shatterbelts exist.
122
 The immediate importance to this thesis of Cohen‘s 
geostrategic vision lies in his affirmation that the Indian Ocean can be considered 
a shatterbelt which, according to Buzan and Wæver is an unstructured security 
region.
123
 Since the high Arctic and Antarctica are also unstructured security 
regions then the implication arising from this Indian Ocean example is clear - 
there is nothing germane to either the geopolitical or security complex ontologies 
which prevent a combination of regional security complex and shatterbelt 
typologies being applied to either region. If in the future either Polar Region 
became the centre of or incorporated into a regional security complex, then a 
section,
124
 rather that the whole, could at the same time become a shatterbelt 
providing appropriate typological criteria are met. It is difficult to conceive of an 
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entire regional security complex being a shatterbelt since the former typology 
describes the process by which states become welded into a regional group 
through security interdependence, while the latter typology identifies a congealing 
of states that are on the cusp of war.  
Ceresole may be proved correct in his assertion that Argentina, having 
become disenchanted with its position on the margin of the Western-orientated 
Trade Dependent Maritime Realm, will, along with many other countries in the 
―South‖ align itself with the Eurasian Continental Realm, although one that no 
longer pivots around the defunct Soviet empire
125
 but on Asia‘s rising superpower 
– China. If this scenario should come to pass at the same time as both realms 
attach importance to Antarctica‘s geostrategic location or to its mineral wealth, 
then the next war in the South Atlantic might be fought not between states but 
between geostrategic realms in a manner foreseen by MacKinder.     
In the twenty-first century the nomenclature of geostrategic realms has been 
superseded by geopolitical regions. This change became necessary as a means of 
differentiating the twin realms of MacKinder‘s era from the contemporary 
multipolar world with its multiplicity of geopolitical regions.
126
 Given that 
shatterbelts are most likely to form along the boundaries of adjoining geopolitical 
regions
127
 Cohen‘s geopolitical map of the twenty-first century displays just how 
important both Polar Regions could become. 
Map 11 illustrates that the boundaries of all but one geopolitical region (East 
Asia) converge at either pole; three at the Arctic and four at the Antarctic 
respectively. If, as a consequence of climate change, the current international 
interest in the mineral wealth and transportation opportunities in the Arctic is 
indicative of the future, then the both Polar Regions can expect heightened 
interest in territorial ―ownership‖ rights. The sponsors of such inquiry are initially 
likely to be the regional second-order powers,
128
 especially if there is an absence 
of great power interest. Intrusion by great powers often exacerbates tensions over 
sovereignty forcing regional states to choose between the great powers thereby 
                                                 
125
 Kelly and Child, op. cit., pp. 63-66. 
126
 Demko and Wood, Reordering the World, op.cit., p. 57. 
127
 Ibid., pp. 53-55. 
128
 For a list of Cohen‘s major and 2nd order powers see Note 79. However, it is inevitable that a 
different clutch of great and second-order powers will arise during the course of the 21
st
 century 
resulting in a change to global power polarity and consequently the shape and location of 
geopolitical regions. Cohen‘s division of the world must therefore be considered transitory.      
 133 
creating a milieu beneficial to the rise of a shatterbelt. If this dynamic was 
sufficiently strong and enduring then it could force a transformation upon regional 
security complexes as states realign their allegiances to reflect a new regional 
political order. 
 
 
Map 11. Geopolitical regions in the twenty-first century.
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Source: Author. 
 
Towards a composite theory 
Three related security typologies have been examined in order to garner together a 
suite of the ―useful‖ theoretical elements to form the essential structure of a 
―hybrid‖ theory. The seventh element defines an extreme point along the security 
continuum where security against state-on-state aggression appears to be failing 
and interstate relations become progressively directed towards war. In that 
context, such wars will likely occur along the unstable margins between 
geopolitical regions (realms) and involve the constituent states within each region 
(realm) just as MacKinder intuited. It appears inevitable that both Polar Regions, 
being loci from which the majority of these unstable margins radiate across the 
globe, will mirror the margin‘s instability and proclivity for conflict. It is this 
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convergence that likely to make both poles two of the more significant ―focal 
grounds‖ of the twenty-first century.130  
Shatterbelts, like politico-resource security complexes, will tend to be 
overlay classical regional security complexes imposing a further complexity upon 
an already complicated over-lapping cleavage of regional security interests. The 
seven elements that now describe the essential structure of the ―hybrid‖ theory 
are:  
  
1. boundary, which differentiates the SC from its neighbours; 
2. anarchic structure, which means that the SC must be composed of 
two or more autonomous units, but geographical contiguity is not 
mandatory; 
3. polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units;  
4. social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity 
among the units;  
5. the intensity of security externalities on both regional and non-
regional units; and  
6. issues formed within non-traditional security sectors can legitimately 
create security complexes providing elements 1 to 4 are met.  
7. competition for control over a geographic region by strategically important 
states is indicative of a ‗shatterbelt region‘ that can overlay security complexes, 
unstructured security regions or a grouping of the two. 
N.B. Element #5 is not an absolute pre-requisite since for major powers non-traditional issues can 
elicit a similar response to that of ‗externalities.‘ 
 
The role of the final chapter in Part II is to draw together all seven elements into a 
theory with the intention of identifying those facilitating conditions that in the 
future might transform the Arctic and Antarctica into a security complex.  
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Chapter Seven  
 
Conclusion: A Compendium of Theories  
 
There is no shortage of theories purporting to explain the ontology of International 
Relations. According the International Relations Theory web site there exist no 
fewer than one hundred and two separate theories purporting to explain events and 
phenomena common to world politics.
1
 Indeed, some commentators such as the 
American emeritus professor Ole R. Holsti maintain that certain international 
relations theories have been shown to be more ideational rather than material; 
being less of a theory than an approach through which to gain an understanding of 
inter-state relations.
2
 Holsti cites constructivism as an example. As an approach, 
constructivism has been used to analysis the origins, the consequences of norms 
and culture in a broad range of settings. And it might well offer a fruitful 
contribution to the persisting debates on the ―democratic peace‖ thesis.3 
Moreover, Holsti maintains that constructivism bears considerable resemblance to 
the venerable social science dictum that individuals perceive their environment 
through the lenses of belief systems
4
 and therefore ―[i]t is what we think the world 
is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour.‖5 Even if this 
image is in some sense ―wrong‖ so that the ―truth‖ and the image of the ―truth‖ 
don‘t coincide ―it is always the image, not the truth that immediately determines 
behaviour.‖6 Constructivism is considered an attempt by a contemporary 
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generation of political scientist to refine, if not redefine, international relations 
theory into an acceptable ―image,‖ just as their predecessors had sought to do.7 
Despite Holsti‘s disparaging comments about constructivism, whether or not 
something qualifies as a theory often depends on where it originated, for there is 
no universal definition. Europeans often use the term to describe anything that 
organizes a field systematically, structures questions and establishes a coherent 
and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and categories. However, on the other 
side of the Atlantic, the Americans often demand that a theory meticulously 
explains phenomena or is able to generate testable hypotheses of a causal nature.
8
 
This lack of uniformity is compounded by an impression that international 
relations, like other social sciences rests on a shakier theoretical foundation than 
does the natural sciences.
9
 Such foundational uncertainty results in some 
international relations theory for example, ―offensive realism,‖ remaining 
provisional in the sense that it is a hypothesis that can never be categorically 
proved no matter how many times the results of an experiment agree with the 
theory, for there is no certainty that the next result will not contradict the theory. It 
is easy to disprove a theory for all that is needed is a single observation that 
disagrees with a theory‘s premise.10 Perhaps all social science theories can never 
obtain a theoretical status greater than that of a hypothesis.     
In its simplest form a theory is nothing more than a model, or a restricted 
part thereof, plus a set of rules that relate quantities in the model to observations 
made. It exists only in the human mind.
11
 Furthermore, as Stephen Hawking 
maintains a good theory must satisfy two requirements: It must accurately 
describe a large class of observations on the basis of a model that contains just a 
few arbitrary elements and it must also make definite predictions about the result 
of future observations.
12
 Occam‘s ―razor test‖ provides a process by which the 
first of these requirements can be achieved, for it high-lights those arbitrary 
elements that make no difference to the observable predictions of the theory and 
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henceforth should be eliminated.
13
 Contemporary reductionism has shortened 
Occum‘s dictum to nothing more than ―keep it simple;‖14 a common aphorism in 
today‘s world. The second requirement appears to remove any abstract element 
from a theory, which might be appropriate for a natural law but, as Holsti suggests 
this is difficult for international relations theories since each theory is reductive 
and essentialist to a different degree, relying on different sets of assumptions.
15 
‗Natural‘ laws do not exist in the political realm. 
Every international relations theory has its limitations and critics and both 
become accentuated when a theory is used to speculate on the future. While some 
critics may consider theoretical venturing beyond the here-and-now as foolhardy, 
a point fervently disputed by John Mearsheimer,
16
 others consider that the nature 
of uncertainty compels theoretical visionaries to imagine a world fifteen, twenty-
five, even fifty years into the future.
17
 Furthermore, as political phenomena are 
highly complex in character, political predictions would be impossible without 
theoretical tools. However, this is not to suggest that any ‗new‘ theories will not 
include some error, for all forecasting is guilty of that shortcoming. In spite of this 
inadequacy, predictions do help others make sense of world events as they unfold, 
while at the same time, helping those with a contradictory view frame their own 
ideas more clearly. Trying to anticipate a new event is a good way to test 
international relations theories, since theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight 
so cannot therefore adjust their theory fit the evidence, for no evidence is yet 
available.
18
 This thesis maybe considered reckless in character for it uses an 
untried theory in an attempt to anticipate the occurrence of international relations 
events at least two decades into the future.   
As mentioned previously, the concept of securitisation is the main 
theoretical tool for mapping regional variations. An objectivist theory of security 
uses one‘s own awareness of events to fits regional proceedings into a general 
theory to explain what governs the behaviour of actors. A securitisation-based 
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theory accepts that the security agenda is about different issues in different 
regions; where the actors differ, as does the relative importance of different 
security sectors.  It avoids prejudices about how people ‗should‘ react. 
Securitisation also has a meta-theoretical function to ensure that one does not infer 
mechanically from objective factors, the characteristics of regional security 
dynamics because ‗security‘ is a political battleground upon which is fought out 
what matter as security issues and thus what issues will be addressed in the 
security genre.
19
 Additionally, securitisation can be used to identify key security 
issues. In most regions there is but a few issues worthy of detailed security 
analysis through which turning or tipping points are exposed, and actors, politics 
and decisions become open to scrutiny rather than remaining hidden from view.
20
 
In relation to the past, the present and not least the future this thesis will high-light 
crucial events and political decisions rather than permitting them to being lost 
within some larger materialist generalisation. 
Securitisation is often too broad a conceptual mechanism for detailed 
analysis of regional security dynamics; that is a task requiring a finer theoretical 
method. For Buzan the chosen methodology was regional security complex 
theory, while for Lake and Morgan it was regional orders. Others, for example, 
Schulz and Westing chose the typologies of hydropolitics and ecoregionalism 
respectively to explain how securitisation can occur in the environmental arena. In 
this thesis it is a ―hybrid‖ model, a synthesis of applicable theoretical tenets from 
those theories discussed in preceding chapters. This synthesized theory is no mere 
folding of theories one into another, for that might well imply that some level of 
oversight occurred when theoretical incompatibilities arose. Lake and Morgan‘s 
conflation of the global and regional levels of analysis into a single methodology 
is considered by Buzan and Wæver as a ―blindness‖ arising from a fundamental 
misunderstanding of what is a regional security complex.
21
 Hopefully the 
―hybrid‖ theory is robust enough to fend off a similar criticisms; for they are easy 
laid and difficult to refute.   
 The soundness of the ―hybrid‖ theory rests on the authority of those theories 
from which it drew its essential elements. Its strength lies in its ability organize 
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the analytical enquiry around those elements that define a security complex no 
matter the origin of the facilitating conditions. Although it is impossible to 
dispense with the essential elements, for they lie at the very heart of the ―hybrid‖ 
theory, they can be reduced to a two sentence descriptor without losing their 
individual import.  
 
A security complex is a set of states that are so interlinked by one or more 
security externalities that their security problems cannot be reasonably 
considered independently from one another. Intrusion of outside 
adversarial great powers into a security complex would transform the 
complex into a shatterbelt and bring the possibility of conflict escalation. 
 
Because security externalities can arise from both traditional and non-traditional 
issues and create a security complex, essential element 6 is considered 
superfluous. The revised six essential elements are: 
 
1. boundary, which differentiates the SC from its neighbours; 
2. anarchic structure, which means that the SC must be 
composed of two or more autonomous units, but 
geographical contiguity is not mandatory; 
3. polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the 
units;  
4. social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and 
enmity among the units;  
5. the intensity of security externalities on both regional and 
non-regional units; and  
6. competition for control over a geographic region by 
strategically important states is indicative of a ‗shatterbelt 
region‘ that can overlay security complexes, unstructured 
security regions or a grouping of the two. 
 
There are three further riders that warrant stating. All theories encounter 
anomalies because they simplify reality by emphasizing certain factors while 
ignoring others. This criticism will no doubt be levelled at the ―hybrid‖ theory. 
On some occasions simplification is acceptable because resolution of an anomaly 
would create an anomaly of even great significance. If Buzan and Wæver had 
accepted Great Britain as an integral member of the South American regional 
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security complex, then the very concept of overlay in the post-Cold War world 
became questionable which would have weaken the whole regional security 
complex typology. Like most theories, the ―hybrid‖ theory will be incapable of 
providing a satisfactory answer to every question posed of it, because there will 
be situations where the theory could explain several possible outcomes. Thus the 
―hybrid‖ theory might be classified by social scientists ―indeterminate,‖22 a 
description commonly attributed to broad-gauged theories.  
Additionally, the ―hybrid‖ theory is descriptive in character. It will seek to 
define one future, out of a menu of possible futures that await the Polar Regions. 
The selection of a particular scenario is driven by a conflation of global natural 
resource scarcities and the adverse effects of climate change. The theory, 
however, is not prescriptive for it does not seek to advise what actions and 
policies states should adopt in order to address the scenario portrayed. 
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PART II 
 
Chapter Eight  
 
Introduction: People, Climate and Resources 
 
wo definitions for the word scenario, or scaena in Latin, are ‗sequence 
of imagined, usually future, events‘ and ‗details of scenes.‘1 By 
combining these two definitions one could construed to the meaning of 
scenario to be ―a vision of a conceivable future.‖ This as a definition differs little 
from that generally adopted by defence and business strategic planners, for them, 
scenario means ―a plausible description of how the future may develop based on a 
set of assumption about key drivers.‖2 Climate, energy, economic and societal 
concerns are all disciplines that are frequently subjected to scenario analysis, with 
each possessing its own set of drivers.
3
  Scenario analysis, in the context of this 
thesis, is an analytical tool that permits one to model possible alternate paths 
within a political-security environment so as to assess their respective diplomatic 
and war risks. The methodology constructed in Part I represents the analytical tool 
to identify a single security scenario out of a litany of security portraits from a 
multitude of possible futures that await the Arctic and Antarctica by the year 
2035. That single security scenario is predicated on two key drivers – a 
progressively warming global climate and increasing scarcity of natural resources. 
Other than the scenario discussed in this thesis no attempt has been made to 
discuss a range of possible alternate scenarios.  
At the global, regional and local levels, depletion of natural resources and 
environmental degradation, i.e. climate change, results from the interface of 
population pressures, extreme wealth and extreme poverty. The material-intensive 
and pollution-loaded consumption habits, plus the production activities of the 
wealthy Northern countries are responsible for most of the world‘s greenhouse 
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gas emissions, solid and hazardous waste and other forms of environmental 
pollution. High-income countries also generate a disproportionate amount of the 
worldwide demand for fossil fuels, non-fuel minerals, grain, meat, fish, fresh 
water and tropical hardwoods.
 4
  
Developing countries, particularly those with rapidly growing but 
impoverished populations, also overburden the environment. People living in 
poverty frequently live in the most fragile ecological areas where they overexploit 
croplands, pastures, forests, fisheries and water resources in order to eke out a 
living.
5
 These fragile ecological areas, which represent seventy-three per cent of 
the global landmass, have a very limited ability to sustain high population 
densities and are acutely vulnerable to degradation, erosion, flooding, fires, land 
subsidence and climatic change.
6
 Many people have been forced to migrate to 
marginal rural areas due to overcrowding on better land.
7
 An alternate 
consequence of ecological despoliation is the migration of people from the rural 
hinterland to the urban fringes of cities to become unwanted impoverished 
squatters. 
Estimates place the number of squatters worldwide at about a billion (2005) 
or slightly less than one in every six human beings on the planet. And this number 
is on the rise. Every day, close to two hundred thousand people leave their 
ancestral homes in rural regions and move into the cities, leading to doubling in 
number within 25 years. The best guess is that by 2030 there will be two billion 
squatters — one in four people on earth.8 The arrival of hordes of both economic 
and ecological (environmental) migrants has turned many Third World 
metropolitan regions or agglomerations into conurbanations, megacities or 
megalopolises.
9
 The withering away of central government influence over 
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shantytowns is compensated by a rise in tribal and regional domains, the 
unchecked spread of disease and the growing pervasiveness of war.
10
  
If there is a single thread that weaves together the dyadic opposites of 
poverty and prosperity then that must be the ever changing dynamics of human 
population on this overcrowded planet.  
 
Population 
In the twenty-first century the following lament sounds all too familiar: 
 
One thing is sure: the Earth is more cultivated and developed now 
than ever before; there is more farming but fewer forests, swamps 
are drying up and cities springing up on an unprecedented scale. 
We have become a burden to our planet. Resources are becoming 
scarce and soon Nature will no longer be able to satisfy our needs. 
It will come to pass that disease, hunger, flood and war will reduce 
the excessively large numbers of the human species.
11
 
 
This statement dates from the year 200 BC and is attributed to the Roman 
politician Quintus Septimus Tertullianus. Fortunately, Tertullianus‘ prediction has 
to date been proved wrong, however it may be a prophecy on the cusp of coming 
true. 
Future trends in population size is an invaluable measure when projecting 
global and national demands for food, water and energy and the environmental 
impact of the rising consumption of natural resources. Current world projections 
suggest that from a figure of 6.7 billion in July 2007, the global population will 
reach 9.2 billion by 2050.
12
 While past projections made by United Nations have 
deviated from the actual figure by less than four per cent, the recent rapid decline 
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in fertility has resulted in more recent projections being slightly too high.
13
 
Although acknowledging the decline in fertility rate, some commentators‘ readily 
predict that by the end of the twenty-first century global population will have 
grown to around 9.5–10 billion.14 
Future population growth is very dependent on which path human fertility 
follows – see figure 1. To achieve the medium variant, fertility throughout the 
world would have to decline from 2.55 children per woman (2006) to just over 
two children per woman in 2050. Should fertility remain about half a child above 
two then by 2050 global population will be 10.8 billion. A fertility path half a 
child below two will lead to a population of 7.8 billion by mid-century.  Growth 
in world population is likely to be concentrated in just a few countries, generally 
today‘s most populous. During the period 2005-2050, eight countries – India, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, the United 
States, Bangladesh and China, in order of incremental population growth – are 
expected to account for almost half the projected worldwide population increase.
15
  
 
Figure 1.  World Population, 1950-2050. 
Source: Leisinger et al., op. cit., p. 3, based on United Nations Population Division, World 
Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision, New York, 2001.  
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Future population growth and changes in the age composition of the population is 
driven by changes to four causational drivers. First, in most developing countries, 
the number of births per woman is still beyond that required for each generation to 
exactly replace itself; that is above 2.1 births per woman. Nevertheless, birth rates 
in these countries are projected to decline to those commonly found in the 
developed countries by 2020 as global fertility rate dip to below replacement 
level.
16
 Second, in tandem with a fall in fertility is a decline in mortality, as life 
expectancy continues to rise worldwide. Although, many people living in the 
developed world have come to expect that they will live longer, this is a trend is 
also apparent throughout most of the developing world. However, there is a 
difference between these two worlds, for the transition to longer life expectancy is 
moving at a more rapid pace in the developing world than it did in the developed 
world.
17
 
Third, the number of people globally born in one country but resident in 
another has increased from 75 million in 1965 to 120 million in 1990. Currently, 
the number of foreign-born constitutes slightly over two per cent of world 
population, a proportion that has stayed stable for at least thirty years as the global 
population size has risen correspondingly.
18
 One type of international migration 
that is especially problematic for host countries to accommodate has been sudden 
surges in migrants that often result from political, economic and environmental 
crises. These ‗demographic quakes‖ bring about sudden and extreme changes in 
population growth rates which no existing methodology can predict nor foretell 
what the demographic response to such an event might be.
19
 
Fourth, even if the number of births per woman approximated a replacement 
level of two and future mortality levels remain unchanged, the world population 
would still grow because of the high ratio of young to old people. With at least 
half the world‘s population under the age of 27, this ‗youthful‘ population is 
expected to account for more than half of global population growth to 2050.
20
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This ―youth bulge‖ will become a double edged sword, for in the emerging Third 
World economic powers this youth bulge will mature into a ―worker bulge‖ 
especially when these new powers can provide an educated workforce and a 
business friendly environment for investment. Conversely, if employment 
conditions don‘t change drastically in weak states, particularly Iraq, Yemen, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, youth bulge will force young men to migrate, thereby 
externalizing volatility and violence.
21
  
Growth in human population and economic wealth are simultaneously 
transforming the world of the twenty-first century by trigger six Earth-changing 
trends.
22
 First, the sustained period of economic growth since the Second World 
War has, through the process of globalisation, now reached most parts of the 
world making humanity on average richer in terms of income per person.
23
 There 
exists now an economic convergence between the peoples of the First and Third 
Worlds and movement towards the global alignment of standard of living.
24
 
Second, the global population and the overall growth of the world economy will 
rise in tandem. Not only will each person produce more output on average, but by 
mid-century there will be more people producing more. The scale of the world‘s 
economic production is therefore likely to be several times greater than today.
25
 
Third, the rise in income will be greatest in Asia so that by 2025 the world will be 
split into several financial hubs of which Asia will be the most important.
26
 
Fourth, the way humanity lives is fundamentally changing as increasing numbers 
of rural people move into urban areas. According to the United Nations 
Commissioner for Refugees the mid-point between urban and rural dwelling was 
crossed in 2008, and is now on a one-way path to a predominantly urban 
civilisation.
27
 Fifth, the overall impact of human activity on the natural 
environment is producing multiple environmental crises. Never before in history 
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has the magnitude of human economic activity been large enough to change 
fundamental natural processes on a global scale, including the climate itself.
28
 
Sixth, the gap between the richest and the poorest is widening because the poorest 
billion  people inhabit a group of states so enmeshed in poverty that they have 
fallen behind other developing countries and are likely to economically fall 
apart.
29
 This is not contradictory to the notion that on average the poor are getting 
rich, but an illustration of the intransigence of global inequality. Poverty rather 
than prosperity is the most common theme permeating these six challenges.              
 
Poverty 
Poverty has a multiplicity of meanings: poverty can mean hunger; lack of shelter; 
being sick with no access to a doctor; not having a job and in fear of the future or 
worst of all being powerlessness.
30
  Notwithstanding these different definitions, 
the economic standard for measuring poverty in low-income countries is the 
number of people living on US$1.25 per day in 2005 purchasing power parity 
terms (PPP).
31
 Under this measure there are 1.4 billion people in the developing 
world (one person in four) who are living in poverty down from 1.9 billion (one 
person in two) in 1981.
32
 In middle-income developing countries, such as those in 
Central Asia, the poverty line rises to US$2.00 per day in the year 2000 
purchasing power parity terms.
33
 
Extreme poverty exhausts governing institutions, depletes natural resources, 
weakens leaders and squashes any residual hope held by the citizenry, while also 
fuelling a volatile mix of desperation and instability. Poor, fragile states may 
explode into violence or implode imperilling their citizens, regional neighbours, 
and the wider world community as livelihoods are crushed, investors flee and 
ungovernable territory spawns global threats such as terrorism, trafficking, 
environment devastation and disease.
34
 Yet, if poverty leads to insecurity then the 
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destabilizing effects of conflict along with demographic and environmental 
challenges increase difficulties leaders, institutions and external organisations face 
in promoting human development.
35
 A typical civil war leaves a country fifteen 
per cent poorer than it might otherwise have been, and may result in as many as 
thirty per cent more people living in absolute poverty.
36
  Research also suggests 
that thirty-six per cent of all civil wars will ultimately reignite.
37
 
Likewise, research shows that there is a link between the risk of war and 
initial levels of income: halving the starting income in a country doubles the risk 
of civil war.
38
 Another cause of civil war is slow economic growth, or worse, 
economic stagnation or decline. A typical low-income country faces a risk of civil 
war of approximately fourteen per cent in any five year period. But each 
percentage point added to the economic growth rate reduces the risk of civil war 
by a percentage point.
39
 Research also confirms the presence of a third risk factor 
that of a high dependence on exports of primary commodities such as oil, 
diamonds and the like. An otherwise typical country whose exports of primary 
products account for ten per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) has an 
eleven per cent chance of being at war. Should primary product exports eventually 
reach thirty per cent of GDP then the probability of civil war could reach as high 
as thirty-three per cent.
40
 
A perplexing question is why the risk of conflict is higher in poorer 
countries? Some commentators suggest that it is because the poor have little to 
lose or as a columnist for The Economist wrote, ―…it is easy to give a poor man a 
cause.‖41 Poverty is especially intense in low-income countries where high 
fertility rates have resulted in a large youth population or ―youth bulge.‖ Almost 
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sixty per cent of the world‘s poor are under 25 years old.42 Research has linked 
youth bulges to conflict risk, which lends support to the argument that poverty 
increases the opportunities for rebellion because large numbers of youth provide a 
readily available supply of potential rebel combatants.
43
 Today‘s ―youthfully‖ 
countries form a crescent stretching from the Andean region of Latin America 
across sub-Sahel Africa, the middle-East and Central Asia and the through the 
northern states of South Asia. However, by 2025, the number of countries in this 
―arc of instability‖ is project to decline by up to forty per cent owing to waning 
fertility and maturing populations. The majority of the ―youth bulge countries‖ 
expected to linger beyond 2025 will be located in sub-Saharan Africa, the Arabian 
Peninsula, Afghanistan and scattered among the Pacific Islands.
44
 For these 
countries there is no escaping this ―conflict trap,‖45 at least in the short to medium 
term.  
Tragically, poverty and insecurity are mutually reinforcing, with poverty 
playing a complex role by facilitating both the emergence and spread of 
transnational security threats. Poverty significantly increases the risk of conflict, 
which in turn provides a fertile breeding ground for such threats. It also can create 
conditions at the local and state level that are conducive to transnational threats. If 
a state becomes incapable of preventing or containing such threats, adverse 
conditions can be created within and beyond state boundaries that exacerbate 
poverty. This sets in motion what Susan Rice evocatively calls a ―doom spiral,‖46 
where poverty fuels threats that contribute to deeper poverty, consequently 
intensifying those threats.     
The commonly held wisdom that any progress towards stopping wars, civil 
conflict and violence requires a reduction in poverty is not without its sceptics. 
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Migual et al. using rainfall as a measure of economic growth found that 
exogenous economic shocks have a strong statistical correlation to civil conflict, 
i.e., civil war is related to sudden changes in income. This correlation is particular 
evident in economies that largely rely on rain-fed agriculture. Furthermore, in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Migual et al. established a statistical correlation between 
weather shocks and income growth and between short-term economic fluctuations 
and civil conflict.
47
 While these finding are pertinent to Africa they may possess 
indicative relevance of what to expect elsewhere in the world.
48
 Additional 
findings were that GDP growth is significantly negatively related to the incident 
of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1981 to 1999. This 
relationship proved to be extremely strong for a five per cent drop in annual 
income growth increased the likelihood of conflict in the following year by over 
twelve percentage points – which amounts to an increase of more than one-half in 
the likelihood of civil war.
49
 Most interestingly, the impact of weather shocks on 
civil conflict is not
50
 significantly different in richer, more democratic, more 
ethnically diverse or mountainous African countries or in countries with a range 
of different social and political institutional characteristics.
51
 
If the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is correct in predicting 
that the twenty-first century will be characterized by weather extremes becoming 
more frequent, more widespread and/or more intense,
52
 then the findings of 
Miguel and his cohorts represent a stark warning of looming climate change 
conflicts. 
 
Prosperity 
The book, North-South: A programme for Survival, published in 1980 by an 
independent commission chaired the former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Willy Brandt, contained a set of bold reforms, which despite of the 
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misgivings of the North, would, if implemented, have lifted the peoples of the 
South out of the economic morass that still characterizes the poor underdeveloped 
Third World. Tenor of the report suggested that reforming the international 
community would make the ―world a less unequal and a more just and inhabitable 
place.‖53 Despite the good intensions embedded within the report‘s rhetoric, little 
has changed in thirty years. The fortunes of the world‘s three wealthiest 
individuals equal the combined gross domestic product of all fifty-one poorest 
countries. These fifty-one countries represent a mere 0.4 per cent of world trade. 
The most affluent twenty per cent of the global population earn approximately one 
hundred times as much as the poorest twenty per cent. Also, the most affluent 
twenty per cent consume eighty-five per cent of all goods that are manufactured 
for private consumption.
54
 While there remains a wide gap between those people 
existing in poverty and those living in prosperity the future for the world‘s poor is 
likely to progressively improve as the number of middle-class countries grow in 
number.
55
 
There are a number of measures used to determine the extent of the 
poverty/prosperity gap, with the most common being an interstate comparison of 
income per capita, based on purchasing power parity.
56
 Using data included in a 
survey undertaken by Goodman Sachs in 2007 the extreme of poverty is 
represented by Zimbabwe with an income per capita of $188.00 and the extreme 
of prosperity represented by Qatar with an income per capita of $80,870.00. 
Estonia ($21,094) and Portugal ($21,652) straddle the survey mean of $21,254.00. 
Although the survey population is small (N=71), sixty per cent of the countries 
surveyed had an income per capita less than the mean. In a reflection of the 
South/North poverty/prosperity divide no ‗Third World‘ state other than the petro-
states of the Persian Gulf (with a range of $23,243 - 80,870) and Singapore 
($49,714) had a per capita income in excess of the average. One G8 state, Russia 
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($14,692), fell below the survey mean.
57
 As the number of people living in 
‗extreme poverty‘ – less than a $1000.00 per year58 – continues to decline globally 
towards a projected nadir of six per cent of the world‘s population by 2015 an 
adverse paradox could arise in that a greater number of ―wealthy‖ people will 
deplete global resources more quickly ultimately sending greater number of 
people into poverty. Only a radical change in an attitude towards personal wealth 
creation by rich Western states will prevent such a paradox from becoming a 
reality.     
Another methodology for quantifying the poverty/prosperity gap is to 
examine each country‘s ecological footprint. Ecological footprint analysis is an 
accounting technique that enables an estimate to be made of the resource 
consumption and waste assimilation requirements of a defined human population 
or economy in terms of a corresponding productive land area.
59
 The direct 
correlation between lifestyle and the area land required to satisfy that lifestyle is 
clear: greater the levels of resource consumption and waste generated, larger the 
land area needed for a community to sustain itself.  The ecological footprint of an 
average Canadian, that is the amount of land required from nature in the late 
twentieth century to support a typical individual‘s lifestyle, is approximately 4.3 
hectares.
60
 For a typical citizen of the United States that requirement increases to 
5.1 hectares.
61
 The footprint for the Netherlands equals 3.3 hectares per 
individual.
62
  
It is revealing to note that in countries where poverty is prevalent the 
ecological footprint is significantly reduced. For example, in India the land 
required to compensate for a typical individual‘s lifestyle is a mere 0.4 hectare.63 
This is four times less that both the average global footprint of 1.8 hectares and 
the 1.5 hectares of ecologically productive land ―available‖ to each person on 
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Earth.
64
 Indeed, if every person on Earth lived like the average Canadian or 
American then no fewer than three planet Earths are needed to sustain life.
65
 
Alternatively, human population would need to decrease to 5.8 billion if globally 
people are to enjoy North American material standards.
66
 If humanity‘s numbers 
increase as is anticipated reaching nine plus billion by 2050 then each global 
citizen will have slightly less than one hectare of ecologically productive land, 
assuming there is no further soil degradation.  
Yet another methodology to quantify the global poverty/prosperity gap is to 
examine each state‘s carbon footprint. Although a carbon footprint can be defined 
in various ways, generally it is considered to be ―the measure of the greenhouse 
gases, measured in units of carbon dioxide, produced by human activities.‖67 
Carbon foot-printing is a useful method by which individuals and organisations 
can conceptualize their personal or organisational contribution to global warming. 
However, to undertake a more exhaustive analysis that links greenhouse gas 
emissions to consumption categories of goods and services – a more useful 
measure when considering the poverty/prosperity continuum – then more 
expansive definition than that given above is warranted. A more expansive 
definition would also overcome methodological and categorisation difficulties 
often experienced when undertaking cross-country comparisons. Hertwich and 
Peters provide such a definition, defining the carbon footprint ―…as the 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluoride emitted in 
the production of goods and services used for final consumption and GHG 
emissions occurring during the consumption activities themselves….‖ 68   
While the Hertwich and Peters‘ analysis does not include all world states, it 
is detailed enough to show a strong correlation between carbon footprints and per 
capita consumption expenditure. Statistical patterning demonstrates that CO2 
increases strongly with expenditure, while other GHGs increase at a lesser rate. In 
summation, these authors determined that as countries became wealthier their 
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carbon footprint increased by fifty-seven per cent for each doubling of 
consumption.
69
 Of the various consumption categories nutrition was the most 
important with food accounting for nearly twenty per cent of GHG emissions, 
followed by mobility for private households (17%), of which almost half is caused 
by fuel combustion by private motorists, and  then by manufactured products 
which comprises thirteen per cent of the carbon footprint.
70
  
The total emissions analysed by Hertwich and Peters for the year 2001 
amounted to 24.7 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon dioxide and 9.5 Gt of carbon dioxide 
equivalents of non-CO2 greenhouse gases.
71
 Within this figure the per person 
carbon footprint ranges from a low of 0.7 tCO2e/p for Malawi to 33.8 tCO2e/p for 
Luxembourg,
72
 with a mean of 9.4 tCO2e/p which lies between Korea at 9.2 
tCO2e/p
73
 and 9.5 tCO2e/p for Hungary.
74
 Of the seventy countries surveyed 
thirty-eight (54%) fall below the mean, the majority of which are developing 
states. Of the countries that comprise the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) or ―wealthy‖ Western countries, just four countries 
Korea, Poland (8.7 tCO2e/p), Slovakia (8.0 tCO2e/p) and Turkey (4.6 tCO2e/p)
75
 
fail to exceed the global mean. Like ecological footprinting, carbon footprinting 
can be used to show how much humanity needs to reduce consumption, improve 
technology, or change behaviour to achieve sustainability. The methodology also 
revealed that chronic material inequality persists between high and low-income 
countries, which need to be corrected if humanity is to evade the fate that has 
already befallen Afghanistan.
76
  
For almost every person throughout the world development implies an 
improvement in personal living standards. In the wealthy states this continues to 
be tied to the market economy, social protection, an efficient production of 
industrial goods and services, and the individualisation of lifestyles. Happiness in 
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the contemporary First World tends to be measured in terms of personal career 
and consumption opportunities, larger living space, cars, travel opportunities and 
even secondary residences. This lifestyle has resulted in significantly higher 
energy and non-energy resource consumption, as well as an enlargement of both 
the ecological and carbon footprints. The ecological costs of contemporary 
Western lifestyles are high and prosperity continues to be sought with little regard 
for its impact on others. For many in the Third World, over consumption by 
Western societies offers nothing but hunger, squalor, disease and an early death, 
so it is little wonder the world is on the cusp of mass migration.
77
 
The real quandary for the twenty-first century is how to satisfy an entirely 
legitimate desire among the global population for universal prosperity. If such 
prosperity is associated with the attainment of a Western-style of living, then 
resource consumption makes that reality almost unimaginable. Münz and Reiterer 
make a pertinent enquiry when they ask how the world will meet the desires of 1.5 
billion Chinese or a similar number of Indians to have one or two cars per family, 
generous living space, energy consumption at Western levels, and individual 
mobility?
78
 It is impossible to apply globally the lifestyle currently enjoyed by the 
wealthy developed world. Today‘s comparatively high consumption of energy and 
other resources by 6.8 and soon to be more than nine billion people makes a 
universal Western lifestyle impossible, especially since even more modest desires 
remain unfulfilled. Without a change in lifestyles and resource consumption by 
wealthy Western countries, a life of dignity for everyone is hardly imaginable!
79
  
The conundrum that besets the wealthy developed states is how to temper 
expectations of prosperity of the world‘s poorest inhabitants without creating an 
environment that threatens their national interests while their citizens maintain a 
lifestyle that lead to and now prolongs global inequalities. While Western 
societies would dearly love to believe that they can be islands of stability and 
prosperity in a global sea of poverty and unrest, history continues to prove 
otherwise. Any overseas economic crisis that leads to a collapse of state authority 
has adverse consequences for Western countries.
 80
 Likewise, the very notion that 
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developing countries will remain true to traditional values and committed to 
largely Western-created institutional arrangements
81
 may yet prove to be flawed 
precipitating conflict. As inequality continues to dog the world the arguments of a 
risk assessment consultancy firm ring true for a variety of causal factor besides 
pandemic diseases, for ―… sufferers from AIDs may not scruple to commit 
violent crimes because they have little reason to fear the consequences. In some 
case … travellers from the developed world are attacked not only because that are 
potentially lucrative targets but because they are seen as the cause of the poor[‘s] 
economic circumstances.‖ 82  
Part II comprises two subject chapters each one examining how resource 
scarcity and climate change, either separately or in combination, might be used as 
a pretext for interstate conflict. During the course of the twenty-first century a 
resurgence of mercantilism cannot be lightly discarded as a scarcity of resources 
becomes more pronounced and resource nationalism increases the risk of great 
power confrontations, even as early as 2025.
83
 This situation appears destined to 
worsen as global wealth moves away from Western states to the emerging middle-
income countries with their burgeoning middle class population, which could, by 
2030, add an additional two billion consumers to those  in the West that already 
enjoy a surfeit of material wealth.
84
 Like the inequality between rich and poor, the 
inequality between resource supply and consumerist demand could readily spark 
what some commentators call ―resource wars:‖ the topic of Chapter Nine.  
Chapter Ten – on probable future ―climate wars‖ – examines the just one 
consequence of climate change on security, the exacerbation of resource 
scarcities, particular water. It will also mention one consequence of resource 
scarcity the rise of climate refugees as a uniquely twenty-first century phenomena. 
By 2035, worries over the effects of climate change may be more significant than 
any physical change wrought by a changing climate. Perceptions of a rapidly 
degrading biosphere might cause countries to take unilateral actions to secure 
resources, territory and other interests. Willingness to engage in multilateral co-
operation depends on a number of factors, particularly the behaviour of other 
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countries, the economic context and the importance of the interests to be defended 
or won. Although the science associated with climate change predictions remains 
contested as evidenced by the furore born out of the emails stolen from the 
University of East Anglia‘s Climate research Unit,85 a drastic cutback in allowable 
carbon dioxide emissions could plunge both the developed and developing world 
into a recession or worse
86
 or even war.
87
  
Already, resource scarcities and climate change are shaping the security 
architecture in the Arctic and although this combination is not currently a seminal 
influence in Antarctica that may not be so by 2035. 
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Chapter Nine 
 
Scenario Driver – Resource Scarcity 
 
Earth is a small celestial body of finite natural resources.
1
 Although some 
resources – lesser in number - self replenish and are thus continuously available, 
the consumption of the remainder – those resources incapable of self-
replenishment – ensures their on-going consumption will eventually lead to 
exhaustion. In the contemporary world, even resources that self-replenish by 
naturally occurring processes are being jeopardized by human activity and their 
present abundance, at least in an unpolluted form, can no longer be globally 
assured.
2
 Inevitably, resource depletion, when coupled with human induced 
resource pollution, will cause comprehensive resource scarcity; historically a 
catalyst of armed conflict. 
As mentioned in Chapter One the nomenclature used throughout this thesis 
shall categorise natural resources as either living or non-living.
 
However, there is, 
as suggest by Thomas Homer-Dixon, an additional resource category, those 
resources such as the atmosphere, ozone layer and oceans which are neither living 
nor non-living, but a ‗medium‘ held in common by all life forms on Earth.3 The 
fundamental problem associated with this latter category of resources is that of 
determining who holds the responsibility for ensuring their on-going availability 
and the mechanism for holding any responsible party accountable.
4
 In the absence 
of assignable accountability and responsibility such resources, frequently known 
as the ‗global commons,‘ often succumb to what has been described as the 
―tragedy of the commons.‖5  
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Garrett Hardin in his famous essay ―The Tragedy of the Commons‖ explains 
the dynamics of a tragedy within the setting of an old-world English village 
commons green. The green, open to all villagers, is able to sustain a cattle herd 
providing it is a stable population. Unfortunately, the cattle population increases 
as each individual herdsman rationally seeks to maximise his own gain. Quite 
naturally, a herdsman could reason that he will benefit from every additional cow 
that he grazes on the common space, with the cost of that use being dissipated 
amongst all of the herdsmen. But each additional cow actually contributes to the 
progressive deterioration of the commons. Other herdsmen following the same 
logic add their own cows seeking to optimise their personal gain. In this way, a 
rational individual action leads to irrational collective action bringing about the 
inefficient use and eventual destruction of the commons.
6
 Thus, irrespective of 
their original good intentions, humankind in the absence of genuine cooperation 
and enforcement mechanisms are inclined towards misuse and eventual abuse of 
such areas. In the contemporary world such misuse and abuse has resulted in 
significant change to the physical distribution and/or chemical composition of 
global resources. 
Of the other two categories of resources, non-living resources—many of 
which also fall into the category of non-renewable resources–provide the 
indispensable infrastructure upon which all living organisms depend for their 
existence and well-being. The primary non-living resources are land, fresh water
7
 
and minerals. Living resources are those resources that are renewable and thus 
manageable, such as staple food crops and marine fisheries.
8
 However, before 
discussing each category of resource it is necessary to comment on those 
processes that give rise to resource scarcity.     
While it is impossible to diminish the importance to society of any single 
resource there are a small number that are essential to human existence and as 
such have historically been a contributing cause to many intra-state and inter-state 
conflicts. However, in any scramble over access to natural resources Georgescu-
Roegen‘s poignant reminder ―… that of all the necessities of life only the purely 
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biological are absolutely necessary for survival‖ should not be overlooked.9 
Regrettably, since this enjoinder is continually forsaken a direct causal 
relationship between non-essential life-supporting resources and armed conflict 
has progressively become established. How that nexus impacts on the 
international community for each category of resource is discussed in this chapter, 
with an emphasis given to those resources that could plausibly be found in either 
Polar Region. Emphasis is likewise placed on how the militarization of those 
resources by one or more states could plausibly result in interstate hostilities in the 
future, especially once supply insecurities mount towards mid-century.   
 
Resource scarcity 
For any country or the world as a whole a natural resource is in short supply when 
demand, created by need or desire, exceeds availability. The dilemma of natural 
resource insufficiency or scarcity, according to Westing, arises out of one or both 
of two broad reasons: a) when either population numbers or human aspirations 
grow too rapidly or are already too large, yet deny containment; and b) when 
natural resources become degraded through misuse, for example inappropriate 
agricultural practices that lead to soil erosion or by harvesting living resources 
beyond their capacity to replenish themselves.
10
 The causal explanation that gives 
added emphasis to reason b) is that it occurs for the same reason identified in a); a 
global burgeoning in the human population. Robert North, however, considers 
that the scarcity, as a concept, explicitly embodies a strong future dimension since 
it occurs specifically when ―future apparent demand exceeds future apparent 
supply‖ or more precisely when there is a ―mismatch between apparent rates of 
change of supply and demand.‖ 11 (Emphasis in the original) Westing made no 
mention of this particular aspect to resource scarcity. 
However, there is a meshing of all three features in an investigation 
undertaken as phase one of the 1970s Club of Rome‘s Project on the Predicament 
of Mankind. This imperfect, oversimplified and incomplete computer model, 
examined, under different scenarios, the inter-relationship of five variables – 
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accelerating industrialisation, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, 
depletion of renewable resources, and a deteriorating environment – on growth for 
the next hundred years.
12
 Results of these computer analyses did not bode well for 
the future of mankind for it high-lighted that if growth trends in world population, 
industralisation, food production, and resource depletion continued unchanged, a 
limit to global growth would be reached within the next one hundred years 
(approximately 2070), with the most probable outcome being a rather sudden and 
uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity. The analysis 
also indicated that global ecological and economic stability was possible if desired 
by the world‘s populace, but work to obtain that outcome would need to be started 
immediately (1974).
13
  
Two decades later, the inaction of global society to suitably respond to this 
advice sparked a new vocabulary and quantitative measures for discussing 
‗overshoot‘; growth beyond the carrying capacity of the Earth.14 Wackernagel and 
his colleagues measured the ecological footprint of humanity and compared it to 
the theoretical ―carrying capacity‖ of the planet. These researchers concluded that 
resource use by humankind had overshot the sustainable carrying capacity of 
Earth by some twenty per cent. Measured this way, the last time Earth could 
sustain humanity was during the 1980s.
15
 If there is no paradigmatic shift in the 
conventional approach to economic development and providing humanity‘s global 
ecological footprint continues to grow then the world is inviting an eco-
catastrophe and resultant geopolitical chaos.
16
 
Yet another way of measuring the closeness of this potential eco-catastrophe 
has been proposed by Peter Viousek and his colleagues of Stanford University 
who have estimated that humanity has appropriated nearly forty per cent of the 
terrestrial biological product; twelve per cent has been destroyed outright and a 
further twenty-seven per cent is used either directly or co-opted each year. 
Consider these statistics alongside the discernable trend in world population – an 
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increase by one and a half times midway through the twenty-first century – plus a 
consequential increase in the per capita consumption of energy and natural 
resources and Herman Daly‘s ‗full-world‘ economics has a poignancy that cannot 
be ignored.
17
  Parkin concludes that since the forty per cent of human economy 
already appropriated was the most easy to acquire little time remains for humanity 
to initiate corrective action.
18
   
Thirty years has lapsed since the inaugural meeting of the Club of Rome and 
little has altered to change its original premise that exponential population growth 
and attendant consumption of national resources, when combined with an 
explosion in atmospheric pollutants, chiefly carbon dioxide will inevitably result 
in an ecological calamity. According to Meadows et al. humanity squandered 
these thirty years in a futile but well-intended debate that has resulted in half-
hearted responses to pressing global ecological challenges. Does the humanity 
have another thirty years to dither about its response? Meadow‘s thought not! 19 
As exponential growth in human population pushes against the finite limit of 
resource availability inequalities will be created increasing the potential for a 
militarization of society and widespread conflict.
20
 Such notions are predicated on 
there being no new and as yet unexploited resource reservoirs to mitigate these 
shortages. Consequently the impact of the Arctic and Antarctica, as resource rich 
reservoirs, on the availability of many natural resources has not been explored in 
detail.  
Modern views concerning the influence of natural resources restrictions on 
the economic fabric of states simply confirm the original scarcity theories 
developed by Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo during the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century and later elaborated on by John Stuart Mill.
21
 These classical 
economists predicted that scarcity of natural resources (land) would eventually 
lead to diminishing social benefit from increasing economic effort, which 
inevitably would lead to the cessation of economic growth. The Malthusian 
version of scarcity rests on the assumption that the stock of agricultural land was 
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finite and once this limit was reached, continuing population growth would 
require increasing intensity of cultivation and, consequently, would result in 
diminishing returns per capita. The Ricardian version viewed diminishing 
financial returns as a reflection of the quality of successive plots land brought 
within the margin of profitable cultivation. Mill‘s contribution was the extension 
of Malthusian and Ricardian theories beyond their agrarian origins to cover other 
natural resources and the resulting doctrine of diminishing returns per capital.
22
 In 
the contemporary world the effect of these theories is less evident due to scientific 
innovation and resource substitution. But even science has its limitations. 
Scarcity emerges from a number of different considerations some are 
entropic – physical in character – while others are essentially psychological, 
economic, and political and thus have an anthropogenic heritage.
23
  Entropic 
scarcity is an important interlocutor in any discourse on the origins of scarcity and 
thus warrants greater discussion. Entrophy, in this context, has a dimorphic 
quality in that it is used to ascribe environmental scarcity to renewable,
24
 although 
not necessarily living resources, while denying a similar ascription to those 
resources that are non-renewable and thus non-living. 
Environmental scarcity, Homer-Dixon maintains, can arise in three ways: 
through a reduction in the supply of a key resource (supply-induced scarcity), 
through an increase in demand (demand-induced scarcity) and through a change 
in the relative access of different groups to a resource (structural scarcity).
25
  Of 
these three, the first occurs as the result of environmental degradation or resource 
depletion, both of which decrease the physical availability of a particular resource. 
The second is attributed to growth in human population, but it may also occur as 
the result of a change in consumption patterns, nevertheless, both inevitably boost 
demand for resources. Finally, structural scarcity is caused by a severe imbalance 
in the distribution of wealth and power that results in some groups in society 
gaining a disproportionate quantity of a resource and as a consequence the rest of 
society has share an amount that is insufficient to sustain their livelihood. The 
causal link between these forms of resource scarcity and violent conflict has been 
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extensively document. Such conflict tends to be persistent, diffuse and most 
frequently sub-national.
26
  
Violent conflict – however described – is not usually the result of a single 
cause no matter how traumatic, but an amalgam of a multiplicity of factors, many 
of which are social in character and bring with them a historical or contemporary 
context. Environmental scarcity is just one such factor although, in some 
instances, as discussed below, it became the tipping factor that ignites conflict. 
Ecological degradation is the most frequently cited contributing factor of 
environmental conflict, although its causal sponsorship is not universally 
accepted.
27
 However, the weight of evidence indicates that ecological degradation 
when it does occur in developing countries, especially in Africa, does lead to 
conflict. Reidulf Molvær, examined the causal link between severe ecological 
degradation in the Ethiopian highlands, due to adverse climatic conditions and 
unsustainable agricultural practices (overgrazing), and violent conflict between 
rural communities. So severe had cropland degradation become throughout the 
highlands that many agriculturalists were forced to leave their ancestral land and 
join their nomadic lowland brethren as eco-refugees migrating between rural areas 
even sometimes crossing international borders.  With each migratory wave that 
crossed an Ethiopian border the chance of social conflict developing into 
interstate war was considerably heightened and threatened to destabilise the Horn 
of Africa: indeed, transnational movement of eco-refugees pushed Ethiopia into 
war with Somalia in 1977.
28
 
Africa also provides an example a causal link between demand induced 
scarcity and violent conflict. In late 1991, Kenya experienced a wave of rural 
ethnic violence over a large portion of the Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western 
Provinces. By the end of 1993, at least 1500 people had been killed and more than 
300,000 displaced, many of whom migrated to towns and cities. The origins of the 
ethnic strife can be traced to the 1980s when population and environmental 
pressures led to an acute scarcity of arable land, increasing rural economic 
marginalisation and substantial rural-to-urban migration. As Kenya‘s urban 
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population soared and social and economic problems worsened the public call for 
political change grew louder. In an attempt to deflect such calls, the Moi 
government along with its ethnic allies orchestrated acute violence between 
various tribal groups who have farmed the Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western 
Provinces since the colonial period. Thus demographic and environmental stresses 
provided both the incentive and the opportunities for the state to instigate inter-
group violence.
29
 
Staying with Africa, it is possible to examine how structural scarcity 
became one of a multiplicity of factors behind the genocide that blighted Rwanda 
in 1994. This is a classic example of where, in a country of small land holdings, a 
small but ‗prosperous‘ rural elite declined to subdivide their farms to provide 
arable land for a burgeoning rural population out of fear of being left with too 
little land to support themselves. By taking this action the elite, often the elders in 
the community, committed an ever increasing proportion of their youth to 
perpetual poverty and hunger. Inability within the community to resolve this issue 
gave rise to a class of hungry landless young people prone to using acute violent 
to resolve grievances, who, in 1994, readily enlisted in the warring militias and 
proceeded to kill each other.
30
 
Homer-Dixon‘s frequent use of intra-state conflict cannot disguise the fact 
that the sovereign ownership of land and the use to which that land can be put 
often creates tension between states, which can result in hostilities; the Sino-
Indian War of 1962 being an example of a war over an ill-defined border and the 
land and resources encompassed within.
31
 Conflicts over resources other than land 
are discussed under the relevant sub-chapter heading throughout the remainder of 
this chapter. The first of the resource categories to be discussed are the ‗non-
living‘ resources whose scarcity, either directly or indirectly, might impose a new 
security configuration firstly on the Arctic but ultimately on Antarctica. After this 
discussion the focus turns to those ‗living‘ resources whose rising scarcity could 
equally imperil the Polar Regions.     
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Non-living resources 
Fresh water   
Of twelve ecosystems under threat, possibly the most important, is fresh water.
32
 
Fresh water while recyclable is a finite non-living resource upon which all life-
forms depends. The world has a total of 1.4 billion cubic kilometres of water of 
which approximately ninety-seven per cent is saline. Of the remaining three per 
cent, which is fresh water, nearly two-thirds is locked away as ice or in deep fossil 
water aquifers.
33
 Currently, humans withdraw around 3,500 cubic kilometres of 
fresh water a year from various sources, chiefly rivers. Of this amount 
approximately a third or 1,400 cubic kilometres is returned to source, often in a 
polluted condition.
34
 Agricultural use accounts for seventy-three per cent of all 
fresh water consumption much of which is wasted, the result of primitive 
irrigation methods or other water management inefficiencies. Demand for fresh 
water has increased eight-fold since the beginning of the twentieth century
35
 and 
consumption is growing at a rate of two to three per cent annually.
36
 
Although, the cycling of water between the atmosphere and land surface 
generally ensures that there is a worldwide surfeit of fresh water there are great 
differences between geographical regions. Much of Europe, large parts of the 
United States, the Ganges basin in India, and the North-Western provinces of 
China are facing an uncertain future as virtually all of their river runoff is being 
used.
37
 In many dry and poor countries, rapid population growth has reduced per 
capita water availability to a level below those required to meet basic household, 
industrial, and agricultural needs. Should climate change cause significant a shift 
in rainfall patterns, some regions may no longer face water shortages while others 
could suffer ruinous drought.  
Water resources have rarely been the sole cause of violent conflict or war, 
indeed, water is more often a source of co-operation. Thus it is tempting to narrow 
the definition of ―security‖ so as to exclude water from any debate over 
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international security, or to require security threats to be reduced to a single causal 
issue. Either approach not only misrepresents the connection between water and 
security, but it would also mislead the political elite and public in their search for 
ways to reduce tensions and conflict. Indeed, there is a long and informative 
history of tensions and conflicts over water resources, with no fewer than 103 
conflicts over water having been catalogued since 3000 BC.
38
 What causes the 
security situation to become so precarious is the fact that many key sources of 
water are shared by two or more countries. Typically, these sources are large river 
systems like the Nile and Indus that rise in one country then pass through one or 
more others before exiting to the sea through yet another country. The Nile, for 
example, is shared by no fewer than nine countries, while the Jordan River is 
shared by three and the Indus River system is divided between two nuclear-armed 
powers. 
As mentioned in Chapter Five there are 263 shared river basins. These river 
basins cover approximately forty-five per cent of the earth‘s land area, excluding 
Antarctica. No fewer than 145 states depend on shared river systems for at least 
some portion of their freshwater supply, and a good number of these states are 
almost wholly dependent on such systems.
39
 Where two or more states share such 
an invaluable resource the potential always exists for antagonistic interstate 
relations to develop especially should water become an increasingly scarce 
commodity due to the impact of climate change. In such situations there always 
exists the opportunity for a hydro-security complex to develop. In the Nile River 
system tensions over water, particularly between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, 
could draw into the region the United States and China, potentially turning a 
hydro-security complex into a shatterbelt.        
 
Non-hydrocarbon minerals 
Global deficiencies of non-fuel minerals, coupled with their uneven worldwide 
distribution can lead to unlikely and potentially unstable alliances, to national 
rivalries, and ultimately war. As with both land and water, wars over minerals 
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extend back to the earliest civilizations. It has been suggested that the Greeks 
initiated the Trojan War (circa 1200 BC) to ensure their access to a source of tin, 
necessary in the manufacture of bronze.
40
 
Modern industry, particularly defence-orientated industries, needs assured 
access to certain minerals and denial of access remains a potent cause of conflict. 
Even, within this category, commonly known as ‗strategic minerals,‘ the most 
noteworthy of which are those minerals where supply is highly concentrated to a 
limited number of countries from whom major military-industrial powers must 
draw their imports. The most critical of all minerals, even in times of peace, need 
to be stockpiled as insurance against access denial or disruption to supply. The 
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (1946) in the United States 
mandates that a ―stockpile of strategic and critical materials be maintained to 
decrease and preclude, where possible, dependence upon foreign sources of 
supply in times of national emergency.‖41 As a rising economic superpower China 
recently (2006) accepted the necessity of establishing its own strategic reserve of 
key minerals in part to ensure continuance of China‘s economic development, but 
also in part to safeguard national security. In a quest to establish these reserves the 
Chinese are reported to be aggressively seeking out exploration and mining rights 
to mineral deposits in countries as diverse as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile and 
Zimbabwe.
42
  
   China‘s aggressive global search for mineral reserves is without doubt being 
driven by the knowledge that its own mineral reserves have dramatically 
decreased by its economic growth.
43
 In this respect China‘s experience is not 
unlike that of the United States. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
United States was producing fifteen per cent more material (excluding food and 
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gold) than it consumed, while exporting substantial quantities of minerals. That 
export surplus disappeared over the following fifty years and by the early 1950s 
the United States experienced a nine per cent deficit. By the late 1970s the 
material deficit was approaching twenty-five per cent—or, excluding petroleum, 
about fifteen per cent.
44
 The origin of these figures was the United States 
Congress Office of Technology Assessment, but since this government agency 
was disestablished in 1995, no current statistics are available.  
In an era where high-technology is synonymous with economic growth and 
prosperity a group of ―rare‖ minerals, in that they are not found in high 
concentrations, have grown significantly in importance. Rare earth elements 
(REE)
45
 have many applications given their unique nuclear, metallurgical, 
chemical, catalytic, electrical, magnetic and optical properties. Unfortunately 
these properties are highly specific, in that substitutes are either inferior or 
unknown. As dependence on REE grows, so does insecurity within industrialized 
countries whose use of REE is high i.e. the United States, especially since the 
major global suppliers of REE (at least ninety per cent of world output) reside in 
China.
46
 According to the United States Geological Survey, Western States have 
in relocating their REE production to China failed to recognize the true strategic 
value of these minerals and their increasing importance in defence and aerospace 
applications, which include jet engines, electronic countermeasures, underwater 
mine detection, antimissile defence and space-based satellite power and 
communication systems.
47
 Although China will remain at least for the foreseeable 
future the principal supplier of REE there are other significant, but largely 
                                                 
44
 See Eckes, Alfred E., The United States and the Global Struggle for Mineral, University of 
Texas Press, Austin, 1979, p. 241. 
45
 The United States Geological Survey (USGS) lists as rare earth elements lanthanum, cerium, 
praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, 
holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium and yttrium See United States Geological Survey, 
‗Rare Earth Elements-Critical resources for High Technology,‘ U.S. Department of the Interior, 
2002, http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pub/commodity/rare_earths/  (26 May 2006). 
The unique properties of rare earth elements make them essential for applications which include 
miniaturized electronics, computer disk drives, visual display screens, missile guidance, pollution 
control catalysts, high-resolution optics and advanced magnetics material. See Grigg, William 
Norman, ‗Beijing Cornering Strategic Minerals,‘ New American, February 11, 2006, 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/artman/publish/printer_3318.shtml  (11 May 2006). 
46
 See Haxel, Gordon B., James B. Hedrick and Greta J. Orris, ‗Rare Earth Elements—Critical 
Resources for High Technology‘, United States Geological Survey (USGS), 2002, 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/commodity/rare_earths/  (26 May 2006). 
47
 USGS, Ibid.  
 170 
undeveloped reserves in Australia, India, and South America.
48
 Interestingly, 
these three regions were once contiguous with Antarctica through their 
Gondwanaland antecedence. This ancient geographical linkage must beg-the-
question as to whether REE reserves are also buried beneath Antarctica‘s icy 
landscape?  
Uncertainty that surrounds the future supplies of non-fuel minerals is not 
restricted to rare earth elements alone, governments are only now beginning to 
appreciate that current high rates of consumption of many minerals is depleting 
reserves at a rate some experts consider injudicious.
49
 Two factors drive the 
resource depletion paradigm, first global population increase and secondly the 
increase in living standards across the world. Most estimates of how many years 
of global reserves are left for key minerals is speculative for the calculations upon 
which they are based remain crude since they don‘t take into account any increase 
in demand due to new technologies, plus they assume that current production 
equals consumption.
50
 Even given these assumptions the conclusions are 
alarming. Without more recycling, reserves of antimony, used to make fire-
retardant material, will be exhausted in approximately twelve years, silver in 
around seven and indium in less than three years.
51
  Under a more sophisticated 
analysis that does incorporate the effects of new technologies in determining the 
lifespan of a number of mineral the result is just as dramatic. Reserves of zinc 
could be extinguished by 2037, both indium and hafnium-increasingly used in the 
manufacture of computer chips-exhausted by 2017, terbium- used to make green 
phosphorous in fluorescent light bulbs could be depleted by 2012,
52
 and platinum, 
used as a catalyst in automobiles and fuel-cells-will be exhausted by 2020.
53
 As 
another sign of problems yet to come, should all of the world‘s peoples to employ 
zinc at the current wealthy country rate then existing reserves are insufficient to 
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cover that level of usage and recycling is unlikely to makeup the deficit.
54
 
Additional virgin reserves of many minerals need to be found! 
In a world sharply divided into electricity haves and have-nots global energy 
poverty is set to become a defining issue in what is now being termed the 
―Energy-Climate Era.‖55 In a world that now perceives hydrocarbons as a ‗toxic‘ 
fuel source tomorrow‘s global citizens may be forced to accept nuclear energy as 
the single safe and proven energy source that has minimal global consequences.
56
 
However, the feedstock of nuclear energy – uranium – is not inexhaustible, 
although the period of time before known deposits are exhausted is subject to 
debate. David Cohen suggests that as a result of a foreseen growth in electricity 
demand uranium reserves will be effectively exhausted before mid-century,
57
 
whereas the United States National Intelligence Council considers available 
uranium reserves to be sufficient to support the expansion of nuclear energy 
without reprocessing well into the second half of the century.
58
 The global 
availability of uranium deposits means nothing to those countries that are energy-
poor and where disruptions to electricity supplies matters little. But in energy-rich 
countries where the aspirations of the populace have increase with every kilowatt, 
the sudden curtailment of electricity could become ―politically explosive.‖59        
Uncertainties over the continuing availability of most minerals calls into 
doubt aspirations for a planet that in the future might provide all citizens with the 
sort of lifestyle currently enjoyed by people in the developed world. Denying the 
majority of global citizens their prosperity because it may jeopardize the living 
standards enjoyed by a minority presages communal violence and warfare. 
Although not all geologists would agree, many accept that the planet‘s burgeoning 
population, in combination with rising living standards, is likely to place 
unprecedented demands on the minerals only Earth itself can provide. For 
instance, R. B. Gordon et al. maintain that should worldwide demand for minerals 
continue to increase then the ―…virgin stocks of several metals appear inadequate 
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to sustain the modern ‗developed world‘ quality of life for all Earth‘s peoples 
under contemporary technology.‖60 And when resources run short, conflict is 
often not far behind.
61
 In order to forestall conflict counties tend to explore with 
the view to exploit resources in the less accessible reaches of the planet – the 
Arctic today,
62
 Antarctica tomorrow?             
 
Hydrocarbon minerals 
Obtaining reliable estimates of remaining worldwide oil reserves is notoriously 
difficult especially when oil companies such as Royal Dutch/Shell fraudulently 
overstate their oil reserves by some four billion barrels.
63
 Estimates of petroleum 
reserves remaining are flexible depending upon which ―authoritive‖ source is used 
and hence it remains notoriously difficult to garner a straight answer.  In 2001, 
Michael Klare, using U.S. Department of Energy estimates, predicts that 
worldwide petroleum reserves amount to 1,005 billion barrels (Gb).
64
 The oil 
industry itself, with characteristic optimism, estimates reserves at between 1,019 to 
1,160 billion barrels.
65
 A contrary estimate is provided by Petro-consultants 
Campbell and Laherrère who estimated that as of 1996 worldwide oil reserves 
amount to no more than 850 billion barrels.
66
 Two more contemporary estimates 
place oil reserves at 2,628 Gb of ultimately recoverable reserve (URR), a figure 
provided by United States Geological Survey (USGS) after a year-long study 
completed in 2000,
67
 or at 2,448 Gb of remaining recoverable resources (RRR) as 
determine by an International Energy Agency (IEA) 2008 study.
68
 Although both 
estimates make allowances for ‗yet to be discovered‘ oil reserves of 732 and 805 
Gb respectively, some commentators maintain that the USGS study underestimates 
the reserves available in numerous geographical regions including the Arctic, 
Antarctica and sub-Saharan Africa by as much as one fifth of global oil RRRs, or 
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approximately 460 Gb.
69
  Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon questions the accuracy 
of the USGS estimates of remaining oil reserves given their prediction of 24 billion 
barrels per year of ―new‖ oil for the period between 1995 and 2025 has yet to 
materialize. In fact for the first eight years of this period actual discoveries 
represent only 8.5 billion barrels a year, or slightly over a third of the predicted 
amount. Despite whose predictions one accepts it is difficult not to agree with a 
telling remark made by Homer-Dixon that ―…estimating discovery trends, the size 
of existing reserves, and future reserve growth is less a science than a black art.‖70       
An equally contentious issue is the date that ‗peak oil‘ will occur. If 
unrestricted oil extraction occurs the volume of oil extracted from any oil field 
tends to follow a bell-shaped curve – extraction starts slowly at first, builds to a 
peak, before declining at the same rate it climbed. Peak output – represented by 
the curve‘s apogee – occurs when approximately half the oil in the reserve has 
been extracted.
71
 As most governments and analysts have in the past exhibit little 
concern about physical depletion the general level of understanding of this topic 
remains fairly poor. The debate is nevertheless important because without 
sufficient investment in demand reduction and substitute sources of energy, a 
decline in the global production of conventional oil could have major economic 
impacts. If global export capacity declines more rapidly than global production, 
the economic impacts in importing countries would be magnified. Moreover, 
transition from conventional oil to substitute sources of energy is likely to hold 
major economic, environmental and security challenges.
72
 
Some ‗peak oil‘ proponents maintained oil production would peak in 200873 
and then decline at a rate of about six per cent annually unless new reserves are 
discovered.
74
 By 2015, according to Jon Thompson of ExxonMobil, the oil 
industry will need to find, develop and produce 60 million barrels per day or 
eighty per cent of daily world consumption from yet to be discovered oil fields. 
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This is equivalent to the discovery of ten new North Sea oil fields.
75
 Thompson‘s 
predictions were supported by British Petroleum (BP), which maintained that oil 
needed to flow from a yet to be discovered oil fields no later than 2005 to prevent 
consumers from experiencing interruptions to supply.
76
 A recent prediction of the 
IEA suggests that unless significant new reserves are found ‗peak oil‘ will occur 
in 2020, especially if oil demand grows on a business-as-usual basis.
77
 An 
alternative, but strongly supported, prediction by the Agency suggests that if a 
further 64 million barrels per day or the equivalent to eight times the daily output 
of Saudi Arabia became available, then ‗peak oil‘ would be delayed till after 
2030.
78
  However, Sorrel et al consider the assumption upon which this scenario 
is based is ―at best optimistic and at worst implausible.‖79 To date not a single 
significant ‗yet to be discovered oil field‘ has been discovered. 
Year by year, from 1860, the volume of newly discovered oil climbed 
steadily upwards until 1961, when it peaked, and since then, on average, oil 
companies have found less new oil than the world consumes. According to Wood 
Mackenzie Consultants, industry is finding less than forty per cent of the new oil 
needed to keep the base of known reserves from shrinking.
80
 The most obvious 
question, to ask therefore is how much oil is yet to be discovered? Campbell and 
Laherrère suggest that based on data available to them in 1998 about 1,000 billion 
barrels of conventional oil remain to be discovered.
81
 Nine years prior to the 
Campbell and Laherrère estimate of ‗proven‘ but unexploited oil reserves, 
estimated reserves of yet to be discovered oil were as low as 700 billion barrels.
82
 
In a more recent statement (2002) on oil reserves, BP concluded that there was 
1047.7 billion barrels of oil were yet to be discovered, however, like Campbell and 
Laherrère, BP made no mention of possible polar oil fields.
83
 There is no 
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significant variation between the USGS and IEA as to the quantum of oil yet to be 
discovered. The former suggests that the amount is 732 Gb,
84
 while the latter‘s 
estimate is 805 billion barrels.
85
 The non-mention of either polar region in some 
estimates of yet to be discovered oil is interesting given that the former British 
Minister for the Environment, Michael Meacher, identified the Polar Regions as 
the only locations left where new conventional oil fields of significant size may yet 
be discovered.
86
 
Compounding the problem of yet to be discovered oil is estimating the 
quantum of URR. The URR is the amount of oil that can realistically be expected 
to be extracted from the ground.
87
 Extraction using the pressure that is naturally 
present in crude oil reservoirs is rarely sufficient to release more than thirty per 
cent of the oil in the reservoir. Secondary recovery techniques using water flooding 
or gas injection to increase the pressure within the reservoir may increase 
extraction by a further ten per cent. More costly tertiary techniques such as the use 
of steam or solvents which can reduce the oil‘s viscosity could boost recovery to as 
much as sixty per cent.
88
 The steam injection technique used at the Saudi Arabian 
oil field of Ghawar: an oil field that has already peaked and is now declining at the 
rate of eight per cent a year.
89
 Such a poor recovery rate automatically implies that 
total recovery is impossible.  
There appears a reasonable correlation between the statistics issued by the 
various sources as to the quantum of available oil, although how long these oil 
reserves will last depends on worldwide consumption. In 1996, worldwide oil 
consumption was 71.5 million barrels per day.
90
 By the year 2000 consumption 
was approximately 80 million barrels per day
91
 and is projected to rise to 110 
million barrels per day by 2020.
92
  The IEA estimates that by 2030 oil demand will 
reach 120 million barrels per day, of which three-quarters of the increase in 
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demand will come from the transport sector.
93
 In the past oil reserves were 
expected to at least last until 2040.
94
 But by the same estimates, if oil consumption 
rose by two per cent per year — as also predicted by the U.S. Department of 
Energy — then the existing reserves will be depleted between 2025 and 2030.95 
Even this estimate could be overly optimistic since satiation of Asia‘s oil thirst96 
could easily exhaust existing reserves prior to the earliest of the above dates. What 
is evident today from the projections contained in a 2009 IEA report is that by 
2030 output from both conventional and non-conventional petroleum sources will 
leave the world deficient of 23 million barrels of oil per day
97
 unless either 
consumption is curbed or production expanded. Just as with predictions about 
‗peak oil‘ the IEA‘s production figures for the year 2030 are being questioned, on 
this occasion by European academics. Their independent analysis suggests that 
total oil production from both conventional and non-conventional sources will by 
2030 aggregate to no more than 75 million barrels per day, some 26 million barrels 
per day lower than the IEA predictions.
98
  Aleklett et al. findings have been 
supported by some staff of the IEA, who themselves suggest that ―…US influence 
and fears of stock market ―panic‖ were encouraging the IEA to downplay the 
potential for future oil scarcity.‖99  
The International Energy Agency maintains that there is a link between future 
increases in global gross domestic product (GDP) and increases in oil 
production.
100
 On this basis, the corollary should equally hold true that any decline 
in future oil production would cause a similar decline in GDP, as oil could no 
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longer help drive future growth. A similar conclusion was reached by Robert 
Hirsch who concluded that in future world oil supplies and global GDP will decline 
in unison, i.e. a one per cent decrease in world oil supply could conceivably 
produce a one per cent decline in global GDP.
101
  Inevitably, this situation will lead 
to higher global oil prices which will impact most severely on poor Third World 
Countries, curtailing development prospects with consequences ranging from state 
failure to large-scale migration.
102
 
The United States has responded in a consistent fashion to all systemic 
challenges to stability of oil-producing regions which might adversely impact its 
economy: the employment of armed forces to guarantee the unhindered flow of 
petroleum. This approach was first adopted during the Truman and Eisenhower 
presidencies post-World War Two, when Soviet adventurism in Iran and pan-Arab 
upheavals in the Middle East appeared to threaten the security of Persian Gulf oil 
supplies. It found formal expression during the Carter administration, when, in 
response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in 
Iran, President Carter announced that the safety of Persian Gulf oil was in ―the vital 
interest of the United States of America,‖ and that in protecting this interest 
America would use ―any means necessary, including military force.‖103 The Carter 
doctrine of using force to protect the flow of oil was later cited by President 
George Bush senior to justify American intervention in the Gulf War of 1990-91, 
and it provided the underpinning strategic rationale for the 2003 American invasion 
of Iraq.
104
 Not surprisingly, given the United States ever-growing requirement for 
imported petroleum, officials have begun to extend the Carter doctrine to other 
major oil producing regions, including the Caspian Sea basin, Africa and Latin 
America.
105
 Hence the securitisation of oil holds the potential to unsettle many 
strategic relationships any one of which could result in another, but not the last, oil 
war.  
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 Numerous wars in the twentieth century were fought over oil. For example, 
the Chaco War of 1932-35, when Paraguay annexed a region of Bolivia in the 
mistaken belief that it contained oil deposits.
106
 In Asia-Pacific during the 1930s a 
revisionist Japan was violently expanding its Asian empire much to the 
consternation of the United States. Ultimately curtailment of oil supplies to Japan 
by the United States in particular, placed Japan at a strategic disadvantage, for 
Japan needed an unimpeded source of oil in order to prosecute its war with China. 
As the prospects for a peaceful resolution to this oil crisis diminished Japan‘s 
leadership decided to go to war with the United States.
107
 The outcome of this 
decision was the Pacific War (1941-1945) resulting in the defeat and occupation of 
Japan. In one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Cold War era the Nigerian 
government eventually defeated Ibo separatist for control over an oil rich region of 
Biafra in the Niger Delta.
108
 Although four decades have elapsed since the end of 
this war, ethnic conflicts fueled by oil continue to dog the Niger Delta reigniting 
the specter of yet more irredentist wars.
109
  In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 
response to the alleged theft of Iraqi oil by the Kuwaitis. Iraq‘s invasion was 
greeted with worldwide condemnation and resulted in a United Nation sanctioned, 
United States lead War of Liberation; a war that lasted a mere three days.
110
  In this 
century, opponents of the first significant interstate war, the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
by the United States and its coalition partners, argue that the real aim of the war 
was to enable the US to take control of Iraq‘s oil reserves (the second largest of 
any country after Saudi Arabia).
111
  
 
Natural Gas Liquids 
The IEA expects the global output of natural gas liquids (NGL) – light 
hydrocarbons that exist in liquid form underground and are produced with natural 
gas and recovered in separation facilities or processing plants – to almost double, 
from 10.5 million barrels per day in 2007 to slightly less than 20 million barrels per 
day by 2030. This increase will be driven by a steady rise in natural gas output. 
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The majority of the increase will come from Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
(OPEC) countries, where natural gas production has the ability to expand the 
quickest.
112
  Proven natural gas reserves (2004) stand at 180 trillion cubic metres 
which is sufficient to meet global demand at current (2004) consumption rates for 
sixty-six years.
113
 No less than forty per cent of the global natural gas reserves are 
situated in the greater Middle East
114
 where continued access by Western countries 
could become problematic. In the Central Asian republics where Russia is unable 
to prevent China from securing energy resources, it is using all of its political 
influence to deny the United States access to the region economic and military 
purposes.
115
  
It should be acknowledged that the geopolitical implications of gas differ 
from oil. Although the nature of the gas industry is changing, the majority of 
natural gas is still sold on long-term contracts with prices indexed to oil: most 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) is sold on this basis, making LNG tankers nothing 
more than ‗floating pipelines.‘ Thus, the key issues to be address at international 
forums revolve around location of and ownership of pipelines. In geopolitics of gas 
pipelines Russia remains central, placing Eurasia generally, but Europe especially 
at a distinct disadvantage.
116
 Like other regions that have recently become heavily 
dependent on Russian natural gas, Europe, conscious of the regional geo-economic 
control energy provides Russia but, unable to find alternate gas supplies, has 
largely chosen to acquiesce to Russia‘s dominance in the energy field and to 
encourage their national firms to eke out what profits they can make from 
cooperation with the Russians.
117
 Just such an alliance has of January 2011 been 
agreed between Russian and British oil majors for the exploration of oil prospects 
in the Arctic region‘s southern Kara Sea.118   Despite this agreement Russia shows 
no inclination to relinquish its energy dominance since its resource abundance is 
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seen as a means of restoring its major world status, thereby commanding the 
respect of all other major powers. As demand for lower-carbon fossil fuels 
intensifies in a climate change conscious world geopolitical gamesmanships 
centered on natural gas supplies are likely to intensify. Russia‘s leverage is likely 
to grow until a global natural gas market develops and gas becomes fungible as 
oil.
119
 
Over the next two decades demand natural gas is expected to rise from 3,000 
billion cubic metres in 2010 to slightly less than 5,000 billion cubic metres by 2030 
with the greatest increase in demand arising from Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Countries.
120
 If access to natural gas 
supplies from the greater Middle East and Russia become uncertain then the 
developed world might be force to consider less conventional sources of supply 
such as the Polar Regions. If an illustration is needed of the importance the Arctic 
has now assumed in the geopolitical lexicon of energy security there is no need to 
look beyond the planting of a Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole in 
2007.
121
 Although no similar impudent acts have occurred in Antarctica such 
action cannot be entirely dismissed for according to William Westermeyer there 
are six seaborne locations that are potentially natural gas reservoirs of some 
significance.
122
 However, if Klare is correct and conflict over hydrocarbons in the 
years ahead is all but a foregone conclusion,
123
 then exploiting polar hydrocarbon 
reservoirs might serve humanity well by delaying the enactment of Klare‘s 
prognosis, although conversely it might precipitate it.  
 
Alternative energy sources 
Alternative energy sources in 2001 were estimated at thirteen per cent of total 
primary energy supply globally, taking into account both commercial and non-
commercial energy sources. Of this share, eighty per cent was supplied by 
biomass and waste and twenty per cent by hydro-power and other renewable 
energy sources. In the developed world most of renewable energy sources are 
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used to generate electricity, while in the remainder of the world renewable energy 
sources are used directly in the residential, commercial and services sector. 
Increasing the share of biomass production in total primary energy by source 
(TPES) from eleven per cent in 2000 to approximately sixteen per cent by 2050, 
as envisaged by some energy-supply scenarios, would require at least a three-fold 
increase in production, which is almost twice as high as that experience in the past 
ten years. Biomass plantings on this scale would require devoting increasing 
amount of land to this use, potentially leading to stronger competition with food 
production. Moreover, marginal land may not be suitable for such crop systems – 
particularly a problem in dry regions.
124
 
Globally, an increase in biomass production of that magnitude at affordable 
costs requires significant progress in agricultural and soil improvement 
techniques; this would require a paradigmatic shift equivalent to "Green 
Revolution" that food production experienced during the twentieth century. It 
might necessitate the application of bioengineering techniques to improve plant 
yields. In addition, despite its futuristic connotations, biomass production in the 
oceans may have to be considered;
125
 as does the commercialisation of synthetic 
fuel drawn from the brackish ponds of ‗algal farms.‘126 However, a substantial 
reduction in costs and improvements in the energy transformation efficiency 
would be called for if biomass of any type were to replace oil and gas in the 
production of liquid and gaseous fuels.
127
 This would make it implausible to 
expect that the world by 2035 will have entirely foregone fossil fuels for an 
alternative; hence hydrocarbon wars remain possible if not probable.  
   
The food-water nexus 
Since the close of the Second World War, global agricultural output has increased 
at a rate never seen before in human history. Much of this productivity increase is 
attributable to the development of high-yielding crop varieties, intensive use of 
inorganic fertilizers and pesticides, irrigation expansion and capital-intensive 
farming practices. In the 1970s the euphoria surrounding this ‗green revolution‘ 
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was questioned in the wake of the energy crisis and a growing awareness of long-
term environmental consequences brought on by advanced farming management 
practices. Intensive agricultural practices were found to cause soil erosion, 
groundwater contamination, soil compaction and a decline in natural soil fertility. 
Since then agricultural research has expanded its scope to include sustainable and 
resource-efficient cropping system and production techniques.
128
 
Since the early 1980s yet another threat to agriculture has emerged to garner 
global attention. Although there is still much debate over its cause many 
climatologists remain convinced that significant climate change will afflict itself on 
humanity over the coming century due to increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide 
and other trace gases. As a consequence major changes in hydrological regimes 
have been forecast. The severity and geographical distribution of such climate-
induced changes may affect humanity‘s ability to expand food production to a level 
necessary to feed a world population approaching ten billion by mid-century.
129
 
Demand for water for agriculture could increase by thirty per cent by 2030 and 
could double by mid-century.
130
 Although extending one‘s vision four decades into 
the future maybe rash, John Beddington, Great Britain‘s chief scientist, population 
pressures will within as little as two decades result in a ―perfect storm‖ created by 
energy, food and water shortages.
131
          
According to Westing, in order to produce staple food crops a country must 
satisfy a number of critical conditions, among them: (a) sufficient arable land and 
an appropriate climate; (b) receive sufficient rainfall or have access to other 
sources of fresh water (irrigation); (c) have access to fertilizers; and (d) produce or 
import enough oil and other fuels.
132
 Depending upon the extent to which these and 
other prerequisites (vermin-proof storage) are not satisfied, the food deficit must be 
met by imports or international aid. However, both imports and aid may serve only 
to perpetuate the vicious cycle that created the original food deficit. 
Cereals are the staple food crop across the world, in particular in Third World 
countries. In 2005, about 2.2 thousand million tonnes of grain—maize, wheat, rice, 
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barley, millet, oats–was produced globally.133  This was sufficient to feed the 
world‘s population for it equates to approximately a third of a tonne per person. In 
addition to cereals a further 2.1 million tonnes of soybeans was also produced.
134
  
However, statistics hide the fact that production of staple foods occurs unevenly 
across the world, a situation that can only worsen as deserts encroach onto 
available arable land, chiefly in Africa and Asia. This natural occurring 
phenomenon has been aggravated by detrimental and unsustainable agricultural 
practices caused by the economic necessity to export primary produce into the 
global market economy.
135
  
It is difficult to overstate the current importance of irrigation to cereal 
production for globally two-thirds of the world cereal crops are grown on irrigated 
land. Global groundwater extraction for irrigation purposes may exceed 600 to 800 
km³ per year.
136
   In particular, developing countries rely heavily on irrigated land, 
because crop yields from such land are twice as heavy as harvests from solely rain-
fed lands – 3.3 tons per hectare compared with 1.5 tons per hectare.137  
The bulk of world‘s cereal production is committed to providing animal feed, 
indeed about two thirds of all maize and other coarse grains are dedicated to this 
purpose.
138
 The consumption of animal protein is steadily rising in tandem with a 
rise in financial incomes, a point well illustrated by the climb in world beef 
production from 20 million tons in 1950 to nearly 60 million tons in 2003.
139
 
However, the change to a global society that prefers to feast on animal protein is of 
itself wasteful of water. Each kilogram of grain-fed beef consumes 15,500 litres of 
water compared to 3,900 litres per kilogram of chicken, 3,400 litres per kilogram 
of rice, 900 litres per kilogram of maize or 180 litres for a thousand grams of 
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tomatoes.
140
 Each glass of milk (250 ml.) consumes 250 litres water in its 
production prior to being purchased by a retail customer.
141
 Such is the looming 
shortage of water resulting from food production, communities and commodities 
are being critiqued against their ―water footprint‖142 in a manner similar to that 
used to determine their overall ecological footprint.  
As stated earlier in this chapter world population is expected to reach 9.2 
billion by 2050. If, over this period, economic development proceeds as expected 
in low-income countries then the global demand for food will increase 
threefold.
143
 Specialists at the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) estimate that by 2020 the world demand for cereals will equal 2497 
million metric tonnes and of this total the developing world will consume 1675 
million metric tonnes, which is approximately threefold increase on 1974. A 
similar pattern is predicted for meat consumption, whereby in 2020 worldwide 
demand will equal 327 million metric tonnes of which the developing countries 
will consume 213 million metric tonnes or nearly twice the consumption of 
developed countries. Of the global consumption of meat consumed in 2020 forty 
per cent will be chicken and twenty-four per cent beef.
144
 Meeting such a demand 
is seen as a Herculean task. Based on current trends, by 2025, Africa will be able 
to feed only around forty per cent of its population, expected to be about one 
billion souls. The prospect for South Asia is similar. While, in the developed 
world, demand for meat and milk will likely plateau, or even decline, in the 
developing world, income growth and urbanisation will fuel a strong increase in 
their demand.
145
 If humanity fails to implement a strategic transformation to both 
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production and consumption patterns, then by 2050 it is unlikely that all world‘s 
people can be fed sustainably and equitably.
146
 Failure to change existing patterns 
will likely result in societal conflict and civil unrest.
147
 
If the population and food consumption forecasts for 2020 and beyond are 
correct there will a dramatic impact on both global and regional ―water 
footprints.‖ Should consumption patterns by 2050 not have changed radically 
from those of today then their impact on the global water footprint is likely to be 
nothing short of catastrophic, even without the exacerbating effects of climate 
change. In the future it will be water rather than food that turns the thoughts of 
states towards war.  
In the past countries that have turned to war to alleviate perceived scarcity of 
land, fresh water, or oil have only resort to destruction of croplands and food 
supplies as means of subduing their opponent and the community that supports 
them.
148
 Food can also be a potent weapon of war, especially when, as in Sudan, it 
is gifted directly to one protagonist (the rebels) in their fight against government 
forces.
149
 However, future tightening of the relationship between water and food 
suggests that it will no longer be apposite for any state to merely concentrate their 
endeavours on gaining sovereignty over land capable of providing food, what will 
be even more important is securing ‗ownership‘ to water sources capable of 
supporting food production from the ‗acquired‘ land. In the future productive land 
and an attendant water source shall not necessarily share the same geographical 
location. This radical change in emphasis holds dire implications for Antarctica in 
particularly, given that the continent remains the largest repository of fresh water 
on Earth. Paradoxically, it will be restricted access to resources, especially food 
and water, which will ultimately curtail all human activities at a time when the 
majority humanity is enjoying or is on the cusp of enjoying an unprecedented 
standard of living.   
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Expanding middle class 
Previous periods of extensive middle class expansion like those that occurred in 
the late ninetieth century in both Europe and the United States are now considered 
as periods of enormous economic progress, but also of political, social and 
environmental change. Despite its frequent use, the term ‗middle class‘ has no 
generally accepted definition. Goldman Sachs have, in an arbitrary manner, 
defined the global ‗middle class‘ as those with a 2007 equivalent income per 
person of US$6,000-US$30,000 per year in purchasing power parity terms.
150
 
With this definition global income distribution gets narrower, not wider.  
Over the next two decades the expansion of the middle class will accelerate 
and its impact will be felt in two possible ways. The first is a shift in spending 
power, which will move towards rising Eastern middle-income economies and 
away from Western rich countries to a point where the Eastern economies could 
come to dominate global spending once the largest population countries enter the 
middle-income group. By 2050 this middle-income group will include Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, Philippines, Mexico and Vietnam, plus three of the four BRIC 
states Brazil, China and India. It is also forecast that this grouping of countries 
will be responsible for close to sixty percent of global gross domestic product.
151
 
Also by 2050 the economic expansion expected of South Africa and Thailand may 
place them within this grouping.
152
 The second significant impact forecast to 
occur is a shift in spending power towards middle-income people, which will 
result in an explosion of the global middle-class on a scale never previously seen. 
As at the year 2008, the global middle class was estimated at 1.5 billion, or 
marginally above one billion if both China and India were excluded from the 
global total.
153
 Over the last decade humanity has seen an unprecedented 
expansion of this group. However, the pace of this expansion over the next two 
decades is predicted to accelerate resulting in a further two billion people joining 
the global middle-class. At around thirty per cent of the world‘s population this 
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explosion will dwarf even the 19
th
-century middle-class surge in its global 
scale.
154
 
The significance of this middle-class ‗bulge‘ on resource consumption is 
best demonstrated through a scenario posed by David Douglas of Sun 
Microsystems. Douglas poses the question ―What if once the next billion [middle 
class] people are all here, we gave each of them just one small gift – a sixty-watt 
incandescent light bulb?‖ This would equate to 60,000 megawatts. But in all 
likelihood this billion people will use their bulbs for just four hours per day, so at 
any one time the requirement to be met is only 15,000 megawatt. Thus, globally, 
thirty new 500 megawatt coal or gas-burning generation plants would be 
required.
155
 If the middle-class expands by a further one or two billion people then 
the problem of resource consumption in the energy sector, where resource 
availability is anything but unlimited, will be greatly exaggerated.  
While access to electric lighting by the rising middle-class will not be 
limited by the lack of coal for global reserves are estimated at one trillion tonnes, 
enough to last 200 years at present consumption rates.
156
 However, the same is not 
true for the metal tungsten which forms the lighting element within an 
incandescent light bulb, for at present rate of consumption tungsten ore reserves 
could be depleted within fifty years.
157
 Although substitute materials are capable 
of replacing tungsten in many applications, tungsten, along with many other 
minerals will face demand pressures exerted by the new expanding middle-class 
and this sort of change is likely to generate tensions within and between countries.             
 
Signs of a problematic future 
Between 2010 and 2030 the demand for natural gas will grow the fastest in 
absolute terms while demand for non-hydro alternative energy source will grow 
fastest in percentage terms, but oil will remain the dominant fuel. Over the same 
time period dependence on oil imports will be approaching, if not exceeding, 
ninety per cent in many regions of the world including Europe, China, India and 
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the Pacific.
158
 Over a slightly longer review period (2000 to 2030) coal demand 
will have increased by some 900 million tonnes of oil equivalents (Mtoe) to reach 
3,629 Mtoe with seventy-four per cent being committed to electricity generation. 
Nearly sixty per cent of all coal consumed in 2030 will arise from the developing 
world.
159
 This rise appears to be the result of annual incremental increases rather 
than an anticipated demand caused by an exploding middle-class.  
There is no disguising the fact that energy related greenhouse gas emissions 
will continue to rise up to and beyond 2030. Global carbon dioxide emissions 
attributable to energy generation are expected to increase by 1.8 per cent per year 
to thirty-eight billion tonnes in 2030 – seventy per cent above the 2000 level. 
Beyond 2025, the developing world rather than OECD countries will be the 
greatest emitters of energy related greenhouse gases.
160
  
J.R. McNeil in a critique of Jared Diamond‘s book, Collapse: How Societies 
Choose to Fail or Succeed, made a poignant observation when he asserted that 
even if humanity can agree that by 2050 it will have restricted world population to 
nine billion and have globalize a new energy regime, it is the next 40 to 50 years 
that are likely to be the most dangerous.
161
 Given current population and energy 
use projections McNeil has cause to worry. As the global middle-class continues 
to grow the economic convergence between wealthy and poor states narrows; a 
narrowing the West too readily assumes will only come about as the incomes in 
the developing world lift – otherwise it will not occur at all. But there exists a 
third scenario: that income in the West declines, an outcome that appears to be 
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beyond the imagination of many Westerners, most of whom have caught 
America‘s affluenza.162  
With the average American consuming thirty-two times as many resources 
as the average Kenyan and ten time as many as the average Chinese, it is difficult 
to see how the 5.5 billion people who reside in the developing world could match 
the standard of living experienced by the 1.1 billion people of the developed 
world. For peaceful global economic equilibrium to exist the developing world 
must be permitted a ‗rightful‘ rise in their standard of living while the developed 
world accepts the inevitable decline in theirs.
163
 In each ―Americum‖ living 
standards depend on unfettered access to natural resources, in particular increasing 
supplies of fossil fuels. Should access to these be curtailed or worse still denied, 
who can predict what any country‘s reaction will be? 
According to Klare an adverse reaction could precipitate any one of the three 
types of conflict. First are the resource wars driven by scarcity of vital industrial 
materials, such as oil and minerals. The second are those resource wars that will 
occur as rainfall patterns shift to the detriment of food-growing regions; and the 
third, a possible consequence of the second, is the ―migratory war,‖ where people 
are forced to move from uninhabitable regions. Of the third type, people don‘t 
discuss its origins in terms of climate change, but rather in terms of economic 
deprivation. Despite which term is preferred it is likely to cause conflict.
164
  
A sense that disputes over resources may not be resolved peaceably has 
some of the world‘s militaries rethinking their doctrines and force structures, the 
most striking example of which is the creation by the United States Armed Forces 
of a unified military command for Africa (AFRICOM). While the United States 
military along with some military analysts argue that Africa‘s growing strategic 
importance necessitated the establishment of a dedicated regional command, other 
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experts suggest the command‘s creation was motivated by more specific concerns: 
China and oil.
165
 This latter opinion appears to be endorsed by the United States 
Department of Defense through a statement that ―Securing adequate supplies of 
resources and materials has become a major driver of Chinese foreign policy. 
Beijing has pursued stronger relations with Angola…Sudan…and Zimbabwe to 
secure long-term resource supply agreement.‖166 Since publication of this report 
in 2006, China pursued long-term oil supply contracts with other African 
countries including Chad, Egypt and Nigeria.
167
 China‘s Nigerian flirtation will be 
of particular concern to the United States since even as far back as 2003 it was 
importing 900,000 barrels per day of sweet Nigerian crude. The United States 
Department of Energy expects that oil imports from Africa will top 770 million 
barrels per year by 2020.
168
  
China‘s growing economic presence and influence in Africa is not the only 
reality Europe and the United States have to face, for India like China also wants 
access to Africa‘s natural resources. India already imports eleven per cent of its 
oil from Nigeria and is seeking to secure access to supplies from Angola against 
stiff political opposition from the Chinese. However, the Indians and Chinese can 
cooperate in Africa‘s energy development as demonstrated controversial tie-up in 
the Greater Nile Oil Project in the Sudan, which enabled the Sudanese 
government to ignore Western attempts to mediate in the conflict in Darfur. In 
order to secure the resources it needs, India appears willing to follow the Chinese 
rather than the Western model. Like China, India displays few scruples when it 
comes to trading with corrupt authoritarian regimes.
169
  
Displaying a lack of scruples when access to natural resources is at stake is 
not just the prerogative of either the Chinese or Indians. Nuclear power industry is 
also stricken with the problem of future fuel supply. Global uranium supplies are 
currently considered adequate to meet civilian reactor needs, largely because of 
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the uranium stockpiles left over from the Cold War era weapons industry. Once 
this stockpile is expended uranium supplies will become increasingly scarce and 
prohibitively expensive: if demand grows as is predicted then virgin uranium 
reserves could be exhausted in less than sixty years.
170
 It has therefore become 
imperative for those countries that rely currently on nuclear power, or those 
countries that foresee their future tied to nuclear power to secure access to the 
diminishing sources of uranium as the highly prolific mines have become 
exhausted, and only the less productive mines remain in operation today.
171
  
Wittingly or unwittingly, Western states – Canada, France, Japan and the 
United States – have displayed a hypocritical disregard for their professed values 
by permitted national organisations to invest billions of dollars in authoritarian 
Kazakhstan, the location of one of a few remaining underexploited large uranium 
deposits.
172
 Their involvement comes despite allegation by human-rights groups 
that the government of Kazakhstan persists with arbitrary arrests, detention and 
even torture.
173
 Clearly, where a countries prosperity is derived from the 
exploitation or consumption of natural resources, Western ideals, environmental 
protection and human rights can sink beneath a tide of self-interest and likely to 
be replaced by a new set of values.
174
 Natural resources are often consider a 
―curse‖ inflicted upon any country that has them in abundance, especially if 
governance from the centre is corrupt, weak or diffused among competing actors.  
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Both the Arctic and Antarctica could be ―cursed‖ in the same manner given 
their geological location belies a treasure-house of natural resources and they still 
remain devoid of a universally recognized governance structure. Thus, both Polar 
Regions in the future will be susceptible to the imposition of a new governing 
regime especially one formulated by a disparate collection of resource-deprived 
states who have no wish to uphold existing international institutions, for their sole 
concern is to effect an alleviation of their own resource insecurity through the 
exploitation of these twin global commons. 
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Chapter Ten 
 
Scenario Driver - Climate Change 
 
Climate confusion 
Mount Kilimanjaro is an iconic symbol to the people of Tanzania, for its snow-
covered peak provides a dramatic contrast to the dry equatorial savannah. 
Kilimanjaro is also an icon for the world‘s glaciologists for its retreating glaciers 
stand as a bold testament to the ravages of climate change.
1
  
Before proceeding to discuss the nexus between climate change and 
security, wisdom would suggest that the technical difference between ―weather‖ 
and ―climate‖ be explained. Weather is the current state of the atmosphere as 
discussed daily by meteorologists. Climate describes the general characteristics of 
the weather experienced in any region: it is variations in temperature, humidity, 
wind direction and strength, and precipitation. Climate also takes account of the 
rare, more extreme events which cannot always be predicted with accuracy but 
can, based on past experience, be accorded a probability of happening once every 
so many years.
2
  
That climate can change is beyond dispute, for historical evidence shows 
that the world has been both warmer and cooler than it is today, although neither 
climatic state necessarily encompassed the entire globe during the same time 
period. In the Northern Hemisphere a period of warming started around 8,100 
years ago and lasted for approximately four thousand years. It was unusually 
warm in Greenland and, over the same time period, there occurred the greatest 
summer melting of ice over the last ten thousand years. During this period the 
Arctic was up to three degrees Celsius warmer than it is today.
3
 By contrast, it 
was exceptionally cold in Antarctica suggesting that a polar seesaw – an Antarctic 
climate anomaly – had occurred with warmth flipping between hemispheres.4 
                                                 
1
 See Revkin, Andrew, ‗Icon of the climate debate‘. New Zealand Herald, March 27-28, 2004, p. 
B16. 
2
 See Boyle, Stewart and John Ardill, The Greenhouse Effect, New English Library, London, 1989,     
p. 7. 
3
 See Plimer, Ian, heaven+earth - Global Warming: The Missing Science, Howling At The Moon 
Publishing, Kaukapakapa, New Zealand, 2009, p. 49.  
4
 Shackleton, Nicholas, ‗Climate Change Across the Hemispheres,‘ Science, Vol. 291, No. 5501,          
5 January 2001, p. 58. 
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There is also strong evidence for asynchronous temperature changes in Greenland 
and Antarctica during the last ice age.
5
  
That such natural changes are capable of occurring rapidly is evidenced by 
the advent of an intense cold period 12,900 years ago that lasted for some thirteen 
hundred years. At the start of this period known as the Younger Dryas, global 
temperatures are assessed to have dropped by seven degrees Celsius in as little as 
a decade.
6
  At the end of this period temperatures returned to their previous level 
in just a few years, with possibly half of the warming taking place in little more 
than a fifteen year period.
7
 Although climatic changes can occur abruptly, their 
onset or ending is not certain and is difficult to predict. During the 1930s the 
popular press carried news items that the world ―at least for the time being was 
growing warmer;‖ a contention readily supported by meteorologists.8 However, 
this decade long period of balmy weather proved to be a false-promise, for by 
November 1941 ―General Winter‖ forced Hitler‘s panzers to stall at the gates of 
Moscow through a combination of unusually early heavy snowfalls and 
exceptionally severe temperatures, which in at least one instance dropped to as 
low as minus fifty-three degrees Celsius.
9
 
Indeed, this climatic false-promise did end in 1940. From that year onwards 
some meteorologists maintain that the world had entered a cooling phase that did 
not release its icy grip for fifty years. Periodically, but especially during the mid-
1970s, the prospect of another ―ice age‖ featured in the popular media with 
messages such as ―[t]he telltale signs are everywhere – from the unexpected 
persistence and thickness of pack ice in the waters around Iceland to the 
southward migration of a warmth-loving creature like the armadillo from the 
Midwest‖10 of America. To the meteorologists these empirical observations, along 
with other unspecified pieces of ―convincing‖ evidence lead them to conclude that 
the global mean temperature since 1940 had dropped by no less than 2.7˚ 
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Fahrenheit.
11
 A more cataclysmic picture was portrayed in the weekly magazine 
Newsweek one year later when it reported that: 
 
There are ominous signs that the Earth‘s weather patterns have 
begun to change dramatically and that these changes may portend 
a drastic decline in food production – with serious political 
implications for just about every nation on Earth. The drop in food 
output could begin quite soon, perhaps only 10 years from now.
12
   
 
While the cause behind the climatic change was unclear, what was obvious to the 
meteorologists was that lower temperatures would herald reduced agricultural 
productivity for the remainder of the twentieth century.
13
 Today, a similar 
cataclysmic event is being attributed to a change in global temperatures, the result 
of a warming not cooling planet.
14
   
Similarly, the American National Academy of Sciences warned that ―major 
climatic changes would force economic and social adjustments on a worldwide 
scale because the global patterns of food production and population that have 
evolved are implicitly dependent on the climate of the present century.‖15 Given 
that the average global temperature during the great Ice Ages was approximately 
seven degrees lower than the balmy nineteen-thirties, it is little wonder that 
meteorologists were predicting a reversion to the ―little ice age‖ conditions that 
brought bitter winters to much of Europe and northern America between 1600 and 
1900.
16
  
As with global warming, global cooling also has its fervent adherents. 
According to Professor Bob Carter of James Cook University, there is no 
substantive evidence to show that the modern rates of environmental change lie 
outside historical natural bounds. This should come as no surprise since changes 
to global climate follow historic cyclical patterns. Global temperature warmed 
slightly in the late twentieth century and has been cooling since 2002, with neither 
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warming nor cooling being unusual in rate or magnitude.
17
 This could represent 
the onset of another ―Little Ice Age‖ for long cold snaps are historically nothing 
exceptional
18
 as global climate patterns flip-flop every few thousand years, 
sometimes cooling by as much as ten degrees Celsius in just a few years.
19
  
While history cannot be rewritten there exists a body of climatologists that 
believe that ―[H]istorical weather patterns are no longer a reliable predictor of the 
future‖20 and that ―[H]uman-induced climate change is happening now, and 
impacts are already apparent‖ with ―[G]reater impacts…projected, particularly if 
heat-trapping gas emissions continue unabated.‖21 Their contention was reported 
to be supported by a consistent finding of the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program that the ―rate and magnitude of future climate change and resulting 
impacts depend critically on the level of global atmospheric heat-trapping gas 
concentrations as well as the types and concentrations of atmospheric particles 
(aerosols)‖ and ―unless the rate of emissions is substantially reduced, impacts are 
expected to become increasingly severe for more people and places.‖22   
While there is almost universal acceptance that the world‘s climate is 
currently warming, there are differing opinions within the scientific community as 
to the origins of this change. Some climatologists maintain that climate change is 
a natural phenomenon that has a cyclical pattern of occurrence which is quite 
independent of human activity.
23
 Others climatologists accept climate change as 
natural phenomenon but stridently maintain that present-day changes are 
anthropogenic in origin. Irrespective of its origins, climate change is predicted to 
outpace the ability of both human society and ecosystems to adjust to any ―new‖ 
norm.
24
 This is especially true for the two Polar Regions where much of the 
world‘s weather is born. 
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Contemporary climate change is considered to be a post-Industrial Revolution 
phenomenon caused or exacerbated by a build-up of ―green-house‖ gases such as 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and water vapour that trap the sun‘s heat in 
the lower atmosphere. Deforestation, along with the burning of fossil fuels is 
responsible for the majority of greenhouse gas emissions. Projections published 
by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report (IPCC AR4) show that by the year 2100 the Earth‘s average 
surface temperature will have risen by between 2.0 and 4.5 degrees Celsius with 
the most likely rise being about three degrees Celsius.
25
 However, some 
commentators speculate that by the turn of the century the average temperature 
will be nearly six degrees higher that it is today.
26
 Even a temperature change of 
just 0.1°Celsius per decade is of concern because the climate will be changing 
faster than the adaptive capacity of many animals and plants.
27
 
If anthropogenic forcing is the cause of climate change then the ability to 
control the speed and extent of that change requires the stabilization of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. This can only be achieved by a drastic 
reduction in global CO2 emissions. Yet, despite the need for restraint, fossil fuel 
emissions increased by twenty-nine per cent over the period 2000 to 2008. In 
conjunction with the increase in emissions from emerging economies, the 
principal cause behind this increase was a rise in the international trade of goods 
and services and an increase of coal as a fuel source. By contrast, emissions from 
land-use changes were nearly constant over the same period. Over the past fifty 
years there has been a gradual annual increase in the fraction of CO2 emissions 
that remain in the atmosphere and models suggest that this trend was caused by a 
decrease in the uptake of carbon dioxide by both land and ocean carbon sinks; a 
response to climate change and climatic variability.
28
 If carbon sinks fail and 
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emissions are not curtailed then Professor Le Quéré suggests that ―…it is not 
2.5˚C or 3˚C we will get: it‘s 5˚C or 6˚C – that is the path we‘re on.‖29  
The 2009 Copenhagen Accord sponsored by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC) endorsed the need for ―deep cuts in 
global emissions‖ documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report if the 
increase in global temperature is to be held below two degrees Celsius. While this 
goal is clearly enunciated, the path for its achievement is less definitive given that 
―…social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and 
overriding priorities of developing countries.‖30 Although members to the Accord 
may ―…underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our 
time‖31 the vagueness of its wording might induce international commitment over 
the next decade to wane, just as many of the emission-reduction targets contained 
in the Kyoto Treaty are likely to remain unachieved. If the promise of the 
Copenhagen Accord remains unfulfilled then the rise in average global 
temperature is unlikely stabilize at or even near two degrees Celsius.  
The Copenhagen Accord holds salience if, and only if, there is statistical 
validation that the climate is warming and that the origins of such warming are 
anthropogenic. Upon reviewing a wealth of attribution studies Peter Stott et al. 
concluded that there was an increasingly remote possibility that climate change 
was dominated by natural rather than anthropogenic factors.
32
 Stott et al. also 
maintain that progress made since AR4 has shown that discernible human 
influence extends to reductions in Arctic sea ice and changes in the hydrological 
cycle associated with increasing atmospheric moisture content, regional and 
worldwide patterns of precipitation changes.
33
 In addition, changes in Antarctic 
temperatures have been attributed to human influence
34
 and there is increasing 
                                                 
29
 See McCarthy, Michael, ‗Catastrophic rise in temperature tipped by study,‘ New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland, November 19, 2009, p. A11. 
30
 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, 18 December 2009, p. 2. 
31
 Ibid., p. 1. 
32
 See Stott, Peter A., Nathan P. Gillett, Gabriele C. Hegerl, David J. Karoly et al., ‗Detection and 
attribution of climate change: a regional perspective,‘ Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews of Climate 
Change, 2010, p. 15. Statistical tests conducted by Stott et al. shows that the 50-year global 
warming trend observed from 1959 to 2008 is detected at the five per cent significance level, as 
there is less than a five per cent likelihood of such a large trend being due to internal climate 
variability alone. Ibid.,      p. 2.  
33
 Ibid., p. 15. 
34
 See Gillett, Nathan P., Daithi A. Stone, Peter A. Stott, Toru Nozawa et al., ‗Attribution of polar 
warming to human influence,‘ Nature Geoscience, Vol. 1, November 2008, p. 750. 
 199 
evidence that anthropogenic influence on temperature is becoming significant 
below continental scale.
35
 Thus, Stott and his researchers like those authors who 
compiled the AR4 report observed ―fingerprints‖ of human activity on many 
different aspects of climate change. 
Despite a wealth of observational evidence that the climate is unequivocally 
warming, the arrival of intemperate weather in 2008 was put forward by some 
climate sceptics as evidence that ―the hell that the radicals [climate change 
alarmists] have promised is freezing over.‖36  Such media articles encouraged 
David Easterling and Michael Wehner to establish whether the climate was 
warming or cooling. Their research showed that periods of no trend or even 
cooling of the global average surface temperature were found in the last thirty-
four years of the observed records, as well as in the simulation models for the 
twentieth and twenty-first century that included greenhouse gas forcing. Their 
analysis indicates that the climate over the twenty-first century will follow this 
past pattern by producing periods of a decade or two where the global mean 
surface air temperature will show no discernible trend or even a slight cooling in 
the presence of long-term anthropogenic forced warming. The conclusion reached 
by these two researchers was that ―claims that global warming is not occurring 
that are derived from a cooling observed over such short time periods ignore this 
natural variability and are misleading.‖37 So as not to be ‗mislead‘ this thesis 
accepts that in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence to the contrary, the 
IPCC AR4 report represents the unequivocal authority on climate change and its 
future impact on both human and physical systems. 
 
Adapt or die 
While the AR4 report should have provided a universally accepted scientific 
platform from which to launch a discussion on the role society has to play in 
climate mitigation, adaptation or both, regrettably it has been found wanting. The 
ambiguity surrounding the science that underpins this report has created a 
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seemingly unbridgeable schism between the climate change ‗alarmists‘ – those 
who consider climate change is solely the outcome of anthropogenic forcing, and 
‗deniers‘ – those who consider a changing climate results from natural forces 
beyond human control.  Recent inaccuracies included within the AR4 report and 
acknowledged by the IPCC give the deniers cause for healthy scepticism as to 
where the truth about climate change might lie, but given that uncertainties riven 
climate science, these minor scientific infractions are no excuse for inaction.
38
 
Finally, there is a third group, which accepts that anthropogenic forcing has 
probably given rise to an acceleration of natural processes through positive 
‗feedback‘ looping and that both human-induced and natural forces are now 
working in concert to change the global climate to humanity‘s ultimate 
disadvantage. 
From an alarmists perspective humanity has already emitted enough 
additional greenhouses gases into the atmosphere to cause some degree of climate 
change and the disruptions that will come with it are an inevitable part of 
humanity‘s future.39 However, humanity can mitigate the severity of this future by 
curtailing the emissions of carbon dioxide and thus stabilizing the global 
temperature below the level at which it becomes seriously detrimental to 
contemporary civilization. Often the perception of what is required for successful 
mitigation is nothing more than the application of a simple ‗technological fix‘ 
derived from either the space programme or from another form of high 
technology. The means by which mitigation could be achieved can verge on the 
fanciful, with one suggestion being to place a sunlight-deflecting disc 
approximately seven miles in diameter at the Lagrange point
40
 between the earth 
and the sun that could disperse a few percent of the incoming sunlight and hence 
cool the planet.
41
  
Despite the alarmist‘s good intentions the ―window of opportunity‖ to effect 
the stabilization of global greenhouse gas emissions may have physically past or 
now be too expensive to achieve. Recent research shows that along the shallow 
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East Arctic Shelf the Arctic Ocean is ―on the boil‖ as methane gas from deep 
within the ocean floor bubbles to the surface. What remains uncertain is whether 
this is a recent phenomenon or an indicator of a positive feedback loop.
42
 Such a 
phenomenon will be impossible to mitigate hence adaptation measures may 
deliver greater benefits than either the Kyoto Protocol or other more ambitious 
mitigation schemes.
43
 Thus, humanity must adapt or die.  
If the increase in global temperature is to be kept below two degree Celsius 
then immediate mitigation action must ensue by imposing deep emission cuts, 
particularly on developed countries. Emission cuts will find little favour if they 
herald a drastic reduction in quality of life for the citizens of the developed world 
or the termination of a dream held by a substantial number of people in the Third 
World. Furthermore, whether the citizens of the developed world will provide the 
necessary ongoing financial resources, technology and capacity-building support 
to Third World states remains uncertain.
44
 But if such actions were to severely 
jeopardize the lifestyle choices of those in the ―West‖ then self-interest could see 
mitigation support for the Third World wane then vanish. Ultimately, all climate 
accords, in common with other societal responses to climate change, might 
collapse because they cannot fulfill an unrealistically high level of optimism over 
the potential for international co-operation.
45
 The overwhelming difficulty society 
faces in addressing climate change is the one highlighted by Professor Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita of New York University. Using computer assisted games 
theory de Mesquita predicts that the emerging economic powers of Brazil, China 
and India will, despite the protests from the United States and the European 
Union, force the abandonment of any replacement treaty for the Kyoto protocol 
because they will foresee that such a treaty will not be in their best interests.
46
 
This example reinforces de Mesquita‘s other contention that despite the dire 
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predicament humanity might well find itself in through climate change, people 
will be ―… looking out for numero uno.‖47          
 
 Which future? 
Over the second half of the twentieth century the growth in material consumption 
exceeded the growth in population. While world population doubled, food 
production almost tripled, energy use more than quadrupled and the overall level 
of economic activity quintupled. As a result of these unbridled developments there 
came to exist five tectonic stresses that have become so intermeshed that it has 
become impossible to construct a scenario that depicts a plausible future arising 
from the impact of any one stress without having to accommodate the not 
insignificant impact of the other four. These stresses have all been mentioned 
previously, but never drawn together into a single list  
 
 population stress arising from differences in population growth 
rates between developed and less developed countries and the 
burgeoning growth of mega-cities in the latter group of 
countries; 
 energy stress, arising mainly from the increasing scarcity of 
conventional oil; 
  environmental stress arising from worsening damage to global 
land, water, forest and fishery resources; 
 climate stress arising from changes to the global atmosphere, 
and; 
  economic stress resulting from inequities in the global 
economic system and the ever-widening income gap between 
rich and poor people.
48
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State security agencies in several countries have compiled and published trend 
lists that identify key drivers and developments that will shape future world events 
in decades to come. In November 2008, the United States National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) published a compendium of key trends along with the causal 
factors that drive them. The similarity between this list and that compiled by 
Homer-Dixon is striking and, like Homer-Dixon, the NIC does specifically 
highlight resources scarcity as an impending transnational security issue; one that 
will be amplified by climate change.
49
  Many of the key trends identified by 
Homer-Dixon have also been listed as emerging security challenges in an address 
given to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in April 2009 by 
Michéle Flournoy, the U.S. Department of Defense Under Secretary for Policy, 
titled ―Rebalancing the Force: Major Issues for QDR 2010.‖50 When discussing 
climate change, Flournoy considers that it would over time hasten state failures, 
accelerate mass migration, spread disease and create an environment where 
insurgency could flourish, especially in regions where weak governments display 
an inability to cope with the effects of climate change.
51
  
A more recent security futurecast was published in March 2010 by the 
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) of the United Kingdom‘s 
Ministry for Defence, entitled Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040.52 In this 
report climate change is seen as a key driver of global transformation and as such 
was labeled a Ring Road issue –  an issue ―that will affect the lives of everyone on 
the planet over the next thirty years.‖53 It is assumed in the report that the global 
temperature will continue to rise over the next century and as a consequence 
―climate change will affect the land, the atmosphere and the oceans, and may 54 be 
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an unstable and unpredictable process, involving both progressive evolution and 
sudden instabilities.‖55 As a consequence of this and other ‗ring road‘ issues, each 
further aggravating discernible trends such as declining resource availability, the 
era out to 2040 will be a period of transition likely
56
 to be characterized by 
instability in relations both between states and between groups within states.    
 In acknowledging that considerable similarity exists between these 
projections, it is also important to appreciate that there also exists disparities 
between them which make each unique. This is understandable for it is the 
consequence of where each organization places emphasis, but it is also the product 
of unpredictability – what does the future hold for humanity? The uncertainty that 
surrounds the ultimate impact of climate change has created a situation where 
humanity will have to respond to both ―known unknowns‖ and ―unknown 
unknowns‖57 and under such conditions the future is commonly explored using 
scenario analysis. 
The global impact associated with incremental increases in global average 
surface temperature is contained in the IPCC‘s Special Report on Emission 
Scenarios (SRES) appended to each Assessment Report. The SRES provides a 
climate change impact snapshot from which plausible scenarios depicting societal 
and security consequences can be derived. The choice of scenario format varies 
greatly amongst scenario creators. Journalist, Gwynne Dyer prefers to explore the 
societal and security impacts through a chronology of possible political events 
attributable to climate change, but without assigning each event a specific 
occurrence date.
58
 A similar format was adopted by the NIC to portray a 
fictionalized account of how global inattention to climate change might lead to 
major unexpected consequences that could conceivably thrust the world into a 
new level of vulnerability. The specific point made in the NIC scenario is that at 
the current level of scientific knowledge the world may have unknowingly already 
exceeded a climate tipping point which will have already placed the worst effects 
of climate change beyond civilization‘s ability to mitigation.59 Mark Lynas, a 
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journalist who frequently writes about the looming perils of climate change, takes 
a different approach by describing the adverse effects for each degree rise in 
average global temperature up to a maximum of six degrees.
60
 This scenario 
format replicates that adopted by SRES reports. 
Instead of creating a scenario depicting the future global impact of climate 
change some scenario builders restrict themselves to describing a specific 
geographical region or a particular storyline event. The Canadian academic 
Michael Byers used scenario analysis to explore what political and security 
ramifications might arise out of the illegal passage of a foreign merchant ship 
through Canada‘s ‗ice-free‘ Northwest Passage. His analysis concluded that under 
circumstances stipulated within his scenario, the application of military force is 
the only option able to demonstrate Canada‘s determination to defend its 
sovereignty and deter further territorial transgressions by foreign ships. Byers 
maintain that such a military show of force will be required irrespective of the 
international consequences.
61
   
While the storyline of these scenarios is, until the future proves otherwise, 
quite plausible they lack a certain authority that comes from being cited in other 
published works. In this thesis the question of authority can be allayed through the 
use of abridged thumbnail sketches of three plausible scenarios drawn from a 
publication authored by the American CSIS.
62
 These scenarios form the principal 
secondary source for at least two recently published books.
63
 The most telling 
observation to be drawn from each scenario, which has as their basis the IPCC 
AR4 report, is the exponential rise in global impact and damage as each scenario 
becomes more extreme. The year 2040, which features as the end date in the first 
two scenarios, is but three decades hence. Although Scenario 3 is the most 
extreme, it could ultimately prove to be conservative since it does not include all 
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climate feedback mechanisms, notably an increase in greenhouse gas emissions 
from thawing permafrost. All three storylines reflect a northern hemisphere bias 
and one should not assume that the southern hemisphere will follow the same 
pathway portrayed for the northern hemisphere. However, climate change‘s 
uncertain path does not lessen the unwavering message that global greenhouse gas 
emissions need to have peaked in the next ten to fifteen years if the damaging 
effects highlighted in these scenarios is to be avoided.  
Given the security emphasis of this thesis it would appear appropriate to 
include for each of the three climate scenarios a summary of their plausible 
security implications. These implications were developed by a group of both 
academic and non-academic security specialists charged with visualizing the 
security repercussion for each climate scenario. Each summary, except for the 
first, builds upon the impacts of the scenarios that precede it, plus its own unique 
contribution. Not surprisingly these authors envision humanity tumbling towards 
chaos in lockstep with a warming world.   
 
Climate Scenario 1: Expected Climate Change  
By 2040 average global temperature rise is 1.3˚ Celsius above the 1990 average. 
Warming is greatest over land masses and increases from low to high latitudes. Generally, 
the most damaging local impacts occur at low latitudes due to ecosystem sensitivity to an 
altered climate and high human vulnerability in the developing world. The damage to the 
Arctic is significant because of particularly large temperature variability at high northern 
latitudes. Global mean sea level rise is 0.23 metres, causing damage to the most 
vulnerable coastal wetlands with associate negative impact on local fisheries, seawater 
intrusion into groundwater supplies in low-lying coastal areas and elevated storm surge 
damage to unprotected coastlines. Many of the affected areas have large, vulnerable 
populations that will require international assistance to cope with or escape the effects of 
sea level rise. Marine fishing grounds and agricultural zones will shift towards the poles 
in response to warmer temperatures, in some instances moving across international 
boundaries. 
Regionally, the most significant impact to climate change occurs in the 
southwestern United States, Central America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Mediterranean 
region, river deltas of South and East Asia, the topical mountain ranges of South America 
and small islands of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.  The most prevalent and widespread 
impact relates to reductions in water availability and increases in the frequency and 
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intensity of extreme weather events. The Mediterranean region, sub-Saharan Africa, 
northern Mexico and southwestern United States will experience more frequent and 
longer-lasting droughts and extreme heat events such as wildfires.  
Overall, northern mid-latitudes will experience both benefits and harm. The 
benefits include reduced winter heating costs, decreased mortality and injury from 
exposure to cold and an increase in agricultural and forestry productivity in wetter regions 
due to longer growing seasons, carbon dioxide fertilization and fewer periods freezing 
weather. These benefits will be offset by more heavy rainfall events, an increase in heat-
related deaths and illnesses, more intense storms with associated flooding, and wind 
damage resulting in loss of life, property and infrastructure.
64
  
 
Summary of National Security Implications 
 ▪   Conflict over access to resources due to and driving human migration;   ▪ Threat of the 
spread of pandemics diseases curbs freedom of inter-country travel with 
consequential loss of national income;   ▪ Dissatisfaction with state governments 
could radicalize internal politics leading to the establishment of new ‗safe havens‘ in 
weak or failed states;   ▪  A new geopolitical system that favours energy exporting 
countries, while simultaneously weakening, both strategically and economically, 
energy importing countries;   ▪ Where available, both social and welfare services are 
likely to become a burden on central government and;  ▪ Countries capable of 
controlling river system water flows will become regionally more influential as the 
water crisis deepens.
65
    
 
 
Climate Scenario 2: Severe Climate Change  
Average global surface temperature rises at an unexpectedly rapid rate to 2.6˚ Celsius 
above 1990 levels by 2040. As with the previous scenario the largest warming is over 
land masses and at high latitudes. Dynamic changes in polar ice sheets (i.e. changes in the 
rate of ice flow into the sea) accelerate rapidly, resulting in a global mean sea level rise of 
0.52 metres.  There exists a high level of confidence that the Greenland and West 
Antarctic ice sheets have become unstable and that four to six metres of sea level rise are 
now inevitable over the next few centuries. Water availability declines in most affected 
regions at lower latitudes – dry tropics and subtropics – affecting approximately two 
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billion people worldwide. Crop yields decline significantly in the fertile river deltas due 
to sea level rise and damage from increased storm surges. Agriculture becomes nonviable 
in the dry subtropics where irrigation becomes exceptionally difficult because of low 
water availability and increased soil salinity. Arid regions at low latitudes expand, 
removing previously marginal cropland from production. North Atlantic fisheries are 
affected by a significant slowing of the North Atlantic meridional overturning circulation 
(MOC). Globally, there is widespread coral bleaching, ocean acidification, substantial 
loss of coastal nursery wetlands and warming and drying of tributaries that serve as 
breeding grounds for anadromous fish like salmon. Because of a dramatic decrease in the 
extent of Arctic sea ice, the Artic marine ecosystem is dramatically altered and the Arctic 
Ocean is navigable for a significant period of the year. Those developing states in the 
lower latitudes are affected most severely because of their sensitivity to climate change 
and low adaptive capacity. The wealthy developed states experience clear net harm and 
consequently must divert a greater proportion of their wealth to adapting to climate 
change at home.
66  
 
Summary of National Security Implications 
 ▪ Wealthiest members of society separate themselves from the rest of the population 
thereby undermining morale and viability of democratic governance; ▪  Possibility that 
global fish stocks crash, enmeshing maritime states in confrontations over dwindling 
supplies;  ▪  Likely privatization of water supplies: past experience of privatization in 
poor societies suggests the likelihood of violent protest and political upheaval; ▪  
Globalization might end and rapid economic decline could begin, owing to the collapse of 
financial and production systems that depend on integrated global merchandizing 
systems;  ▪ Transnational corporations may become increasing powerful relative to 
nation-states as the wealthy moneyed class seek out financial and physical security from 
private providers. This may engender a new form of globalization in which transnational 
business becomes increasingly more powerful and; ▪ Alliance systems and multilateral 
institutions might collapse – among them the United Nations, the result of the Security 
Council becoming irreconcilably polarized.
67
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Climate Scenario 3: Catastrophic Climate Change  
Between 2040 and the twenty-second century, the impact associated with 
previously described climate change become progressively more severe and large-
scale singular events of abrupt climate change occur. The average global 
temperature rises to 5.6˚ Celsius above 1990 levels with greater warming over 
land masses and higher latitudes. Dynamic changes to the polar ice sheets 
accelerate resulting in a mean sea level rise of two metres relative to 1990, 
rendering low-lying coastal regions uninhabitable, including many large coastal 
cities. The large fertile deltas of the world become largely uncultivable due to 
saltwater inundation and more frequent and higher storm surges that reach farther 
inland. The North Atlantic MOC stops mid-century, generating large-scale 
collapse of the North Atlantic ecosystem and associated fisheries. Northwestern 
Europe experiences colder winters, shorter growing seasons and reduced crop 
yields relative to the twentieth century. Beyond the North Atlantic borderlands the 
collapse of the MOC increases average temperatures in most regions and 
reorganizes precipitation patterns in unpredictable ways, hampering water 
resource planning across the world and drying out existing grain-exporting 
regions. 
Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region remain warmer than the 
twentieth century average and continue to experience hotter dryer summers. 
Agriculture in the traditional food-growing regions is severely compromised by 
alternating drought and extreme storm events that bring irregular severe flooding. 
Crops are physiologically stressed by temperatures and grow more slowly even 
when environmental conditions are otherwise favourable. In many regions 
experiencing increased precipitation summertime soil moisture is reduced by 
increased evaporation. Conditions favourable to food production shift northwards 
into formerly sub-Arctic regions with traditionally small human populations and 
little infrastructure, but extreme year-by-year climate variability in these regions 
makes sustainable agricultural production difficult on the scale needed to feed the 
world population.  
Mountain glaciers have virtually disappeared and the annual snow pack is 
dramatically reduced in regions where large human populations traditionally 
relied on glaciers and snowfall for water supply and storage including Central 
Asia, Europe, mountain spine of South America and western North America. Arid 
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regions expand rapidly overtaking regions that previously received sufficient 
rainfall to support high population numbers. The dry subtropics, including the 
Mediterranean region, much of Central Asia, northern Mexico, much of South 
America and the southwestern United States are no longer habitable. Not only do 
these regions require remote water sources for habitability, but such water sources 
are much fewer in number because mountain glaciers and snowlines have 
dramatically retreated as well. Half of the world‘s human population experiences 
persistent water scarcity. Locally devastating weather events have become the 
norm for coastal and middle latitude continental locations, where tropical and 
mid-latitude storm activity and associated wind and flood damage becomes much 
more intense and occurs annually, leading increased loss of life, property and 
infrastructure in many countries every year. Whereas water availability and loss of 
food security disproportionately affect poor developing states at lower latitudes, 
extreme weather events are more or less evenly distributed, with perhaps greater 
frequency at mid-latitudes because of extra tropical storm systems, including 
severe winter storms.
68
  
 
Summary of National Security Implications 
▪ Lack of access to food and freshwater drives millions of ‗climate change‘ refugees 
towards those countries where both resources still exist. This march of refugees will 
likely dominate security and humanitarian concerns of recipient states; ▪ A shrinking 
Russian population might have considerable difficulty preventing China from asserting 
control over much of Siberia and the Russian Far East, increasing the likelihood of 
conflict between two destabilized nuclear powers; ▪ A rise in public anger at 
governments‘ inability to deal with abrupt and unpredictable crises;   ▪  A rise in religious 
fervor and ‗doomsday‘ cults;  ▪  Growth in public hostility towards migrants and minority 
groups;  ▪  Altruism and generosity likely to be severely curtailed;  ▪  Curtailment of  
United States military‘s worldwide role so it can concentrate on the demands of near 
neighbourhood missions and;  ▪  Electricity generation and distribution systems are highly 
vulnerable to attack by disenfranchised groups, terrorists and rogue states.
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The ―storyline‖ conveyed through these scenarios is of a world in the future 
racked by abrupt and sudden climate change which will challenge the ability of 
every society to adapt. Two countervailing trends could mitigate the more dire 
effects of climate change in the long-term: innovation in science and technology 
and the social changes brought on by them. New technologies may dramatically 
reduce society‘s reliance on fossil fuels as the principal source of energy and 
provide the tools to mitigate those climatic effects that cannot be prevented. 
Conversely, for some commentators, reliance on future technologies to solve 
today‘s problems is ludicrous since many of the assumed ‗techno-fixes‘ rely on 
crucial, non-renewable materials that are already in short supply.
70
     
Secondly, the human capacity for hope and determination should never be 
discounted even under the most extreme circumstances. Once the effects of 
climate change become undeniable, people could elect to work collaboratively to 
find solutions which may ultimately provide the much-needed catalyst for global 
change. Regrettably, as the failure of the United Nations climate change 
conferences held in both Copenhagen and Cancun demonstrated, that time has not 
yet arrived.  
 
Future implications of climate change  
As a ‗ring-road‘ issue, climate change will cause a measure of security 
disadvantage for every state, but what remains indeterminable is the exact 
character and severity of that disadvantage. In that sense the CSIS has identified a 
number of systemic events caused by the likely non-linear character of climate 
change that humanity will need to grapple with and will hopefully resolve before 
the future alone determines their outcome.
 
 
 
 Increase in Centre-Periphery Tensions 
In the context of this chapter section casting countries either as the ‗North‘ and 
‗South‘ is obsolete and unhelpful. Equally, the often used term ‗Third World‘ has 
lost of its import once the ‗Second World‘ vanished with the demise of the Soviet 
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empire.
71
  Moreover, what does the ‗West‘ mean when it includes Japan and New 
Zealand; the ‗East‘ when it includes Brazil or ‗South‘ when it includes Korea and 
excludes Australia? An alternate approach that retains the notion of hierarchy 
within the international system, but without necessitating recourse to geographical 
images, is that of ‗Centre-Periphery.‘ Barry Buzan‘s adaptation of this 1970s 
approach appears to encapsulate not only the existing hierarchical relationship 
between states, but also allows for the probable transiently nature of interstate 
relationships over the course of the twenty-first century. ‗Centre‘ implies a 
globally dominant core of capitalist or market-orientated economies, while 
‗Periphery‘ denotes a set of industrially, financially and politically weaker states 
operating within a set of relationships largely constructed by the ‗Centre.‘ The 
more robust and developed states in the periphery comprise a ‗semi-periphery‘, 
whose aspiration is membership of the existing ‗Centre‘72 or membership of an 
alternate ‗Centre‘ in a new international order.73  
Centre-Periphery tensions are likely to increase as problems of equity and 
cause and effect permeate the climate change debate. States within the ‗Periphery‘ 
with limited response capabilities will suffer disproportionately from the adverse 
impacts of climate change. Their ability to overcome several such events 
simultaneously or in succession is doubtful. A failure by the ‗Centre‘ to assist the 
‗Periphery‘ to manage the climate change challenges will almost certainly cause a 
heightening of Centre-Periphery tensions. Additionally, citizens of wealthier 
countries of the ‗Centre‘ appear better positioned to cope with early consequences 
of modest climate change. Nonetheless, social and economic disparities within 
every society will conceivably result in its wealthy citizens pulling away from the 
rest of the population creating internal friction or even class warfare that could 
plausibly undermine morale and the viability of democratic governance, 
worldwide.
74
  
A dysfunctional security relationship between the states of the ‗Centre‘ and 
those of the ‗Periphery‘ could easily be mirrored within the ‗Periphery‘ especially 
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in the locally rooted dynamics of regional security, whose patterns of amity; 
enmity, and rivalry do not depend on input from the ‗Centre.‘75 A number of 
‗Periphery‘ countries are vulnerable to virtual obliteration by sustained drought 
and desertification or by rising sea levels. Given that their ability to cope with 
such changes is severely limited, the mass migration that would be triggered could 
quickly develop into a schismatic antagonism between societies leading to further 
political instability, poverty, population growth and environmental degradation.
76
 
Even less dramatic changes that do not threaten obliteration might put such stress 
on weak state structures as to cause political breakdown, adding pressure on 
boundary maintenance.
77
  
    
●    Increased Migration 
People rarely migrate for environmental factors alone. Other contributory factors 
include economic opportunity, food scarcity and other resource limits, health 
impacts or even the cultural effects of globalisation.  To say that on occasions an 
influx of migrants into a new area can be a significant factor in violent conflict is 
no longer challenged, although by no means do all large scale migrations end in 
conflict. In cases where conflict does arise, the causal factor is not usually the 
migration per se, but a consequential clash of national identities. Moreover, 
identity conflicts are not an inevitable outcome of inter-group mixing, rather they 
are a product of political forces seeking to gain power or defend themselves 
against perceived threats to power. It is therefore less the movement of people and 
more the political and institutional responses to that movement that matter most in 
conflicts in which immigration is a factor.
78
  
Displaced people, no matter the cause of their displacement, have in the past 
been more likely to move locally rather than regionally, with a relatively small 
proportion of them moving internationally. However, the flow of migrants 
towards the countries of the ‗Centre‘ already shows a significant increase. For 
example, in 1960, fifty-seven percent of migrants lived in ‗Periphery‘ states, but 
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by 2005 only thirty-seven percent did so.
79
 Irrespective of which region of the 
world climate-forced migration occurs in it will be uncontrolled and will generate 
significant social disruption,
80
 along with unfavourable economic impacts, which 
are likely to necessitate international humanitarian assistance of an unprecedented 
scale and duration.
81
         
Taken globally, climate forced migration is likely to be on a very large scale. 
Although, the average global temperature has currently risen by less than one 
degree Celsius, climate-induced sudden-onset natural disasters have been credited 
with displacing no fewer than twenty million people in 2008 alone.
82
 Naturally, 
when faced with sudden shocks and long-term challenges brought about by or 
exacerbated by climate change, people will move. Thus it is entirely conceivable 
that the scale of climate forced migration will reach between 200 million
83
 and 
250 million by 2050.
84
 Ultimately, migration could reach a level predicted in a 
World Development report of 2007, which suggested that should the average 
global temperature rise by 3-4˚ Celsius then 330 million people could be displaced 
through flooding alone.
85
 In the face of significant change, the pressure to accept 
large numbers of refugees from ―donor‖ countries could become intense and will 
certainly divert resources of the ―host‖ countries away from long-term 
development budgets into humanitarian aid and disaster preparedness or, more 
plausibly, border security.  
Without doubt climate change will alter the frequency and intensity of extreme 
weather events, it will threaten densely populated littoral, urban and farming 
regions with changing growing seasons, flooding and storm damage. However, 
this ominous future is not restricted to any one state or specific geographical 
region, for humanity‘s vulnerability to climate change links the fate of each state 
to that of every other state.  Historically, society‘s reaction to a government‘s 
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inability to mitigate the worst effects of abrupt and unpredictable crises is 
increased religious fervor, radicalisation and hostility and violence towards 
migrant and minority groups.
86
 Massive movements of refugees, climate-inspired 
or not, within a relatively short period of time is likely to be deeply problematic 
for ―host‖ countries and the refugees themselves. As in the past, any future 
profound increase in the unsanctioned movement of people will likely result in 
violent conflict within and between countries. 
 
●    Global Health Consequences 
Climate change will have profoundly negative consequences for the population‘s 
health, especially in, but not exclusively to, ‗Periphery‘ countries. Not only will 
some geographical regions become more hospitable for vector-borne disease, but 
climate–induced shortages of food and water supplies will increase the 
population‘s susceptibility to diseases and chronic illnesses. Any mass movement 
of refugees can be expected to expose themselves to diseases to which they have 
little resistance, and the diseases with which they become infected are likely move 
with them to their new place of refuge, thereby inflecting the people living in that 
area.
87
 Equally, a warming climate in temperate countries could exacerbate insect-
borne diseases like malaria and dengue fever given that their vector-host mosquito 
will find northern latitudes climatically hospitable.
88
   
The emergence of novel, highly transmissible and virulent illnesses, such as 
highly pathogenic avian influenza strains, for which there currently exist no 
adequate counter measures, could initiate a global pandemic. If a pandemic does 
emerge then internal and cross-border tensions and conflict becomes more likely 
as states struggle, possibly with degraded capabilities, to control the movement of 
people seeking to avoid infection or gain access to medical services. While 
pandemic diseases are considered a ―push‖ factor behind the displacement of 
people,
89
 such contagious diseases also hold dire consequences for more stable 
societies. The NIC maintains that no country‘s social fabric can be maintained if 
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the population‘s infection rate is above ten per cent.90 Thus, a significant aspect of 
the pandemic/security nexus relates to the maintenance of social coherence and 
economic wellbeing within an ―afflicted‖ state and between that state and its 
regional neighbours and ultimately with the global community. 
           
●    Resource Scarcity 
There is no common view as to whether natural resources will over the next thirty 
years continue to be abundant or become critically scarce. The United Kingdom‘s 
Ministry of Defence considers that over this period there will be sufficient energy, 
food and freshwater resources available to sustain the growing global population 
and the global economy. However, their distribution and access will be uneven, 
and both local and regional shortages will occur thereby increasing the likelihood 
of societal instability within states and jealousies between states. Both conditions 
could ignite conflict. States on the ‗Periphery‘ will be unable to access resources 
necessary to allow their population to prosper and their economies grow.
91
 This 
situation could exacerbate the flow of migrants from the ‗Periphery‘ to the 
‗Centre.‘  
The United States Centre for Strategic and International Studies suggests 
that over the next three decades climate change exacerbated water scarcity will 
contribute to instability in many regions of the world. A shortage of potable water 
is a significant problem in itself, but the lack of fresh water for irrigation will 
accentuate climate changes other detrimental effect on agriculture – drought. 
Friction could arise within and between states that experience dwindling water 
supplies, with countries husbanding an abundance of freshwater seeking to exploit 
their good fortune for economic, political and diplomatic advantage.
92
 Conflicts 
over food and water resources may be both bloody and protracted since 
combatants may be view these conflicts as wars of survival. Even the presence of 
a water sharing treaty, such as that which apportions the waters of the Indus River 
between India and Pakistan, cannot overcome the fear that one country will gain 
water security at the cost of the other‘s survival. In Pakistan, for example, as the 
gap between water availability and requirements widens so will the desire to 
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intensify jihadi operations grow.
93
 Even more disturbing is a comment attributed 
to a Pakistani official in 2001, ―that any conflict [with India] over water would 
lead to Pakistan using nuclear weapons on a first strike basis against India.‖94 In 
the future this may not turn out to be an empty threat for rapid glacial melt in the 
Himalayas is likely to exacerbate water access problems throughout Asia.
95
   
Population growth, access to fresh water, food shortages and crop decline 
are not discrete issues, but an aggregation, with two or more issues layered over 
each other to form ‗multiple stress zones.‘ According to the United Kingdom‘s 
Ministry of Defence, by 2040 climate change will be responsible for extending 
existing multiple stress zones now covering Africa and South Asia eastward to 
Asia‘s Pacific littoral and southwards into Oceania. This will increase the 
challenges for these states and may increase the likelihood of interstate conflict.
96
 
Competition for resources will increase the geostrategic importance of certain 
regions such as the Asian meridian, the wider Middle East and both Polar 
Regions.
97
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Map 12. Regions of multiple stresses as at 2040. The processes that give these regions substance 
are already occurring and their severity and geographical extent will be observable by 2030.  
Source: Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2040, p. 64.   
 
 
Wild fish represent a special category within the living resource grouping for 
species are often temperature sensitive and capable of migrating to an 
environment that best suits their needs. Climate change itself is unlikely to alter 
the total levels of fish stock to a great degree, but it will have a large impact on the 
location and composition of fish stock. For states of the ‗Periphery‘ this will have 
a serious impact on traditional, subsistence fishers who cannot follow fish stocks 
as they move and might not be able to survive off any replacement species. 
Shifting fish populations will drive conflict between commercial and subsistence 
fisher people and could cause the collapse of existing fish management 
agreements between countries.
98
 Climate change will simply exacerbate existing 
tensions between fishers of each hemisphere given that the northern hemisphere 
industry‘s future depends on its ability to exploit new species from the southern 
hemisphere.
99
 In the absence of a new global agreement governing the fishing 
industry, piracy will appear an increasingly attractive option for those fishers 
heavily in debt and with no access to a legitimate fish quota.
100
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The security threat for maritime states implicit in the desperate plight of 
northern hemisphere fishers should not be dismissed lightly, since it is common 
for fishing vessels sailing out of Asian ports to carry heavy machineguns and 
rocket-propelled grenade launchers.
101
  It is also quite common for fishing fleets 
to be accompanied by a naval flotilla especially in the highly contested waters of 
Pacific Asia.
102
 Within three decades the New Zealand Defence Force anticipates 
that foreign fishing fleets will be accompanied by naval forces as they illegally 
exploit fish stock in or near New Zealand‘s Exclusive Economic Zone.103   
Climate change could plausibly affect the international politics of energy 
production and consumption. Any oil or natural gas importing country with high 
energy intensity could suffer disproportionately due to the difficulties associated 
with a switch to alternative fuel supplies. The availability of hydroelectric power 
might be adversely affected by a decline in glacial runoff, or by upstream states 
diverting river water flows, or husbanding water in reservoirs within their state 
borders. Electricity generated from nuclear power plants might also be curtailed 
due to the limited availability of water necessary to cool generators. An increase 
in the number and intensity of storms could interfere with long-distance electricity 
transmission, further stressing infrastructure assets that in many countries are 
already prone to failure. Addressing the current vulnerability of energy 
infrastructure would address two conceivable problems of the future: the 
heightened risks of resource-related terrorism, state initiated or not, and the need 
to find alternative energy sources that mitigate further climate change impacts.
104
 
Rectifying either vulnerability increases the likelihood of actor-to-actor conflict.  
 
●   Social and Political Change 
Severe or sudden climate change will present a profound challenge to existing 
social and political organisations in countries of both the ‗Centre‘ and ‗Periphery.‘ 
There exists the possibility that international cooperation might increase as 
globally people rally to save human civilisation, but equally likely is that 
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individuals and groups become solely preoccupied in their own survival.
105
 In the 
presence of climate change, the future of international institutions appears 
uncertain. The United States government foresees the authority of multilateral 
institutions being severely weakened by 2025. Moreover, as the type and kinds of 
actors proliferate in the future so does the prospect that the international system 
will fragment and in so doing highlight the inability of international institutions to 
address new transnational challenges. According to the NIC, current trends 
suggest that global governance will become a patchwork of overlapping, often ad 
hoc and fragmented efforts, comprised of a shifting coalition of member states, 
international organisations, social movements, non-governmental organisations 
and transnational companies.
106
 Additionally, this situation will be further 
complicated by a shift in economic and political power away from the existing 
centres of power in the United States and Europe to Asia. Such a shift in power 
could, when couple with the global challenges of climate change, resource 
scarcity and population growth, result in a period of instability and intense 
competition between major powers.
107
 Hence, international institutions such as the 
United Nations will experience great difficulty in managing the full range of 
adverse consequences.
108
 Implications arising out of new international alignments 
are always uncertain, but the complex and inherently divisive nature of climate 
change is likely to impede a collective response.
109
  
 
●   Challenge to Existing Governments 
Climate change could hold deep implications for the effectiveness and viability of 
existing governments. The political elite along with established institutions may 
be unable to effectively manage climate-induced challenges thereby losing their 
legitimacy once public support wanes. National leaders professing authoritarian 
ideologies could become attractive to constituents if liberal democratic systems 
fail to marshal sufficient political determination to manage the climate challenge. 
Under climate-induced stress the citizenry might resort to violence – especially 
when the opportunities to change leaders through elections are circumscribed – to 
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remove existing governments. It is conceivable that citizens might turn to non-
state actors including religious movements or terrorist groups for comfort or to 
achieve dramatic change.
110
 Furthermore, under conditions of severe climate 
change, environmental factors might well push already failed states or a region 
within a weak state, deeper into the realm of being ungovernable.  
 
●   World Political Disequilibrium 
Climate change holds the potential to affect world politics, given that the 
challenges ensuing from a changing climate will likely affect states very 
differently, with some states able to respond more effectively than others. Climate 
change also has the potential to affect relations among states. In the future certain 
states could require increased public health assistance to face new to them vector-
borne diseases such as malaria, while other states could experience limits on their 
exports resulting from unanticipated changes in the global trading regime due to 
climate-related effects.
111
 Some states could even become vulnerable to foreign 
predation by militarily stronger states that covert their resources or by a stronger 
neighbouring state that desires their land upon which to settle its own burgeoning 
population.
112
  
Disequilibrium within the international system would likely usher in an era 
of increased global instability. Over the long term, the very divergent regional 
effects of a changing climate could affect the evolving global distribution of 
power with unpredictable consequences for international security. 
 
 Increase in Nuclear Activity will Increase Attendant Risks 
Climate change could lead to a renaissance in nuclear energy, driven partly by the 
expectation that an increase in production will reduce the use of carbon-emitting 
fossil fuels, while also reducing penalty costs imposed under a global carbon 
trading mechanism. However, such a renaissance could worsen problems of 
nuclear safety and proliferation. As of December 2009, there existed 435 nuclear 
reactors operating in thirty countries, 53 reactors under construction, with a 
further 136 either on order or being planned. An additional 299 reactors are 
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proposed to be built by 2030. New reactors brought into service during the period 
1996-2008 were balanced by old plants retired from service. However, there is no 
firm indication of the number of reactors to be retired by 2030.
113
  Thus, over the 
next two decades there will be an increase in the total number of nuclear reactors 
around the world, including some under the control of states that may lack the 
experience to safely manage such operations. 
The threat of global climate change could also provide states interested in 
acquiring nuclear weapons with yet another justification to pursue nuclear-related 
research and technologies. As an example, oil-rich Persian Gulf states are among 
the largest emitters of greenhouse gases per capita and it would be reasonable for 
these states to claim a need for nuclear energy to power water desalination plants 
or cut greenhouse gas emissions.
114
 This argument becomes even more 
compelling for countries such as Saudi Arabia, which by 2040 could well face a 
nuclear-armed Iran without a strong guarantee from the United States as to its 
security against attack.
115
  
 
The above list represents a daunting catalogue of challenges for the future. More 
ominously, if climate change is not dealt with proactively then it will come to 
dominate both foreign and national security policies. For some commentators 
climate change will shape the current and subsequent generations view of the 
world and their place within it, just as the Cold War was responsible for shaping 
the world view of the last three generations.
116
 To meet these challenges in the 
future states might elect to exploit the more extreme geological regions of the 
globe, including both Polar Regions, in order to avert the need to embark upon a 
military campaign to obtain those resources necessary to stabilize their society. 
Eventually, even the respite such action provides will be exhausted heightening 
the possibility of interstate conflict. 
   Whilst Cold War ideologies fashioned the world into a number of classical 
regional security complexes, in the future it could be the ideologies arising from 
the politics of climate change that will shape the world into a new series of 
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security complexes. These are likely to be a response to the pressures climate 
change imposes upon societies – mass migration or pandemic disease – rather 
than climate change per se. Hence, the origin of any security complex formed 
more correctly lies within the societal rather than the environmental sector of the 
sector securitisation typology.
117
 Such cross-overs will serve only to make more 
difficult the identification of facilitating conditions that precipitated the formation 
of a sector-specific security complex. There is little doubt that climate change will 
increasingly complicate both foreign policy and national security issues in the 
years ahead. 
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Chapter Eleven 
 
Conclusion: A Lack of Will 
 
Natural resource scarcity and abundance have always been intertwined with 
poverty and insecurity. Demographic and environmental stresses can exacerbate 
demands further weakening societies, while unresolved grievances can ferment 
instability from below. The recent unrest amongst the peoples of certain Middle-
Eastern and North African states has been attributed, at least in part, to the 
scarcity of affordable resources, particularly food. Furthermore, climate change is 
one environmental stress that appears certain to aggravate any weakness in 
societal cohesion at the global, regional or state levels. At the global level this 
lack of cohesion is exemplified by the continuing failure of states to make the 
necessary accommodations in order to agree a procedure that would replace the 
Kyoto Accord. Given the global impact of just these two adversities it would be 
reasonable to expect humankind to respond through cooperation but, as discussed 
further in this chapter, the will to cooperate is diminishing as humankind puts self-
interest ahead of the common good. Unless attitudes change self-interest will 
drive humanity to exploit the Polar Regions in order to satisfy lifestyle choices.           
Speaking at the Dimbleby Memorial Lecture in London just three months 
after the terrorist attack on New York in 2001, former American president, Bill 
Clinton, called for ―a truly global consciousness‖ to spread the benefits of the 
twenty-first century around the world.
1
 Clinton went on to say that ―…we have 
the means to make the 21
st
 century the most peaceful and prosperous in human 
history. The question is whether we have the will.‖2 The will of the developed 
world in 2009 and again in 2010 was definitely lacking, for even a foreseeable 
global climate crisis failed to prevent vested interests from extinguishing any 
immediate hope that humanity could arrive at a common position on reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions prior to the onset of an irreversible human-initiated 
calamity.  
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Every serious study of commitments made to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions by states at the Copenhagen climate conference show that they will be 
insufficient to ward off a two degree Celsius rise in global temperature. The 
United Nations Environment Programme found that countries had locked in less 
than half the greenhouse gas reductions necessary to provide a fifty per cent 
chance of preventing a two degree temperature increase by 2050. Another study 
conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the United States 
based Sustainability Institute suggests that the emission reductions agreed at 
Copenhagen will result in the world warming by 3.9 degrees Celsius by 2100. A 
third report, this one by Germany‘s Potsdam Institute, found that even if every 
proposal agreed to by those states that attended the Copenhagen conference was 
fully funded the average global temperature will be 3.2 degrees Celsius higher by 
century‘s end. A recent assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change suggests that a business-as-usual approach could result in global 
temperatures in excess of six degrees Celsius by 2100.
3
 If the United Nations 
sponsored climate change conferences achieved anything then that was to 
demonstrate that self-interest remains a cardinal human motive. 
Professor Mirko Bagaric maintains that human beings appear incapable of 
making meaningful sacrifices for the betterment of others (other than family), 
especially foreigners and future generations.
4
 This observation was also made by 
Al Gore who maintains that when climate change takes centre stage, humanity 
will show itself as predisposed to both short-term thinking and restricting 
emotional connections to ―those who are closest to us.‖5 Gore does claim, 
however, that humanity can with considerable effort extend emotional 
connections to future generations.
6
 The lack of intergenerational concern possibly 
explains the results of resent social surveys that suggest people, especially those 
in the developed world, are unlikely to support climate change mitigation if they 
are expected to shoulder ―significant costs.‖7 Such self-interest on the part of the 
developed world was, according to Bagaric, the reason why the Copenhagen 
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conference turned into a failure, despite universal acceptance that the world is 
lurching towards an environmental disaster.
8
 
Regarding the Copenhagen Conference, it is easy to accept Bagaric‘s 
observation that the First World was ultimately too greedy and short-sighted for a 
meaningful, effective and binding climate accord to be reached.
9
 By this action 
the people of the developed world have proved themselves to be the ultimate 
climate sceptics. Yet, despite today‘s inaction, action will occur, but only when 
the developed world is ―hit with widespread life-taking environmental disasters, 
which are unequivocally linked to global warming.‖10 Absent that, the leaders of 
the developed world ―will continue to be green only at the conversational level.‖11 
Even at the sub-state governmental level climate change induced self-
interest drives policy. In Australia, the degradation of the Murray River Basin has 
been the cause of much interstate friction especially between New South Wales 
and South Australia. The basin is in deep crisis with its waters afflicted by salinity 
and pollution, its flow dehydrated by overuse and drought, and the wetlands at its 
mouth facing extinction. The Australian Constitution allows for each state to store 
whatever quantity of river water it deems appropriate, which has historically 
meant that South Australia receives less water than it requires. The self-interest of 
New South Wales became obvious in the aftermath of the 2009/2010 summer 
floods that spilt approximately 500 gigalitres of water into the basin. In a display 
of beggar-thy-neighbour attitude, the New South Wales government immediately 
withheld this ‗windfall‘ precipitation. Only after a flurry of complaints from two 
states through which the Murray River also flows – Victoria and South Australia – 
did the government of New South Wales relent and release additional water into 
the river system.
12
 While the action of New South Wales might have been 
deplored by the governments of the two other affected states it may equally be 
indicative of self-interested behaviour that will become increasingly common as 
water resources become regionally scarce and degraded.  
 Bagaric‘s view on the power of self-interest echoes the result of a 
mathematical simulation of a community‘s voluntary vaccination uptake in a 
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response to a bioterrorism threat.
13
 Modelling this threat suggests that voluntary 
vaccination levels may be difficult to maintain because an individual has little to 
gain from being vaccinated if the rest of the community is already immune. This 
situation is similar to the classical ―prisoner dilemma‖ in which cooperative 
behaviour does not produce a stable strategy because it cannot overcome the 
pervasive power of self-interest. Historical examples, together with game-
theoretical modelling, suggest that self-interested behaviour is both inevitable and 
universal and that its pursuit should be seen as normatively appropriate, rational, 
and enlightened.
14
  
Self-interest as a social norm can be defined as a shared perception of 
appropriate behaviour that possesses the power to induce people to act in a 
manner that deviates from their private inclination.
15
 This same behavioural trait 
is regularly displayed by states, though in those situations the term ―national 
interest‖ is frequently used.16 Although interdependence among states, plus the 
emergence of increasing numbers of supranational actors has diminished reliance 
on national interest as an analytical concept, national interest continues to be the 
motivation behind many political actions taken by states. For some European 
countries nothing other than ―self-interest and idiosyncratic‖ reasons can account 
for the rekindling of their involvement in sub-Saharan Africa.
17
 More recently, the 
United States in pursuit of its own self-interest has found itself in a geopolitical 
struggle with China over access to West Africa‘s oil wealth.18 Equally driven by 
self-interest, China cut export quotas of rare earth minerals by 72 per cent during 
2010, which not only forced price increases upon competitor states, but also 
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exacerbated tensions with the United States.
19
 In pursuit of its national interests 
China has found itself in conflict with a resurgent West, particularly Europe, 
which considers Africa to lie within its commercial sphere of influence. In this 
clash of self-interest China envisages itself the victor.
20
 Irrespective of whether 
self-interest pertains to the individual or the state, humanity should not forget that 
it inhabits a social world where selfishness on any level can often have unforeseen 
consequences.       
One such consequence, and one that would no doubt shock societies that 
preceded today‘s, is how attitudes and behaviours are now highly influenced by 
whether people conceive that they will obtain a material benefit from the 
implementation of a particular social policy.
21
 Thus, people who would likely 
benefit from the implementation of a social policy can be expected to hold a more 
favourable attitude towards that policy than those people who will not benefit. 
Equally, it is now expected that people who are offered financial compensation 
for undertaking a socially beneficial act e.g. the giving of blood, are expected to 
be more willing to participate in such acts than those who receive no financial 
gratuity.
22
 Such self-interest and selfishness continues to perpetuate what 
Friedman would call the ―Santa Claus‖ syndrome,23 where politically difficult, but 
statesman like decisions are forsaken for the continuance of a phenomenon 
described by Thérèse Delpech as the pleasure principle: the desire for perpetual 
peace so that the existing order of Western societies can continue untroubled into 
the future.
24
 What should not be overlooked is that by 2030 an additional two 
billion middle-class people in the developing world
25
 could equally be ensnared 
by the pleasure principle, exacerbating further the strain humanity already 
imposes on the climate and natural resources.   
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PART III 
 
Chapter Twelve 
 
Introduction: The Thawing of Frozen Wealth 
 
he primacy accorded to material self-interest has rapidly turned a custom 
into a natural law that people believe should not be violated, even 
though in the past such ready acquiescence to self-interest would have 
been derided as contrary to society‘s social values.1 However, according to 
Thérèse Delpech, today‘s Western societies no longer believe strongly enough in 
social values to teach them, much less to defend them against existential threats.
2
 
The demise of values is seen by people from other cultures, Confucians, for 
example, as the predominant cause for the rise of egoism, utilitarianism and 
hedonism, as well as a lack of spirituality, that has enveloped the developed 
world.
3
 Coincidentally, the waning influence of values on policies at the national 
level has seen a rise of beggar-thy-neighbour nationalism, national egoism and 
local chauvinism: all behaviours that are said to pose a threat to world peace and 
prosperity.
4
 
 However, in the absence of the kind of threats typified by the United States-
Soviet confrontation of the Cold War era, domestic political agendas have had a 
large impact on the foreign policy choices of all states, especially those of current 
and nascent great powers. In reinforcing the pleasure principle great powers 
continue to seek means to prevent rival great powers from dominating the wealth-
generating regions of the world. Today those regions are usually populated by the 
leading industrialized states, although increasingly they encompass less-developed 
states that possess critically important raw materials. Great powers sometimes 
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attempt to dominate these regions themselves, but at the very least they try to 
ensure that none fall under the control of a rival great power.
5
 Regions that 
contain little intrinsic wealth are less likely to interest great powers,
6
 unless they 
harbour states that possess or seek to possess a nuclear arsenal, weapons of mass 
destruction or provide a sanctuary for terrorists.
7
               
Energy is one category of resource that continues to direct great power 
interest towards certain geopolitical regions, principally the Persian Gulf and 
Central Asia and more recently Africa. After a long era of excess capacity, the 
prices for oil have risen sharply and become more volatile. Yet, resource concerns 
go far beyond oil. European governments worry about the security of natural gas 
supplies, particularly when their principal supplier, Russia, is given to capricious 
behaviour that benefits neither itself nor its consumers.
8
 Similar worries beset 
India and other states which are destined to depend heavily on coal imports in the 
coming decades. The governments of nearly every large consumer country are 
besieged with doubts about energy security, not dissimilar to concerns 
experienced during the oil crisis of the 1970s.   
Energy insecurity for Western industrialized state comes from the 
knowledge that they will have to compete with the emerging-market countries 
notably China and India for energy. Moreover, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) maintains that by 2030, China will depend on imports for no less than two-
thirds of its oil, and India for even more.
9
 Both countries, but especially China, are 
choosing to secure access to energy resources by relying less on multinational 
commercial interests and more on state-to-state negotiations with producer 
countries. Through their actions they are making it harder for the energy markets 
to function smoothly, thus endangering the energy security of all states.
10
 In face 
of this reality, states will seek energy security by diversifying the regions from 
which they draw their supplies, even if such locations require the exploitation of 
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ecologically vulnerable and politically sensitive regions; plausibly, these will 
include the Arctic and Antarctica. 
It is easy to treat the political and security environment of the two polar 
regions as distinctly different since they are geographically and geologically 
‗worlds apart.‘ However, the political and security differences that separate them 
today will likely lessen over the course of the twenty-first century as both climate 
change and resource scarcity forces society to consider the unconscionable; the 
intensive development and exploitation of first the Arctic and then Antarctica. 
Both governmental and non-governmental organisations predictive scenarios 
signal that serious consideration of this prospect has commenced by those charged 
with assessing the national security implications of a climatically warmer, 
resource constrained world. 
The United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) is charged with 
identifying key drivers and developments likely to shape world events a decade or 
more in the future. While the NIC has made no predictions in its 2008 report with 
regard to what future awaits Antarctica, its predictions for the Arctic point to a 
radically changed physical and security environment for the region by 2025. The 
Council suggests that potential climate change winners out of the Arctic-rim 
countries are likely to be Canada and Russia.
11
 A warming climate along with a 
cornucopia of resources should result in economic prosperity and enhanced 
geopolitical status. However, these advantages could be sullied by renewed 
interstate tensions and small-scale confrontations over contested territorial 
claims.
12
 Also, while future developments in novel drilling techniques will create 
new opportunities to find and exploit previously unexplored ultra-deep oilfields, 
the application of such techniques in the Arctic could expose hydrocarbon 
reserves that lie within currently contested territory and thereby represent a high 
potential for interstate conflict.
13
  
In 2009, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) when undertaking 
its quadrennial defense review concurred with a NIC assertion that ―The 21st 
century will see momentous change in the international system‖ the result of 
                                                 
11
 National Intelligence Council, ‗Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,‘ United States 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., November 2008, p. 52, 
http://www.dni.govt/nic/NIC_2025_project.html   (23 November 2008).  
12
 Ibid., p. 55. 
13
 Ibid., p. 63. 
 232 
globalisation and the emergence of new powers.
14
 Among the challenges to the 
international system identified by the review is the rise in interstate tension within 
the global commons – sea, space, air and cyberspace.15 The importance of these 
commons in security terms is underscored by Barry Posen, who maintains that ―if 
grand strategists [in the United States or any other aspirant great power] wish to 
pursue an activist global foreign policy, then they must preserve command of the 
commons‖16 Flournoy and Brimley contend that as states grapple with problems 
ranging from economic crises to climate change and globalisation the ability to 
command or deny access to global commons will become a strategic necessity. 
Challenge to America‘s self-assumed command of all global commons is 
becoming increasingly evident. For example, Flournoy et al suggest that 
America‘s current command over the Arctic Ocean is under serious challenge by 
Russia,
17
 while a similar allegation has been levelled at the Chinese by Hillary 
Clinton over China‘s perceived desire to dominate outer space.18     
One of the future strategic trends identified through the quadrennial review 
process that poses a significant challenge to the United States, and thus to its 
allies, is the possibility that rising powers will not be content to simply acquiesce 
to America‘s role as uncontested guarantor of the global commons. Flournoy et al 
worry that countries such as China, India and Russia will demand a role in 
maintaining the international system commensurate with their actual or perceived 
power and national interests. As a consequence of this devolution in power, 
regions within the global commons that were once seen as secure, such as the 
Indian and Arctic Oceans, will become ―new global centres of gravity.‖19 This is 
an acknowledgement that the strategic importance of the Polar Regions will likely 
grow during the twenty-first century. 
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Like the United States military, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 
has recently published a comprehensive review of future global strategic trends 
for a period extending out to 2040.
20
 While this is a wide-ranging review of global 
strategic trends, it makes a specific comment about the Polar Regions by asserting 
that ―…competition for resources will [emphasis in the original] increase the 
geostrategic importance of certain regions such as…the Polar Regions.‖21  
The Ministry of Defence foresees as a defining feature of the next three 
decades the constant tension between greater interdependence and intensifying 
competition between all levels of society, including the interstate level. This 
feature is likely to stimulate competing strategies among states in an environment 
where meeting resource demands will be difficult and as a consequence states are 
likely to pursue individual rather than multilateral solutions. In this quest for 
resources, specific regions, those most likely to hold deposits of resources, will 
eventually possess a geopolitical importance far in excess of their contemporary 
standing; these are the ‗pivotal regions‘ of the future:  
 
Pivotal regions are those whose future paths are likely 
[emphasis in the original] to have an effect on global stability 
disproportionate to their geopolitical status. They represent 
significant strategic chokepoints, where trends have the 
potential to converge to give them importance out of 
proportion to their economic, political or demographic 
standing. These regions include…the Polar Regions…. 22  
   
 
The on-going search for alternative sources of energy, food and water is becoming 
more urgent. Consequently the commercial pressure to explore and eventually 
exploit extreme environments, such as the Polar Regions, is likely to significantly 
increase. This is even more probable given that the United States Geological 
Survey estimates that approximately fourteen per cent of the world‘s yet to be 
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discovered oil and natural gas reserves are likely to be located in the Arctic.
23
 It is 
equally likely that similar pressure will be applied to Antarctica where littoral oil 
and gas reserves are known to exist.
24
 While environmental restrictions and 
technological difficulties currently inhibit both polar exploration and exploitation, 
in the future resource shortages and climate change will be the decisive factors 
that persuade the global community to pursue commercial goals despite 
environmental limitations and societal constraints and concerns. 
 Exploitation of all extreme environments will not ultimately satisfy the ever 
increasing demand for natural resources. Supply disruptions caused by scarcity, 
hoarding or withholding of vital resources may cause conflict both between states 
and within states as groups vie for sovereignty and access. States that are unable 
to access the necessary materials to allow their population to survive and prosper, 
either through participation in international markets or bilateral arrangements, 
might resort to the use of force. Such risks will be considerably heightened once 
states are forced to adapt to the worst effects of climate change. 
The insecurities created by interstate relations during the Cold War inspired 
Sam Hall to portray how the simple need to secure resources and protect citizens of 
the Arctic could readily cascade form a purely defensive endeavour to a world war. 
As climate change and resource scarcity drive states to consider the exploitation of 
the Polar Regions Hall‘s Cold War portrayal holds a message too poignant to be 
overlooked: 
  
Suddenly, [a]rctic wealth has become a military liability. In 
political terms, oil, gas, uranium and other valuable 
minerals, in addition to the growing number of Arctic 
residents, must be defended. Oil installations and pipelines 
are tempting targets for terrorists and saboteurs. Tankers 
and liquefied natural gas carriers operating in northern 
seas are vulnerable in times of war. Communications and 
supply lines to isolated cities must be protected. Yet this 
preparation of defences leads inevitably to the formulation 
of plans for attack and counter-attack, an unwritten law 
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which has impelled defence chiefs in the United States, 
Canada, Scandinavia and the Soviet Union to develop the 
Arctic as the decisive battleground in the event of a future 
world war.25 
 
Although war has not erupted above the Arctic Circle in the three decades since 
Hall‘s caution, Arctic states still have no policies rooted in irenical ideals. 
Therefore, the political geography of the Arctic has changed little since the days 
of MacKinder. As a consequence, the Russian military still view the Arctic 
through a geostrategic lens, as confirmed by Rear Admiral V. Aleksin, who stated 
in the summer of 1995 ―…he who controls the Arctic controls the world.‖26 In the 
twenty-first century these words could ring equally true of Antarctica. 
Although a war for territorial possessions or resources at either pole is not 
inevitable, conflict becomes more likely as polar warming renders previously 
undesirable regions susceptible commercial exploration and exploitation,
27
 
especially for those mineral that are becoming physically, politically or 
commercial unattractive to exploit elsewhere in the world. The melting of the 
Arctic sea ice, for example, has brought about an era of mounting competition 
over territory and resources both between Arctic-rim states and between these 
states and non-Arctic rim states. While to date, the majority of these disputes have 
been resolved peaceably or held in abeyance, this may not be so in the future.
28
 
The severity of any conflict in the Arctic, or indeed in Antarctica, will be a 
function of the degree to which the interests of the actors concerned are 
incompatible and the importance each actor attributes to the issue that divides 
them.
29
 It is difficult to conceive anything that is more important than securing 
access to the resources that allow one‘s citizens to survive and prosper. In 
securing these resources states create a level of security interdependence amongst 
states with the same polar ambitions as themselves. It is these ambitions that will 
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ultimately compel states to coalesce into either a single polar regional security 
complex or a number of complexes depending upon the relevant importance of 
the issues under contest. Such is the growing importance of energy and non-
energy resource security that a resource-inspired security complex could evolve 
into a shatterbelt, especially if antagonistic great powers seek to turn a minor 
regional imbroglio into a theatre of conflict. 
While this chapter has highlighted a number of issues that may shape the 
future of the Polar Regions, these issues are but influences to be tested against the 
essential elements. Those six elements are recalled below:   
 
1. boundary, which differentiates the SC from its neighbours; 
2. anarchic structure, which means that the SC must be composed of 
two or more autonomous units, but geographical contiguity is not 
mandatory; 
3. polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units;  
4. social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity 
among the units;  
5. the intensity of security externalities on both regional and non-
regional units; and  
6. competition for control over a geographic region by strategically important 
states is indicative of a ‗shatterbelt region‘ that can overlay security complexes, 
unstructured security regions or a grouping of the two. 
 
Part III consists of three chapters. The first, Chapter Thirteen pertains to the 
Arctic, concentrating quite narrowly on the current political setting, its rising import 
created by natural resources and its increasing geostrategic importance. Since 
Antarctica shares many of the Arctic‘s geostrategic and geopolitical characteristics it 
is conceivable that both polar regions could share the same fate. Thus, Chapter 
Fourteen explores a compendium of topics, ranging from Antarctica‘s political 
architecture to the impact of climate change, and from the governance exerted by 
the Antarctic Treaty to the availability of natural resources.  The third chapter, 
Chapter Fifteen, draws upon all that has been raised and discussed in preceding 
chapters to either affirm or deny a hypothesis that by 2035 states with polar 
interests will have been forced by mutual security concerns to coalesce into a new 
regional security structure, the manifestation of which could be as a collage of 
security complexes or in the worst-case as a shatterbelt.  
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Chapter Thirteen 
 
The Arctic: The High North 
 
Militarisation of the Arctic wilderness 
 
During the early decades of the twenty-first century, the Arctic could act as a 
window through which one could observe the probable changes awaiting 
Antarctica further into the future. This would be a role reversal for, during the first 
half of the twentieth century Antarctica was deemed more strategically important 
than the High North. Prior to the Second World War the Arctic region was, from a 
military view point, one of the few remaining unexploited regions of the world. 
Militarily, the region was considered benign because Nature single-handedly took 
care of the security for all Arctic Ocean littoral states.
1
  
Unlike Antarctica, where latitude 60
o 
South determines the northern 
geopolitical boundary of the southern polar region, there is no natural 
geographical delineator for the Arctic region. The Arctic Circle – at latitude 66 
degrees 33 minutes North
2
 is a datum line above which there is at least one 24-
hour day of darkness and one 24-hour day of daylight each year – is popularly 
accepted as the boundary between the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions.
3
 By this 
parameter the Arctic region encompasses about six per cent of the Earth‘s 
surface.
4
 It is a region with an area in excess of twenty-one million kilometres 
squared, of which almost eight million kilometres squared is onshore and seven 
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million kilometres squared is on continental shelves under less than 500 metres of 
water.
5
 
 This problem of delimitation is compounded by the fact that unlike 
Antarctica, which is a continent surrounded by an ocean, the Arctic is an ocean 
surrounded by continents. Thus, the Arctic per se is not a landmass but a shallow 
ocean, which has a maximum depth of 4,665 metres.
6
 This ocean is known for its 
broad continental shelve that extend 100 to 200 kilometres from the United States 
(Alaska) and Canada, and more than one thousand kilometres north from the 
Russian Federation. With an area of 14.056 million kilometres
 
squared, the Arctic 
Ocean is the smallest of the world‘s five oceans. It is primarily an enclosed ocean 
with a limited exchange of deep water with other contiguous Oceans.
7 
   
A threshold often used to define the Arctic environment is that set by the ten 
degrees
 
Celsius
 
July isotherm – see Map 13. This isotherm marks the southern 
Arctic boundary where the monthly mean temperature in July is below ten degrees 
Celsius.   Above this threshold the climate is described as being persistently cold 
with a relatively narrow annual temperature range varying, for example, in 
Greenland, from a summer high of 5.5
o  
Celsius to a winter low of minus 35
o 
Celsius.
8
 Winters are cold, but with clear skies, while summers are characterized 
by damp and foggy weather interspersed with weak cyclones that bring rain and 
snow.
9
 The terrain of the Arctic Ocean  is characterized by drifting pack ice about 
three metres thick which is moving in a clockwise direction propelled by the 
Beaufort Gyral Stream. During the summer months the pack ice is surrounded by 
open seas, whilst during winter the area of pack ice doubles in size and encircles 
the adjacent land mass.
10
 However, as of 2009, the Arctic sea ice cover is 
undergoing an extraordinary transformation that has significant implications for 
marine access and shipping throughout the Arctic basin.
11
  
Politically, the Arctic Ocean does not define the Arctic region per se. If the 
Arctic Circle represents the political perimeter of the Arctic region then only six 
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countries – the United States, Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, Norway 
and Russia are Arctic states.
12
 However, if less precise markers were used to 
delineate the region‘s southern margin, for example the northern extremity of 
taiga biome or the natural southern maxima of the indigenous peoples, then two 
additional countries would qualify as Arctic states – Finland and Sweden.13 
However, these two countries are not usually considered to be Arctic-rim states.  
The loosening of Nature‘s grip on Arctic security was observed by the 
British journalist H. P. Smolka during a visit to the Soviet Arctic in 1937. Smolka 
was convinced that the Soviet Union was systematically undertaking the 
militarisation of the Arctic Ocean. Based on these observations, Smolka correctly 
predicted that the Soviet Union would make Murmansk their principal naval base 
in Europe, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) an artery for naval vessel transfers 
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the ocean column beneath the Arctic 
sea ice an area for submarine operations.
14
 The usefulness of the NSR as a means 
of providing a safe passage for shipping in the time of war was aptly illustrated by 
the voyage of the German commerce raider Komet. In the summer of 1940, the 
Komet travelled without official Soviet permission, and undetected by the allies, 
from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait in order to gain access to the Pacific 
Ocean where it successfully conducted a merchant raider‘s war.15  
Early in the twentieth century, a British geographer, Halford MacKinder 
identified a vast sweep of Eurasia including all of the Soviet Union south of the 
Arctic Ocean, but minus the territory east of the Yenisie River, as the pivotal 
heartland from which world domination could spring.
16
 While the geopolitics of 
the 1920s and early 1930s was not embraced by either British or American 
strategic thinkers, MacKinder‘s views did attract the attention of German 
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geopoliticians, notably Karl Haushofer.
17
 It still remains unclear whether 
MacKinder‘s ―Heartland‖ theory influenced Hitler‘s global strategy,18 suffice to 
note that in June 1941 the German army, the Wehmacht, attacked the Russian 
heartland in a campaign known as Operation Barbarossa. 
 
 
 
 
Map 13. The Arctic Region. 
Source: CIA Atlas, 1999.  
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The strategic importance of Arctic Scandinavia was recognized by both the Allies 
and Axis powers at the outset of the Second World War. For the Allies, 
occupation of northern Norway presented an opportunity to deny Germany 
seaports from which it could export Swedish iron ore back to Germany. For Axis 
powers, the invasion of Norway provided access to the Gällivare iron ore deposits 
of northern Sweden, which the Allies were intent on denying them.
19
 Hence, the 
Norwegian Campaign can be viewed, at least in part, as a resource war. Once the 
Soviet Union joined the Allied powers in 1941, Norway‘s Atlantic seaports 
provided Germany with sheltered bases from which its navy could interdict allied 
convoys that shuttled military supplies between Great Britain and the Soviet 
military complexes on the Kola Peninsula. Just the mere presence of two German 
capital ships – Tirpitz and Scharnhorst – in Norwegian waters caused Great 
Britain in the early years of the war to overreach its ability to prosecute naval 
warfare worldwide.
20
 As the Cold War emerged from the fading ghost of the 
Second World War, two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – 
began to view the Arctic through a new geopolitical lens: a lens created by two 
nuclear explosions half a world away in Japan. 
 
A Cold War in a cold place 
The impact of the Cold War on the Arctic needs to be examined in light of the 
prevailing regional and global context of one of the greatest power struggles of 
the twentieth century. While the Cold War meant many things to many people, 
geopolitically, it meant that the United States along with its Western allies, were 
in a crusade against an ‗evil‘ communist empire intent on territorial and 
ideological expansion into Eurasia, including all of the Arctic-rim lands.
21
 Given 
Western rhetoric, the Soviet Union naturally sought additional territory to buffer 
itself against American militarized capitalism. Under such tension, the Cold War 
became a zero-sum game marked by fear and suspicion with both superpowers 
gripped by a totalitarian image of the other.
22
 National interest on both sides of 
this ideological schism was intertwined with security, where security was defined 
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as the ability to keep the potential adversary from making either territorial gains 
or ideological converts at the expense of one‘s own interests. For the United 
States this schism became synonymous with the foreign policy advocated by 
George Kennan, which centered on the ―long term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment of Russian expansionist tendencies.‖23  
The era of Soviet containment coincided with the beginning of a period 
when political interest in the Arctic underwent a dramatic transformation, 
ultimately foreclosing all options for cooperation in both the military and non-
military realms. As if to defy the past when most strategists considered the Polar 
Regions to be the wrong place for large military operations,
24
 the policy of 
containment forced both superpowers to consider the Arctic the key geostrategic 
deployment area in any future global contest. Ultimately, geography determined 
the strategic importance of the Arctic. Lying at the top-of-the-world, the Arctic 
provides the shortest route between three continents – Asia, Europe and North 
America. With core industrial regions in Europe, Russia, the United States and 
Japan lying within seven thousand kilometres of the North Pole, the strategic 
importance of the Arctic throughout the Cold War era remained undiminished.
25
 It 
is also difficult to overlook the fact that the United States and Russia are 
immediate neighbours in the Arctic, being just a mere ninety-one kilometres 
distant at the Bering Strait.  
The dramatic transformation of the Arctic from Nature‘s kingdom to the 
military frontline gained impetus following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when 
the Soviet Union launched an ambitious development programme to strengthen its 
navy. The goal of this programme was to enable to Soviet navy to the match the 
naval capability of the United States wherever and whenever necessary. The 
Soviet Northern Fleet, based well within the Arctic Circle along the Kola 
Peninsula, benefitted enormously from this naval construction programme, which 
continued with undiminished haste throughout the 1970s and 1980s. By the mid-
1980s no ocean in the world had a higher concentration of naval vessels than the 
Barents Sea, where the Northern Fleet located 203 submarines and 220 surface 
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combatants.
26
 Although vessel numbers have decline dramatically since the late 
1980s, the Northern Fleet still remains a potent naval force.
27
  
As the enmity between the two Cold War superpowers deepened, new 
means of launching nuclear weapons were developed with missile launching 
submarines quickly replacing aircraft as the preferred weapons platform. Initially, 
the Soviet Union could not match the technological sophistication and range of 
the American submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and was forced to 
dispatch, at great risk, its own nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBN) into the mid-Atlantic through the ‗choke-point‘ formed at the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. However, with improvements in missile 
technology the Soviet Union gained a strategic advantage vis-à-vis its Western 
adversaries by being able to retain their highly valued SSBNs within a heavily 
defended bastion in the Barents Sea under the Arctic pack ice.
28
 By the mid-
1970s, the Soviet navy was able to operate its principal SLBMs – Typhoon and 
Delta class submarines – throughout the majority of the Arctic Ocean29 while the 
United States was forced to commit its nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) 
to missions deep within a secure Soviet submarine bastion. 
Nuclear deterrence during the Cold War
30
 required the establishment of 
numerous surveillance systems, a number of which were located in the Arctic. 
Each superpower needed the other to know that any attack on their homeland 
would be detected in time for a counterattack to be launched. In order to provide 
credibility to this belief both adversaries needed to have dependable surveillance 
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systems as far north as possible. With regard to the siting of radar stations, the 
Soviet Union held an advantage for it could position its early-warning Hen House 
and large phased-array missile-tracking radars around the country‘s north-west 
periphery. The United States, rather than confining its early-warning radar 
systems to within central forty-eight states, was required to deployed its phase-
array surveillance radar assets in Alaska, Greenland and the United Kingdom.
31
 
Therefore, the Arctic was the critical strategic location for both fighting an 
intercontinental nuclear war and avoiding it.    
     
The post-Cold War Arctic 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought to an end the Cold War and both 
superpowers allowed their military forces to dissipate. Among the NATO 
northern allies, Canada, Denmark and Norway took immediate action to garner 
the economic advantage any ―peace dividend‖ offered.32 The United States, of all 
Arctic states, retained the largest and most capable Arctic navy and air force. The 
former Soviet Union‘s navy rapidly dwindled to a fraction of its former capability 
as it dealt with its newly diminished powers.
33
  
The reduction in naval capabilities did not bring to an end the practice  of 
aggressive surveillance operations undertaken by submarines operated by either 
the United States navy or that of the navy of the  newly formed Russian 
Federation.
34
 Nor did the assumed reduction in capabilities greatly reduce the 
number of ex-Soviet bomber aircraft available to the Russian Federation. Thus, 
the United States, in particular, felt the need to retain aircraft detection facilities 
and hence to maintain the North America Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) until the commissioning of the highly automated Northern Warning 
System.
35
    
During the decade and a half following the end of the Cold War, attention 
shifted from military security to environmental security among the circumpolar 
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states as their focus became directed towards protecting the Arctic environment. 
This change in emphasis created the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS), a Finnish initiative that has become subsumed within the responsibilities 
allotted to the Arctic Council.
36
 This redirection of attention enabled most of the 
Arctic states to shift their focus from matters military to concerns associated with 
constabulary duties, such as environmental protection and fishery patrols.
37
 
Concern for the environment also lead to one of the more significant international 
security actions undertaken by the Arctic states the safe decommissioning of the 
Russian government‘s nuclear-powered submarine force. With the collapse of the 
Russian economy following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
armed forces fell into disarray and submarines were allowed to decay within the 
confines of their naval base. International concern over this situation grew once 
Western nations realized that the nuclear reactors left on board these submarines 
could suffer a meltdown thereby posing a serious environmental threat. It was left 
to the United States, Norway and Russia to properly decommission these 
submarines and to safely store the radioactive materials.
38
 
Furthermore, during this period Arctic states reduced the military forces 
they had previously deployed in the region, curtailed or eliminated Arctic military 
exercises; and gave the appearance of having stopped developing policies that 
were directed towards operations in the Arctic. For example, Canada, not only 
cancelled plans to purchase a significant number of nuclear-powered submarines 
and heavy-duty ice breakers, but also ended, or significantly curtailed its military 
forces‘ Arctic operation.39 The military confrontation in the Arctic, which began 
in the Second World War, was now conveniently confined to history.      
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Geopolitics of a resource-rich wilderness 
The origins of geopolitics in the Arctic extend back nearly five centuries to the 
pressing need for resources (whale oil) and the discovery of the Spitsbergen 
Archipelago by the Dutch mariner W. Barents in 1556.
40
 The Spitsbergen 
Archipelago, or as it is now known the Svalbard Archipelago, is collection of 
islands lying approximately midway between northern Norway and the North 
Pole. Spitsbergen (previously known as West Spitsbergen) is the largest island in 
the archipelago and contains abundant reserves of coal and other minerals, 
including potentially significant offshore reserves of oil and natural gas. A 
noteworthy feature of the archipelago is that it is devoid of an indigenous 
population.  
Following the discovery of larger schools of whales within the boundary of 
the archipelago, there were sharp clashes between English and Dutch whalers. As 
a result the English whalers persuaded the King of England to annex the islands so 
they could carry out whaling undisturbed by nationals of other countries. 
However, such annexation was contested by the Dutch, who being at the height of 
their seafaring primacy, effectively challenged English supremacy in Svalbard 
whaling. The Dutch challenge effectively ended the English presence in these 
northern waters and their claims to sovereignty over the archipelago. As stocks of 
whales became depleted in the waters around Spitsbergen, the Dutch were forced 
to find other areas of operation, thus leaving only Denmark-Norway to maintain 
an interest in the archipelago, and a claim to its sovereignty. Once the whalers 
sought their prey elsewhere, Arctic sealing became the industry of choice and thus 
of considerable importance to the population of northern Norway. However, 
sealing like whaling was an unsustainable industry and eventually Norwegian 
commercial interests focused their attention on the coprolite deposits on West 
Spitsbergen.
41
  
Historical disputes over sovereignty diminished with the demise of whaling 
and a proposal to colonize the archipelago by Sweden-Norway was favourably 
received by other European states, except Russia. By the third-quarter of the 
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nineteenth century an understanding was reached between Sweden-Norway and 
Russia to treat the archipelago as terra nullius, or no man‘s land, which up to that 
time had been the de facto situation. In 1906, the newly independent state of 
Norway reaffirmed its commitment to terra nullius for Svalbard. Almost 
immediately there was keen competition for space and resources on the 
archipelago and the very notion of no man‘s land came under stress. What was 
needed was a system of laws and administration for a large, resource-rich Arctic 
region with no indigenous population, while at the same time preserving the 
archipelago as ‗open territory.‘42 Unfortunately no model existed.43 
In 1909, Norway took the initiative of organizing a conference of all the 
powers interested in Spitsbergen. However, Russia, supported by Sweden, insisted 
on preliminary negotiations or pourparlers between the three powers in order to 
prevent any involvement by the United States, whose nationals had commercial 
interests on Spitsbergen. What eventually emerged from the pourparlers, was an 
agreement in principle that the archipelago was to remain terra nullius and the 
sovereign territory of no state, while remaining open to citizens of all states. Land 
was to remain public property, with rights of occupation exclusively restricted to 
those people exploiting natural resources.
44
 However, ―other interested‖ powers – 
those states whose citizens historical frequented the archipelago for the purpose of 
resource exploitation – failed to endorse this proposal, effectively scuttling any 
international agreement covering the administration of the archipelago.
45
 
In early 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference following the First World War, 
Norway requested that the Spitsbergen question be considered and that the 
archipelago be allocated to Norway. A special commission duly drafted a treaty 
by which contracting powers recognize Norwegian sovereignty over the 
archipelago, subject to certain limitations, including equal rights of access to 
resources by nationals of signatory powers and provided for the demilitarisation 
of the islands.
46
 Only the Soviet Union of all the First World War allies expressly 
sought to void the treaty, but ultimately it too signed away its sovereignty rights 
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over the archipelago. Although the strategic location of the islands was not of 
major importance in 1919, subsequent actions, especially by the Soviet Union, 
have become increasingly strategic, for the archipelago has since the 1970s 
abutted the principal launch area for Soviet and then  Russian nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarines.
47
 Furthermore, serious stresses are likely to be placed 
on the treaty arrangement if offshore oil and gas reserves are found beneath the 
continental shelf upon which the archipelago is located.
48
 
While there is no doubt that Norway, with sovereignty over the archipelago, 
would have regulatory jurisdiction over resources within the maritime zone, 
questions arise about the operating conditions other states might be required to 
comply with. Should provisions of the Svalbard Treaty apply, then nationals from 
other countries are entitled to equal access and rights of exploitation on favourable 
conditions. If Treaty limitations do not apply beyond Norwegian maritime 
territorial limits, then the general principle of exclusive coastal state rights will 
apply. Given the potential economic value involved, any disagreement over which 
state holds rights to those resources beneath the continental shelf could readily 
spark interstate conflict.
49
 
The Norwegian position is that treaty provisions cannot be interpreted to 
extend beyond the shoreline and out into the maritime area. The Norwegians 
argue that the continental shelf surrounding the archipelago is nothing more than 
an extension of Norway‘s own continental shelf. If this argument is accepted, then 
Norway has exclusive sovereignty over seabed resources within the two-hundred 
nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surrounding the archipelago.
50
 At 
present, no other signatory party to the Svalbard Treaty openly supports Norway‘s 
claim, while some, Russia for example, strongly contest it.
51
 On several occasions, 
dating back to 1986, the British Foreign Office has supported Russia through its 
claim that Svalbard had its own continental shelf, the extent of which had not 
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been determined.
52
 At its heart this dispute revolves around the desire by certain 
states to have the same access rights as Norway to Svalbard‘s waters in the event 
that the region becomes available for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation.  
Svalbard is not the only area under contest. Some disputes have been 
resolved amicably, usually through international arbitration, in the same way that, 
in 1931, Norway formally acknowledged Canadian sovereignty over the Sverdrup 
Islands in the Arctic.
53
 However, others remain unresolved and thus a potential 
source of conflict. 
One of the ongoing controversies in the Southern Arctic is where does the 
maritime border between Canada and the United States lie in the Beaufort Sea. 
For the United States the border should lie at the perpendicular angle to the 
coastline, about thirty degrees to the east. Canada insists that the border should 
replicate that agreed by treaty in 1825 between Russia and Great Britain, which 
defines the eastern border of Alaska as the meridian line of the 141
st
 degree. On 
Map 14, the disputed area appears as an insignificant wedge, but physically 
represents an area in excess of 18,000 kilometres squared, which could be 
incredibly important to either country given that geologists suspect it harbours 
considerable reserves of natural resources.
54
  
Canada is also involved in another dispute over territory, this time with 
Denmark. Han Island is a tiny uninhabited island barely measuring two kilometres 
across and is at the centre of an international dispute over whether Greenland 
(Denmark) or Canada holds sovereignty. This international boundary dispute 
takes on great significance for two reasons. First, these waters abound with fish 
stock, including turbot and shrimp and the boundary will affect the division of 
these resources. Secondly, since the impact of climate change is expected to cause 
substantial warming of the polar region this geophysical change could open up the 
island and waters immediately surrounding it to petroleum exploration. This 
territorial disagreement has sometimes escalated into bitter squabbling that on 
occasions has resulted in military posturing and brinksmanship.
55
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South of the Svalbard Archipelago is the ‗Grey Zone,‘ which is the location 
of yet another simmering border dispute. It resolves around the same issue as the 
Beaufort Sea controversy: the delineation of the border between maritime Russia 
and Norway. The Norwegians claim that drawing a ‗median line‘ equidistant to 
the nearest point on each state‘s mainland would give the fairest outcome.  The 
Russian claim, based largely on a Soviet order of 1926, maintain that the border 
should follow a more westerly line that would extend the existing Russian-
Norwegian border straight up to the North Pole, bypassing the Svalbard 
Archipelago. An agreement between these two states over shared fishing rights 
within this area has failed to reduce tension over sovereignty of this disputed 
region.
56
  
In several regions of the Barents and Norwegian Seas, various coastal states 
are making overlapping claims as to the size and limits of their continental 
shelves. These conflicting claims will ultimately need to be resolved to each 
state‘s satisfaction through the processes instituted by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea if peace and cooperation is to be maintained. 
The same is equally true of areas of the far north into which the Arctic-rim states 
could claim, or have already claimed, that their continental shelves extend. There 
are some areas close to the North Pole where the claims made by Russia, Canada 
and Denmark could overlap.
57
 However, what is now evident is that some non-
Arctic states, for instance China, are questioning whether the Arctic-rim countries 
can legitimately take unto themselves the sole right to determine sovereignty 
issues in the Arctic, given the region‘s changing geopolitical environment arising 
―from the melting of the ice.‖58  
Despite the current tension between states over sovereignty, peace and 
cooperation rather than conflict prevails in the region. However, this situation 
could readily change for, if as the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence claims, in 
the future the greatest likelihood of confrontation between great or major powers 
lies in contested regions, especially those in geo-strategic locations with 
significant resource potential or where spheres of influence overlap or touch. The 
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Arctic is identified as one such region, for its resource potential is beyond doubt 
and, as Map 14 illustrates, Arctic states jostle each other for legitimacy over 
sought-after maritime territory and the resources such territory may hold.
59
 There 
is also another aspect to sovereignty in the Arctic that cannot be overlooked now 
that the world is entering an Energy-Climate Era: the right of free passage for 
shipping throughout an increasingly ice-free Arctic Ocean. 
The centuries-long quest to find the fabled Northwest Passage, which could 
link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans across northern Canada and has proved 
quixotic for generations of explorers, will likely become ice-free during the 
twenty-first century. If navigable, the Northwest Passage would cut eleven-
thousand kilometres off the Europe-to-Asia route through the Panama Canal and 
nineteen-thousand kilometres off the trip around Cape Horn for those supertankers 
too large to transit the canal.
60
 International interest in this ‗new‘ shipping route 
has heightened Canadian concern over which, if any, single state has sovereignty 
over the Passage. For Canada this question is an issue of national security. 
Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen made the first complete transit of the 
Northwest Passage from 1903 to 1906. Forty years passed before the next ship, 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Schooner St. Roch completed the transit in 
1942. Prior to the Manhattan Crisis of 1969, only eight surface ships and two 
nuclear submarines had successfully transited the Passage and the ship, the 
Manhattan, would be the first merchant ship to do so.
61
 Several oil companies 
sponsored the experimental voyage of the oil-tanker Manhattan as a 
demonstration of the economic benefits that would accrue if Alaskan oil could be 
shipped directly from Prudhoe Bay to the North-eastern United States rather than 
via the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline and tanker to the United States. Initially, Canada 
endorsed this experiment for the success of the venture would also prove that 
commercial access to the mineral wealth of Canada‘s Arctic Archipelago and 
tanker transport from the Mackenzie Delta oil fields was possible.
62
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           Map 14.  Map of the Arctic region showing boundaries of claimed & disputed territories. 
Source: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2010, p. 63.   
 
However, the question of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage placed the 
venture in jeopardy when the United States refused to accede to a Canadian 
request that the United States seeks permission for the Manhattan‘s transit. The 
United States did not wish to make an official request. Such a request might have 
given tacit acknowledgement of Canada‘s sovereignty over Arctic straits, thereby 
weakening the notion of freedom of passage through strategic straits around the 
world.
63
 The accompaniment of a United States Coast Guard icebreaker tended to 
give the impression that the voyage had official United States sanction, which in 
itself contributed to public outrage in Canada.
64
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In an action prompted by the unwelcome voyage of the Manhattan, Canada, 
one year later, extended the outer limit of its territorial sea from three to twelve 
nautical miles. With this extension, Canada made it impossible for foreign 
shipping to use the Northwest Passage without entering Canadian territorial 
waters at some point during their transit.
65
 In the mid-1980s, the United States 
once again challenged Canada‘s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. The 
challenge came when the United States government ordered the Coastguard ship 
Polar Sea to transit the passage, having intentionally failed to give Canadian 
authorities prior notice of the voyage. As a consequence Canada redefined the 
boundaries of its territorial seas, but this time used the internationally recognised 
straight baseline system – as specified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
Territorial Sea.
66
 An immediate effect of this change was that the entire sea area 
enclosed within the Canadian Arctic Archipelago became an integral part of 
Canadian territory. While the United States finally accepted, albeit with 
reservations, Canada‘s sovereignty over the sea area within the Arctic 
Archipelago, Canada‘s authority over this maritime area remains disputed by 
some member states of the European Community.
67
 The Russian Federation has 
also adopted the straight baseline system to delimit its territorial seas. By so doing 
Russia has effectively prevented free passage along the Northern Sea Route, for it 
is impossible to travel this sea-lane without intruding into Russian territorial 
waters.
68
  
Just as its Arctic policy prevents the United States from accepting Canada‘s 
sovereignty claim over the Northwest Passage, the same policy equally prevents 
America from accepting a similar claim made by the Russian Federation over the 
Northern Sea Route.
69
 Reconciling these policies would appear impossible, 
especially given that Russian Federation Arctic Policy proclaims ―the use of the 
Northern Sea Route as a national unified transport link of the Russian Federation 
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in the Arctic‖ to be in the national interest of Russia.70 This divergence in policy 
mattered little when sea ice prevented all but small cargo ships from navigating 
the iceberg strewn Northern Sea Route during the brief Arctic summer. However, 
the geopolitics of the Northern Sea Route changed in the late summer of 2010 
when a Russian liquid petroleum gas supertanker successful navigated the 
Northern Sea Route carrying gas from Murmansk in Russia to Ningbo in China. 
Taking this route effectively reduced by one-third the distance the supertanker 
would have travelled if its passage was through the Suez Canal.
71
  
This reduction in distance could make travel through the Northern Sea 
Route four times cheaper in terms of fuel and charter time than the conventional 
route from Europe to China and the rest of Asia via the Suez Canal and the pirate 
plagued African coast.
72
 Commercial transport through the Arctic will become 
economically more attractive with the ready availability of a new class of double-
acting ice-strengthen container ship able to traverse the region even during the 
winter months without the need for attendant icebreakers.
73
   
When the ice recedes sufficiently, which could be within a decade or two, a 
marine highway over the North Pole could materialize.
74
 This route would most 
likely run between Iceland and Alaska‘s Dutch Harbour, connecting the shipping 
megaports of the North Atlantic with those in the North Pacific.
75
 Already some 
states are foreseeing that the opening of this route will result in Iceland becoming 
a major maritime hub and in anticipation of this event, China, has significantly 
increased the size of its embassy staff to become the largest embassy in 
Reykjavik.
76
 Other states consider a more direct shipping route would be one that 
links the Arctic port of Murmansk in Russia with the Hudson Bay port of 
Churchill in Canada, for the latter port is connected to the North American rail 
network.
77
 The first of these alternate shipping routes would make both the 
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Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage redundant as a prospective 
transcontinental shipping lane. Conversely, both shipping routes would make 
more pressing the need to resolve the issues of territorial sovereignty beyond 
existing exclusive economic zones, for with sovereignty comes a responsibility 
for the safety of mariners and the ships they sail. 
 
Geopolitics of climate change 
 Cold War geopolitics in the Arctic lost its salience with the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall. As a result high politics within Arctic-rim countries was redirected away 
from the Arctic to more pressing global security issues, culminating in the War on 
Terrorism. But the Arctic‘s strategic location, immense resource wealth and 
disappearing icecap has now reasserted its prominence as a region of heightened 
national interest to both Arctic and non-Arctic states alike. Although a melting 
Arctic holds great promise, it also poses grave dangers. The combination of new 
shipping routes, the promise of considerable wealth from oil and gas reserves and 
a poorly defined picture of state ownership make for a ―toxic brew.‖78  
The situation is especially precarious because there are currently no 
overarching political or legal structures that can provide for the orderly 
development of the region or mediate political disagreements. The Arctic Council 
only addresses environmental issues because the United States purposefully 
emasculated it at conception by prohibiting it from addressing security concerns. 
It is argued that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides 
mechanisms for states to settle boundary disputes and submit claims to resources 
beyond their Exclusive Economic Zones. However, according to Borgenson, the 
Convention cannot be seamlessly applied to the Arctic, for the region‘s unique 
geographic circumstances do not allow for a neat application of its legal 
framework.
79
 The Arctic is home to a number of vexing problems, some of which 
have been discussed previously, which, when taken in their entirety, make the 
region a special case. While the Antarctic Treaty might provide some valuable 
lessons, this treaty is pertinent to a continent not an ocean, and the negotiations 
that gave birth to it unfolded in an entirely different era.
80
 Few of today‘s Arctic 
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challenges that so vex the international community would have arisen but for 
climate change. 
Warming in the Arctic is causing change to nearly every part of the physical 
climate system. Manifestation of these changes is becoming increasing apparent 
and will likely have a considerable geopolitical impact as climate change becomes 
increasingly more severe. Although climatologists have long appreciated that 
changes in the Arctic would be faster and more intense than elsewhere on Earth, 
the degree and speed of those changes has been underestimated.
81
  
The most obvious change has been the rise in atmospheric temperature. 
Annual average temperatures have increased at almost twice the rate as that of the 
rest of the world over the past few decades. The rise is especially evident in winter 
and particularly in Alaska and western Canada where temperature has risen by 
three to four degrees Celsius over the past fifty years. Paralleling the rise in 
temperature is an increase in precipitation. Precipitation has increased by about 
eight per cent over the past century with much of this increase falling as rain, 
especially during autumn and winter months. A stark consequence of increased 
rainfall has been a rise in river flows and a decline in snow cover. Indeed, snow 
cover has declined by approximately ten per cent over the past thirty years.
82
 
The severity of climate change on the Arctic terrestrial environment is 
fittingly demonstrated by the early break-up of lake and river ice, the rapid 
melting of glaciers, especially in Alaska, and the thawing of permafrost 
throughout the polar region. Over recent decades permafrost has warmed by up to 
two degrees
 
Celsius, with the depth of the layer that thaws increasing year by 
year. Possibly, the most serious impact of Arctic warming in a global context is 
the area of the Greenland Ice Sheet subjected to summer melting. In volume, the 
Greenland ice sheet equals ten per cent of the world‘s freshwater and should it 
melt entirely global sea levels would rise by about seven meters.
83
 The area that 
experiences some melting increased by approximately sixteen per cent between 
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the years 1979 and 2002;
84
 but the rate of melting is accelerating. In 2007, the 
extent of the melt affected at least forty per cent of the total ice sheet.
85
  
Yet another significant impact of climate change is the depletion of Arctic 
Ocean sea ice which has long been identified as one of the strongest signals of 
climate change. Ice cover is now disappearing at an alarming and unprecedented 
rate, well beyond the most pessimistic predictions. A cautious Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (ACIA) projects a ―near-total loss of Arctic sea ice in the 
summer…for late this century.‖86 But when recent trends are taken into account, 
some commentators suggest that a seasonally ice-free Arctic could happen as 
early as 2013.
87
  Over the thirty years up to the turn of this century the annual 
average sea ice extent had decreased by about eight per cent or nearly one million 
kilometres squared and this rate of melting is accelerating.
88
 In the summer of 
2008 – for the second year in a row – the sea ice extent had dropped below five 
million kilometres squared, but most alarmingly, this occurred one month earlier 
than normal, at the end of August.
89
 The volume of sea ice is also shrinking very 
rapidly. While there is some uncertainty over the precise thickness of Arctic ice, 
there is nevertheless evidence that ice volume is shrinking at an ever faster rate 
because thicker, older ice is being replaced by younger, thinner ice. This makes 
the sheet more vulnerable as young ice is less resistant to melting. According to a 
United States Office of Naval Research report, sea ice has now almost thinned to 
less than half its pre-warming volume.
 90
 Another, equally alarming observation is 
that the sea ice is on average thirty per cent thinner than in the year 2000.
91
   
While the Arctic climate is warming rapidly, much larger changes are 
forecast to occur. Based upon a better than worst-case emissions scenario, by the 
latter part of this century, the annual average temperature is expected to rise 
across the entire Arctic region by around three to five degrees
 
Celsius over the 
land area and up to seven degrees
 
Celsius over the ocean. Winter temperatures are 
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projected to be significantly higher, with increases of four to seven degrees
 
Celsius over land and seven to ten degrees
 
Celsius over the Arctic Ocean. Some of 
the strongest warming over land is expected to occur along the coastal regions of 
northern Russia due to a projected sharp decline in sea ice.
92
 Global warming will 
lead to increased evaporation, which will result in increased precipitation. Over 
the Arctic as a whole, annual total precipitation is expected to increase by 
approximately twenty per cent by century end, with most of the increase falling as 
rain. While rainfall patterns will be uneven, coastal regions can expect an increase 
in excess of thirty per cent during the autumn and winter months.
93
 
Furthermore, as the climate warms, acceleration in the contraction of sea ice 
is expected. An additional decline of around ten to fifty per cent in annual sea ice 
extent is projected by the end of the century. Loss of sea ice during the summer 
months is expected to be significantly greater than the annual average decrease, 
with some climate models projecting near complete disappearance of summer sea 
ice. The projected reduction in sea ice will increase regional and global warming 
by reducing the reflectivity of the ocean surface.
94
 As in the marine environment, 
a warmer climate is expect to significantly affect snow cover over the Arctic 
landmass. By century end, snow cover is expected to have decreased by an 
additional ten to twenty per cent, with the decline being greatest during the spring 
months. This suggests a further shortening of the snow season and an earlier pulse 
of river runoff to the Arctic Ocean and coastal seas.
95
  
While the majority of climate impact assessments focus on scenarios in 
which the climate gradually warms, there exists the possibility that this gradual 
warming could, as it has done in the past, trigger an abrupt change in the 
climate.
96
 Abrupt changes could result from non-linear processes forcing the 
climate to switch from one state to another. This situation is consistent with 
climate simulation models that show external forcing increases the probability of 
a threshold crossover. Thus, if human activities are driving the climate system 
towards one of these thresholds, it will increase the likelihood of an abrupt climate 
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change occurring, possibly within the next hundred years.
97
 Should this occur 
when humanity is struggling to produce enough food to feed itself, the 
consequences would be devastating
98
 and result in the re-emergence of age-old 
patterns of conflict.
99
 
Ice core records indicate that temperatures over Greenland dropped by as 
much as five degrees
 
Celsius within a few years 8,500 years ago following the last 
ice age, before abruptly warming again. This relatively sudden and persistent 
change in weather across Greenland led to a sharp curtailment in the ocean 
circulation that brings warmth to Europe and the Arctic. In the future a similar 
change could be initiated by increases in Arctic precipitation and river runoff and 
the melting of Arctic snow and ice – all of which are currently occurring and 
predicted to become more serve in the future.
100
 The outcome of such a 
catastrophic event is the subject of a pessimistic Pentagon report authored by 
Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall.
101
 These authors portray a future world of 
warring states, frequently racked by famine, disease and weather-related disasters. 
They suggest that in a sense of desperation arising from an inability to provide for 
their human population, states will impose their unwanted citizens upon an 
unreceptive foreign country through a programme of aggressively enforced 
lebensraum.
102
 Although Professor Alan Dupont considers many of Schwartz and 
Randall‘s projections to be highly speculative and possibly misleading, he also 
concedes that they warrant credit for thinking the unthinkable by identifying how 
abrupt climate change might impact on international security. Dupont accepts that 
while the probability of such a scenario is low, it is far from zero, and given that 
its impact is very high policy makers ought to factor its occurrence into their 
security calculations and alternative-futures planning.
103
  
Climate change is a double-edged sword. While many Arctic residents, 
especially among the indigenous peoples lament the changes climate change has 
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wrought upon their lives,
104
 other, for example, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian 
Foreign Minister, sagely note that ―global warming not only creates additional 
problems for us but opens new possibilities as well.‖105 Furthermore, Lavrov 
conceded, that these new possibilities arose from Arctic ―oil and gas production, 
nuclear energy, the transportation and processing of hydrocarbons and other raw 
materials.‖106 Thus climate change in tandem with the exploitation of non-living 
resources are two new forces driving the contemporary resurrection of geopolitics 
in the High North. 
 
Geopolitics of natural resources 
According to the U.S. Geological Survey most of the Arctic, especially beyond its 
shoreline, is essentially unexplored with respect to petroleum. This is especially 
true of the region‘s extensive continental shelves which may constitute the 
geographically largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on 
Earth.
107
 Onshore, numerous areas in Alaska, Canada and Russia have been 
explored for petroleum resulting in the discovery of nearly four hundred oil and 
gas fields north of the Arctic Circle. These fields alone account for approximately 
240 billion barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural gas, which is almost ten per 
cent of the world‘s known conventional petroleum resources – these resources 
comprise both production and proven reserves.
108
  
It is the petroleum potential hidden beneath the Arctic Ocean, especially 
beneath the continental shelves, which is responsible for the contemporary 
geopolitical interest in the region. In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated 
that the Arctic could hold as much as ninety billion barrels of oil, which is 
equivalent to thirteen per cent of the world‘s undiscovered oil reserves. The 
Survey also suggests that the region could hold 47.3 trillion cubic metres or thirty 
per cent of the world‘s undiscovered natural gas, in conjunction with forty-four 
billion barrels of natural gas liquids.
109
 At prevailing 2008 consumption rates and 
assuming a fifty per cent utilization rate of reserves, this quantity of oil would 
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satisfy global demand for nearly two years or United States demand for six years. 
Arctic natural gas reserves may equal Russia‘s proven reserves, the world‘s 
largest.
110
  
The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources estimates the maritime Arctic 
region claimed by Russia could hold as much as 586 billion barrels of unproven 
oil reserves. Also, according to the Ministry, proven oil deposits ―in the Russian 
area of water proper‖  in the Barents, Pechora, Kara, East Siberian, Chukchi and 
Laptev Seas might reach three billion barrels, while proven gas reserves may be as 
high as 7.7 trillion cubic metres. Unexplored reserves in the same region could 
amount to 67.7 billion barrels of oil and 88.3 trillion cubic metres of natural 
gas.
111
 Russian officials have also concluded that the continental shelf beyond the 
country‘s Exclusive Economic Zone could hold hydrocarbon deposits equivalent 
to seventy-three trillion barrels of oil.
112
  
Although the release of large quantities of methane gas and methane-
hydrates from thawing permafrost concerns climatologists, methane gas hydrates 
harvested from beneath the oceans could be a potential source of energy in the 
future. Under certain temperature and pressure conditions methane, when 
combined with water solidifies. As the temperature rises this unstable state can be 
shifted and methane gas released.
113
 As a future energy source, gas hydrates are 
difficult to overlook given that one cubic metre of gas hydrate will release 164 
cubic metres of natural gas.
114
 As global usage of natural gas continues to rise, 
conventional and unconventional natural gas production are not expected to match 
demand and hence gas hydrates are anticipated to play a significant role in 
moderating price increases and ensuring adequate future supplies. While no 
technology currently exists to extract gas hydrates at an industrial level, small 
scale field experiments in hydrate extraction have been successful.
115
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Known offshore Arctic oil and gas reserves are likely to be supplemented by 
gas hydrated deposits, although the extent of these deposits remains speculative. 
One report suggests that gas extracted from gas hydrates reserves along Alaska‘s 
North Slope region would be sufficient to heat 100 million homes for more than a 
decade.
116
 A hypothesis contained within a Canadian government report presumes 
that hydrate fields extend from Canada to the North Pole.
117
  
In the future, the liquid resource most treasured by humanity and one which 
the Arctic has in abundance, will be fresh water. Although, fresh water resources 
are rarely the sole source of violent conflict or war, the relationship between fresh 
water and security is often belittled or ignored.
118
 However, this relationship 
cannot be ignored in a world affected by climate change. Clean fresh water has 
become a valuable commodity due to its chronic shortage in many regions of the 
world. This shortage represents a commercial opportunity especially for Arctic-
rim states to export fresh water harvested from either icebergs or pristine northern 
lakes. While no state has to date availed itself of this opportunity the Arctic 
Research Council envisages that by the year 2040 specialized tankers will be 
transporting water from ports in Greenland and Canada to the Middle East, Japan 
and the Mediterranean.
119
    
What the Arctic Research Council appears to have failed to consider is that 
non-Arctic states could themselves harvest fresh water directly from icebergs 
adrift in the Arctic Ocean beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone of Arctic-rim 
states. The opportunity for Arctic-rim states to prevent such an activity is severely 
limited, for as Christopher Joyner states:     
... the international law concerning ice remains 
incomplete and unclear. No international legal regime 
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is yet in place which comprehensively sets out the legal 
status of ice in its various forms.
120
 
Terrestrial hard mineral mining already exists beyond the Arctic Circle. The 
world‘s largest zinc mine (Red Dog mine) is located in the Alaskan Arctic and the 
largest nickel mine (Norilsk) in Siberia, while the Mary River iron ore deposits on 
Baffin Island, in the Canadian Arctic is renowned for high-grade ore.
121
 Recently, 
the owners of the Raglan Mine in northern Québec commenced extracting nickel 
ore from one of the largest deposits in the world. Although mining only began in 
1997 this deposit is expected to be exhausted by 2030.
122
 The discovery of 
volcanoes and thermal vents along the Gakkel Ridge offers a potential source of 
commonly precipitated metals including copper, silver and gold.
123
 Although, 
such deposits might not be tapped anytime soon, other maritime resources are 
available. The Arctic seabed is known to contain significant deposits of various 
hard minerals and precious stones, such as gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, 
manganese, nickel, platinum, tin, zinc and diamonds.
124
  Just the prospect of 
access to such mineral wealth has rekindled numerous interstate rivalries and 
attracted resource-hungry non-Arctic states, such as China and India to the 
region.
125
  
 
A geopolitical futurecast 
 The Arctic, being located between the United States and the Soviet Union, was a 
conflict front line during the Cold War. Nuclear ballistic missile submarines 
prowled the Arctic Ocean while nuclear bomb carrying aircraft from both 
superpowers circled on standby overhead. Runways and radar stations were 
constructed throughout the High North, as were underwater acoustic sensors. 
Even as the Cold War was coming to an end demilitarisation of the Arctic was 
considered neither practical nor conducive to strategic stability.
126
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 A more cooperative approach emerged in 1990, allowing the United States 
and the Russian Federation to agree upon the location of their maritime border in 
the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea – although this has not been ratified by the 
Russian Duma. This warming of relations permitted both states to easily discuss 
common non-military issues under the auspice of the Arctic Council. Since the 
turn of the century this cooperation intensified further in response to the impact 
imposed by climate change. The melting of sea ice, opening of shipping routes 
and more ready access to oil and gas meant that maritime boundary disputes 
gained new salience. In May 2008, the five Arctic-rim countries adopted the 
Ilulissat Declaration in which they reaffirmed their commitment to work within 
the existing framework of international law to delimit their respective areas of 
seabed jurisdiction.
127
 Despite this apparent warming of relations, the Cold War 
schism has not been easy to bridge on matters of security. 
Notwithstanding forty-five years of Cold War history, the most significant 
security threats in the Arctic still remain those found along its southern fringes, in 
the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route. These involve non-state actors 
such as terrorists who could take advantage of ice-free Arctic waters to move 
contraband and people between oceans and continents. These non-traditional 
threats continue to attract the attention of Arctic states although not all states are 
equipped to address this challenge.
128
 With the exception of Russia, the other 
Arctic countries have not maintained a sufficient number of capable maritime 
assets (icebreakers) necessary to conduct policing or military operations in the 
harsh Arctic environment.
129
  
In this harsh environment it will be the larger countries which will set the 
frame work within which the smaller Arctic states will form their security 
policies.
130
 Features of this arena of contest are already visible.  The United States 
and Russia continue to deploy nuclear powered and armed submarines in Arctic 
waters. Likewise, both countries continue to deploy military aircraft over the 
Arctic, often to the consternation of the other Arctic-rim states. The Russian 
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navy‘s decline has been reversed and its strength is bound to increase in the years 
ahead. Moscow is determined to increase its prestige and influence not only in its 
immediate neighbourhood, but worldwide. The Russian navy is potentially the 
most effective instrument to support Russia‘s foreign policy. Professor Milan 
Vego maintains that while Russia‘s power projection capabilities are modest 
compared with the United States navy, they should not be underestimated or, even 
worse, ignored.
131
  
Despite conciliatory rhetoric emanating from Arctic-rim countries, 
Professor Rob Huebert, maintains that resource scarcity has heightened both 
political tension and the prospect of conflict throughout the Arctic region.
132
 His 
view has gained salience with the recent call by the Russian president Dmitry 
Medvedev for Russia to drill its Arctic territory for the resources it contains. In a 
speech laced with belligerent overtones to the Russian Security Council 
Medvedev is reported to have said: 
 Regrettably, we have seen attempts to limit Russia‘s access to 
the exploration and development of the Arctic mineral 
resources…That‘s absolutely inadmissible from the legal 
viewpoint and unfair given our nation‘s geographical location 
and history.
133
 
Although this might have been a direct attempt by President Medvedev to exert 
pressure on the UNCLOS process, it elicited, perhaps unintentionally, a 
confrontational response from Canada.
134
   
As mentioned previously, the United States is not bound by the strictures of 
UNCLOS, but is pursuing its claim to sovereignty over Alaskan continental 
shelves by relying on President Truman‘s Presidential Proclamation of 1945, 
which uncompromisingly declared:     
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Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently 
utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United 
States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea 
bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but 
contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining 
to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.
135
  
 
For the United States, the Arctic remains important for the defence of its territorial 
integrity and for the resources, especially energy resources, it could provide. For 
these reasons the region will likely increase in importance as an arena for military 
operations and intelligence gathering, especially on Russian operational 
capabilities.
136
 In a further sign of the transformation currently underway in the 
Arctic, the United States is assessing the need for a new strategic deep-water naval 
base in Alaska adjacent to the western entrance to the disputed Northwest 
Passage.
137
 In a definitive gesture the Canadian government plans to construct a 
deep-water port near the waterway‘s eastern gate, at Nanisivik on northern Baffin 
Island.
138
  
China is a large non-Arctic state with an increasing interest in the region. It 
has started to assess the commercial, political and security implications of a 
seasonally ice-free Arctic region.
139
 For a country with no Arctic strategy
140
 China 
holds very definite views on how the Arctic States should consider the interests of 
non-Arctic States. Hu Zhengyue, China‘s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
issued a caution to Arctic-rim states by saying: 
 
When determining the delimitation of outer-continental 
shelves, the Arctic states not only need to handle relationships 
between themselves properly, but must also consider the 
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relationship between the outer-continental shelf and the 
international submarine area that is the common human 
heritage, to ensure a balance of coastal countries‘ interest 
and the common interest of the international community.
141
  
 
Hu‘s comments were reinforced by those attributed to Admiral Yin Zhou of the 
People‘s Liberation Army Navy who asserted, ―Under the provisions of the UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Arctic does not belong to any 
particular nation and is rather the property of all the world‘s people‖ and that 
―China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as it has one-fifth of 
the world‘s population.‖142 In particular, China appears cautious of Russian 
intentions in the Arctic. In a rare open-source article about the Arctic, an officer of 
the People‘s Liberation Army warns that the use of military force cannot be ruled 
out in the Arctic due to complex sovereignty disputes.
143
  
Therefore, a peaceful and cooperative future for the Arctic region is far from 
assured, for as Professor Rob Huebert asserts:  
  
All of the Arctic states have begun rebuilding their military 
forces and capabilities in order to operate in the region. 
Personnel are undertaking Arctic training exercises; 
submarines that can operate in ice are being developed or 
enhanced; icebreakers are being built; and so forth. The 
catalyst for the Arctic states‘ efforts appears to be a 
recognition that the Arctic is critically vital to their interests 
and they will take the steps necessary to defend these interests. 
The consequence of these efforts is that notwithstanding the 
public statements of peace and cooperation in the Arctic 
issued by the Arctic states, the strategic value of the Arctic is 
growing. As this value grows, each state will attach a greater 
value to their own national interests in the region. The Arctic 
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states may be talking cooperation, but they are preparing for 
conflict.
144
 
 
Although they have arisen in two different geopolitical epochs there is a striking 
similarity between the predictions proffered by Hall and Huebert 
If, in the future, contemporary interstate cooperation is replaced by tension 
or even conflict as Huebert contends, and if this potential centres upon access to 
resources, particularly liquid resources (petroleum or water), then Arctic-rim 
states are likely to coalesce into a resource based security complex. The structure 
of this complex is discussed in Chapter Fifteen. More problematic for states 
within and beyond the Arctic region is the probability that adverse external 
interstate relationships will create political intransigence and an inability to 
resolve contentious issues, which will then transform this security complex into a 
shatterbelt. 
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Chapter Fourteen 
 
Antarctica: The Deep South 
 
A continent like no other 
 
The ancient Greeks presumed the existence of Antarctica for, having noted the 
probable existence of the Arctic, they assumed that there must be a countervailing 
twin landmass to the south. The first recorded venture south to the Antarctic Circle 
was by the British ships Adventure and Resolution, during an expedition led by 
Captain James Cook in 1772-75. Although Cook circumnavigated Antarctica, his 
expedition was denied a glimpse of its landmass as pack ice prevented him from 
sailing within one hundred nautical miles of the continent.
1
 Nevertheless, the bitter 
cold in combination with floating icebergs indicated the presence of a continent or 
at least a large tract of land near the South Pole. During the years 1819-21, 
Antarctica was ‗discovered‘ by both the Briton Edward Bransfield and the Russian 
explorer Thaddus von Bellingshausen. A dispute over priority of discovery was 
resolved in 1955 when the International Court of Justice ruled that Bransfield 
discovered Antarctica on 30
 
January 1820.
2
  
Sealing and whaling provided the incentive for most nineteenth century 
voyages to Antarctic waters and as a consequence interest in Antarctica began to 
flourish. As interest grew in the science of geography the International Geographic 
Congress proclaimed 1901 as the ―Year of the Antarctic.‖ This was followed some 
eleven years later by two notable Antarctic expeditions, one led by the 
Englishman Robert Falcon Scott and the other by the Norwegian Roald 
Amundsen. The laurel for being the first person to reach the South Pole went to 
Amundsen. Scott, having lost the race to the Pole, lost his life in tragic 
circumstances on the return journey to the Ross Sea. 
Science was not the only impulse that propelled countries to renew their 
interest in Antarctica: the doctrine of economic imperialism also played a part. 
The seemingly unlimited bounty of living resources led to a flurry of territorial 
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Publishing, Cheltenham, 1995, p. 1. 
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claims during the first half of the twentieth
 
century, with Great Britain asserting 
the first sovereignty claim in 1908. Sovereignty claims were also made on behalf 
of the peoples of New Zealand (1923), France (1925), Australia (1933), Norway 
(1939), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1943). Two other countries with a long 
history of involvement in Antarctica, Russia and the United States, have claimed 
no Antarctic territory and nor do they recognise the claims of other countries. 
In terms of the geophysical features that identify it, the Antarctic region 
stretches north of the Antarctic Circle (66° 30' South) to include an area bounded 
by the Antarctic Convergence. The Antarctic Convergence at around 60° South 
delineates a belt of sea where the waters of the southern and northern oceans mix.
3
 
The continental landmass of Antarctica is approximately 14 million kilometres 
squared, an area exceeding the combined area of China and India or the United 
States and Mexico.
4
 Ice shelves amount to an additional 1.6 million kilometres 
squared.
5
 During the winter the newly formed pack ice around Antarctica‘s 
perimeter may extend the continent to twice its summer size. In total, Antarctic ice 
sheets holds approximately seventy per cent of all the freshwater on Earth and 
produce about one thousand cubic kilometres of icebergs per year.
6
 
The continent is commonly divided into two regions: West Antarctica, 
essentially a chain of islands bonded together by ice, and East Antarctica, a great 
ice-covered plateau. These two regions are divided from each other by the 
Transantarctic mountain range that runs for more than nine-thousand kilometres 
from the Filchner Ice Shelf to the eastern side of the Ross Sea.  
The South Pole lies at an elevation of 2,800 metres. With an average height 
of 2,300 metres Antarctica is three times as high as any other continent. Moreover, 
its continental shelves are exceptionally deep, with water depths averaging 
between five-hundred metres and one kilometre, compared to a mean depth of one 
hundred and thirty metres for the world‘s other continental shelves.7 Ice up to 4.5 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., p. 17. The Antarctic Convergence is a band of sea where the cold dense nutrient-rich waters 
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kilometres thick covers ninety-eight per cent of the continent and has an estimated 
volume of twenty-nine million cubic kilometres.
8
 
The Antarctic plateau is effectively a desert which under normal conditions 
receives an annual precipitation of less than 0.05 metre of snow - although coastal 
regions can receive ten times as much. Antarctica also holds ninety per cent of all 
the Earth‘s glacial ice9 while along its littoral margin gigantic ice shelves rise and 
fall with the tide. The Ross Ice Shelf, being the largest, measures 540,000 
kilometres squared - about the size of France.
10
 There exists an acceptance that 
climate change may cause the collapse of ice shelves and that the disintegration of 
the Larsen B Ice Shelf in 2002 was one such casualty.
11
 Once ice shelves collapse, 
glaciers that feed them are then capable of moving faster. In the wake of Larsen B 
collapse surrounding glaciers accelerated by up to six times their original flow 
rate.
12
  A more recent ice shelf collapse occurred on the western base of the 
Antarctic Peninsula in late February 2008, when the Wilkins Ice Shelf 
disintegrated. This is considered as affirmation of warming temperatures in the 
region.
13
 
The strong westerly winds that rage unhindered around Antarctica are fed by 
the steep temperature and atmospheric pressure gradients of the southern latitudes. 
Gales blow for approximately 300 days a year.
14
 On land, ‗katabatic‘ winds can 
reach velocities in excess of three-hundred kilometres per hour, making Antarctica 
the stormiest continent on earth.
15
 Wind drives the mean annual air temperature to 
a low of minus 22° Celsius at the coast and minus 56° Celsius in the interior, with 
an extremely low temperature of minus 89.2° Celsius being recorded at the 
Russian Vostock Station. In summer the mean temperature approaches zero 
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(7 September 2010). 
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degrees Celsius, although a high of fifteen degrees Celsius has been recorded in a 
dry ice-free valley at Australia‘s Vanda Station.16 
 
 
Map 15. Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. 
Source: http://www.ducksters.com/geography/antarctica/php  (7 September 2010). 
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Despite its frigid climate, observable evidence shows that climate change is 
causing changes to the Antarctic environment. It is the current and potential 
change in climate that enables this thesis to contend that Antarctica can be divided 
into three distinct regions – the Antarctic Peninsula, the remainder of West 
Antarctic and East Antarctica.
17
 
 The Antarctic Peninsula has been warming at the rate of half a degree 
Celsius per decade
18
 or by 2.8
o 
Celsius over the past fifty years.
19
 The Peninsula is 
considered to be one of the fastest warming locations on Earth:
20
 comparable to 
the rapidly warming regions of the Arctic.
21
 This rise in temperature has facilitated 
the establishment of flowering plants and mosses along the promontory and 
colonizing invertebrates have also advanced down the Peninsula in tandem with 
this progression.
22
 In another sign of warming along the Peninsula, a recent study 
found that since 1940 no fewer than 210 glaciers were in retreat and that the 
average rate of retreat was accelerating. Retreat of some individual glaciers has 
been extensive, for example, the Sjogren Glacier had move back by thirteen 
kilometres since 1993. Not all glaciers on the Peninsula were in retreat, but those 
that were advancing have gained on average only three-hundred metres over the 
past fifty years.
23
     
Antarctica, west of the Transantarctic mountain range, is warming at a rate 
of 0.17
o
 Celsius per decade which is a significant advance on the average surface 
temperature for the continent as a whole, which for the past five decades has 
warmed by only 0.12
o
 Celsius.
24
 Studies of ice around the Amundsen Sea have 
shown that West Antarctica‘s two principal glaciers, Thwaites and Pine Island, are 
shedding more than 110 cubic kilometres of ice each year. This rate of discharge 
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is triple that of a decade ago. Together these two glaciers have the ability to raise 
sea levels world-wide by more than a metre.
25
 
While some areas of East Antarctica have cooled in recent decades the 
longer fifty-year trend indicates that, on average, temperatures are rising across 
the entire continent.
26
 There appears to be little disagreement that Antarctica is 
warming – see Map 16, but it is not melting as rapidly as scientists would have 
expected. The main factor determining the extent of continental warming is the 
strength of the winds that circle Antarctica. These winds have become stronger 
over the past four decades effectively sealing off most of the continent each 
summer from the effects of global warming. The cause behind the strengthening 
circumpolar winds is the thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer. As the ozone 
hole heals over the coming decades, however, the winds should weaken, and as 
Antarctica warms during the summer months ice melting will increase.
 27
   
Regional warming is not restricted to the continent alone, for there is an 
accumulation of evidence to show that the sea surface temperature in the Southern 
Ocean has also warmed substantially during the second half of the twentieth 
century.
28
 According to Sarah Gille, the Southern Ocean is warming twice as fast 
as other world oceans.
29
 Associated with this warming, there has been an 
enhanced atmospheric hydrological cycle in the Southern Ocean that has resulted 
in an increase of Antarctic sea ice over the past three decades created through a 
reduction in the upward movement of warm ocean water and an increase in 
snowfall. 
Simulation models suggest that the warming over the past fifty years was 
associated with the Antarctic Oscillation rather than anthropogenic forced climate 
change. Nevertheless, with the expected increased loading of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere over the twenty-first century, the same models predict accelerated 
warming throughout the Southern Ocean, and indicate that anthropogenic forcing 
will exceed natural internal variability. As both the atmosphere and ocean warm 
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and rainfall associated with the enhanced hydrological cycle increase leading to a 
decline in Antarctic sea ice.
30
 
 
 
           Map 16.  Antarctica: showing warming for a fifteen year period ending 2007. 
          Source: http://antarcticasun.usap.gov/features/image/antarctica  (7 September 2010). 
 
 
Ice thickness, its spatial extent, and the fraction of open water within the ice pack 
can vary rapidly and profoundly in response to weather and climate. Sea ice 
typically covers approximately seventeen-to-twenty million kilometres squared of 
the Southern Ocean nestling Antarctica. On average, the seasonal decrease is 
much larger in Antarctic than in the Arctic, with only about three to four million 
kilometres squared remaining at summer's end, compared to approximately seven 
million kilometres squared in the Arctic.
 31
 As a consequence of global warming, 
sea ice in the future will retreats earlier and further and so present a diminished 
physical barrier to the exploitation of both Polar Regions. 
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Over the next hundred years the impact of climate change in the Polar 
Regions is expected to exceed the impact forecast for many other regions and will 
most likely produce reinforcing feedbacks of globally significance. However, 
according to the IPCC, the uncertain nature of climate change means that any 
future impact on biological and human systems remains very difficult to predict.
32
 
Aligned with the proposal for dividing Antarctica into three distinct climatic 
zones, this thesis will give priority to describing suggested future climatic changes 
to the Antarctic Peninsula. The Peninsula is a rugged mountain chain that differs 
from most of Antarctica by having a summer melt season that produces many 
isolated snow free areas. The Peninsula has experienced dramatic warming rates 
several times the global mean. Over the past fifty years average temperatures have 
risen by greater than 2.5
o 
Celsius, which is sufficient to raise the number of 
positive-degree days by seventy-four per cent. This has resulted in approximately 
14,000 kilometres squared of ice being lost from floating ice shelves, causing 
eighty-seven per cent of glacier termini to retreat and seasonal snow cover to 
decrease. If summer warming continues, the IPCC expects these effects to grow.
33
  
Ice sheet cores show that ice selves have not retreated so far landward for at 
least 10,000 years. This suggests that the retreat is not a natural phenomenon, but 
created by anthropogenic influences. Winter warming along the Peninsula‘s west 
coast appears to be caused by similar influences, but these have found 
manifestation in the persistent retreat of sea ice and the warming of the 
Bellingshausen Sea. If warming continues (especially in the summer) there will be 
significant regional impacts for the retreat of coastal ice and loss of snow cover 
would result in the exposure of additional rock and permafrost, thus providing 
new habitats for colonisation not only by expanding and invading flora and 
fauna,
34
 but also by human beings. 
The IPCC maintains that in its entirety the global significance of the 
Antarctic Peninsula warming is difficult to encapsulate, but their main concern 
centres on the loss of a unique landscape and biota. Furthermore, the Peninsula is 
a dramatic illustration of how subtle climate-dynamic processes can drive regional 
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climate change and the complexity of its impacts in an environment where human 
influence has been at a minimum.
35
 
On the Antarctic Peninsula, anecdotal evidence of a climatically changed 
region track that of climate science and the personal observations of Meredith 
Hooper have poignancy too strong not to repeat: 
 
The Antarctic Peninsula is unstitching. Ice slides off, 
crumbling, tumbling. Glaciers shrink and thin, discharge 
rates accelerating. Ice shelves are at risk, melt water 
penetrating consistently, deeply, into ancient structure. 
Along the western coast the sea‘s annual coating of ice 
performs fitfully. 
The stiches were held together by cold. Warmth denies 
their performance, removes their ability to function. The 
Antarctic Peninsula was cold. Now it is warming. 
Temperature, and the seasons are everything.
36
  
 
If climate change is going to facilitate the development of Antarctica over the next 
twenty-five years, then exploitation will most likely to occur on either the 
Antarctic Peninsula or along the coastal margin of West Antarctica. The ice sheet 
on the Antarctic Peninsula is not alone in showing a clear response to 
contemporary climate change, for the larger West Antarctic and East Antarctic ice 
sheets are also showing changes attributed to climate change. In West Antarctica, 
there is a suggestion that the dramatic recent thinning of the ice sheet throughout 
the Amundsen Sea sector appears to be the result of recent ocean change. Indeed, 
there is evidence of deglaciation in some parts of West Antarctica, although there 
is no universal acceptance that climate change is responsible. However, the retreat 
of glaciers has reinvigorated debate over the timescale one would expect such 
deglaciation to occur. Satellite observations fail to provide unequivocal evidence 
of whether the mass balance of the East Antarctic ice sheet has marginally 
thickened or experienced no change.
37
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The illusion of ownership  
Antarctica is fashionably described as the only terrestrial global commons. 
Without an indigenous human population of its own, Antarctica is considered by 
many to be the property of all humankind. While this is an admirable notion, it is 
complicated by conceptual difficulties and political realities. There appears to be 
little agreement amongst political actors as to a common understanding of the 
global commons concept. The fundamental problem associated with the global 
commons is often expressed, as noted in a previous chapter, as the ―tragedy of the 
commons.‖38  
In broad terms, global commons have been described as those portions of the 
planet that lie beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and the legal prerogatives 
of individual states. If global commons are to remain economically productive, 
they must remain environmentally healthy. To that end, regimes must be devised 
and effectively implemented that provide for the sustainable management of such 
areas. While the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) has been successful in some 
areas, i.e. preservation of the Antarctica terrestrial wilderness, it has been less than 
successful in preventing the pirating of Southern Ocean fish stocks.
39
 The latter is 
considered a classic illustration of Hardin‘s ―tragedy of the commons.‖  
Political realities in Antarctica continue to be shaped by the lack of clarity as 
to legal ownership of the continent. What still remains unclear is whether 
Antarctica is owned by any state or by every state. Four principal approaches in 
modern international law pertain to the status and ―ownership‖ of international 
spaces such as Antarctica.
40
 The first is the concept of res nullius, ―the property of 
nobody.‖ In the absence of an owner, sovereignty accrues to the first lawful taker 
able to demonstrate sufficient legal authority and control over that territory. This 
is the basis of all existing claims to Antarctica. For the international community, 
other than the seven claimant countries, the consequence of applying res nullius to 
Antarctica is to admit that the current seven claims might merit legal credibility. 
To date, that admission has not been forthcoming.  
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The second concept is that of res communis, the property is available for use 
by everyone. Generally this classification is applied to common areas that do not 
have definitive boundaries, i.e. oceans or the atmosphere. While sovereignty 
claims do not legally occur under res communis, the clear implication is that of an 
open access regime. Hence, any country with the technology and economic 
wherewithal may exploit a common area, provided that any specified obligations 
of resource conservation and environmental protection are observed.  
Common heritage of mankind (CHM), while often confused with res 
communis, is more far-reaching in its intended scope. First, no person, group, or 
sovereign owns the commons. Secondly, access to the commons is not restricted. 
Most importantly, however, the distribution of benefits shifts from state(s) to 
humankind as a whole. In 1982, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad proposed that Antarctica be declared the common heritage of mankind. 
In advocating this proposal before the United Nations General Assembly, 
Mahathir, with characteristic directness said: ―The days when rich nations can 
grab whatever territory and resources that they have access to, are over. 
Henceforth, all the unclaimed wealth of this earth must be regarded as the 
common heritage of all nations.‖41 While the Malaysian initiative remains a thorny 
issue for the Antarctic Treaty Parties (ATP), it has not changed the management 
regime for Antarctica nor given the Third World access to the continent‘s mineral 
wealth.  
Res publica, or ―public heritage of humankind‖ is yet another concept that 
could be applied to Antarctica, as it would give free access to the continent while 
at the same time preventing abuses through enforcement action of a state. This 
begs the question as to which state? As no single country has a sovereign right to 
Antarctica, administration under res publica would in all probability devolve to 
the United Nations. This alone would make res publica unacceptable to the 
Antarctic Treaty Party states.  
As none of the above concepts have found universal acceptance, the legal status 
of Antarctica remains unresolved. Even if a legal framework were to be agreed there 
is no guarantee that territorial claims by any of the seven claimant states would stand. 
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Today, it is the doctrine of occupatio42 that determines the legitimacy of acquired 
territory. This doctrine is comprised of two elements: possession and administration.43 
To meet the test of possession, the territory must be taken into possession by the 
occupying state. As for administration, this test is met only once the occupying 
state, having taken possession, establishes some kind of institutional 
administration that shows that the territory is being effectively governed by the 
occupying state. If, however, within a reasonable time after the act of taking 
possession, the occupying state does not establish some institutional authority to 
exercise governing functions, then there is no effective occupation.
44
 It is doubtful 
that the claimant state could use the doctrine of occupatio to legally prosecute a 
claim for a segment of Antarctica. 
 
Geopolitics of Antarctic imperialism  
At the turn of the twentieth century, Great Britain began to appreciate the strategic 
significance of Antarctica in the domination of the southern maritime trade routes 
via the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn. Such sea lines of communication 
(SLOC) would become vital to Britain‘s commercial well-being should shipping 
routes through either the Suez or Panama canals be severed by political or military 
interference.
45
 However, it was not only the threat of political instability in both 
North Africa and Latin America that brought Antarctica to the fore in British 
strategic thinking. In the early stages of both World Wars the British fought major 
naval engagements in the region
46 
and was forced to commit considerable sea 
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December 8 1914, a British naval force under command of Vice-Admiral 
Sir Doveton Sturdee successfully and without the loss of a single man-of-war, defended the 
Falkland Islands against attack by the German East Asiatic Naval Squadron under the command of 
Vice-Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee. By dint of good fortune, Sturdee turned what should 
have been a repeat of the British defeat at the Battle of Coronel into a stunning victory. Twenty-
five years later, at the dawn of the Second World War (1939-1945), the German Admiralty 
dispatched two 10,000-ton displacement pocket-battleships into the Atlantic Ocean to serve as 
commerce raiders. The Deutschland was to interdict shipping on the North Atlantic trade route 
while the Admiral Graf Spee sailed into the South Atlantic in search of allied merchant shipping. 
The Admiral Graf Spee was eventually trapped off the coast of South America by a naval flotilla 
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power to search out German armed commerce raiders (disguised as harmless 
merchantman) as they hid amongst the icebergs of the Southern Ocean.
47
  
The strategic position of the Falkland Islands, lying at the eastern entrance 
to Drakes Passage, was not lost on the British Admiralty. With France and Spain 
showing interest in colonising these islands, Britain was forced to react promptly, 
and first occupied the Falkland Islands in 1764. Thus, any ambiguity about the 
status of the Falkland Islands was settled once and for all.
48
 However, early 
sovereignty claims to Antarctica were more difficult to prosecute for, as recorded 
in the British parliamentary Hansard, the ―continent was constantly under snow 
and ice, is only partly explored, and it is difficult to say with any exactitude where 
the land finishes and the ice begins.‖49 These doubts did not completely inhibit 
British political interest in the control of Antarctica for a sector (20°W-80°W) was 
claimed in 1908 and in 1917 amalgamated into the Falkland Islands Dependency 
(FID). In 1919-20 with the memory of the Falkland War acting as a driver, the 
British government decided to acquire control over the entire continent through 
the pursuit of a gradualist strategy.
50
 To this end, a secret committee was 
convened, comprising mainly civil servants, but with representatives from 
Australia and New Zealand. By 1923 this committee had galvanized the British 
parliament to pass by Order in Council a claim for sovereignty over another sector 
of West Antarctica. This new claim henceforth called the ‗Ross Dependency‘ lay 
below latitude 60° South and between longitudes 160° East and 150° West. An 
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January 
19, 1941, the German commerce raider, ―H.K. 33‖ entered the Weddell Sea, and there affected the 
surprise capture of three Norwegian whaling factory ships and eleven whale chasers. The capture 
of the three factory ships represented a war prize of some 35,000 gross registered tons of shipping 
space and some twenty-two thousand tons of whale oil. Three German commerce raiders are 
known to have used Gazelle Basin in the Sub-Antarctic Kerguelen Islands for crew rest and 
recreation. There also existed a German proposal to establish a meteorological and radio station on 
the Kerguelen Islands. In total, German commerce raiders sank in total, 134 ships equalling 
837,278 gross tons. 
48
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enthusiastic New Zealand government accepted sovereignty over this latest 
addition to the British Empire.
51
 
Anticipating that Britain‘s imperialist desires would not be satiated with 
sovereignty over the Ross Dependency, France formally annexed, by Presidential 
decree, in November 1925, the islands of Saint Paul and Amsterdam, the 
Kerguelen and Crozet archipelagos, along with Adélie Land on the continent 
proper.
52
 Although the French Antarctic enclave comprised a relatively small 
wedge sandwiched between the two large slices of territory ultimately claimed by 
Australia, the French presence caused consternation amongst British Empire 
claimants although no counter-claim was made. 
By the late 1920s, international interest in Antarctica had reached a new 
height with the continent presenting a unique challenge to adventurers. In 1928, an 
American, Commander Richard Evelyn Byrd, with the support of commercial 
sponsors
53
  established a base called Little America at the Bay of Whales on the 
Ross Ice Shelf. The following summer Byrd became the first person to 
successfully fly to the South Pole and back, thus ensuring that his name became 
synonymous with Antarctica in the minds of most Americans.
54
  
The British acknowledged American involvement in Antarctica with little 
warmth. As a result of such ‗interloper‘ activity, the British became even more 
focused on implementing a policy ‗to paint the whole of Antarctica red‘ and add a 
further five and a half million square miles to its Empire.
55
 This policy provided 
the impetus for the 1929-31 British-Australian-New Zealand Antarctic Research 
Expedition (BANZARE) led by Sir Douglas Mawson. While this expedition 
carried out some excellent science its principal purpose was political,
56
 paving the 
way for Australia to claim forty-two per cent of Antarctica. In 1933, the British 
Parliament passed another Order in Council affirming British sovereignty over a 
sector south of latitude 60° and between longitude 45° and 160° East. Sovereignty 
was transferred to a reluctant Australian government in 1933, but a further three 
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years lapsed before any formal Australian proclamation was publicised.
57
 By 
1933, the British Empire laid claim to two-thirds of Antarctica, but it had also 
reached the zenith of its territorial ambitions. 
Norway was next to stake an Antarctic claim. On 14 January 1939, Norway 
claimed all of the territory that stretches from the FID boundary to the Australian 
Antarctic Territory (AAT) in the east. The territory became a Norwegian 
dependency in 1937 and was called Dronning Maud Land.
58
 Norway‘s claim was 
initiated by the need to protect its whaling industry from British interference, 
especially once Britain recognized that exploitation of southern whale stocks by 
American and European whalers was seriously jeopardizing its own whaling 
industry.
59
  
The advent of the Second World War once again sharpened perceptions of 
strategic and political possibilities in the Antarctic. Even before hostilities began, 
a possible German claim to territory resulting from a 1938 Deutsche Antarktische 
Expedition raised concerns in both London and Washington. Such was the 
strength of those concerns that further American Antarctic expeditions were 
approved for the summer seasons of 1939 through to 1941. For the first time these 
expeditions were sponsored by the United States Antarctic Service organised 
under the auspices of the Departments of State, Treasury, Navy and Interior. By 
now a Rear Admiral, Byrd, with two ships and four aircraft, was dispatched to set 
up an East Base on Stonington Island off the west coast of the Antarctic Peninsula 
and a West Base called, Little America III, on the Ross Ice Shelf.
60
 While this 
expedition was purported to be scientific in orientation, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt advised Byrd that permanent bases on Antarctica were necessary 
―…because of their growing valve for four purposes – national defense of the 
Western Hemisphere, radio-wave promulgation, meteorology and minerals.‖61 As 
for the German territorial claim, nothing eventuated, although it was rumoured, 
somewhat improbably, that Hitler and his mistress Eva Braun had landed by U-
boat at a ‗New Berchtesgarden‘ built in Antarctica by the 1938 expedition.62 
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Argentina and Chile began to assert their rights in the Antarctic during the 
Second World War. Once again such interest only served to heighten British 
disquiet. This time, however, anxiety reached fever pitch and a secret British naval 
expedition titled Operation Tabarin
63
 was dispatched in 1943 to establish a 
permanent presence on the Antarctic Peninsula. The British also dispatched a 
warship, HMS Carnarvon Castle to the Falkland Islands in response to numerous 
acts of perceived trespass committed by the Argentineans as they tested Britain‘s 
resolve to defend its strategic South Atlantic possessions.
64
 At the conclusion of 
the war, Operation Tabarin was terminated and the facilities constructed on the 
Antarctic Peninsula were transferred to a nascent civilian organisation known as 
the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).  
Chile was the first South American country to stake a claim to territory in 
Antarctica. On the 6 November 1940, Chile sought sovereignty over all lands and 
territorial waters of the ―Southern Territories‖, a sector that lies between 
longitudes 53° and 90° West. This claim had an immediate international impact. 
The British government protested on the grounds that the sector defined 
incorporated a part of its FID, while the reaction of the United States was in 
keeping with its previous stance of recognising no territorial claims. Even the 
Argentineans held reservations about the validity of the decree since it cut across a 
sector of the continent that Argentina would soon claim as its own.
65
 In February 
1943, Argentina laid claim to a section of Antarctica south of latitude 60° and 
between the meridians 25° and 68° West.
66
  
The Anglo-Argentine imbroglio of the war years continued to dog the 
relationship between the two states after war‘s end. On several occasions this 
acrimony almost resulted in naval conflict, the most serious of which occurred in 
1948 when a large Argentine naval flotilla was encountered off the South Shetland 
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Islands by a British cruiser and frigate.
67
 This incident encouraged these two 
protagonists, along with Chile, to formally agree that none of their warships would 
henceforth venture beyond of 60° south. The nebulous nature of its claim
68
 
convinced the British government that the best course of action to resolve the 
simmering dispute in the South Atlantic was to refer the whole issue to the 
International Court. This Britain attempted to do on two occasions. However, 
neither South American country saw any value in this approach, since in all 
likelihood the Court would confirm Britain‘s hegemony over Antarctica. Instead, 
they set their differences aside in a vain attempt to expedite Britain‘s removal 
from a slice of Antarctica they both claim.
69
  
Argentine and Chilean ambitions in the Antarctic were both reinforced and 
challenged by other South American states. Support from Brazil, Ecuador, Peru 
and Uruguay was conditional upon both Argentina and Chile accepting an 
alternate legal approach – the Brazilian conceived ‗frontage‘ concept that divided 
‗Latin American Antarctica‘ amongst the six states according to the length of each 
Latin-American country‘s own maritime boundary.70 Therezinha de Castro, a 
Brazilian political commentator, has suggested that the ‗frontage‘ theory arose 
from an acknowledgement that ―Antarctica is fated to be constituted as a 
cornerstone of our [Brazil‘s] destiny, thanks to its importance as a base of 
warning, interception and departure in whatever emergency might occur to affect 
the defence of the South Atlantic.‖71 The frequent and unqualified reference to 
―defence‖ and ―security‖ of the South Atlantic has continued to provide Brazil 
with the pretext for an involvement in Antarctic affairs.
72
 Obviously, the 
‗frontage‘ concept does not favour either Argentina or Chile, for neither country 
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would retain in totality their respective Antarctic claim. However, ratification of 
the frontage concept would completely exclude Great Britain from Antarctica.  
The Cold War brought about a change in American attitudes towards 
Antarctica. The United States needed to resolve the Argentine-British-Chilean 
imbroglio as the continuing impasse was diverting British military interest away 
from the more important European theatre. At the same time the impasse brought 
an ‗expansionist‘ European power (Great Britain) into the Western Hemisphere, 
which was contrary to America‘s own Monroe Doctrine. To assert its hegemony 
over Antarctic affairs, America mounted the largest individual expedition ever 
sent to the region, Operation Highjump (1946-47), to which America committed 
some 4,700 personnel plus thirteen naval ships including an aircraft carrier, two 
seaplane tenders and a submarine. It left no room for doubt about America‘s 
capability to transport a sizeable military force to Antarctica.
73
 The objectives of 
Operation Highjump were more military than scientific, for it was used to prepare 
men and equipment for possible deployment to the Arctic – the Arctic being too 
sensitive to allow training activities.
74
 Operation Highjump was followed a year 
later by Operation Windmill, which again had a military objective, this time of 
testing equipment developed out of  the experiences gained during the previous 
expedition.
75
 
 
The road to a treaty 
American activity was viewed with misgivings by other nations with interests in 
Antarctica. These concerns persisted until the dawn of the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY).
76
 The IGY did highlight the value of Antarctica as an 
open-air laboratory for the natural sciences and gave the politicisation of the 
continent a totally new direction. The political need to preserve a pristine 
Antarctica away from the tensions of Cold War politics became clearly apparent to 
the two superpowers. This was especially so since a parallel effort in the Arctic 
had failed. It was against this backdrop that the United States, in May 1958, 
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invited eleven other countries –including the Soviet Union – to a conference on 
Antarctica.
77
  
American interest in the continued protection of the Antarctic environment 
was not strictly altruistic, for any treaty negotiated would allow America to protect 
any potential territorial claim from deterioration while providing sufficient time to 
formulate strategies to protect its national interest. Moreover, a treaty would help 
avoid further conflict between the Latin-American claimants and Great Britain, 
while at the same time preventing a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the 
prevailing Cold War climate the Soviet Union, for economic, technological and 
military reasons, was content to endorse the American initiative provided that any 
treaty negotiated recognised its interest in Antarctica.
78
 Obviously the interests of 
the United States and the Soviet Union had converged forestalling any immediate 
confrontation between these hemispheric powers over the continent. 
The Antarctic Treaty with a preamble and fourteen articles was signed in 
Washington on
 
December 1, 1959 by the representatives of the twelve countries 
that had participated in the IGY.
79
 The Treaty took effect on 23
 
June 1961.  
In terms of geopolitics there are four clauses salient to the continued success 
of the Treaty. Article I of the Treaty declares that ―Antarctica shall be used for 
peaceful purposes only.‖ All activities with a military orientation, such as the 
establishment of military bases and fortifications, the pursuance of military 
manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any weapons, are strictly prohibited. This 
Article won strong support at the treaty conference from the superpowers for both 
were keen to keep Antarctic away from the influence of Cold War politics. 
However, the use of military personnel and equipment was permitted (in 
recognition of the inhospitable environment of the region) so long as military 
endeavours are in support of scientific research or other peaceful purposes.
80
 The 
geographical realities have forced the militaries of many nations to co-operate 
with each other for the sake of science. 
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Article I is complemented by Article V, which prohibits any country from 
conducting nuclear tests in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste 
material. This initiative came principally from the Southern Hemisphere countries 
for the nuclear powers of the late 1950s, being located distant from the continent, 
were less than enthusiastic about incorporating such a provision.
81
 
Article VII provides for wide rights of inspection of all areas of Antarctica 
by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP); these being the countries 
that are signatories to the Treaty and actively undertake research activities on the 
ice. The right of inspection was included primarily to monitor non-militarisation 
and to engender mutual trust amongst participant states. Great Britain proposed 
the inclusion of this article as means of reducing suspicion that states are not 
complying with the intent of the Treaty. The United States also insisted upon its 
inclusion and made it clear that without the unfettered right of inspection there 
would be no treaty.
82
  
Under Article III, the contracting parties agreed that, to the greatest extent 
practicable there should be an exchange of information about scientific 
programmes, an exchange of scientific personnel between expeditions and bases, 
and a free exchange of scientific observations and results between nations.
83
  
The remaining articles concern the ways and means of making the treaty 
system function in the desired manner. In operation, the Treaty is administered on 
behalf of the international community by the ATCP. There are periodic Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM) held among the ATCP to recommend 
measures that would further the objectives of the Treaty. Since 1984, Non-
consultative Parties (NCP), countries that do not undertake Antarctic research, but 
are signatories to the Treaty, along with environment-orientated NGOs, have been 
invited to attend all meetings of the ATCP. 
For the seven claimant countries the Treaty neither endorsed nor 
extinguished their territorial claims. These were simply ―frozen‖ with the 
possibility of being resurrected at some future date. As for the Soviet Union (now 
Russia) and the United States, neither sought to obtain or extinguish their 
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individual right to claim a sector of Antarctica, preferring instead unfettered 
access to the whole continent.  
 
Conventions and protocols 
Since the Treaty was principally a device to keep Cold War adversaries apart, 
scant attention was paid to the protection of the Continent‘s fauna and flora, a 
deficiency made obvious when several European states renewed their interest in 
harvesting Antarctica‘s burgeoning populations of fur and elephant seals.84 
International dismay at this prospect was such that precautionary measures were 
negotiated before any large-scale commercial harvesting could commence. In 
1972, the Consultative Parties (CP) formally adopted a Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS). Although feared at the time negotiations 
took place, commercial sealing has not resumed in Antarctica.
85
 This was in large 
part because of the seemingly stringent requirements imposed by the Scientific 
Committee on Antarctic Research of the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (SCAR). 
Following the reduction in Antarctic whaling, commercial fishing emerged 
as an important new activity in Antarctic waters. By the early 1970s there were 
fears that over fishing, particularly of krill, might herald the collapse of the entire 
marine ecosystem if it was not properly regulated. In addition, both the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the United Nations 
Development Program had proposed a food development programme for Third 
World countries based upon the utilisation of Antarctic marine resources. 
Although not specifically mentioned in the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) agreed in 1980, regulation of the 
krill fishery was central to the development and adoption of an ecosystem 
approach to resource management. However, the ATCP had a political motive for 
seeking an agreement on Antarctic living resources. Such an agreement would 
avoid sovereignty claims driven by a state‘s desire to gain exclusive control of 
marine living resources, while at the same time, allowing consultative countries to 
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retain control over Antarctica in the face of threats from Third World countries or 
the FAO.
86
 
Just as with the management of living resources, the Antarctic Treaty failed 
to address the question of mineral resources and their possible exploitation. As the 
economic potential of Antarctica became subject to increasing speculation during 
the 1970s, the ATCP appeared less willing to address the mineral rights issue than 
protecting marine living resources. Although commercial mining activities were 
not imminent the ATCP eventually decided to adopt a precautionary approach in 
preference to trying to negotiate a mineral regime once exploitable deposits had 
been discovered. This was made necessary once American oil companies began 
exploratory drilling off the Ross Ice Shelf in 1973.
87
 Any mineral discovery would 
have raised legal and sovereignty issues and carried the risk of destabilising the 
treaty system: for example, the Dufek Intrusion, also referred to as the Dufek 
Massif, which may contain significant deposits of strategic ores, lies within 
territory claimed by Argentina, Britain and Chile.
88
 In addition, non-treaty parties 
and developing states perceived that Antarctica held vast mineral riches and were 
keen to acquire common heritage access by drawing a parallel to the Law of the 
Sea Convention. These political concerns underscored the urgent need to develop 
a mineral regime.
89
 
The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Activities 
(CRAMRA) was signed in 1988, but in 1989 both Australia and France 
backtracked on ratifying the convention. Instead, both countries advocated that no 
mining should take place in Antarctica and that the continent should be a ‗natural 
reserve land of science.‘90 Although environmental concerns were cited as the 
basis of both Australian and French rejection of CRAMRA, other factors came to 
dominate their attitudes. In Australia it was a fear about loss of sovereignty, public 
opposition to mining on environmental grounds, pressure from NGOs, and a rise 
in popularity of the Green Party in the crucial Tasmanian State electorate.
91
 For 
the French, the pivotal political issue was the rise in the ‗green‘ vote. As a 
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consequence of joint Australian-French lobbying consultative parties became 
divided over the suitability of CRAMRA. Countries including Belgium, Italy and 
New Zealand eventually supported the Australian-French initiative while 
America, Britain and Japan argued against any permanent ban on mining. 
Although New Zealand had assiduously sponsored the CRAMRA in the past, its 
announcement in 1990 that it would not ratify the convention effectively shelved 
CRAMRA. 
Having scuttled CRAMRA, Australia and France submitted an alternative 
environmental protection regime for Antarctica. However, this initiative was 
universally dismissed, as was an initiative developed by Chile. The quest for an 
acceptable replacement instrument for CRAMRA was concluded at Madrid in 
1990, with the approval of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty (PEPAT) which embraces many of the features of CRAMRA but, 
unlike CRAMRA, applied them to most human activities in Antarctica rather than 
only to mineral resource activities. Also, unlike CRAMRA, one of the central 
elements of PEPAT was that it unconditionally prohibited any mining-related 
activity in Antarctica, but only for a fifty-year period.
92
 After this period has 
expired countries may request a revision of this prohibition. The lack of a 
permanent ban on mineral activities angered numerous ATCP along with many 
environmental NGOs, but an ‗implied‘ moratorium on mining was all that the 
United States would agree too. When signing the Protocol in 1991, President 
George Bush senior was given to comment that the Protocol ―addresses our 
concerns and provides effective protection for Antarctica without foreclosing the 
options for future generations‖.93 Other states, however, considered the Protocol 
an irresponsible document and only agreed to it after the United States had used 
bully-boy tactics.
94
 
In comparison with CRAMRA, the Protocol leaves one vital question 
unanswered - it does not address who is responsible for planning human activities 
in Antarctica. It does place an obligation upon each state that is a signatory to the 
Protocol to ensure that agreed environmental assessment procedures are applied 
during any planning process leading to decisions about an activity contemplated in 
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Antarctica.
95
 After two decades of indecision the lack of agreement on how to 
manage human activity in Antarctica is tearing at the very fabric of the Antarctic 
Treaty system. While countries such as Russia have a history of subverting 
processes regulating fishing in the Southern Ocean, regulation of new activities on 
the continent itself, initially tourism, but more latterly bio-prospecting, are still 
defying resolution via the consensus process. 
If these twentieth century issues continue to remain unresolved simply 
because they are too contentious or run counter to the national interest of one or 
more of the ATCP, then how are the disputatious issues of the twenty-first century 
to be resolved? Once states seek access, especially to non-living resources of 
Antarctica (as inevitably they must),
96
 the lack of consensus amongst a few 
privileged countries on how best to deal with such requests will likely breed 
frustration that could easily turn to unilateral action or even conflict. 
 
Gondwanaland’s minerals 
Hard minerals 
The presence of non-living resources was first recorded by Frank Wild, who 
discovered coal deposits close to the Beardmore Glacier during Ernest 
Shackleton‘s early twentieth-century expedition.97 These tentative observations 
belie the fact that Antarctica probably contains the world‘s biggest coalfields.98 
Given the Energy Watch Group caution about diminishing coal reserves, their 
exploitation may prove too enticing for some states to resist.  In the world of the 
1970s and 1980s when global interest became focused on world mineral reserves, 
especially on oil and natural gas, attention naturally turned to the potential mineral 
wealth of Antarctica. However, apart from large coal resources along the Trans-
Antarctic Mountains and iron-ore deposits in East Antarctica, the presence of 
significant mineral deposits has yet to be conclusively proved or if they exist, 
made public. This paucity of information can be directly attributed to the 
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enactment of PEPAT which prohibits, at least overtly, any exploration for 
minerals.
99
  
The International Geophysical Year was especially fruitful for establishing 
that many valuable minerals were to be found in the exposed rocks of the 
mountain ranges. Besides immense seams of coal, traces were found of 
manganese, molybdenum, uranium, copper and lead.
100
 Other reports note that 
substantial quantities of unspecified minerals have been discovered during the 
course of scientific investigation in ice-free areas.
101
 As a consequence of 
commercial efforts to locate new reserves of oil and natural gas during the 1970s 
and 1980s, the occurrence of many non-fuel minerals was established as shown on 
Map 17. Not all deposits may turn out to be commercially viable for in geological 
terms ―an occurrence is defined as a small quantity of a mineral, often of interest 
only to geologists.‖102 
Given the past difficulties in exploring for minerals under an ice-sheet with 
a thickness that can be in excess of four kilometres, any review of Antarctica‘s 
prospective mineral wealth is best based on circumstantial geologic evidence. 
Nevertheless, according to Maarten de Wit, there is a sound scientific basis for 
believing that there exist a number of well-defined areas in Antarctica that have a 
high probability of ore-grade mineral concentrations.
103
 In this regard, the most 
frequently referred to area is the Antarctic Peninsula. Rock from the Peninsula‘s 
mountain belt are so comparable in type and association to those of the Andes of 
South America that speculation about similar ore deposits in these two mountain 
belts appears reasonable.
104
 The central Andes of Chile and Peru comprise zones 
of copper and molybdenum deposits, which may or may not occur in association 
with gold and a host of other minerals. Still other deposits in the central Andes of 
Peru, Bolivia and Argentina are rich in tin and tungsten, often in association with 
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other minor minerals.
105
 By 1983, the British Antarctic Survey had catalogued on 
the Antarctic Peninsula 87 separate occurrences of copper, 22 occurrences of lead 
and zinc in association with silver, 3 occurrence of gold and 15 occurrence of tin, 
molybdenum and tungsten.
106
  Indeed, mineral occurrences on the Antarctic 
Peninsula are so abundant that de Wit suggests that if the same abundance 
occurred elsewhere in the world, even in the Canadian Arctic or Greenland, such 
areas would be intensely prospected.
107
  
 Map 17.  Known mineral occurrences and probable areas of oil and natural gas 
reserves.
108
 
Source: Westermeyer, 1984, Politics of Mineral Resource Development in Antarctica. 
 
 
A similar comparison can be made between mineralisation held within the 
Transantarctic mountain range and the mineralized rocks of Tasmania and Eastern 
Australia. This Gondwanaland connection means that besides known coal deposits 
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this range of mountain might also contain reserves of copper, lead, zinc, silver, tin 
and gold.
109
  
Yet another area of potential mineralisation straddles the Transantarctic 
mountain range. This geologic anomaly is the previously mentioned the Dufek 
Massif. This geological intrusion was discovered during the IGY as a 
consequence of a geographic and geophysical exploration of the region behind of 
the Filcher and Ronnie Ice Shelves.
110
 The Dufek Massif is of particular interest 
because it is an igneous stratiform complex similar to others around the world 
where chromium, platinum, copper and nickel are mined in commercial 
quantities.
111
 Similar intrusions containing platinum mineralisation are found in 
Montana, USA, and more significantly, in a mineral-rich Bushveld layered 
complex in South Africa.
112
    
The geological relationship that exists between South America and the 
Antarctic Peninsula similarly exists between the other locations in Antarctica and 
countries that once comprised Gondwanaland. Along the margins of East 
Antarctica lies a possible mineral-rich belt which connects it to the lead–zinc–
silver–rich belts of Australia and Southern Africa.113 East Antarctica also displays 
strong similarities with India most significantly with regard to hydrocarbon and 
coal potential.
114
 
 
Hydrocarbons 
There is more than anecdotal evidence to suggest that Antarctica is rich in 
petroleum. In 1973, the American drillship Glomar Challenger drilled four 
exploratory wells in the Ross Sea bed, in three of which traces of hydrocarbons 
were found.
115
 The same vessel revisited Antarctica in the mid-1980s
116
 and as a 
part of the American managed Ocean Drilling Program (ODP) another drillship, 
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Joides Resolution, drilled a series of holes in the Weddell Sea in 1987 and Prydz 
Bay in 1988. Although pressure still exists for the drilling programme to continue 
in Antarctic waters, overt drilling for oil is currently not acceptable. 
Notwithstanding treaty provisions, seismic mapping of potential oil reservoirs and 
covert drilling continue under the auspices of science.
117
 Also, there are 
reoccurring reports of Russia prospecting for oil in Antarctica‘s Cosmonaut 
Sea.
118
  
While there are no proven commercial petroleum reserves in Antarctica, it has 
long been speculated that extensive hydrocarbon deposits exist in the sedimentary 
basins in and around the continent. Such speculation is based on the relationships 
of hydrocarbon occurrence in sedimentary basins and undisturbed tectonic plate 
edges elsewhere in the world.
119
 Although geophysical data is sparse, sedimentary 
basins with hydrocarbon potential exist beneath the Ross Sea continental shelf, the 
Weddell Sea, the Bellinghausen Basin, along the Wilkes Land coast, and in the 
Prydz Bay-Amery Basin.
120
 An additional potential site has been identified in the 
Amundsen Sea close to Mary Byrd Land, offshore from the Russian base of 
Russkaya.
121
  
In Antarctica the prospects of commercial exploration for offshore 
hydrocarbons are better than for onshore. Of twenty-one onshore and offshore 
sedimentary basins ten have been identified as suitable for further exploration. 
There is conjecture that these basins hold in total some 203 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent,
122
 which would be sufficient to turn the gaze of an oil-starved world 
south despite the Antarctic Treaty. One estimate of the hydrocarbon reserve 
beneath the Ross Sea suggests it will hold at least a  billion cubic metres of oil 
equivalents,
123
 while another estimate posits that this location holds at least 15 
times the hydrocarbons potential of New Zealand‘s Maui field.124  
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Outside the Antarctic Treaty area, the sedimentary basins around the 
Falkland Islands are generating active exploration interest. Almost 30 years after 
the victory in the Falklands conflict against Argentina a United Kingdom 
petroleum exploration company has discovered an oil reserve north of the 
Falkland Island.
125
 The ‗Sea Lion‘ field is expected to hold at least 240 million 
barrels of oil, although more than one expert suggests that the field could hold 
some 700 million barrels of oil.
126
 Irrespective as to which estimate is eventually 
judged correct it is but a small portion of the sixty billion barrels of oil that the 
South Atlantic fields are presumed to contain.
127
  
Illustrative of how far Anglo-Argentine relations have deteriorated, 
Argentina took the unprecedented step of securing the support of thirty-two Latin 
American and Caribbean countries in demanding that Britain stops its oil 
exploration in the South Atlantic.
128
 A substantial oil find is likely to intensify 
Argentine rhetoric over sovereignty of the Falkland or Las Malvinas Islands. 
Moreover, the relationship between these two ‗Antarctic‘ states is likely to 
deteriorate further given that Great Britain intends to extend its exploration rights 
to cover the vast tract of seabed between South America and the coast of 
Antarctica.
129
  
 
 
 
Frozen water 
The volume of Antarctic ice is estimated at around thirty million cubic kilometres 
representing approximately ninety per cent of all the earth‘s glacial ice and about 
                                                 
125
 See Webb, Tim, ‗UK firm's Falklands oil find sparks mix of hopes and fears,‘Guardian,                   
6 May 2010, http://www.guardian.uk/uk/2010/may/06/falklands-oil-discovery-rockhopper                  
(21 September 2010).  
126
 See Hawkes, Steve, ‗£3 billion Falkland oil boost,‘ The Sun, 21 September 2010,  
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/money/city/3145751/3billion-Falkland-Island-oil-
boost.html  (21 September 2010). 
127
 Guardian, op.cit. 
128
 See Austin, Mark, ‗If the Falklands oil saga comes to war, Britain is on her own,‘ The Mirror,       
28 February 2010, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/top-story/2010/02/28/if-the-falklands-oil-saga-
comes-to-war-Britain-is-on-her-own-115875-22076343/  (21 September 2010). 
129
 See Strange, Hannah, Frank Pope and Deborah Haynes, ‗British drilling for Falkland oil 
threatens Argentine relations,‘ The Times, February 13, 2010, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/business/industrysector/naturalresources/article7025799.ece     
(21 September 2010). 
 298 
two-thirds of the world‘s theoretical fresh water.130 Captain James Cook, as far 
back as 1773, testified to the quality of the water, for he exclaimed even sea ice, 
once drained of its salt-water covering, yielded fresh water that was perfectly 
sweet and well tasted.
131
  
Although commercial harvesting of Antarctic freshwater ice has not yet 
begun, it could become a reality because it is not prohibited by PEPAT. The 
commercial harvesting of icebergs has been discussed for many years as a 
potential source of fresh water for an increasingly parched world. Yearly 
production of icebergs in Antarctica represents an estimated 1000 billion tons of 
water and a ―small‖ iceberg may yield as much as 10 billion litres of fresh 
water.
132
 Mining the continent itself or its larger ice shelves for water cannot be 
discounted as a future method of satiating a thirsty world.  
Countries that are confronting a fresh water shortage have not discounted the 
potential of Antarctica as a source of fresh water. With water draw-off rendering 
Australia‘s great Murray River no more than a trickle as it nears the sea, 
extraction of fresh water from icebergs transported to the South Australian coast 
has been seriously debated in the past.
133
 A changing climate when coupled with 
exponential population growth and unfettered economic prosperity has resulted in 
both China
134
 and India
135
 being blighted with an acute shortage of potable fresh 
water. Since both countries have identified that Antarctic ice holds the potential to 
quench their water requirement, it is only a matter of time before either or both 
turn their attention and technical resources towards harvesting the continent‘s ice.  
In Antarctica, icebergs are calved from the grumbling sea edges of the 
numerous glacier-fed ice shelves. According to Professor Pat Quilty
136
 the notion 
of towing melted icebergs from Antarctica was seriously considered by the 
Germans in the 1980s and since then the technology of wrapping icebergs in a 
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plastic coat has been patented by a North American company. When using this 
technology the optimum sized iceberg is around one million tonnes. However, as 
there is little economic merit in traveling to Antarctica to harvest a single iceberg, 
each voyage would result in a number of icebergs being wrapped and left to drift 
north away from the continent prior to being towed to their ultimate destination.
137
 
In what might ultimately turn out to be a conservative forecast the United 
Nations predicts that by 2025 global fresh water requirements will exceed by five 
per cent all accessible fresh water sources unless deep underground aquifers and 
polar icebergs are utilised.
138
 Therefore, icebergs calved from Antarctic ice 
shelves could come to represent a valuable resource coveted by many water 
stressed countries. 
      
Antarctica is a unique continent. Its  geophysical uniqueness comes from being 
the highest, coldest, driest and windiest continent on Earth. No other land displays 
such extremes in climate and nor has climate been such a primordial determinant 
in shaping its terrestrial and marine environments. Geopolitically, Antarctica also 
is unique for it is without an indigenous people it is the only continent that can 
truly be called terra nullius. As a consequence, the legal status of Antarctica still 
remains undetermined and not beyond dispute. Also not beyond dispute, is the 
validity of the seven sovereignty claims to Antarctic territory. Had it not been for 
the Antarctic Treaty preventing the international community from assertively 
challenging the validity of these claims, Antarctica, in all probability would have 
been raked by continual dissention and conflict. The national interest of states has 
in the past determined Antarctica‘s future and will likely to do so again, especially 
when the need to access its natural resources displaces any lingering veneration 
towards the continent.  
It was the drawing together of states under the auspice of the International 
Geophysical Year that sparked global determination to protect the continent from 
geophysical devastation spawned by a geopolitical malison – a nuclear conflict 
that could have turned Antarctica into a decimated battlefield pockmarked by 
weapons fielded by ideologically-driven combatants. Having survived this nascent 
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threat, Antarctica could now be entering a new uncertain geopolitical era created 
by a previously unknown geophysical malison – climate change.  Paradoxically, it 
is this latter curse that could render impotent the very geopolitical regime installed 
to protect Antarctica‘s geophysical environment from anthropogenic initiated 
destruction. 
The treaty system has not lessened the desire among states to commence 
mining Antarctica for strategic hard minerals or to explore its continental shelve 
to determine the exact extent of the continent‘s oil reserves. Indeed, despite 
protestations to the contrary, evidence suggests some countries could be 
surreptitiously exploring Antarctica to determine what minerals lay beneath its icy 
mantle.
139
 In a rush to satiate their national interests, states, particularly those that 
foresee commercial opportunities in a less regulated Antarctica, are already 
displaying declining respect for the treaty system.
140
  This cavalier attitude 
towards the spirit of the Treaty may represent a precursory signal indicating that 
the long standing reverence shown the continent is now on the wane. If that is so 
then PEPAT may have a truncated lifespan. Renewed interest in Antarctica‘s 
mineral wealth would bode ill for the preservation of the status quo ante.  
An unstable Antarctica racked by resource-fuelled imbroglios would pose a 
serious threat to all six Southern Oceanic Rim Countries. How this threat would 
manifest itself will depend upon the political single-mindedness with which extra-
regional states pursue their quest for resources. Assuming a weakening of the 
status quo ante, and a rise in resource competition between belligerent states, then 
one security option available to the Southern Oceanic Rim Countries is to 
coalesce into a security complex centered on Antarctica. However, as previously 
mentioned, an academic exploration of such an event is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. A less desirable outcome would be for these same countries to find 
themselves unwitting members of an ―Austral‖ shatterbelt. These options are only 
briefly touched upon in Chapter Fifteen for the emphasis of that chapter is 
directed towards exploring the nature of the security architecture that might 
envelop the continent per se. 
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Chapter Fifteen  
 
Discussion - The Precarious Poles 
 
Introduction 
 
The below quotation attributed to the  English historian and parliamentarian 
Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) is an essential truism even in the contemporary 
world, for the past inevitably  exerts a deep shadow over the future. 
 
I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided and 
that lamp is experience. I know no way of judging the 
future but by the past.
1
 
 
If historical evidence is required that there is an unquestionable linkage between 
resource scarcity and war, then Adolf Hitler‘s ‗Hossbach Memorandum‘ of 
November 1937 will prove more than adequate, for it is illustrative of one state‘s 
quest to achieve resource autarky in a time of rising uncertainty. This ‗testament‘ 
was centred on Hitler‘s conviction that Germany‘s  needed additional lebensraum 
– living space – to accommodate her expanding population if there was to be any 
chance of maintaining the people‘s living standards2 (emphasis added). Hitler 
concluded that if Germany could not make itself self-sufficient in the resources 
needed, especially food, by 1945 then ―we can expect a change for the worse.‖3 In 
keeping with the ‗Hossbach Memorandum,‘ Germany‘s thrust onto the steppes of 
Russia appears a rational solution to a foreseen problem.
4
  
Contemporary – as of October 2010 – talk is of the polarizing effect of 
‗currency wars‘5 which would be engendered globally if states adopted self-
serving economic methods to revitalize their economies; even at the risk of 
triggering a repeat of the trade wars that contributed to the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. In part this is in recognition that the ‗free market‘ has proved incapable 
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3
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5
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of resolving all systemic economic failures. When market forces fail, states revert 
to political means to secure a position that favours them, even if that position 
disadvantages other states.
6
 The same was true in the early 1980s when the market 
lost its force as a means of allocating supplies of natural resources. Access to raw 
materials was considered too important to leave to the market alone, especially 
under conditions of political instability resulting from the Soviet Union‘s 
flirtations with resource-rich Third World countries.
7
 Such flirtations recognized 
that in spite of which side of the Cold War ideological schism a state positioned 
itself on, every country had to grow its economy to insure its security and 
tranquillity. Citizens then, as now, expected and demanded both a continual rise in 
income and the standard of living, neither of which could be achieved without 
assured access to resources.
8
  
Materially satisfying these twin expectations divided the world into great 
power spheres of influence.
9
 Moreover, then as now, the probability existed that 
critical raw materials would lie within another great power‘s sphere of influence 
and hence misgivings over continued access were rife. In an anarchic world 
suspicions over the motives of other great powers can prove to be corrosive. On-
going mistrust between ideologically divided states in combination with the 
availability of technically superior weapon systems lead countries over the course 
of the Second Cold War to develop and improve their military capabilities.
10
 In 
such circumstances the acquisition of arms can be seen as a normal or regular 
pattern of state behaviour. However, under periods of intense military competition 
‗normal‘ behaviour can turn ‗abnormal,‘ causing states to embark upon an arms 
race.
11
       
According to Colin Gray, definitions of the term ―arms race‖ are rare and 
often unconvincing hence he penned his own which will suffice as a descriptor of 
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this politico-military phenomenon that is now reported to be occurring among 
Arctic rim states. 
…there should be two or more parties perceiving 
themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who 
are increasing or improving their armaments at a 
rapid rate and structuring their respective military 
postures with a general attention to the past, current, 
and anticipated military and political behaviour of 
the other parties.
12
 (Emphases in the original) 
 
Gray maintains that in order to create an arms race dynamic there must be a 
measure of action-reaction or there would be no arms race at all. Those states 
embroiled within this phenomenon are forced to maintain an awareness of 
military activities undertaken by rival participant states because their action serves 
as a trigger for a corresponding reaction.
13
 Additionally, Gray maintains that war 
or the fear of war is the most likely initiator behind any arms racing, although, 
other analysts, for example Coral Bell, believe that there is an obvious correlation 
between a ―crisis slide‖ and arms racing, which was evident during the periods 
1906-14 and 1936-39.
14
 A contemporary ―crisis slide‖ along with a resultant arms 
race occurred in the southern Sudan ahead of the January 2011 referendum over 
independence for Sudan‘s southern province.15 In this oil-rich region both the 
Sudanese government and Sudan People‘s Liberation Army were in a race to 
rearm ahead of what analysts foresee as a conflagration over hydrocarbons.
16
 
Without doubt, the fiercest arms race occurred during the perilous years of 
the Cold War (1945-91) when military competition pivoted on the number of 
thermo-nuclear warheads and intercontinental delivery systems each superpower 
could field. While the collapse of the Soviet empire heralded a slow reduction of 
warheads and delivery systems held by each superpower, it failed to relegate the 
concept of cold wars to the draws of history. Since the dawn of the twenty-first 
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century the concept has once again found favour with political commentators,
17
 
principally in the guise of a resource-initiated cold war.
18
 
Media reports inevitably, but not exclusively, link the fossil fuel/minerals-
new cold war nexus to the current competition between states for sovereignty over 
the Arctic.
19
 A similar linkage has also made with regard to the Antarctic.
20
 
Hence, the Polar Regions appear as the most likely loci where the new global 
resource-initiated cold war will be contested first. In an increasingly 
interdependent world, the forthcoming scramble for polar resources will serve as 
proof that neither the Arctic nor Antarctica can be shielded from social, economic, 
environmental or military milieus originating from within the non-polar world. 
Equally, both complementary and competing interests stemming from climate 
change will serve to bind the polar and non-polar worlds more firmly together, 
irrespective of whether either world is united through cooperation or cleaved by 
conflict.
21
  
                                                 
17
 A frequently cited reference on this topic see Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the 
Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West, Bloomsbury, London, 2008.Tf seeking a non-
traditional origin of a new Cold War see Larry Diamond, ‗Winning the New Cold War on 
Terrorism,‘ http://www.stanford.edu/-ldiamond/papers/ColdwarOnTerrorism.pdf  (12 October 
2010).    
18
 A. M. Martin Ferguson, the Minister for Resources and Energy for Australia in 2008, delivered 
a conference address in which he raised the possibility that a new ―Cold War‖ had emerged in the 
competition over access to energy resources. See A. M. Martin Ferguson, ‗Energy Security: the 
new Cold War,‘ International of Global Energy Issues, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008, pp. 366-367. In 
2007, at least two other assertions that a Cold War is again a political phenomenon have been 
published. In the first, Liam Fox, the then British shadow Defence Secretary, argued that a rising 
strategic challenge for all countries would be maintenance of energy security in an environment 
where the supply of fossil fuels had become a political weapon and energy security had become 
synonymous with national and economic security. See Fox, Liam, ‗Energy: the new cold war,‘ The 
Sunday Times, London, July 15, 2007, 
http://www.tmesonline.co.uk/tot/comment/columnist/guest_contributors/article207667.ece          
(13 October 2010). Such comments having been made by a Minister of the Crown could be seen as 
an initial step towards the securitisation of energy resources. The second article was published in 
the journal Economist, which highlighted that a scramble had begun among Arctic States to garner 
proof that their portion of the Arctic continental shelf incorporated a sector of the ‗oil-rich‘ 
Lomonosov Ridge.  A successful proof of claim would be detrimental to other Arctic-rim states. 
See Economist, ‗Drawing lines in Melting Ice,‘ August 16, 2007, pp. 51-52, 
http://iilj.org/documents/DrawingLinesinMeltingIce.TheEconomist.pdf  (14 October 2010).     
19
 Lucas, op. cit., pp. 242-243. Also see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ‗An Integrated Approach to 
Canada‘s Arctic,‘ Behind the Headlines, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2008, p. 21and Cohen, Ariel, Lajos F. 
Szaszdi, and Jim Dolbow, ‗The New Cold War: Reviving the U.S. Presence in the Arctic,‘ 
Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2202, 2008,  
www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/bg2202.cfm  (31 August 2010). 
20
 See Rozoff, Rick, ‗Scramble for World Resources: Battle for Antarctica,‘ Global Research, May 
16, 2009, http://www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=13639.  (14 October 2010). 
21
 See Macalister, Terry, ‗Climate change could lead to Arctic conflict, warns senior Nato 
commander,‘ Guardian, 11 October 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/oct/11/nato-conflict-arctic-resources/print              
(13 October 2010). 
 306 
Many similarities appear to exist between the contemporary era and that 
described by Bruce Russett in 1981. Perhaps with prophetic insight, Russett 
argued that there will be a rising risk of great power confrontations stemming 
from economic causes in the twenty-first century. The reason behind many 
perceived forthcoming confrontations was clear; no industrialized state can 
tolerate sustained interruption in the supply of critical commodities, be they living 
or non-living resources. Russett wisely suggested that ―neither exaggeration of the 
‗resource war‘ nor ignoring the likelihood of [resource] shortage can be done 
safely.‖22 Russett‘s comments were proffered before climate change made more 
complex an already obfuscated situation. It is within these parameters that this 
chapter postulates upon the likely future configuration of security architecture for 
each polar region.  
The ―hybrid‖ theory approach developed in Chapters Three through to Six 
can be applied to evaluate the security architecture within any defined 
geographical region. Its strength is derived from an ability to synthesize from 
seven essential elements a theoretical structure capable of guiding the analytical 
enquiry at the heart of this chapter. The six essential elements it will be 
remembered are:  
 
1. boundary, which differentiates the regional security complex 
from its neighbours; 
2. anarchic structure, which means that the regional security 
complex must be composed of two or more autonomous units, but 
geographical contiguity is not mandatory; 
3. polarity, which covers the distribution of power among the units;  
4. social construction, which covers the patterns of amity and enmity 
among the units;  
5. the intensity of security externalities on both regional and non-
regional units; and  
6. competition for control over a geographic region by strategically 
important states is indicative of a ‗shatterbelt region‘ that can 
overlay regional security complexes, unstructured security 
regions or a grouping of the two. 
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A security complex’s evolutionary path 
At this juncture in the thesis it is appropriate to revisit those characteristics that 
make geopolitical theories an applicable analytical tool to examine the future 
regional security for both Polar Regions. The main advantage of the regionalist 
approach inherent in regional security complex theory is that it differentiates 
global from regional security dynamics and different regional security dynamics 
from each other. In so doing it reflects upon the territoriality innate in many 
security dynamics. Regionalism emphasizes local security dynamics and forces an 
evaluation of how the global and local security dynamics interplay with each 
other. According to Buzan and Wӕver, acknowledging the regional level as an 
independent and frequently powerful factor in the security equation is essential to 
both sound theory and sensible policy.
23
 While regions are not necessarily formed 
by geography, culture, patterns of current events or local discourses about 
regionalism, regional security complexes are essentially socially constructed by 
members through processes of securitisation or desecuritisation. Security 
complexes, therefore, can be transformed by changes to these processes. 
One characteristic that will define both the global and region security 
discourse in the future is the issue of polarity within the international power 
structure in which all states must operate.
24
 During the first two decades of the 
post-Cold War period, the global power structure has remained 1+ 4, with the 
United States as the sole superpower and China, the European Union, Japan and 
Russia as great powers.
25
 While in the short-term this polarity is likely to remain 
unaltered, the structure might evolve into 1 + x or possibly 0 + x, where ‗x‘ will 
only be quantified through hindsight. If America‘s superpower status is to be 
challenged, then that challenge will almost certainly come from Asia and most 
probably from China. If the United States accommodates this challenger then 
global polarity will revert to that which characterized the Cold War period of 2 + 
x.
26
  
If America fails to maintain a 1 + x system, either by abdication or by 
misplaying its role, the shift to 0 + x would have several clear consequences for 
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the relationship between the regional and global levels. This possibility cannot be 
dismissed lightly for such an eventuality has been recognized by the United States 
National Intelligence Council through its ‗―first‖ among equal [great] powers‘ 
statement.
27
 Irrespective of whether global polarity is 1 + x, 2 + x or neither, in 
the future the ‗x‘ in the polarity equation will determine the number and 
geographic composition of regional security complexes. Almost certainly a future 
list of great powers will differ quite markedly from that identified by Buzan and 
Wӕver: with the most notable absence from many lists of future great powers 
being the European Union.  Condoleezza Rice, a former United States Secretary 
of State, identified six countries – Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa 
and Russia – along with the United States as the world‘s future great powers.28 
The American consulting firm Goldman Sachs suggests that the seven great 
economic powers of the mid twenty-first century will be China, the United States, 
India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia and Mexico.
29
 In conceptualizing regionalism 
from a different perspective than the above authors, George Friedman envisages a 
future world fractured by political fault lines into regions centred on the United 
States, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Turkey and a condominium of China and Japan.
30
  
All of the above are illustrations of a probable hemispheric shift in power polarity 
which has implications for international security, the number and geographic 
composition of security complexes and the creation of shatterbelts. 
There are two further evolutionary trends that have the potential to impact upon 
the theoretical precepts underlying this thesis. First, unstructured regions are in 
retreat. In its pure form this condition no longer exists, although in parts of Africa 
and central Asia, where the condition previously existed, structural transformation 
has not resulted in the creation of regional security complexes, but rather in pre- 
or proto-complexes. Thus Buzan and Wӕver consider the world is now close to 
being made up entirely of classical regional security complexes.
31
 Under this 
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scenario the status of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean is not clarified, hence 
the region can reasonably be considered as unstructured.  
The second evolutionary trend affects the concept of insulator states which 
is central to regional security complex theory. All states, with the exception of 
global powers, are located in only one regional security complex or they are 
insulator states that belong either to no region or several regions. In this latter 
category one or more states can occupy an insulating position ―where they define 
and occupy the boundaries of indifference between the self-contained dynamics 
of [regional security complexes] on either side of them.‖32 However, limiting the 
role of ‗insulator‘ to a single state (Burma) or a group of states (Caucasus) is seen 
as too narrow given that Sahel states of Africa perform this function by isolating 
the Southern African and Middle Eastern regional security complexes from each 
other.
33
 In recognition of this evolutionary development, regional security 
complex theory now accepts that insulators can assume the structure of a mini-
complex.
34
 Just as with an insulator state, a mini-complex can isolate two regional 
security complexes from each other because neighbouring states may get involved 
in that part of the mini-complex that borders them, without that engagement 
‗coming out on the other side,‘ thus amalgamating two regional security 
complexes into one.
35
  
Insulator states are by definition candidates for external transformation. 
They have links into several security complexes and their continued status 
depends on their miniscule level of security interdependence being maintained. If 
one regional security complex becomes more intense, while the other loses its 
relative importance, then the insulator could be absorbed into the strongest 
neighbouring security complex. While such a happening is neither frequent nor 
easy,
36
 it is not an impossible event as will be demonstrated in the Arctic.  
 
The Arctic: today a proto-complex, tomorrow a shatterbelt  
As discussed in Chapter Thirteen, the Arctic is undergoing physical and political 
change at an alarming pace that has astonished both the Arctic-rim states and the 
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world as a whole. Global media usually concentrate their attention on the linkage 
between the impacts of climate change and the threat to Arctic states sovereignty. 
Never before has the very nature of the Arctic been challenged by such a 
disparate set of issues. The worldwide realisation that the Arctic is melting and 
hence more accessible than ever before, has forced upon the coastal states an 
awareness that they must prepare for the outside world‘s entry into their polar 
domain. With international challenges to Arctic states control of the region now 
emerging, no Arctic-rim state can afford to ignore its high north.    
At the centre of the emerging challenges lies the issue of sovereignty. There 
are three main elements of sovereignty: an existing governance system, a defined 
territory, and people within that defined territory. In the Arctic, each of these 
variables is difficult to achieve and may not be achieved in their entirety.
37
 For all 
Arctic-rim states there is no question that the first and third variables are met, but 
to meet the second variable defined boundaries are required. For a boundary to 
have validity, the agreement of the international community is required, although 
the number of states that must agree to a boundary before it is considered 
internationally acceptable remains unclear.
38
 
The complexity surrounding the determination of ocean boundaries is 
extremely pertinent to state sovereignty in the Arctic. The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea codified existing customary international law 
and created several new maritime zones. As a general rule, the further removed a 
zone is from terrestrial territory the less control a state has over the activities 
within the zone. Sovereignty over the two zones nearest land – the territorial sea 
and the Exclusive Economic Zone – is universally accepted and gives coastal 
states control over all living and non-living resources in these zones. Beyond the 
Exclusive Economic Zone a state can exert control over the ocean soil and 
subsurface if it is able to show that the deep-ocean continental shelf is an 
extension of its own continental shelf. If this can be satisfactorily proved then a 
state can claim control of the seabed and resources for an additional 150 nautical 
miles. A state with such a zone has control of all activities that occur on or 
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beneath the seabed, but not within the water column. This is currently understood 
to mean control over such activities as oil and gas development.
39
  
If, in the future, there is a challenge to the Arctic-rim states‘ sovereignty 
over the Arctic region, principally over the Arctic Ocean, then that challenge will 
centre on the recognition or non-recognition of each state‘s maritime boundaries. 
The question of legitimizing maritime boundaries and sovereignty over territory 
within those boundaries has been discussed previously in this thesis, as have the 
three unique and powerful forces leading to the Arctic region‘s transformation: 
climate change, resource development and a geopolitical transmutation.  
It is these three forces working in concert that are likely to reshape the 
current strategic environment, although precisely how is not yet fully 
appreciated.
40
 Most Arctic states have embarked upon reshaping their security 
requirements in the Arctic, though their actions have often been taken in the 
absence of a clear understanding of the future strategic environment. 
Consequentially, most Arctic states are currently rebuilding their military 
capabilities, particularly the capabilities likely to be needed in the Arctic, in order 
to be able to respond to every imaginable contingency. 
Of particular concern among a number of Arctic states is the redeployment 
of Russian armed forces to the Arctic. While this concern has yet to translate into 
an actual threat, their concern is that should Russian actions become more 
bellicose then they must have the ability to respond. An equally nebulous concern 
is the indiscernible impact of climate change. Most Arctic states have publically 
announced that an increasingly accessible Arctic is expected to give rise to new, 
but as yet unspecified economic activities. The desire to be prepared for such an 
eventuality has focused their attention on enhancing surveillance and enforcement 
capabilities: the need to know what is happening is a significant driver for 
creating an indigenous ability capable of responding to any ominous exogenous 
event.
41
  
Arctic-rim states previously accepted that with the cessation of the Cold 
War the strategic significance of the Arctic ended, as did the need to be concerned 
about traditional security threats. So total was the collapse of the Soviet Union 
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that the threat posed by its Northern Fleet‘s impressive array of nuclear-powered 
attack and missile carrying submarines was quickly discounted. Simultaneously, 
almost all other Arctic states reduced the northern element of their own forces so 
that by 2002 the northern military capabilities of all Arctic states had been 
substantially curtailed.
42
 This reduction in capabilities, in combination with a lack 
of interstate tension, apparently lead Buzan and Wӕver to overlook the Arctic 
region when constructing their three post-Cold War classical regional security 
complexes centred on the continental great powers – the United States, the 
European Union and the Russian Federation. 
Security complexes are considered to be durable, but not permanent 
structures. Structural transformations are possible, although they are likely to be 
limited in number. To date transformations in the post-Cold War era have 
occurred in Asia, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, as well as in 
Africa all of which have been driven by changes in polarity, boundaries and/or 
shifts in the amity/enmity quotient.
43
 Given that the processes driving 
transformation will continue, it is desirable to establish a datum point from which 
to view possible future changes to the three security complexes that border the 
Arctic. In the years immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11 
2001, Buzan and Wӕver foresaw only limited change to these security complexes. 
Accordingly, states comprising the  North American regional security 
complex have accepted a deepening in centricity based on the United States as 
demonstrated by an increasingly regionalist attitude exemplified by the 
ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Buzan and 
Wӕver express concern about the future role the United States might play as 
patterns of international relations develop and change during the twenty-first 
century. These authors accept Dominique Moïsi‘s view that: ―In world history, the 
US is the first empire that has ever combined so much comparative power and so 
little interest in the affairs of a world it de facto controls.‖44 With a decreasing 
sense of a direct military threat to the American state, policies are shaped more by 
immediate interests than by long-term strategies for the international order. Such 
disinterest has lead Buzan and Wӕver ask the ―crucial question‖ as to whether the 
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United States will continue to be a superpower and hence maintain the global 
power structure of 1 + x, or will it opt to change the polarity to 0 + x.
45
 Any 
diminution in its superpower status will severely curtail America‘s ability to 
influence political events in the Arctic.  
The EU-Europe has few security problems. Most European states remain 
relatively strong and prior to what is now termed the ―Great Recession (2007-
2009) era‖46 domestic politics had not readily turned violent. These underlying 
pacifistic tendencies are a characteristic of a security community built on 
desecuritisation.
47
  For Europe, this security architecture works only by mixing 
the twin fears of resecuritisation with Europe‘s politically turbulent past.48 
Although the theories of democratic peace, interdependence and trading states 
insist that war among states of Western Europe is no longer credible, the region‘s 
history makes the notion of future European wars difficult to erase. Buzan and 
Wӕver conclude that as long as war within Europe is possible, it will not happen, 
but if war becomes impossible, it might happen.
49
 George Friedman posits that the 
portends of a twenty-first century European war already exist, for as the economic 
and political power of Europe ebbs, European  states will seek to secure a line of 
buffer states between themselves and future tumultuous changes in Russia.
50
 Any 
deterioration in interstate relations on the broader Eurasian continent will colour 
relationships between contesting states that share interests in the Arctic.  
In the post-Soviet era, Buzan and Wӕver foresee the possibility of 
numerous transformations involving Russia. Transformations range from the post-
Soviet regional security complex becoming balanced rather than centred on 
Russia as states within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) garner 
influence, to an external transformation of its border with Europe. Out of this 
ambit of possibilities the most likely are that Russia will adopt attitudes 
reminiscent of a superpower rather than those of a mere regional power.
51
 It is this 
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aspiration that continues to define its relations with ex-Soviet Central Asian states 
– its ‗near abroad‘ – its global role as an energy superpower52 and its direct 
relations with countries that share a mutual interest in the Arctic. 
The Eurasian continent comprises two centred regional security complexes, 
one centred on the EU and the other on Russia. Both are centred on great powers. 
Together, these two regional security complexes form a weak supercomplex.  Any 
future strengthening of the European supercomplex would be an 
acknowledgement that the European Union was in the process of becoming a 
great power of increasing global relevance. Such an assertion is not assured given 
that the possibility remains, albeit unlikely, that the EU will fragment and 
individual states embark upon renationalisation.
53
 In the Russian-centred complex 
the question of legitimacy over the post-Soviet space remains pivotal for without 
control over peripheral states the Russian centred classical regional security 
complex would collapse. According to Buzan and Wӕver, the merger between 
these two complexes can be imagined either through increasing tension created by 
insecurity interdependence, or, by bolstering European security institutions and 
cooperation. A conflictual scenario is difficult to imagine in the near-term, but 
cannot be discounted over the longer-term.
54
 Despite the torturous economic and 
security cooperation that exists between states within these two complexes, the 
cooperative scenario continues to hold, although, as with the conflictual scenario, 
it is unlikely to spark an external transformation leading to a complete merger.
55
  
Compared to Buzan and Wӕver‘s rather conservative view of the world in 
2003, there is need to quantify the ―new‖ non-traditional security threats that are 
likely to become increasingly pronounced over the course of the twenty-first 
century. Although these threats have been catalogued in a previous chapter, their 
importance to the future politico-military sector has not long been recognized by 
security organisations. This change is exemplified in a recent publication authored 
by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) titled ‗Quadrennial Defence 
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Review Report,‘ from which a paragraph is worth quoting as it places these ―new‖ 
threats to the Polar Regions in their security context. 
 
…powerful trends are likely to add complexity to the security 
environment. Rising demand for resources…the effects of 
climate change…are just some of the trends whose complex 
interplay may spark or exacerbate future conflicts.
56
  
 
The confluence of these two powerful trends in the Arctic domain is seen by the 
Department of Defense as posing a threat likely to require a military response.
57
 
More importantly, it is recognition that these threats could create an entirely new 
security complex – a petropolitical security complex – that would overlay the three 
existing Arctic regional security complexes.
58
 The identification of hydrocarbons 
as a specific causal factor does not preclude access to other natural resources, 
especially frozen water, as the impetus behind a number of additional 
environmental security complexes come into being. 
Unexploited hydrocarbon reserves in combination with disputed maritime 
borders can create fiction between sovereign states as evidenced by the political 
fury East Timor displayed towards Australia over the latter‘s initial unwillingness 
to share the hydrocarbon reserves beneath the Timor Strait.
59
 In the Arctic the first 
oil wells began to operate at full production in 1911,
60
 the single most important 
discovery was that made in 1967 when oil reserves were discovered at Prudhoe 
Bay on the Alaskan Arctic coast.
61
 There are also various locations in northern 
Siberia, north of the Arctic Circle, where the oil industry is firmly established. 
The first Soviet field was discovered in 1930 and since that date in excess of 230 
fields have be identified and more than 5,400 wells drilled.
62
 Onshore reserves in 
Canada, Russia and Alaska north of the Arctic Circle support more than four-
hundred oil and natural gas fields. Despite extensive oil exploration most of the 
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Arctic, especially offshore, is essentially unexplored with respect to hydrocarbon 
resources.
63
 
Of the potential billions of barrels of undiscovered oil identified by the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS) as lying beneath the Arctic Ocean, 
approximately two-thirds of the oil deposits located by the USGS lie beneath the 
inner continental shelves of Alaska, Greenland, Siberia, in the East Barents Sea 
and the Beaufort Sea where the question of territorial sovereignty either does not 
arise or only exists between close allies.
64
 Although, the USGS did find evidence 
of oil reserves beneath the disputed waters around the Svalbard Archipelago 
where Russia and Norway are rivals over sovereignty. The Lomonosov Ridge, or 
that portion that lies beyond existing Exclusive Economic Zones is predicted to 
harbour at least 2.5 billion barrels of oil equivalents,
65
 which is not an 
insignificant economic windfall for any state that can extract such a prize.   
The USGS survey is not without its critics for it is speculative and not based 
upon a systematic programme of exploratory drilling. Despite the publication of 
the survey report there still remains a paucity of reliable information on the 
Arctic‘s hydrocarbon reserves. This is especially true of the offshore Russian oil 
fields east of the Kara Sea, which had not been surveyed using modern methods 
of exploration and surveillance.
66
  This could equally be true for offshore 
Greenland, given that the director of the Island‘s Bureau of Minerals and 
Petroleum has received ―some very impressive estimates for northwest and 
northeast Greenland [amounting to] 50 billion barrels of oil and gas.‖67 Hence, the 
Arctic is likely to prove Thomas Homer-Dixon correct in that predictions about its 
hydrocarbon resource rely more on black art than science. Only the future will 
show whether actual exploitable reserves match the USGS‘s ‗best guess.‘ 
Irrespective of the ultimate size of Arctic hydrocarbon reserve their importance to 
the world community should not be understated, especially when the International 
Energy Agency predicts the world will face an energy crunch by 2015-2020.
68
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Acknowledging that maritime boundary disputes still exist in the Arctic 
implies that in the presence of an energy crunch such disputes could readily 
transmute into interstate conflict over hydrocarbon reserves. Equally, but less 
likely, given the governing ideologies of the states involved, this transmutation 
could lead to deeper more expansive cooperation between Arctic states. The 
ultimately hypothetical expression of either of these alternatives is as a petro-
security complex that will ‗overlay‘69 the Arctic Ocean portion of the Russian 
Heartland, European and North American classical regional security complexes – 
see Map 1. To be valid, this hypothesis must fulfil the specific requirements of the 
essential elements that undergird the hybrid theory – that test is as follows: 
 
[A] boundary, which differentiates the security complex 
from its neighbours. Defined boundaries confine the 
geographical extent of this petro-security complex in 
both a latitudinal and longitudinal direction. In the 
latitudinal direction the complex will encompass the 
entire globe north of the Arctic Circle, with the northern 
longitudinal perimeter being defined by the outer limit of 
the existing Exclusive Economic Zone. Within this 
encompassment lie not only the five Arctic-rim states, 
but also Sweden and Finland. However, the traditional 
political-military influence created by the formation of 
this petro-security complex would extend well beyond 
constituent states, for example, Norwegian Arctic 
operations would impact on NATO operations. With the 
discovery of oil in Greenland‘s maritime zone comes the 
prospect that Greenlanders will expect Denmark to cede 
its sovereignty over the island to them.
70
 Should this 
transformation occur it would significantly weaken 
Europe‘s claim to being an Arctic great power. Being 
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transcontinental in geographical extent would suggest 
that the complex might be more correctly termed a petro-
supercomplex
71
 to differentiate it from the hypothetical 
Asian petro-security complex and existing Middle East 
hydro-security complex, all of which are much smaller in 
geographical extent. 
 
[An] anarchic structure, which means that the security 
complex must be composed of two or more autonomous 
units, but geographical contiguity is not mandatory. The 
composition of this petro-supercomplex encompasses the 
five Arctic-rim states in three different regional security 
complexes. Two of these complexes – European and 
Russian Heartland – are contiguous, while the third – 
North American – is separated from the other two by the 
Atlantic Ocean and Bering Strait respectively. 
 
[P]olarity, which covers the distribution of power among 
the units.                                    
The existing polarity within the Arctic petro-supercomplex 
is  1 + 2: the United States being the sole superpower and 
the European Union and Russia being great powers. 
However, by 2025 this polarity structure may have 
significantly changed with the United States, the ―first 
among equals,‖ as a great power,72 while the European 
Union may have lost its status as a great power.
73
 The 
resurgence of Russia as a great power is accepted while its 
access to energy resources continues.
74
 Should this polarity 
structure be evident prior to 2035, then the polarity within 
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the Arctic petro-supercomplex would become 0 + 2 – the 
United States and Russia: a polarity that would exist into 
the foreseeable future. 
 
[S]ocial construction, which covers the patterns of amity 
and enmity among the units. The current (2010) social 
patterns favour amity within the suggested Arctic petro-
supercomplex as demonstrated by the amicable resolution 
of a long-standing maritime border dispute between 
Norway and Russia; although the claim by Russia to the 
Norwegian Svalbard Archipelago has not been withdrawn. 
However, questions have surfaced over whether Russia‘s 
current benignity towards other states, particularly Arctic-
rim states, will continue three decades into the future when 
the United States has possibly lost its global hegemony
75
 
and Russia actively seeks to dominate the Arctic in order to 
secure resources to guarantee its prosperity and security.
76
 
A more authoritarian Russia is foreseen to be the primary 
security challenge in the Arctic for Europe, and by 
implication for the United States.
77
 Thus it is probable that 
by 2035 the social construction within the Arctic petro-
supercomplex will have turned from amity to enmity. 
 
[T]he intensity of security externalities on both regional 
and non-regional units. It can be argued that some states, 
even non-Arctic-rim states, might be tempted to use 
military force to seize potentially oil-bearing regions from 
less military capable states on the premise that in the future 
technology and expertise will enable them to develop and 
exploit such regions. Will Denmark in the future permit 
‗defenceless‘ Greenland to cede from their union when at 
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the current (November 2010) price of US$80.00 a barrel 
Greenland‘s potential oil reserves have a value in excess of 
four trillion dollars.
78
 This enquiry will assume greater 
poignancy in the future given that the International Energy 
Agency expects demand to drive up the cost of a barrel of 
oil to US$200.00 by 2035:
79
 Greenland‘s oil reserve would 
then be worth ten trillion dollars. As access to hydrocarbon 
reserves becomes increasingly fraught throughout the non-
Arctic world, tensions between states over access to 
remaining reserves will create security externalities for all 
five Arctic-rim states.  
  Security externalities that could give rise to the 
establishment of a non-traditional security complex are not 
sufficiently strong enough to supplant the causal factors 
responsible for the creation of the classical regional 
security complex. Nor is there the opportunity for extra-
regional states to impose themselves upon the established 
pattern of regional security and create an entirely new 
regional security structure.  
 
The sixth element does not apply since the transformation of this petro-
supercomplex into a shatterbelt by 2035 appears unlikely; although it cannot be 
entirely precluded. However, this worst-case scenario, when viewed from a 2010 
perspective, looks highly speculative providing the Arctic petro-supercomplex 
does not geographically extend beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone of each 
Arctic-rim state.  
The region beyond the Arctic Exclusive Economic Zones, colloquially 
known as the ―Area,‖ or more correctly the ―outer-continental shelves,‖ which to 
date is the last unclaimed area of the Arctic Ocean. The ―Area‘s‖ extent and 
location is shown on Map 18. It is possible to draw an analogy between the ―Area‖ 
and the ―focal ground‖ as proposed by Sun Tzu. Both are considered to be outside 
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of one‘s own territory, but to be of considerable strategic importance. The future is 
likely to confirm what history has aptly demonstrated, the state that first occupies 
the ―Area‖ will ultimately finds itself in a most advantageous position. Under one 
interpretation of Sun Tzu‘s writings the ―[f]ocal ground is a junction which 
extends in all directions. …it gives security to get but is dangerous to lose.‖80 The 
first foray to secure a significant portion of the ―Area‖ occurred on the 2 August 
2007, when two Russian miniature submarines descended over four thousand 
metres to the Lomonosov Ridge enabling a politician plant the Russian flag on the 
seabed adjacent to the North Pole.
81
  
 
 
Map 18. The region within the Arctic Ocean known as 
the ―Area‖ that lies beyond the 200-mile territorial limit 
of all Arctic-rim states.                                                
Source: United Oil and Gas Consortium Management 
Corp, http://www.unoilgas.com  
 
Before Russia and the other four ‗Arctic Five‘ states can divide the ―Area‖ 
between themselves, they will need to overcome one issue. That issue relates to 
the continued legitimacy of Western-orientated multilateral international 
institutions and universal adherence to laws such institutions promulgate. The 
United States National Intelligence Council has suggested that by 2025 global 
governance will be comprised of a patchwork of overlapping, but often ad hoc and 
fragmented systems, with shifting coalitions of states, international organisations, 
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social movements, non-governmental organisations and companies. This 
fragmentation of interests and actors will further erode prospects for the United 
Nations to strengthen consensus among its members for effective multilateral 
action.
82
 At a sub-global level the European partners to NATO already express a 
fear that America, being preoccupied by its strategic competition with China and 
global terrorism, will no longer sees the alliance as vital to its security and thus 
lose interest in this longstanding multilateral institution.
83
 One test foreseen for 
both the United Nations and the multilateral international system as a whole is the 
re-emergence of strategic rivalries especially, but not exclusively, centred on 
access to resources such as energy and water. Disputes over these resources could 
return the world to an international system reminiscent of the late nineteenth 
century which was characterized by arms racing, territorial expansion and military 
rivalries.
84
  
Although generally echoing the National Intelligence Council‘s predictions, 
the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence maintains that while the United Nations 
Charter framework will remain in place, the legal prohibition on the use of force 
is likely to come under increasing pressure when resource security adversely 
affects national survival. Under such circumstances a state may well interpret the 
legal framework in a manner that legitimizes its use of force.
85
 In the future, 
securing access to resources could stimulate a complete disregard for any legal 
provisions that inhibit non Arctic-rim states from cementing, by military force if 
necessary, their right to exploit the minerals beneath the Arctic Ocean.  
China‘s concerns over how the existing international system may deny it 
access to Arctic resources were discussed in Chapter Thirteen.  Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, recent Chinese statements have become more bellicose in their assertion 
that the ―Arctic Five‖ states need to recognise the interests of non-Arctic states. 
Although the Chinese maintain they have no formal Arctic strategy, several 
Chinese academics have recently encouraged their government to ―Grasp this 
historic opportunity and recognise the political, economic and military value of 
the Arctic and then re-evaluate China‘s rights in the Arctic region and adjust its 
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strategic plan.‖86 These academics have also raised the alarmist possibility of an 
alliance among the Arctic states that could further disadvantage China.
87
 Equally 
bellicose statement have been attributed to the Russian President who, in a recent 
truculent address to his country‘s Security Council in March 2010 maintained that 
Russia must be prepared to defend its claims to the Arctic‘s mineral riches. This 
bellicose rhetoric only served to further heightened security tensions that have 
come to exist between Russia and Canada. President Medvedev predicted that 
climate change will spark conflicts once the ice melts exposing new areas for 
exploration.
88
 In September 2008, Moscow endorsed the ―fundamentals of state 
policies of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and 
beyond:‖ one fundamental was the need to settle the outer limits of the continental 
shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit,
89
 i.e. Russian sovereignty over a sector 
of the ―Area.‖ 
China stands ready to exploit interstate tensions over the question of 
resource access that will arise between the great powers,
90
 including, no doubt, 
tensions over sovereignty of the ―Area.‖ China is not the only non-Arctic state 
with an expressed interest in the future governance of the Arctic. Japan, North 
Korea and South Korea have shown a keen interest in access to Arctic minerals.
91
 
Furthermore, India, in a concerted effort to secure access to energy resources 
ahead of China, is seeking to exploit oil reserves in the Russian Arctic which is 
likely to bring India into a ―strategic and economic tussle‖ with China.92 A 
‗resource union‘ between India and Russia would be viewed with concern by 
China given that it views both countries as strategic opponents and Russia as a 
potential military challenger.
93
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So could the ―Area‖ be transformed into a non-traditional regional security 
complex or a shatterbelt? 
Despite the five littoral states having endorsed militarisation as a means of 
prosecuting their individual claims within the high Arctic, it is questionable as to 
whether these states will have an unfettered right to dictate the region‘s future. 
This would be especially true for the ―Area‖ which is considered by some non-
Arctic states to be the ―property of all of the world‘s people.‖94 This question 
could be resolved in one of three ways. First, it could be resolved in the manner 
suggested by  Klaus Dodds, that during a period when interstate goodwill prevails, 
all states with interests in Arctic affairs subscribe to a political governance 
arrangement similar to the treaty arrangement instituted by the Antarctic Treaty 
Parties in the late 1950s. Even though this suggestion has been made on numerous 
occasions, to date it has never found favour amongst the Arctic-rim states. Unless 
unanimity exists among all interested parties, adopting this option would 
perpetuate the status quo, which is already unsatisfactory to both Arctic and non-
Arctic states alike. In terms of regional security complex theory, as long as the 
status quo remains the ―Area‖ would continue to be an unstructured insecure 
region. The second option is for the United Nation to resolve through UNCLOS a 
division of the ―Area‖ among the Arctic-rim states that is universally accepted. 
This would preclude the involvement within the ―Area‖ of all non-Arctic-rim 
states unless invited to participate in the region‘s development by an Arctic-rim 
state. From a security complex theory viewpoint this option would simply enlarge 
the area encompassed by the petro-supercomplex.‖ Thirdly, should the awarding 
of sovereignty not be accepted universally, and especially not by the emerging 
great powers, or should the United Nations fail to decide upon the issue, then the 
prospects of a peaceful resolution appear slim.  The most probable outcome is that 
interested states that hold the necessary technical, economic and military 
capabilities will unilaterally exploit the ―Area‖ for its resources. The resultant 
‗resource rush‘ could temporarily establish an unsustainable non-traditional 
regional security complex or supercomplex which would eventually disintegrate 
to be replaced by a shatterbelt or under the worst-case scenario, a resource war.  
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The sixth essential element identifies the reasons why a shatterbelt appears 
the most probable future security structure for the ―Area:‖  
        
[C]ompetition for control over a geographic region by 
strategically important states is indicative of a ‗shatterbelt 
region‘ that can overlay regional security complexes, 
unstructured security regions or a grouping of the two. 
There is no certainty that under UNCLOS the United 
Nations will be able to award the five Arctic states 
sovereignty over the ―Area,‖ for such a proposition would 
inevitably be contested by non-Arctic great powers. Other 
states with no interest in the Arctic may also wish to 
contest the United Nations proposal for no other reason 
than it might set an unwelcome precedent for the 
settlement of sovereignty claims elsewhere in the world, 
including Antarctica. Worst still, in the decades ahead the 
authority of the United Nations took unto itself to instigate 
international agreements could be declared void by 
‗disadvantaged‘ states. While to date China has adopted a 
wait-and-see approach to Arctic developments, in other 
regions it has not shied away from using or threatening to 
use military force in the process of securing access to 
resources. A dispute with neighbouring states over 
resources beneath the South China Sea is an illustration of 
China‘s aggressive approach to resolving its hydrocarbon 
insecurity.
95
 The bellicosity of Russia illustrates that the 
peaceful resolution of ownership over the ―Area‖ is not 
assured. Furthermore, confronted by renewed great power 
interest in the Arctic, America‘s President George W. Bush 
issued, in 2009, the first new Arctic directive in fifteen 
years, which placed an emphasis on the creation of 
―greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect 
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United States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic 
region‖ along with an ―increase Arctic maritime domain 
awareness in order to protect maritime commerce, critical 
infrastructure, and key resources.‖96 The United States 
seeks, like the other Arctic-rim states, to extend its 
sovereignty into the ―Area.‖ 
If the ―Area‖ becomes subsumed into the Exclusive 
Economic Zones of the Arctic-rim countries, then the 
boundaries of the Arctic petro-supercomplex would simply 
be extended northwards. An overlaying shatterbelt is an 
unlikely consequence of such a territorial rearrangement. A 
more likely scenario established in the absence of 
international cooperation, suggests that states will seek to 
secure, probably by force-of-arms, access to the region‘s 
energy and mineral resources. Under this scenario the 
criteria necessary for a shatterbelt to form would be present 
especially if strategic mistrust evident amongst great 
powers elsewhere in the world comes to clouds their 
relations in the Arctic.
97
   
 
Antarctica: from a past proto-complex to a future shatterbelt 
Regional security complex theory suggests that as unstructured regions continue to 
retreat they would most likely be replaced by proto-complexes. Changes to one or 
more of the essential elements that characterized such security complexes
98
 also 
determined the transformational path taken towards achieving a different status. In 
the post-Cold War era the unstructured region that was central Africa evolved into 
two quite distinct proto-complexes – regions where there is sufficient security 
interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbours, but 
where the regional security dynamic is too weak to make the region a fully-fledged 
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regional security complex
99
 – one, in West Africa became centred on Nigeria 
while the other, the Horn, which for the present, is centred on Ethiopia.
100
  
Plausibly, the above process is not the only evolutionary mechanism through 
which an unstructured region can metamorphose into a proto-complex. Unlike the 
African experience, Antarctica could be seen to have passed through an 
intermediary transformation — that of a pre-complex. This pre-complex101 stage 
could have become established in 1917 when Great Britain claimed sovereignty 
over the Antarctic Peninsula and amalgamated that claim with its claim over the 
Falkland Islands to create the Falkland Island Dependency. This pre-complex 
would have collapsed upon the end of Second World War hostilities. Although 
their Antarctic claims were predated by some three decades by Great Britain, the 
respective territorial claims of Argentina and Chile over the Antarctic Peninsula 
pitched all three states against each other. It was during the Second World War, 
however, that Antarctica, or at least the Antarctic Peninsula, garnered the strategic 
significance necessary to provoke a heightened level of security interdependence 
among these and other competing states. 
Initial militarisation of Antarctica came about as the consequence of Anglo-
Argentine rivalry
102
 and a need by the British to establish observatories on the 
Antarctic Peninsula to provide valuable meteorological information – ‗Operation 
Tabarin.‘103 Furthermore, German submarines prowled the ocean north of the 
Antarctic Peninsula harassing ships transporting food to Europe from the Atlantic 
coast of Latin America,
104
 while German commerce raiders ventured into 
Antarctic waters to harass allied shipping and whaling fleets.
105
 With the defeat of 
Germany, Great Britain‘s hegemony over Antarctica waned only to be replaced by 
that of the United States. 
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Underscoring its changed status the United States undertook Operation 
Highjump, which according to the popular press was mounted ―primarily as a lap 
in the race for uranium.‖106 This naval foray occurred during a period of rising 
acrimony between Great Britain and Argentina which nearly resulted in naval 
conflict. In 1948, the British cruiser HMS Nigeria and accompanying frigate HMS 
Snipe when on a patrol to the South Shetland Islands intercepted an Argentine 
flotilla capable of forcing an opposed landing comprising the cruisers Veinticinco 
de Mayo and Admirante Brown, six destroyers, two transports and various support 
vessels.
107
 If indeed Argentine intensions were to execute a forced landing on 
British Antarctic Territory then the presence of the Royal Navy provided timely 
intervention. Tensions between Great Britain and Argentina on the Antarctic 
Peninsula were further exacerbated by the Hope Bay incident of 1952, when 
Argentine soldiers fired shots over the heads of British personnel as they 
disembarked to rebuild a station that four years earlier had be destroyed by fire. 
And just a year later Britain forcibly removed Argentine and Chilean huts that it 
considered were too close to its own facilities.
108
 
The United States needed to resolve the Argentine-British-Chilean imbroglio 
over the Antarctic Peninsula, for the impasse was diverting British military interest 
away from the increasingly important European theatre. Even if ‗expansionist‘ 
Great Britain withdrew from Antarctica a sovereignty conundrum would still 
overlay the Antarctic Peninsula reflecting the historical terse relationship between 
Argentina and Chile. The origin of this tension dates back to Latin American Wars 
of Independence of the nineteenth century when, as independent states, both 
countries failed to resolve overlapping claims to six hundred thousand square 
miles of Patagonian territory
109
 and the ownership of three barren islands – Picton, 
Lennox and Nueva – in the Beagle Channel, south of Tierra del Fuego.110 
However, past resolution of both disputes has not eliminated every opportunity for 
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either one of these disputes to once again sour relations between these 
neighbouring states as witnessed by recent (2010) reopening of old wounds over 
one hundred miles of contested land known as the ‗Southern Icefields‘ – a region 
reported to contain the second largest reserve of potable water in the world.
111
    
The increase in United States‘ Antarctic activity was viewed with misgivings 
by other nations with interests in the continent. On Stonington Island the British 
viewed the Americans with suspicion, while Argentina and Chile saw Operation 
Highjump as a direct threat to their territorial claims. Australia and New Zealand 
were also fearful that some malevolent military intent lay behind the renewed 
attention America was showing Antarctica. International concerns forced America 
to adopt a new strategy. In order to calm these fears the United States proposed 
that Antarctica become a territory under international trusteeship or under an 
eight-power condominium – the seven claimant states plus America. Only New 
Zealand, among the seven claimant nations, was willing to surrender sovereignty 
to such a cause.
112
 There was a suggestion that New Zealand could better assert its 
right to a slice of Antarctic territory by partnering the United States in a joint 
claim.
113
 While this suggestion might have led to improved co-operation between 
the two countries, New Zealand‘s adamant stance over the rightfulness of its claim 
to the Ross Dependency scuttled the proposal.
114
 
Despite Russian involvement in Antarctica since the Thaddeus 
Bellinghausen expedition of 1819-21, the Soviet Union was denied a copy of the 
American proposal for an international treaty. This caused Moscow to proclaim 
that it would not recognise any change to the governance of Antarctica to which it 
was not a party. The Soviet response only served to ensure that future American 
policies were designed to guarantee that the Soviet Union was given no 
opportunity to participate in an Antarctic settlement and administration or present 
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it with an excuse to become a claimant nation.
115
 Such was the nature of Cold War 
politics.
 
 
Undeterred by American attitudes, the Soviet Union, in 1955, advised all 
claimant states that it would mount a significant Antarctic expedition and establish 
several bases primarily in the sector claimed by Australia. In February 1956, to the 
booming of guns, the Soviet Union hoisted its flag over Mirny, a station on the 
edge of the Antarctic continent. While the Australians did not protest such 
ceremony,
116
 they became hysterical at the thought of the Red Flag flying so close 
to the South Pole. Many Australians believed that the Soviets would use science as 
a pretext to establish numerous missile bases on Antarctica.
117
 Thus, American 
attempts to internationalise the politics of Antarctica achieved little other than to 
make the existing situation worse. The final impetus, which ultimately resulted in 
the Antarctic Treaty, was the growing interest in Antarctica by newly independent 
states such as India. However, the seven claimant states along with America 
successfully resisted Indian pressure to have Antarctica placed under United 
Nations stewardship. 
Scientifically, the International Geophysical Year (IGY) was considered a 
success, but this success could hardly hide the fractiousness of the politics that 
gave it birth. The claimant countries only agreed to unfettered passage of scientists 
and the establishment of scientific bases on the clear understanding that such 
access would not void their sovereignty claims. When the Soviet Union was 
invited to participate in IGY, hysteria in Australia reached new heights fuelled by 
fears that any Soviet Antarctica installation could easily be used to launch missiles 
on Melbourne or Sydney.
118
 It was during this period that Great Britain finally 
accepted that its dominance over the affairs of Antarctica had now passed to the 
United States. The IGY clearly demonstrated that a gulf now existed between old 
and new Antarctic powers. While the United States produced thirteen tons of 
information at the end of its Antarctic programme, Britain funded less research 
than either Argentina or Chile.119 
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The Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington D.C. on
 
December 1, 1959 
by the representatives of the twelve countries that had participated in the 
International Geophysical Year. The Treaty took effect on 23
 
June 1961. 
Fortunately for the Southern Oceanic Rim States negotiations for the Treaty were 
completed during a brief period of reduced East–West tension120 and signed some 
five months before the rift consequent upon the U-2 spy plane affair. According to 
Beck, if the Treaty had not become a reality before the U-2 affair, then in all 
likelihood Antarctic would have been turned into a testing ground for nuclear 
weapons.
121
 
Within the limits of regional security complex theory, a proto-complex in 
Antarctica is a plausible response to the interstate interplay that occurred on the 
cusp of the Cold War, for the continent, unlike the Arctic, was not overlaid by 
either superpower. The most likely location where a classical proto-complex 
would form was along the Antarctic Peninsula where three countries had 
overlapping claims and military adventurism was not unknown. While the security 
dynamics of a proto-complex may not be as strong as those of a regional security 
complex, the essential elements are the same for both.  For the Antarctic Peninsula 
proto-complex the essential elements are discussed below:  
 
[A] boundary, which differentiates the regional security 
complex from its neighbours. This intra-Antarctica proto-
complex would likely divide the continent into two 
segments – ―the Peninsula‖ the parameters of which would 
be 25
o 
West, the extent of the British claim and 90
o 
West, 
the extent of the Chilean claim. The balance of the 
continent, pre-Operation Highjump, given the military 
weakness of all other claimant counties, would have 
remained ‗unstructured.‘ Post-Operation Highjump, and 
given the hegemonic intensions of America, the other 
claimant countries might have aggregated their claims to 
form a single security entity: possibly a standard regional 
security complex created through Regional Order 
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typology. An equally plausible alternative was for the 
United States as the hegemonic power to have forcibly 
overlaid the entire continent to prevent both conflict on the 
Peninsula and to extinguish any territorial aspirations held 
by the Soviet Union. 
Conceptually, the ―Peninsula‖ proto-complex could 
have formed a sub-complex within the South American 
regional security complex in a manner similar to the 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands. This would be an 
acknowledgement that other Latin American states i.e. 
Brazil and Peru had interests as prospective claimant states 
in the future of Antarctica.
122
 
 
                    [An]anarchic structure, which means that the regional 
security complex must be composed of two or more 
autonomous units, but geographical contiguity is not 
mandatory. Antarctica, subsequent to the voyages of 
Captain James Cook, has never suffered from a lack of 
interested actors, be they private enterprises or states. The 
Peninsula proto-complex would have comprised two Latin 
American states – Argentina and Chile and one external 
non-geographically contiguous great power, Great Britain. 
 
[P]olarity, which covers the distribution of power among 
the units. Although militarily weakened by the Second 
World War, Great Britain, after the cessation of hostilities 
was still a great power of at least one magnitude greater 
than either Argentina or Chile. 
  
[S]ocial construction, which covers the patterns of amity 
and enmity among the units. In the immediate post-Second 
World War years there existed tension along the Antarctic 
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Peninsula between Argentina, Chile and Great Britain, with 
all three sending warships to Antarctica in support of their 
claim.
123
 The enmity that characterized this period 
eventually waned between Argentina and Chile, for by 
1948 both countries had committed themselves to 
cooperate in the Antarctic and to mutual recognition of 
their Antarctic rights in South American Antarctica.
124
 
However, these amicable relations had collapsed by the 
time the Falkland Islands War commenced with Argentina 
accusing Chile of secretly supporting Great Britain.
125
  
 
[T]he intensity of security externalities on both regional 
and non-regional units. The Argentinean-Chilean-British 
imbroglio created  security complications for the United 
States and the Western Alliance as neither could afford for 
Great Britain becoming embroiled in confrontation in the 
South Atlantic when yet another European war appear 
immanent. Indeed, one of the objectives of Operation 
Highjump was to bring an end to this imbroglio through a 
show of United States military power. What would have 
aggravated this situation had these three states been aware 
that the secret objective of Operation Highjump was to 
claim for America ―sovereignty over the largest practicable 
area of the Antarctic continent.‖126 Had the American 
forcibly followed through on this objective an entirely 
different security dynamic would have arisen on the 
continent, especially given the revived interest of the Soviet 
Union in Antarctica. 
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 Under the above scenario the geopolitical drivers that would have given rise to a 
proto-security complex emanated entirely from within the politico-military sector 
of security complex theory and would have been driven by the divisive politics of 
the Cold War. Paradoxically, the science that helped to sustain claims over 
Antarctica also played a powerful role in alleviating tension over this contested 
continent.
127
  
The overt display of military power by the United States would have 
prevented mistrust between the three claimant countries from transforming 
Peninsula proto-complex into a shatterbelt. While the Soviet Union, whose 
military involvement could have contributed to the creation of a shatterbelt had it 
supported Argentina and/or Chile, displayed little interest in Antarctic politics 
during this period. Therefore, element six does not apply.  
Mistrust of another state‘s long-term political, military and economic 
objectives may have many sources, both imagined and real. One state may hold 
fears that another has ambitions to acquire territory or resources or to exploit or 
dominate it is some way. Ideological differences such as the fear of communism 
can also be the cause of strategic mistrust.
128
 Strategic mistrust can equally arise in 
the anarchic arena of geopolitics when one or more states challenge the status quo 
causing structural tension between themselves and defenders of the prevailing 
international order. The cause and probable outcome of such a challenge is often 
explained in terms of ―power-transition theory‖ – an international relations theory 
with a long record of empirical support.
129
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Replacement of British influence over matters Antarctica by the revisionist 
policies of the United States, especially its proposal to internationalize the 
continent, caused diplomatic panic within the claimant countries. More broadly, 
the long-term implication of the American proposal reactivated Soviet interest in 
the region. The Soviets were vehement in their denouncement of any proposal to 
internationalize Antarctica that excluded them from the decision-making process. 
By 1950, the military and political language of the Cold War had impinged upon 
the international politics of Antarctica and Great Britain began to realize that its 
disputes with Latin American countries over Antarctica could no longer be 
isolated.
130
  
The emergence of the Soviet Union as an interested party meant that the 
United States and the claimant countries had to consider a wider constituency of 
concerned states. In an era where ideological conflict became the principal 
determinant in international relations, hysterical rhetoric served to further inflame 
nascent concerns within southern hemisphere countries about the future intentions 
of the Soviets in Antarctica. Some articles printed by the Australian press sought 
to convince readers that the Russians would use science as a cover to locate 
missile stations in the frozen wastes of Antarctica.
131
 Even more alarmist 
pronouncements were carried by the American media, for example under the title 
―Red Threat from Antarctica‖ the following warning was made: 
 
At the frozen bottom of the earth Russia is moving into a 
position from which its missile squadrons could outflank 
the free world. Half of Antarctica is rapidly turning from 
white to red… From the snowy Antarctic coasts and 
plateau Russia is in a position to have the entire Southern 
Hemisphere within easy missile range… The earliest 
Antarctic threat involves the use of missile-launching 
conventional submarines operating out of the Soviet 
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Union‘s increasing number of Antarctic bases… The 
Soviets can put their ICBM‘s on Antarctica itself… New 
York, Washington, Chicago, Denver, Seattle, Los 
Angeles…would be reachable… South America and Africa 
would become much more sensitive to Soviet pressure as 
the shadow of Soviet missiles might spread across both 
continents… Meanwhile, Soviet tractors bearing red flags 
are moving through Antarctic in increasing numbers.
132
 
  
Even responsible journalists were given to argue that: ―Its [Antarctica‘s] vastness 
provides a sanctuary from which aircraft could dominate the waters that, apart 
from the vulnerable Panama and Suez Canals, provide the only ready link between 
the Atlantic and Pacific and Atlantic and Indian Oceans.‖133 Such rhetoric not only 
serves to amplify a nascent sense of vulnerability and the invocation of ―self-
defence,‖ but could become an important means of mobilizing public opinion on 
behalf of foreign ventures: a common use to which speech acts are put.  In that 
sense, the Antarctic was not immune from such pressures.
134
 
Bellicose rhetoric, on-going fractiousness displayed by claimant countries, 
strategic mistrust, revisionist tendencies of both superpowers and existential 
pressures of a Northern Hemisphere Cold War could readily have caused the 
Antarctic proto-security complex to expand and metamorphose into a shatterbelt, 
overlaying not only Antarctica, but also encompassing all Southern Oceanic Rim 
States. If it is possible to insert a theoretical criterion from the typology of security 
complex theory to geopolitics, then Antarctica, during the first decade and a half 
of the Cold War, could have been categorized as a pre-shatterbelt. That is a region 
where there appears to exist a set of political-military relations hold the potential 
to bind superpowers, great powers and regional powers into a shatterbelt, but yet 
the existing cross-linkages between these powers proved to possess insufficient 
force to do so.  Ultimately, no shatterbelt formed. Klaus Dodds was given to 
comment that the most remarkable feature about this period was that whilst 
English-language reports on Antarctica were filled with dire strategic predictions 
                                                 
132
 Cited in Dodds, Klaus, Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim, John 
Wiley, Chichester, 1997, p. 36. 
133
 See Sullivan, W., Quest for a Continent, Secker and Warburg, London, 1957, p. 357. 
134
 Dodds, Geopolitics in Antarctica, op. cit., p. 36. 
 337 
and fears of Soviet expansionism, twelve states were participating in a series of 
negotiations destined to remove tension and strife from the international politics of 
Antarctica.
135
  
 
Antarctica: tomorrow’s shatterbelt  
Ratification of the Antarctic Treaty by the protagonist states of the early Cold War 
era did guarantee the prevalence of peace across the greater Antarctic region. 
However, Argentina and Great Britain continued to display animosity towards 
each other. One notable incident in their contest over sovereignty of the 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands occurred near the islands of South Georgia in 1976 
when an Argentine naval vessel, Admiral Storni was ordered to fire across the 
bows of a British Scientific research ship, Shackleton. A flurry of naval activity 
followed, including the diversion of the British frigate Chichester to the Falkland 
Islands during its passage home to Great Britain from Hong Kong.
136
  Later in the 
same year the Argentine navy landed a team of some fifty ‗technicians‘ on South 
Thule in the South Sandwich group of islands.
137
 However, it was in 1982 that the 
most serious incident occurred with the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands 
and their reclaim by a British military task force. 
One seemingly innocuous declaration at the United Nations ultimately 
resulted in a war over sovereignty for this remote and often forgotten South 
Atlantic archipelago. In August 1964, the British representative at the United 
Nations, Lord Caradon, declared that the interests of the Falkland Islanders must 
be paramount in deciding the Island‘s future. This simple declaration committed 
Great Britain and Argentina to engage in a seventeen year diplomatic battle and a 
three month military confrontation.
138
 The antagonism generated by this long-
drawn-out conflict can be considered the causal factor behind the creation of a 
Malvinas/Falkland Island sub-complex within the boundary of the much larger 
South American regional security complex. This proposal resolves the 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands conundrum highlighted in Chapter Four. To justify this 
                                                 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Hastings et al., op. cit., p. 29. 
137
 Ibid., p. 32. 
138
 Ibid., p. 15. 
 338 
assertion, this sub-complex must comply with the same four essential elements 
that define regional security complexes.
139
  
 
[A] boundary which differentiates the [sub]-complex from 
its neighbouring RSCs. The perimeter of the sub-complex 
encompasses only the sovereign territory of Argentina and 
the Falkland Islands archipelago. A defined boundary 
delineates the sub-complex from the all-encompassing 
South American regional security complex. 
 
[An] anarchic structure, which means that the [sub]-
complex must be composed of two or more autonomous 
units, but geographical contiguity is not mandatory. The 
Falkland Islands have been a colony of Great Britain since 
1833. The autonomous units of this sub-complex are 
Argentina and Great Britain, although the latter has no 
geographical contiguity with this sub-complex. 
 
[P]olarity, which covers the distribution of power among 
the units. Although, during the ―Seventeen Years War‖ 
Great Britain embarked on restructuring (reducing the size) 
of its military forces, such restructuring did not deny its 
status as a great power. In 1982 Argentina was no more 
than a regional power. 
 
[S]ocial construction, which covers the patterns of amity 
and enmity among the units. The Argentineans claimed 
sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands in 1820, 
but unwillingly consented to transfer its sovereignty to 
Great Britain thirteen years later. This transfer of 
sovereignty has often clouded relations between these two 
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states, but the enmity that is displayed is primarily a 
response to competing claims to Antarctic territory.
140
 
 
The causal factors behind this three-month war were entirely traditional in 
character and consistent with the conjoint criteria for securitisation embodied in 
the political-military security sectors.
141
 While the desire to control the region‘s 
potentially lucrative wild fish, oil and natural gas reserves may have been a 
contributing factor behind Argentina‘s ill-conceived invasion of the Falkland 
Archipelago,
142
 such non-traditional environmental factors appeared to have 
engendered less public emotion amongst Argentineans than did the desire to 
reinsert Argentine sovereignty over the islands.  
Irrespective of what importance is attached to the respective causal factors, 
the Malvinas/Falkland Island sub-complex developed because it met the 
theoretical criteria required of a standard regional security complex. Yet, once 
Chile sided with Great Britain against Argentina
143
 a new and more dangerous 
geopolitical extension replaced the Malvinas/Falkland Island sub-complex 
developed. According to Phillip Kelly and Luisa Pérez, the alignment of Chile 
with Great Britain against Argentina created a shatterbelt,
144
 but unlike the sub-
complex it did not survive beyond the end of hostilities.  
The Falkland Islands conflict transformed the South Atlantic into an area of 
major international concern. Although the region had in the past warranted only 
scant attention that changed during the 1970s for a variety of reasons: anxiety in 
the United States over increased Soviet naval activity; continuing political 
instability and uncertainty in Southern Africa; increased awareness of the 
importance of undersea resources and concerns over the future status of 
Antarctica.
145
 Unlike the North Atlantic, where the military strength of the NATO 
was evident, a strategic vacuum formed in the South Atlantic in the absence of a 
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similar alliance. This strategic vacuum was not total because the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty of 1947) which covers the South 
American sector of the South Atlantic as far as the South Pole. Indeed, it is the Rio 
Treaty that provides an avenue through which Argentina, Brazil and Chile claim a 
special responsibility for Antarctica to the benefit of their various claims over the 
continent.
146
 In the wake of the Falkland Islands War and in recognition of a 
divergence of security interests and perceptions within and between the Southern 
African and Southern Cone South American countries, the prospect of a South 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (SATO) coming into being remains remote.
147
  In 
Argentine geostrategic thinking much of the geographical rectangle SATO alliance 
would have secured against Soviet infiltration has now in been transformed into a 
shatterbelt.
148
  
If the Falkland Islands War was in part motivated by Argentina‘s desire to 
control the region‘s potentially lucrative oil and natural gas reserves, then the 2010 
reported discovery of a possibly 700 million barrel oil reservoir beneath the 
island‘s Exclusive Economic Zone will do little to improve relations between 
Argentina and Great Britain. Analysts believe that up to sixty billion barrels of oil 
might lie beneath the waters of this United Kingdom territory.
149
 However, other 
industry commentators remain sceptical that such a discovery has indeed occurred 
given that exploratory wells drilled as recently as 1998 failed to establish the 
presence of commercial quantities of oil in the same region.
150
    
Argentine nationalism made resolution of the ―Seventeen Years‘ War‖151 
impossible prior to the Argentinean invasion of the Falkland Islands. 
Contemporary nationalistic cries of ―Las Malvinas son Argentinas!‖ (The 
Malvinas are Argentine!), resonate well with national politics and public 
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discourse
152
 and could further deepen the existing South Atlantic security 
cleavage. If recoverable oil reserves are found then ‗old wounds‘ over the Island‘s 
sovereignty could once again propel these two protagonist countries towards 
conflict. The absence of placatory statements from either the Argentine or United 
Kingdom polities renders a peaceful resolution to this intractable problem difficult 
– a situation not made easier by a reported statement quoting retired naval officers 
that ―Argentina could retake the Falkland Islands with ‗barely a shot fired‘ 
because [2010] defence cuts will cripple the Royal Navy.‖153 Great Britain‘s 
political position is also somewhat different from that which prevailed three 
decades ago. The support it garnered from Latin American countries in 1982 has 
now evaporated with the Rio Group of countries now unanimously supporting 
Argentina‘s claim to the archipelago.154 Given this contemporary military/political 
juxtaposition, then should the future prove the Falkland Islands to be ―a southern 
Persian Gulf‖155 then the party‘s belligerent speech acts could formalize the 
Malivinas/Falkland Islands as a pre-petropolitical security complex. If a petro-
security complex formed then it would overlay the previously discussed classical 
security sub-complex. However, the geographical composition of the former 
complex will ultimately be determined by the number of countries directly 
affected by its security externalities.   
While current oil exploration in the South Atlantic is restricted to the North 
Falkland Basin, equally promising exploration opportunities exist in the South 
Falkland Basin, the southern limit of which extends beyond the latitude of Cape 
Horn.
156
 Thus, resource exploration continues to ―creep‖ ever nearer to Antarctica. 
Over the next twenty-five years this process is likely to accelerate as the disregard 
for the current rule-based international order intensifies.
157
 Throughout the 
Southern Ocean illegal extraction of both living and non-living resources is 
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expected to become more prevalent and in a worst-case scenario resource 
extraction will be undertaken in the presence of or with the active support of 
military forces.
158
 Despite treaty limitations there could be significant competition 
for energy and fishing resources, with rising and emerging powers challenging the 
existing (Western) patterns of exploitation.
159
  
Of the continent proper, some commentators consider it has already lost its 
reputation as a land of seals, ice and penguins and gained a new image as a region 
of iron, coal and oil.
160
 Hence international cooperation through scientific research 
might well be replaced by aggressive nationalistic activities associated with 
natural resource acquirement.
161
 Comments are once more surfacing, as they did 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, of a looming land and resource grab
162
 ahead of 
what has been describe as the ―Battle for Antarctica.‖163 Moreover, China now 
acknowledges that Antarctica‘s economic (mineral) wealth is as important as it 
strategic position. And the United States Coast Guard considers ―the ice-cold 
South Pole could prove a fiercely hot battlefield‖ in a resource deprived world.164  
A great power scramble for Antarctica‘s mineral wealth is a plausible 
extension of the recent upsurge in the global hunt for and the acquisition of 
mineral reserves elsewhere in the world, notably in Africa.
165
 As more accessible 
reserves become either exhausted or their ownership lies with competing 
commercial or state organisations, companies and countries in the search for new 
reserves will quite naturally turn their attention to the last vast potential reservoir 
of mineral resources on Earth – Antarctica. The geopolitics of this search became 
evidence in early 2010 when on a visit to Antarctica, members of a senior Chinese 
political delegation, mentioned that their visit was in part, an investigation for 
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minerals and resources.
166
 Other countries are more clandestine about their 
intensions. In 2002 the Russians had sought to reassure treaty parties that: ―The 
Russian geological scientific programs…must not be mistaken for mineral 
exploitation:‖167 Likewise, South Korea has also talked about exploiting Antarctic 
minerals.
168
        
Although Ceresole‘s South Atlantic shatterbelt failed to materialize during 
the Cold War, his vision has merit since southern world‘s natural and energy 
resources traveling to the northern industrialized states have to transit either the 
South Atlantic or South Pacific. As the stabilizing affects inherent in the existing 
Western hegemony over Antarctica weaken, international rivalry over possession 
and transportation of resources could prompt formation of a shatterbelt covering 
both the Southern Ocean and Antarctica.
169
 Under these circumstances any 
shatterbelt is unlikely to be a geopolitical extension of a previously established 
regional security complex. The need to access resource will become so imperative 
that competing states will opt to secure their resource needs by force-of-arms, 
knowing full well that such action will precipitate the ―Battle for Antarctica.‖ 
Under these circumstances there will be no opportunity for either a security 
complex or a shatterbelt to form; instead the continent will be torn apart by one or 
more resource wars.  
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Chapter Sixteen  
 
Conclusion: A Bleak Future 
 
his thesis is self-consciously theoretical in character.  In common with 
many social science theories it could be portrayed – unjustifiably one 
would hope – as idle conjecture and thus of limited relevance in 
explaining happenings in the ―real world.‖ Paul Nitze, a prominent American 
defence and foreign policy-maker during the Cold War wrote: ―Most of what has 
been written under the heading of ‗political science‘ …since World War II has 
been … of limited value, if not counterproductive, as a guide to the actual conduct 
of policy.‖1 This view suggests that theory has no place beyond academia and that 
policy-makers should rely solely upon common sense, intuition, and practical 
experience to carry out their duties. 
Such a view undervalues the inherent worth of theories in understanding the 
contemporary world and consequently to making intelligent decisions. Indeed, 
without international relations theories to rely upon it would be difficult for both 
academics and policy-makers to comprehend their surroundings.  Likewise, it is 
difficult to deny the fact that it would be impossible to make sense of an 
increasingly complex world without simplifying theories.
2
 
The thesis is constructivist in character. It embodies an acceptance that 
international security as a concept can operate both within and beyond the 
traditional military-political understanding of that concept. In this way, security is 
neither exclusively objective (there is a real threat) or subjective (there is a 
perceived threat), but the outcome of a process of securitization. Securitization is 
inter-subjective (a shared understanding) and hence socially constructed. 
Successful securitisation is not decided by the securitizer (usually the political 
elite) but by the audience of the speech act.  The crucial question to be answered 
is whether or not the audience accepts that something is an existential threat to a 
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shared value?
3
 It will be through this political process that communities will 
decide whether each polar region should be saved for its intrinsic value or secured 
for its resource wealth.  The answer to this question will determine the future 
security architecture of both the Arctic and Antarctica. 
The method by which both traditional and non-traditional existential threats 
can transmogrify an existing security arrangement into a security complex has 
been explained in Part I. The original four descriptive elements Buzan et al 
considered essential for the formation of a classical regional security complex 
have within the thesis been supplemented with two additional elements.  Buzan‘s 
aphorism mandating geographical contiguity amongst units (states) has been 
ameliorated through the inclusion of a fifth element – ―security externalities‖ – a 
theoretical concept borrowed from the typology of Regional Orders. Combining 
elements from two different typologies has led to the ―hybridisation‖ of the 
original theory.  
Buzan and his cohorts leave unanswered the question as to whether the 
formation of a security complex is an end in itself or an intermediary step along a 
continuum linking peace with war. Interestingly, Buzan conceives a world where 
peace may not mean harmony between states, but war is ruled out as a legitimate 
instrument of foreign policy except for the purpose of defence against military 
attack.
4
 However, the unabated rise of intra-regional tensions that result in conflict 
denies the universality of this view: hence, regions must be capable of evolving 
beyond mere security complexes. In recognition of this evolutionary process the 
―hybrid‖ theory has been further amended by including a sixth element –
shatterbelts – a concept drawn from the ontology of Geopolitics.  
Hybridisation has occasioned a ‗new‘ theory that reflects the six essential 
elements: 
 
A security complex is a set of states that are so 
interlinked by one or more security externalities 
that their security problems cannot be reasonably 
considered independently from one another. 
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Intrusion of outside adversarial great powers into a 
security complex would transform the complex into 
a shatterbelt and bring the possibility of conflict 
escalation. 
 
This new theory provides a useful analytical tool with which to explain why a 
nexus of natural resource scarcity and climate change will precipitate changes to 
the existing security architecture in each Polar Regions: changes that acknowledge 
the probable establishment of both security complexes and shatterbelts. 
The drive by both developed and developing countries towards increased 
material prosperity is a known cause of behavioural changes within societies. 
Historically, these behavioural changes have resulted in changes to consumption, 
diet and health patterns. The proportion of the world‘s population considered 
middle-class has increased rapidly over the past thirty years and, by 2030, an 
additional two billion people could deliver thirty per cent of humanity into the 
global middle-class.
5
 Furthermore, a considerable portion of this bulge could 
appear as early as 2020, when China‘s middle-income class trebles to 450 million6 
and Africa‘s mineral rich economies spawn a materialistic middle-class.7 
Consumption of food, water, energy and minerals remains positively correlated to 
increased prosperity despite efforts towards conservation, recycling and 
environmentalism.
8
The downside of prosperity driven by consumer consumption 
is that it will further exacerbate the looming worldwide shortage of many natural 
resources.
9
 
Energy and non-energy resource scarcity have become critical strategic and 
economic agenda items for both existing and emerging major powers. 
Contemporary societal anxieties have been aggravated by a substantial rise in 
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commodity prices which have culminated in what has been called a ―super-cycle‖ 
of price increases.
10
 No doubt influencing, but also being influenced by this super-
cycle, is a rise in resource nationalism: a phrase used to describe the drive by 
governments of commodity-rich countries to exploit demand for their 
endowments by securing a greater share of natural resource rents.
11
The reverse of 
the ‗resource nationalism coin‘ is ―consumer country resource nationalism;‖ the 
aggressive competition among consuming countries for the same resource.
12
As 
major powers worldwide, but particularly in Asia, compete for access to key 
commodity supplies, energy and resource nationalism, plus a beggar-thy-
neighbour attitude to control over supplies, denotes commodities as a potential 
source of interstate rivalries, tensions and conflicts.  
Exacerbating problems of supply is an unrelenting public demand for 
increased private wealth. Any disruption to the flow of resources into the civilian 
economy poses a severe threat to the continuance of political institutions and, 
through the process of contagion, to the wider region.  The ―Arab Spring‖ 
uprising of 2011, serves as a dramatic illustration of how a decline in the standard 
of living, when combined with resource shortages, can be a powerful force for 
political change.
13
Similar or worse developments might easily be replicated across 
the planet as those without the means of survival invade or migrate to countries 
with greater resource abundance – thus producing endless struggles between 
resources ―haves‖ and ―have-nots.‖14 
As little as thirty-five years ago when ―master strategist and futurologist‖ 
Herman Kahn was envisaging a scenario for the world two hundred years hence, it 
was still possible to be disparaging about climate change for there were no 
                                                 
10
 See Herberg, Mikkal E., ‗Introduction: Asia‘s Rising Energy and Resource Nationalism,‘ in 
Gabe Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, YufanHao, Mikkal E. Herberg, Liewelyn Hughes, Weihua Liu, 
and Jane Nakano, Asia‘s Rising Energy and Resource Nationalism: Implications for the United 
States, China, and the Asia-Pacific Region, NBR Special Report #31, National Bureau of Asian 
Research, Seattle, September 2011, p. 3. 
11
 See Butler, Anthony, ‗Beware the hazards of resource nationalism,‘ Business Day, 10 June 
2011, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=145475  (4 October 2011). 
12
 See Ward, Halina, ‗Resource nationalism and sustainable development: a primer and key 
issues,‘ International Institute for Environmental Development, March 2009, p. 11.  
13
 See Anderson, Lisa, ‗Demystifying the Arab Spring,‘ Foreign Affairs, Vol.90, No. 3, May/June 
2011, pp. 2-7.  
14
 See Klare, Michael, ‗The Coming Resource Wars,‘ ZNet,13 March, 2006, 
http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID-9900&sectionID-56 (31 May 2006). 
 348 
indications of an imminent greenhouse gas catastrophe.
15
  Today, however, that 
catastrophe appears only too real, which gives the words of Professor Clive 
Hamilton a common-sense ring of truth: 
 
One of the most striking features of the global warming 
debate has been how, with each advance in climate 
science, the news keeps getting worse.
16
 
 
Exacerbating the worst effects of a changing climate is a global political process 
driven by self-interest. In a number of developing countries the need to maintain 
political stability through economic growth has, despite frequent proclamations to 
the contrary, prevented any significant curbing of greenhouse gas emissions. The 
future prospects for achieving a dramatic emissions reduction appear poor given 
that both the 2009 and 2010 United Nations climate change conferences ended in 
failure
17
 and few positive outcomes are expected to emerge from the 2011 Durban 
conference.
18
 Without dramatic worldwide reductions in greenhouse gases the 
world appears set to experience no less than 3.2 degrees Celsius of warming. 
Unfortunately, given the current lack of public will to change behaviour, 
combined with political ambivalence, the world is now firmly on course to 
experience a rise in the average global temperature of six degrees Celsius over the 
next one hundred years.
19
 
Contemporary scientific research strengthens the more pessimistic nuances 
highlighted in Chapters Nine and Ten. A recent British Geological Survey report
20
 
on future resource availability has prompted commentators to recommend that 
                                                 
15
See Kahn, Herman, William Brown and Leon Martel, The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for 
America and the World, William Morrow, New York, 1976, p. 176. 
16
 See Hamilton, Clive, Requiem for a Species: Why we resist the truth about Climate Change, 
Allen&Unwin, Crows Nest, New South Wales, 2010, p.1. 
17See Carrington, Damian, ‗Cancún deal leaves hard climate tasks to 2011,‘ Guardian Weekly, 17-
30 December 2010, p. 1. 
18
 See Spenser, Chris, ‗What can a Deal in Durban Deliver?‘ International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, June 28, 2011, http://climate-1.iisd.org/policy-updates/what-can-a-deal-in-durban-
deliver/htm  (27 September 2011). 
19See McCarthy, Michael, ‗Catastrophic rise in temperature tipped by study,‘ New Zealand 
Herald, Auckland, November 19, 2009, p. A11. 
20
 See British Geological Survey, ‗Risk List 2011,‘ 11 September 2011, 
http://www.bgs.ac.uk/download/stat.cfm?id=2063  (27 October 2011).  
 349 
states should immediately act to secure future access to raw materials.
21
 Whilst an 
article in the New Scientist suggests that even previous worst-case scenarios could 
underestimate the severity and timing of climate change.
22
 Even prior to the 
publication of these cautionary warnings global attention had become focused on 
both Polar Regions, primarily on the Arctic, as localities worthy of explorative 
attention. Inevitably, interstate competition and region-wide insecurity will 
parallel improved accessibility to polar resources.  
Under these inimical circumstances, the ―hybrid‖ theory anticipates that the 
contemporary Arctic could be transformed into an enmity orientated hydrocarbon-
security complex. The theory also highlights that any unilateral awarding of 
sovereignty over the High Arctic which precludes non-Arctic energy deprived 
great powers will be violently contested. The presence of one or more belligerent 
great powers in the High Arctic would turn the region into a shatterbelt and 
possibly precipitate a resource war. 
Antarctica is a continent devoid of sovereign states and over which no 
country has hegemony. Whilst states continue to honour the Antarctic Treaty there 
appears little impetus for Antarctica to be transformed from an unstructured 
region into a classical regional security complex. Even if the Treaty were to fail, 
conflicting sovereignty claims among some Southern Oceanic Rim States are 
unlikely to engender sufficient intergroup security interdependence as to create an 
austral regional security complex. Moreover, even the induction of an extra-
regional great power into this grouping of states, be it a great power with 
hegemonic aspirations and capabilities, will not to produce a continent-wide 
regional security complex. What is less certain, however, is whether in the 
absence of the Treaty inter-claimant country animosities would transform the 
Antarctic Peninsula into a security sub-complex or even a shatterbelt. 
As the twenty-first century unfolds stresses imposed upon civilization will 
both multiply and intensify. Economically, there will be a widening of the income 
gap between the worlds rich and poor. Socially, the poorest billion will remain 
trapped at a subsistence level while the richest billion become wealthier with each 
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year that passes. Environmentally, the burgeoning global human population will 
likely result in a proliferation of refugees as once productive land turns to desert 
and food and water become increasingly scarce commodities. Politically, twenty-
first century stresses will become a cause of conflict within and between societies 
as access to living and non-living resources becomes constricted.
23
 
Additionally, as future societies are presented with a dramatic reduction in 
the quality of life due to climate change they will be forced to implement one of 
several coping strategies: they can adapt or, where adaption is impossible, they 
will be presented with the options of flee, fight or die. Anecdotal evidence would 
suggest conflicts caused by climate change are probable outcomes for societies 
already suffering from a multitude of other ills.
24
 There is little doubt that the 
future harbours no shortage in either number or variety of ills to threaten societies. 
In a world where societies will struggle to supply the basic necessities of 
life, the United States Department of Defense foresees nuclear arms proliferation 
as inevitable.
25
  The same conclusion was reached by an academic enquiry into 
the national security implications of abrupt climate change.
26
 Both enquiries 
suggest that if proliferation and climate problems are not tackled in a 
comprehensive manner, then one could impede solving the other. Providing 
countries continue to acquire nuclear power and nuclear weapons, arms races and 
threat perceptions could damage international relations and undermine co-
operative climate policies. Conversely, a deteriorating climate could undermine 
human and international security, incentivising the use of nuclear weapons to 
protect resources and interests.
27
  Under either scenario the world would beget a 
series of zero-sum conflicts of interest.
28
 
If conflicts in the past have been fought over access to food, water and 
living space – the essential elements of lebensraum – then in tomorrow‘s 
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congested world there can be little expectation that history will not repeat itself.
29
  
For states, the security problems of the future will revolve around how to make 
secure an increasingly fearful populace in a world of relentless climate change and 
ever greater competition for land and resources. Rather than turning to interstate 
warfare, states will instead turn towards exploiting those few remaining 
unexploited regions of the world over which state sovereignty is either absent or 
contested.  For all states, this will become an issue of survival. 
During this period the world will be also undergoing a transition from a 
single superpower to a multiplicity of great powers resulting in the replacement of 
today‘s single ―international community‖ by multiple ―communities‖ each centred 
on a great power. As a result of this transition, the rule-based international order 
that has served the traditional Western alliances well will come under increasing 
pressure as international institutions struggle to forge consensus amongst 
constituent member states.
30
 In an atmosphere of declining consensus existing 
international agreements, contracts and treaties may not be honoured, thus 
ultimately representing nothing more than waste paper.
31
 
By the year 2035, many of today‘s security complexes and shatterbelts are 
likely be of only historical significance, for the then contemporary security 
architecture, covering both global and regional domains, will be determined by 
the emerging great powers. New security complexes will be formed by 
securitisation of resources and the impact of climate change. As recognition grows 
over the dire consequences these issues represent, interstate relationships will 
deteriorate and antagonisms will establish shatterbelts where there were none 
previously.  Evidence of this metamorphosis is already present. 
Although in the past there have been notable political disagreements across 
the Cold War East-West divide, contemporary Arctic relations have been 
amicable and stable. These harmonious relations have lead one commentator to 
postulate that the region can reliably be called a ―zone of peace.‖32 The same 
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commentator also surmises that the Arctic region could readily evolve into a 
regional security complex comprised of peaceable states
33– a security community. 
However, this sanguine view is not shared by the Head of Norway‘s Northern 
Regional Command, who argues that the simultaneous presence of unsettled 
borders, natural resources and armed forces ―has proved definitely not to be the 
right recipe for peace.‖34 
The geostrategic importance of the Arctic Ocean region will be determined 
primarily by the countries that have the most to gain or lose from a changed 
climate over the High North. In the immediate post-Cold war era (1991) these 
states established the Arctic Council – comprised of the five Arctic littoral states 
plus Finland and Sweden – and although this institution has no responsibility for 
regional security, it is the principal organisation for resolution of regional 
problems. Today, however, the future of the Arctic appears less likely to be 
decided by the Arctic Council than by a recently established (2010) ‗Arctic Club,‘ 
the membership of which is restricted to the five littoral states. Meetings of this 
select group are not open to observers from Arctic ‗near-abroad‘ states or 
representatives from the region‘s indigenous peoples.  Establishment of this forum 
has bred suspicion amongst the excluded states as to the motive behind its 
formation.  All suspect that the Arctic Club is planning to divide the Arctic‘s 
mineral wealth amongst themselves.
35
 
Anxiety over the intentions of the Arctic Club has served to heighten 
concerns amongst all Arctic states as to the territorial ambitions of their near 
neighbours – particularly Russia –for it is the Arctic states themselves that pose 
the greatest threat to regional security. A lesser, but ever present threat to peace 
comes from those extra-regional states, i.e. China, Japan, and South Korea, along 
with the European Union, which maintain an interest in exploiting the region‘s 
hydrocarbon potential. Through a reluctance to commit political and military 
resources to the region the United States has by default permitted Russia to 
strategically dominate the Arctic.  Any attempt by the United States to remedy 
this situation will not be achieved without increasing tensions throughout the 
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Arctic and the wider region.   On the question of outer continental shelf (the Area) 
delimitations, it would be in the mutual interest of all five littoral states to co-
ordinate their submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS) in order to prevent protracted conflicts – both inside and outside of 
courts.
36
 However, in a unilateral move to secure immediate sovereignty over the 
regions resource wealth Russia has signalled its intention to file an independent 
claim with the CLCS to annex 380,000 square miles of Arctic seabed that lies 
beyond its Exclusive Economic Zone.
37
 
The rise of Russian influence within the Arctic is eliciting different 
responses from each side of the Atlantic Ocean. The Europeans, particularly the 
Scandinavians, are discussing securing their northern borders by creating a new 
regional institution, a mini-NATO alliance, responsible for keeping an eye on 
Polar bears and Russians.
38
 Canada has cautioned against such a development on 
the grounds that it will only antagonize Russia and exacerbate existing interstate 
tensions.  It would also serve to increase the influence of two NATO member 
states – Great Britain and France – in a region where according to the Canadian 
Prime Minister, ―they don‘t belong.‖39 Moreover, the Canadians are resentful of 
increased European participation in the Arctic since European Arctic policies 
generally run counter to Canadian interests.
40
 
These geopolitical tensions exaggerate existing security anxieties harboured 
by most, if not all, Arctic states.
41
 Claims and counter-claims to sovereignty over 
Arctic resources are shaping the region‘s geostrategic environment. Societal 
pressure on states to secure hydrocarbon resources can result in autarchic 
behaviour that would rapidly transform the Arctic into a petroleum supra-complex 
spanning three continents. The presence of two previously antagonistic 
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superpowers – Russia and the United States – within this complex will, if their 
relations outside of the Arctic deteriorate, create a shatterbelt and ultimately bring 
the region to a state of war. War is also a probable outcome should Arctic 
countries contrive to deny non-Arctic great powers sovereignty over resources 
within the Area. If the Arctic was ever a zone of peace that time is quickly 
passing, for as enmity supplants amity Arctic states must prepare themselves for a 
series of zero-sum conflicts of interest. 
The Arctic provides a window through which to view Antarctica‘s future. 
The existing treaty regime cannot indefinitely shield Antarctica from the 
consequences of a world facing a burgeoning population, a rising middle class, 
climatic change and scarcity of natural resources. By mid-century individual great 
powers, coerced by necessity, will seek to exploit Antarctica and in so doing 
become embroiled in numerous resource initiated imbroglios. As competition and 
animosity grow more intense the prospect of Antarctica being transformed into a 
shatterbelt correspondingly increases. Under this scenario the future appears bleak 
for, like the Arctic, Antarctica appears destined to become a locus of restricted 
resource conflicts. 
Yet, there is another scenario, equally as bleak, the result of the Treaty 
failing and thereby facilitating the division of Antarctica into discrete sovereign 
territories: each being the dominion of an extra-regional neo-imperialistic great 
power. Under this scenario the existing territorial claims in Antarctica would 
immediately be declared void through a lack of international recognition. 
Although appalling to contemplate, the division of Antarctica among great powers 
is not improbable given that de-jure Antarctica remains international territory. 
This scenario is also predicated on the certainty that deposits in exploitable 
quantities of minerals will be discovered, which would collapse the Treaty and set 
the territorial division mechanism in motion. Such a division is already being 
discussed by Russian commentators.
42
 As was the case thirty years ago when 
anticipation of mining Antarctica was at a zenith,
43
 the very notion of territorially 
dividing Antarctica will spark the last great land rush on earth.  
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In the ensuing turmoil it is unlikely that parties to the existing treaty regime 
could enforce any rules on states not parties to the Antarctic Treaty or 
supplementary conventions. Many of the future great powers which would have 
an interest in exploiting Antarctic are not Claimant, Consultative, or Non-
Consultative Treaty member states.  Equally in doubt is whether the current 
unanimity among Treaty member states not to exploit Antarctica will continue 
when each is faced with a choice, rooted in self-interest, of retaining or 
dismantling the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. 
Dismantle this protocol and the Treaty will unravel. 
Given that the Arctic is likely to become a contested militarized region once 
excavation of minerals begins, it is conceivable that the same fate awaits 
Antarctica once its mineral wealth is validated and countries stake claims to the 
last frontier.
44
 The militarisation of Antarctica would present all six Southern 
Oceanic Rim States with a security problem unlike any they have confronted in 
the past sixty years. 
Antarctica would be transformed into a security complex shaped by a union 
of countries with a shared interest in resource exploitation, but vastly different 
political ideologies and strategic objectives. For that reason, a security complex is 
probably just a transitory stage towards the formation of a shatterbelt.  Hence the 
Southern Ocean will come to represent a common theatre of maritime operations 
for all Southern Oceanic Rim States. Under such circumstances their defence 
community of interest would be best served through a security alliance: an austral 
treaty organisation which could be a contemporary interpretation of the proposed 
1980s South Atlantic Treaty Organisation.  Although this new alliance would 
involve non-traditional security partners, geography is the ultimate determiner of 
all communities of interest and thereby alliance membership. 
The confluence of numerous disparate issues discussed in this thesis make 
geopolitical changes in both Polar Regions inevitable. With change comes the 
possibility of security transformations; the Arctic into a security complex and 
Antarctica into a shatterbelt. Furthermore, the ‗transition world‘ will likely lack 
the necessary political cohesion to prevent either region from sliding into 
‗resource‘ anarchy. Under this reality, austral states as unprepared as New 
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Zealand have little time, probably no more than twenty years, to shed their 
lethargy towards their own southern defence and embark upon a capability 
enhancement programme commensurate with securing their sub-polar border. 
Prevarication, when faced with such a disagreeable outlook, could be a tempting, 
but totally unrealistic option to indulge for the future has a tendency to 
remorselessly overwhelm those who procrastinate. 
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